General Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 19, 4 June - 24 June 1918, Part 11

HEADQUARTERS,

AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

No S/4671

S E C R E T.

G.

Australian Corps.

21st June, 1918.

Fourth Army.

HAMEL OFFENSIVE

1. With reference to proposals for an offensive operation on the

   front of the "A" and "B" Divisions of this Corps, with a view to the

   capture of HAMEL Village and VAIRE and HAMEL WOOD, etc, the accompanying

   map shows, in blue, the proposed ultimate objective line. This

   line has been chosen as representing the minimum operation that would

   appear to be worth undertaking, while offering a prospect of substantial

   advantages.

2. These advantages may be briefly summarised thus :-

   (a) Straightening of our line. 

   (b) Shortening of our line.

   (c) Deepening our forward defensive zone, particularly east of

   Hill 105.

   (d) Improvement of jumping off position for future operations.

   (e) Advancement of our artillery, south of the SOMME.

   (f) Denial to enemy of observation of ground near VAUX-sur-SOMME,

   valuable for battery positions.

   (g) Facilitating subsequent further minor advances North of the

   SOMME.

   (h) Disorganisation of enemy defences.

   (i) Disorganisation of possible enemy offensive preparations.

   (j) Inflicting losses on enemy personnel and material.

   (k) Improvement of our observation.

   (l) Maintenance of our initiative on this Corps front.

3. The disadvantages are those arising from the necessity of

   bringing into rapid existence a new defensive system on a frontage

   of 7,000 yards and also the particular incidence, at the present

   juncture, of the inevitable losses, small or large, of such an

   operation in this Corps.

4. In view of the unsatisfactory position of Australian reinforcements,

   any substantial losses would precipitate the time when the

   question of reduction in the number of Australian Divisions would

   have to be seriously considered. It is for higher authority to

   decide whether a portion of the present resources in Australian

   man-power in this Corps would be more profitably ventured upon such

   an operation as this, which is in itself a very attractive proposition

   rather than to conserve such resources for employment elsewhere.

5.  Detailed plans can only be prepared after I have had conferences

   with representatives of all Arms and Services involved, but

   the following proposals are submitted as the basis of further

   elaboration :-

   (a) The operation will be primarily a tank operation - at least

   one and preferably two Battalions of Tanks to be employed.

   (b) The whole battle front will be placed temporarily under

   command of one Divisional Commander - by a temporary readjustment

   of inter-Divisional boundaries.

   (c) The infantry employed will comprise one Division plus a Brigade

   i.e. 4 Infantry Brigades totalling say 7500 bayonets; about

   one half of this force to be employed in the advance and the

   Other half/---

    

    

   5. (c) (Contd.)

   other half to hold our present front defensively taking over the

   captured territory within 48 hours after Zero.

   (d) The action will be designed on lines to permit of the Tanks

   effecting the capture of the ground, the roles of the

   Infantry following the Tanks will be :-

   (i) to assist in reducing strong points and localities.

   (ii) to "mop up"

   (iii) to consolidate the ground captured.

   (e) Apart from neutralising all enemy artillery likely to engage

   our troops our artillery will be employed to keep under fire

   enemy centres of resistence and selected targets, - in front

   of the advance of the tanks. Artillery detailed for close

   targets will work on a prearranged and detailed time table

   which will be adjusted to the time table of the Tank and

   Infantry advance.

   Except for this, no advancing barrage time-table is proposed.

   Sufficient "silent" field artillery supplied before the

   battle should be emplaced in advanced positions, to ensure

   an effective protective barrage to cover consolidation on the

   blue line, and to engage all localities from which enemy

   counter attacks can be launched. It is estimated that,

   in addition to the resources of the Corps, four Field Artillery

   Brigades will be required, for say 4 days in all.

   (f) Engineer stores in sufficient quantities to provide for the

   complete organisation of the new defences will require to

   be dumped beforehand as far forward as practicable.

   (g) No additional Machine guns, outside of Corps resources will

   be required.

   (h) Contact and Counter-attack planes and low flying bombing

   planes prior to and during advance must be arranged for.

   (i) Artillery and Mortar smoke to screen operations from view

   of all ground North of the SOMME in the SAILLY LAURETTE

   locality are required.

6. As to the date of the operations, the necessary preparations

   will occupy at least 7 days after authority to proceed has been

   given. As an inter-divisional relief is planned to occur on

   June 28/29th and 29/30th, it would seem that this operation

   cannot take place earlier than the first week in July. The postponement

   of this relief would not be desirable for several reasons.

7. Valuable training in the joint action of Tanks and Infantry

   can be arranged probably in the territory west of the HALLUE

   Valley, - provided that one or two Tank Companies can be detached

   for such a purpose. Thorough liaison prior to and during the

   operation between all tank and all infantry commanders would have

   to be a special feature. For this reason only Infantry units

   not in the line can be considered as available too undergo the

   necessary preparations.

   J.M.

   Lieut-General,

   Commanding Australian Corps.

    

    

   SECRET

   G.

   Australian Corps,

   21st June, 1918.

   G.O.C., 4th Australian Division.

   1. - With reference to the proposed operation for the

   capture of HAMEL and the ridge south and east of the village, please

   find attached - 

   (a) Letter from G.O.C. Australian Corps to Fourth Army laying

   down the general nature and scope of the proposed

   operation (with map).

   (b) Proposals of G.O.C. 5th Tank Brigade for the employment

   of tanks in the operation (with map).

   2. - It is proposed that 4th Australian Division should

   carry out the operation with an additional brigade from the

   Division in reserve when the operation is carried out.

   The Corps Commander desires you to consider the

   operation and to submit your proposals for -

   (a) The infantry plan of operations:

   (b) The co-operation of tanks and infantry:

   (c) Artillery co-operation.

   3. - It is intended to hold a conference on or about

   the 23rd instant to consider details as far as possible.

   JB

   Brigadier-General,

   General Staff,

   Australian Corps.

   Copy to :- G.O.C.,R.A.

    

   [*GOC's File*]

    

    

8.

S E C R E T

G.

Australian Corps.

21st June, 1918.

Fourth Army.

HAMEL OFFENSIVE

1. With reference to _∧my proposals for an offensive operation on the

   front of the "A" and "B" Divisions of this Corps, with a view to the

   capture of HAMEL Village and VAIRE and HAMEL WOOD, etc, the accompanying

   map shows, in blue, the proposed ultimate objective line. This

   line has been chosen as representing the minimum operation that would

   appear to be worth undertaking, while offering a prospect of substantial

   advantages.

2. These advantages may be briefly summarised thus :-

   (a) Straightening of our line.

   (b) Shortening of our line.

   (c) Deepening our forward defensive zone, particularly east of

   Hill 105.

   (d) Improvement of jumping off position for future operations.

   (e) Advancement of our artillery, south of the SOMME.

   (f) Denial to enemy of observation of ground near VAUX-sur-SOMME,

   valuable for battery positions.

   (g) Facilitating subsequent further minor advances North of the

   SOMME.

   (h) Disorganisation of enemy defences.

   (i) Disorganisation of possible enemy offensive preparations.

   (j) Inflicting losses on enemy personnel and material.

   (k) Improvement of our observation.

   (l) Maintenance of our initiative on this Corps front.

3. The disadvantages are those arising from the necessity of

   bringing into rapid existence a new defensive system on a frontage

   of 7,000 yards and also the particular incidence, at the present

   juncture, of the inevitable losses, small or large, of such an

   operation in this Corps.

4. In view of the unsatisfactory position of Australian reinforcements,

   any substantial losses would precipitate the time when the

   question of the reduction in the number of Australian Divisions would

   have to be seriously considered. It is for higher authority to

   decide whether a portion of the present resources in Australian

   man-power in this Corps would be more profitably ventured upon such

   an operation as this, which is in itself a very attractive proposition

   rather than to conserve such resources for employment elsewhere.

5.  Detailed plans can only be prepared after I have had conferences

   with representatives of all Arms and Services involved, but

   the following proposals are submitted as the basis of further

   elaboration :-

   (a) The operation will be primarily a tank operation - at least

   one and preferably two Battalions of Tanks to be employed.

   (b) The whole battle front will be placed temporarily under

   command of one Divisional Commander - by a temporary readjustment

   of inter-Divisional boundaries.

   (c) The infantry employed will comprise one Division plus a Brigade

   i.e. 4 Infantry Brigades totalling say 7500 bayonets; about

   one half of this force to be employed in the advance and the

   Other half/---

    

    

    

   9 & 10.

   5. (c) (Contd.)

   other half to hold our present front defensively taking over the

   captured territory within 48 hours after Zero.

   (d) The action will be designed on lines to permit of the Tanks

   effecting the capture of the ground, the roles of the

   Infantry following the Tanks will be :-

   (i) to assist in reducing strong points and localities.

   (ii) to "mop up"

   (iii) to consolidate the ground captured.

   (e) Apart from neutralising all enemy artillery likely to engage

   our troops our artillery will be employed to keep under fire

   enemy centres of resistence and selected targets, - in front

   of the advance of the tanks. Artillery detailed for close

   targets will work on a prearranged and detailed time table

   which will be adjusted to the time table of the Tank and

   Infantry advance.

   Except for this, no advancing barrage time-table is proposed.

   Sufficient "silent" field artillery supplied before the

   battle should be emplaced in advanced positions, to ensure

   an effective protective barrage to cover consolidation on the

   blue line, and to engage all localities from which enemy

   counter attacks can be launched. It is estimated that,

   in addition to the resources of the Corps, four Field Artillery

   Brigades will be required, for say 4 days in all.

   (f) Engineer stores in sufficient quantities to provide for the

   complete organisation of the new defences will require to

   be dumped beforehand as far forward as practicable.

   (g) No additional Machine guns, outside of Corps resources will

   be required.

   (h) Contact and Counter-attack planes and low flying bombing

   planes prior to and during advance must be arranged for.

   (i) Artillery and Mortar smoke to screen _∧the operations from view

   of all ground North of the SOMME in the SAILLY LAURETTE

   locality are required.

6. As to the date of the operations, the necessary preparations

   will occupy at least 7 days after authority to proceed has been

   given. As an inter-divisional relief is planned to occur on

   June 28/29th and 29/30th, it would seem that this operation

   cannot take place earlier than the first week in July. The postponement

   of this relief would not be desirable for several reasons.

7. Valuable training in the joint action of Tanks and Infantry

   can be arranged probably in the territory west of the HALLUE

   Valley, - provided that one or two Tank Companies can be detached

   for such a purpose. Thorough liaison prior to and during the

   operation between all tank and all infantry commanders would have

   to be a special feature. For this reason only Infantry units

   not in the line can be considered as available too undergo the

   necessary preparations.

   (Signed) John Monash

   Lieut-General,

   Commanding Australian Corps.

 

SECRET

To Company

Aus Corps S/4671

 

Map - see original document

 

SECRET

To Company Aust. Corps S/4671

 

Map - see original document

 

D.A.G.

10/567

A.I.F.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

Headquarters, A.I.F.,

Attached Australian Corps,

22nd June, 1918.

Lieut-General Sir John Monash, K.C.B., V.D.

With reference to my memo 10/567 of 14th May,

1918 forwarding schedule of applications received from

officers of the A.I.F. for appointment to commissions

in the Permanent Military Forces for consideration by the

special committee appointed for that purpose, attached

herewith is schedule of applications since received and

it is asked that they be considered along with the

others.

HD Wynter Lt Col

for Brig-General.

D.A.G., A.I.F.

 

 

22/6/18

B.G.G.S.

Hamel Offensive

Proposals for Infantry available for the operation.

1. "C" Division to take over that portion of the "B" Division sector which lies North

of the Somme, 2 or 3 days prior to Zero, finding the Infantry & M.G's

requisite for that purpose. - Present Inter divisional boundaries to be

resumed after Zero day, - say 2 or 3 days - when decided by me in

accordance with the situation. - This will release 2 Battalions

& some M.G's for employment by 'b' Division. -

2. The 6th Brigade (Paton) in the one of the (future) 'A' Division nominated

by G.O.C. 2nd Div. as available to operate, in the offensive, on that portion

of the objective which is in the sector of "A" Division; - passing through

the 5th Brigade, which will then be in the line. - There is a suitable

Brigade H.Q. near the Railway in O.26 which is 'on the busy. - Probably

only 2 Bns of 6th Brigade will be required for occupation of objective

(xxx new frontage about 2300 yds)

3. On the frontage of 'B' Division, S. of Somme, there will thus be available

4 Brigades, i.e. the two line Brigades & the support Brigade _∧of 4th Div. & a

Brigade of the 3d Division. - G.O.C. 3d Div. will have to be asked to

nominate this Brigade, but it will probably have to be the 10th Bde -

which will be in support from June 23 onwards, & will therefore be the

only Brigade which can undertake training with Tanks.

4 Machine Guns. As 'B' Division cannot wholly dissolve its existing M.G.

defences, it will become a question for consideration whether the M.G.

Bn of the (then) support Division will have to be called upon

 

 

for assistance in xxx 'consolidating' the captured territory.

 

Above proposals should be discussed with G.O.C. 4th Div; if

he concurs, a time-table of _∧internal reliefs must be laid down,

counting from Zero day, to which all Divisions must conform, -

so that the particular troops designated for the operation

may be available for preparation & training, when required. -

 

J.M.

22/6/18