General, Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 19, 23 June - 7 July 1918 - Part 14

General Plumer

2^nd Army.
Your kind message much appreciated

by all troops of this Corps and General

Monash

Austn. Corps

adg 26

1.5 PM

5/7/18

6/7/18 88      Army form C, 2123.

(In books of 100.)

“O” FORM.

MESSAGESAND SIGNALS. No of Message

Prefix…. Code….Words			Received From ?? By ??	Sent, or sent out. At …..m To……….. By…….	Office Stamp. AUU 6.V111.18 TELEGRAPHS
Service instructions
Handed in at East St?? Office W/D m. Received 12.56pm.
To	General Sir John Monash Australian Army Corps France
* Sender’s Number.		Day of month.		In reply to Number.	AAA

In company with Mr 

Lloyd George and General

Rawlinson today saw several 

hundred of Prisoners taken by 

Australian Troops in Battle before 

Hamel Rowlinson expressed to me

the opinion that the operation

was a brilliant piece of work

please convey this to troops. 

 

 

FROM  PLACE & TIME

W. M Hughes

* This line should be erased if not required.

(19629) Wt528/M1970. 300,000 Pads. 4/17. M^cC. & Co., Ltd. (E1213).

 

6/7/18

88       Army form C, 2123.

(In books of 100.)

“O” FORM.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.                 

No of Message……….

Prefix Sm Code KH?? Words			Received From DAP By coll	Sent, or sent out. At …..m To……….. By…….	Office Stamp. AUO 6.VII.18
Service instructions
Handed in at East Strand  Office 1040am m. Received 12.56 pm.
To	General Sir John Monash Australian Army Corps France
* Sender’s Number.		Day of month.		In reply to Number.	AAA

In company with Mr 

Lloyd George and General

Rawlinson today Saw several

Hundreds of Prisoners taken by 

Australian Troops in Battle before

Hamel Rawlinson expressed to me

the opinion that the operation 

was a Brilliant piece of work

please convey this to Troops 

 

 

FROM  PLACE & TIME

W. M Hughes

* This line should be erased if not required.

(19629) Wt528/M1970. 300,000 Pads. 4/17. M^cC. & Co., Ltd. (E1213.  

	KILLED HAMEL OFFENSIVE						6/7/18
//  Moon up 7.18 TIME	2nd Div		3rd Div		4th Div
	OFF   3	O.R’S   39	OFF	O.R’S	OFF   4	OR’S   20	7	59
Noon 4-7-18
" 5-7-18	1	11	4	17	4	50	9	78
" 6-7-18	-	6	-	3	-	5	-	14
							16	151
					o/pth DW 07 Rh
				4/7/18	3	22
				5/7/18	2	8
				6/718	2	19
6/7/18

6/7/18

BGGS Draft for a "G" Circular         D R A F T.

An incident occurred on the 6th instant, on the Corps Front,

which aptly illustrates the many opportunities which occur for the

rapid exploitation of a successful Battle.

A hostile post South of VAIRE WOOD was observed to be occupied, 

and was engaged by our troops in the front line with rifle grenades. -

One of our men went forward to examine the post and found it occupied.

He was seen and, although the enemy showed a little fight, he was they were

quickly disposed of.- With the aid of a few hand grenades, he ^ our men sub-

dued the post and personally took prisoner the whole garrison, con-sisting of 1 officer and 12 other ranks and brought them back to our  

lines.--- On examination of these prisoners, they showed ^ to a striking 

degree the state of utter demoralisation to which the enemy troops

had been brought as the result of our operation. = It was difficult

to imagine men exhibiting greater dejection and a poorer morale than

these prisoners.- They had been sent forward aimlessly ^ assit in to forming a

sort of outpost line to cover the remainder of their Battalion.-

They had been left without food or water and utterly cut off, not 

knowing either our situation or that of their own troops.- They were

indeed quite helpless and fell an easy prey to our enterprise and

pressure.

Examination of other prisoners disclosed how hopelessly mixed

the enemy units became as the result of our attack, small posts being cut off and left without rations or means of communication, owing to the harassing fire of our artillery.- This confusion was not 

/continued...

confined to t he immediate area where the battle was fought, but extended to a considerable distance behind the enemy's most forward troops.

The Corps Commander desires that these considerations occurrences should be 

brought to the notice of the Regimental Officers, in order to stimu-

late them to spare no effort, immediately after a Battle, to exploit 

our successes to the utmost by the incessant harassing of the enemy

and the mopping up of small posts. - By judiciously seizing 

opportunities, by energy and enterprise, and by bold action, the 

fruits of a victory such as that of July 4th can almost always be

largely extended without appreciable cost to ourselves.- The 

Corps Commander hopes that, under similar circumstances in the 

future, all front line Commanders will be animated with this spirit

of enterprise.- P the only safeguard which most must, however, be at all

times ^be insisted upon, is that the artillery covering the sector must be kept fully advised as to any patrolling enterprises, so that 

no unnecessary risks are taken as regards our own men. 

			7/7/18
2	3	4	5
?? of operations 8th ?? & prob date Further exploitation Secrecy Du.. an extra week Are all Hangars ours	Tank training (not 11th) C.C.S trouble Possible shortening Of front Exploitation in  Somme re-entrant Medal presentation Date of reply – 13th  Replacing Vasey	Exploitation –  Probably shortening of front	Exploiting S flank Probable shortening of Corps front. Lt Col. Clarke Proposed operation

Secret

2  7/7/18

Fourth Army.

Monument Wood Offensive

1. Here under is an ^ I beg to submit in outline ? a plan for ?? offensive action to the south 

of Villiers-Bretonneux, involving the capture of territory ground on a frontage of ^ about 4000 yards, to an average depth of 700 yards ^ east of Villiers Bretonneux. - It is 

submitted, however, that this plan should be considered only as the first stage of a larger ^ comprehensive operation designed to effect to eliminate the enemy salient lying 

to the east of Cachy and Villiers-Bretonneux.- In view of the fact that

As it may be very difficult satisfactorily to arrange for synchronised 

action by this Corps and the 31^st French Corps d' Armeē, it is suggested

that the objectives proposed for the respective Corps should be considered

together i.e. as a complete operation; but that the carrying out of the task

proposed for this Corps should take place first in order of time, the action 

of the French Corps (being ^ which would be thereby be greatly facilitated) following after a 

very short interval of time.-

2. It is further pointed out that action by this Corps alone, without the any 

subsequent action by the French, would form for us an awkward, &

in some aspects, as very undesirable salient; disadvantages which 

would largely counteract the advantages to us of the proposed operations.

3. The advantages to us are:-

(a) shortening and straightening of our line

(b) deepening our defences east of Villiers Bretonneux

(c) ejecting the enemy from the remainder of the high ground

which he still holds in P.31 (hill 105)

(d) maintenance of our initiative.

4. Accompanying map shows:-

(a) in black, approximate present British and French front line. 

(b) in red, proposed final objective for Australian Corps, in the 

first stage

(c) in blue, proposed final objective for the French Corps, in 

the second stage.-

5. The red objective will involve the capture of the Monument and Wood

and the ^remai higher ground in P3 remainder of Hill 105 in P.31

and P. 26.- The new frontage will be 4550 yards, until 

the completion of the second stage, when it will be reduced to 3000 yds.

A temporary encroachment of about 150 yards upon ^& south of the French Corps tactical boundary is also involved.-

6. The red objective task will involve the employment of one Brigade of 

Infantry ^ of the Second Austr. Division with three Battalions in first line, and one Battalion in

immediate support of the Monument Wood flank.- An addit-

ional Battalion of the 2nd Division would be placed at the disposal

of the attacking Brigadier, as a Reserve to deal with ^ any unexpected

eventuality emergency. The Brigade allotted for this task to be the 5th

Aust. Brigade, (Brig. Gen. Martin).- This Brigade is at present

in the line.-

7. In view of the occurrence of an inter-divisional relief in B Division

sector, of the fact that one ^other Brigade of the Second Division was employed

in the battle of July 4 & urgently requires a few days rest, & of the fact

that at least 4 days will be required to prepare the 5th Brigade for 

the operation, it is thought considered that the operation cannot take place 

before July 15; but that it would be better to plan it to take place

not earlier than on July 17, so that proper coordination of all arms can be ?? assured.-

8. It is proposed ^ again to empty Tanks, in order to reduce casualties to the 

Infantry. In view of the necessity for secrecy, this matter has not yet

been discussed with the Tank Brigade, but It is thought considered that one

Battalion of Tanks should be held in readiness for employment, in-

cluding supports & reserves, and counterattack tanks.- Probably 21 or 

24 Tanks will be sufficient in the actual advance with the Infantry.

9. It is also proposed to employ a normal advancing artillery

Barrage. The frontage will require 9 Brigades of Field Artillery, all of 

which could, if indisposable obligatory, be provided from Corps resources, but 

the loan of 2 Brigades of Field Artillery from Army resources would 

materially simplify the Artillery dispositions, and save obviate any en-

croachment upon the normal Artillery defences of the Corps. 

10. All other subsidiary arrangements would be on normal lines, i.e.

Counterbattery work, M.G. barrages, use of smoke, employment of

aircraft tc tc.- None of these matters could present any 

difficulty.

11. Very special attention will have to be given to the working out of

plans in order to ?? disguise our preparations, and to conceal ^during battle the

actual frontage of the attack, so as with a view to dislocating the enemy Artillery 

reaction.- It is hoped that, in this, moved expedients will support

themselves, after fuller consideration of the matter.-

12. As, in view of the necessity for secrecy, I have refrained from discussing 

these proposals, in detail, with any of ?? my Subordinate Commanders con-

cerned, they must be regarded, for the present, as tentative only, &

subject to modification in detail.-

Lt Gen