Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 10 June - 31 July 1917, Part 17

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I would accordingly submit :-

1. That while the 9th. Brigade is fit for a short 
intense effort if necessary, their physical

condition is not such as would allow of their

standing well against a prolonged period of strain.

2. That this Brigade will require eighteen (18) days 

rest when relieved.

These two recommendations are made tentatively 

and are open to review.

I do not consider a complete breakdown of the

men imminent.

Arthur T. White

COLONEL

A. D. M. S.

JMA/FGL.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Cases of Sickness admitted to and evacuated from Field

Ambulances - By Brigades (each Brigade includes,

Four Battalions, Machine Gun Coy. & T.M.Btty.

Cases admitted to Field Ambulances.

Cases evacuated to C.C.S. from Field Ambulances.

Cases admitted to Fld. Amb.
Diagram - see original document

Cases of Sickness
Evacuated to Cas. Clg. Stns.
Diagram - see original document

28/7/17
8 L.G sections in each
line, - on yellow & green
lines - of 9^th Bde to
remain in for night 29/30
& 30/31 - Cannan will relieve
them by daylight 31 - replacing
them temporarily by a similar [[nucleus?]]
for E & F B^ns (40^th Bde) who
will, in turn be relieved by 42^nd & 43^rd
after they have rested.
p.t.o.

25% of Howitzer smoke )
on Brown barrage.          )

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
29th July, 1917. -
CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM No. 61.
BURIALS

1. It must be distinctly understood that the
responsibility for burial (identification, and
disposal of personal effects) rests with the
O.C. Unit who appoints his Office in charge of
burial parties.
2. The importance of leaving identification
on bodies until they are actually being buried
must be impressed on all ranks, as bodies have
been found by burial parties completely stripped
of all means of identification.
3. Units should regularly inspect the identity
discs of men to ensure that they are correct.
H.N. FARMAR, Lieut-Colonel
A.A. & Q.M.G. 3rd Australian Division.
A.D.C.

 PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,
Divisional Headquarters,
30/7/17.
My dear Jobson.
My duties involve many painful and disagreeable tasks,
but none more so than that which I now feel compelled to take. -
Out of motives of sincere regard, I wish to adopt the course of
writing to you, in a personal way, in terms of the utmost candour,
and without any reserve.
Briefly, then, I have regretfully come to the conclusion
that the stress of the last few weeks has told so heavily upon you,
that it has seriously impaired your efficiency as a Brigade Commander.
- and, having regard to the prospect that this stress is likely to
become ever more severe, I have had to decide whether I would be
justified in allowing you to carry on.
I should much prefer, as between you and me, to do no
more than thus to give expression to my conclusions, without stating
any reasons, but I feel that it is due to you that I should mention
at least some of them.-
My adverse opinion was really finally formed at and
since the conference at my Headquarters, on July 24th. - You are
possibly unaware of it, but it is none the less a regrettable fact,
which did not and could not escape the notice of a number of junior
officers present at the conference, that you were then in a 
thoroughly unnerved state. - You said, and in spite of my efforts to stop
you, reiterated things which were a plain index of the fact that
you had lost control of the situation and of yourself. - It made
the worst possible impression upon me, and, I fear, upon others. - In
regard to this particular incident. I feel I need not be more specific. -
But this occurrence illuminated what I have previously had
reason to suspect, that you had not succeeded, during your recent
tour in the line (admittedly under somewhat arduous conditions) in
exercising strong and determined command and leadership, and in preserving 
an optimistic influence. - The unredeemed failure of two

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30/7/17.
minor offensives, the muddle about the heavy artillery shoots,
the subservience of your views to those of your subordinates, and
your disposition to magnify, instead of to minimise, your
difficulties, and the supposed stress on your troops, are only
minor evidences, but all pointing in the same direction.
You must realise that, in the case of a higher
Commander, one looks for the very reverse of such a frame of mind;
and, backed as he always is by the full weight and influence of
higher authority, he should be the last man of his whole command
to become disorganised, or to let others plainly perceive that he
has.
Consider the consequences upon his subordinates, and
upon the fighting value of his whole command. - I feel that I
need not elaborate this point of view to you. -
Frankly, I have lost confidence in your ability to see
this thing through, in a manner which will get the best value out
of the Brigade. I would like you to sincerely reflect whether,
in the light of what I have stated, you feel yourself justified in
continuing, at this critical stage of the war, to bear the 
responsibility 
of the command of a Brigade in the fighting line. -
I particularly do not wish to do anything harsh, and least
of all to have say anything officially which may reflect upon
you hereafter. - I think it is due to our 18 months' association
(I hope for you a pleasant one) that I should offer you the opportunity 
of yourself taking the initiative. - If, after reflection,
you feel disposed to do so, I shall be glad to help you in pointing
the way. -
Yours sincerely,

 PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,
Divisional Headquarters,
30/7/17.
My dear Jobson
My duties involve many painful and disagreeable tasks,
but none more so than that which I now feel compelled to take. -
Out of motives of sincere regard, I wish to adopt the course of
writing to you, in a personal way, in terms of the utmost candour,
and without any reserve.
Briefly, then, I have regretfully come to the conclusion
that the stress of the last few weeks has told so heavily upon you,
that it has seriously impaired your efficiency as a Brigade Commander
- and, having regard to the prospect that this stress is likely to
become ever more severe, I have had to decide whether I would be
justified in allowing you to carry on.
I should much prefer, as between you and me, to do no
more than thus to give expression to my conclusions, without stating
any reasons, but I feel that it is due to you that I should mention
at least some of them.-
My adverse opinion was really finally formed at and
since the conference at my Headquarters, on July 24th. - You are
possibly unaware of it, but it is none the less a regrettable fact,
which did not and could not escape the notice of a number of junior
officers present at the conference, that you were then in a thoroughly 
unnerved state. - You said, and in spite of my efforts to stop
you, reiterated things which were a plain index of the fact that
you had lost control of the situation and of yourself. - It made
the worst possible impression upon me, and, I fear, upon others. - In
regard to this particular incident. I feel need not be more specific. -
But this occurrence illuminated what I have previously had
reason to suspect, that you had not succeeded, during your recent
tour in the line (admittedly under somewhat arduous conditions) in
exercising strong and determined command and leadership, and in preserving 
an optimistic influence. - The unredeemed failure of two