General, Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 18, 8 May - 25 May 1918, Part 4

Conflict:

First World War, 1914–18

Part of Quest:

Sir John Monash (General, b.1865 - d.1931)

Subject:

Documents and letters

Status:

Open to contributions

Accession number:

RCDIG0000630

Difficulty:

- 8 -

intervent in the fight by opening fire rapidly to a flank, even when

advancing, and will be a vital factor of protection against the

enemy's counter-attacks.

(d) Machine Gun follow the waves of attacking infantry advancing

in alternate sections by large "bounds", making every use of the ground

and taking up positions from which overhead or flanking fire can be

brought to bear on the enemy.

(e) The aim of the Machine Gun Commanders at all times must

be the production of the greatest possible fire power at those points

where the hostile infantry is fighting most vigourously, so as to assist

the progress of our infantry in the attack by bold and opportune

action.

(f) In the moving battle the Machine Guns should be so disposed

and so handled, that the largest possible number will automatically

intervene by fire at any point where out infantry is held up, being

attracted as it were, by the localities where our infantry meets the

greatest resistance.

(g) The engagement of Machine Guns in Divisional or Brigade Reserve,

should be governed by the tactical situation and the urgency

of breaking definitely the resistance of the enemy at certain points.

(h) When firing a defensive barrage the necessity of ensuring

that a sufficient supply of filled belts is always kept in reserve

for direct fire, and of being able to change quickly from indirect to

direct fire, and as when the tactical situation renders the necessary,

should be impressed on all ranks.

(j) Machine Guns disposed in depth have proved very effective

especially in place where they are placed in position before-hand,

or proceeded to emplacements allotted before-hand. The system of

leaving Machine Gun emplacement empty with no MachineGuns definitely

~~detat~~ allotted to them before-hand, but to be occupied by Machine Guns

detailed as the battle dictated, has ~~xxxx~~ proved unsatisfactory.

(k) Isolated Machine Guns with no means of retirement cannot be

expected to put up sufficiently protracted resistance; Machine Gun

emplacements should be connected by a Trench or Tunnell to trench

system and Machine Guns should be grouped in batteries of four or

in not less then pairs, under the command of an officer.

(sgd) W.H. ANDERSON.

Major-General.

General Staff, First Army.

First Army.

10th May 1918.

Appendix 'A'

TACTICAL ORANIZATION OF MACHINE GUNS.

1. The guns allotted tasks for the defence of the Divisional Sector are

divided into Classes as follows :-

Forward Guns vide S.S.192, Part 1.

Rear Guns --do--

Reserve Guns --do--

2. The forward and rear guns are allotted tasks for the active defence

of the Divisional Sector as a Whole. For purposes of control these guns

are formed into groups, each gun being commanded by a Machine Gun

Commander. Each Group Commander will have his headquarters in the

vicinity of the headquarters of the Brigade whose front his guns are

covering.

3. Each Group Commander will have under his Machine Gun Officers, who

control the forward and rear guns respectively.

The Group Commanderwill be in direct communication with those

officers, and also the Machine Gun Battalion Commander.

4. The O.C. Forward Guns will have his headquarters at the H.Q. of one

of the Infantry Battalions responsible for the defence of the front

system, and will maintain communication :-

(a) With the officer at the guns.

(b) With all Infantry Battalion Commanders whose battalion are

holding the Front System.

(d) With O.C. Rear Guns.

5. The O.C. Rear Guns will select his headquarters at the most

convenient point, ensuring communication with :-

(a) His batteries.

(b) O.C. Forward Guns.

6. The O.C. Reserve Guns will be in communication with the O.C., M.G.

Battalion.

7. Duties.

(a) M.G. Bn. Commander.

( i.) Is responsible to the Divisional Commander for the

tactical organization of his battalion. the/

(ii) Carries out through his Group Commanders orders of the

Divisional Commander.

(b) The Group Commander.

(i) Carries out the orders issued by the M.G. Bn Commander.

(ii) Carries out the wishes of the Brigade Commander, in

conformity with the Divisional M.G.Defence Scheme.

(iii) Ascertains through his O.C.Forward Guns any suggestions

for improving the Machine gun Defence Scheme. If these

suggestions are approved by the Brigade Commander he

will inform the M.G. Battalion Commander, In order that

they may be brought to the notice of the Divisional

Commander.

(i) Will keep the Infantry Battalion Commanders responsible

for the defence of the front system, Informed as regards

the tasks of his guns.

(ii) Carries out the orders of his Group Commander.

(iii) Acquaints the O.C. Rear Guns as regard the firing of

these guns, other than on S.O.S., In accordance with the

wishes of the Infantry battalion Commanders.

/(iv). . . . . .

-2-

(iv) Inform his Group Commander of any suggestions made by

the Infantry Battalion Commanders. (vide b. (iii).

(d) O.C. Rear guns.

(i) Carries out orders of his Group Commander.

(ii) Communication with the O.C. Forward Guns ar regards

opening and ceasing fire when the situation is obscure.

(e) O.C. Reserve Guns.

Carries out orders received xx from the Machine Gun

Battalion Commander.

8. Examples illustrating above :-

Front | Line

‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾

O.C.Forward | O.C. Forward Guns

o | o

| | |

O.C Rear Guns O.C. Rear Guns

o o

| |

Group Commander Group Commander.

o o

O.C Reserve Gun

Machine Gun Bn. Commander.

Example "A" An Infantry Battalion wishes fire brought to

bear on a particular target, He informs O.C. Forward

Guns, who decided whether the task is suitable to

Forward or Rear Guns. If the former, he gives the necessary orders.

If the latter, he informs O.C. Rear Guns as to requirements.

Example "B". A Brigade Commander wishes fire brought to bear on

a particular target or targets, He informs the

Machine Gun Group Commander who issues the necessary

orders, and if more fire is required than his gun can produce, he

informs the Machine Gun Battalion Commander who arranges accordingly.

9. Routine firing.

Is carried out under the orders of the Machine Gun Battalion

Commander in accordance with instructions from the Division. Those

orders are carried out by O.C.'s Forward and Rear Guns on orders issued by

Group Commanders.

The O.C.'s Forward Guns are responsible for informing Infantry

Battalion Commander holding the Front System as regards the details

of fire.

APPENDIX B.

EMERGENCY SYSTEMS OF DEFENCE

First Army

No.G.S.925/65

1. Siting of Defences.

1. The emergency system of defence in the First Army rearward area

will be constructed on the principles given below. It must be realised

that the object of the emergency system is to prevent a break through

by German infantry who have penetrated our forward defences, possibly

supported by Field Artillery but before the Heavy Artillery can be

brought up; or acurate registration on the system carried out. Consequently

the amin object must be to obtain as good a field of fire as possible

and develop a maximum of rifle, Lewis gun and machine gun fire.

Time for constructing dug-outs and elaborate shelters will not be available,

but weather shelters should be made, where possible, for men and

S.A.A.

2. In undulating country.

The system should consist of :-

(a) A front line cited in front of the crest in order to obtain

observation.

(b) The support line 150 to 250 yards behind the front line sited

in front of the crest in order to obtain observation and to

bring as heavy rifle fire as is possible to bear.

sited, if possible, on the reverse slope and out of view of

the enemy, with at least 200 yards field of fire.

A system consisting of a single trench behind a belt of wire is

useless.

The whole system will be joined up by communication trenches designed

so that they can be used as switches. Special attention must be paid to

the defence and obstruction of valleys up which the enemy constantly

works in his advance.

If the enemy brings up heavy artillery, the reserve line, if on the

reverse slope will become the main line of resistance, provieded

artillery observation is available from the flanks orrear.

3. In the flat and enclosed country of FLANDERS. full use must be made

of every village, house, wood, hedge, piece of broken ground, ditch, etc.,

and advantage should be taken of the possibilities this country

offers of concealing our defensive dispositions. The men must be taught

to realise the difference between the defence of houses, etc., before

the enemy has brought up guns, and when these are subject to Heavy

Artillery fire.

Lines of trenches or breastworks on the same principle as given in

para. 1. will be built as time permits. These lines should be flanked

and supported by fire from houses, woods etc, Streams, ditches and

enclosures must be wired to as to form distinct obstacles flanked by

fire from the defences.

11. Siting of Machine Gun Positions. (Note :- The references are to

S.S.192.- The employment of Machine Guns, Part 1. Tactical).

1.Principles.

The principles governing the siting of machine gun positions in

emergency systems differ materially from those laid down in S.S.192

Part 1. Chapter 111 of that publication deals definitely with the

FRONT SYSTEM of an elaborately prepared defensive position, when the

enemy is 'dug-in' and has had ample time for detailed observation

and for registration of heavy artillery and trench mortars. In this

case we are dealing with 'improvised defence' and Chapter VI must be

studied in this connection.

/The principles. . . . .

-2-

The principles governing the siting of machine guns laid down in

Section 32 should be carefully studied; but in the emergency system

these principles will approximate more closely to those for the defence

of a MAIN LINE OF DEFENCE, laid down in section 30.

2. Objects in View.

In siting Machine Guns for emergency defensive lines, the following

objects should be kept in view :-

(a) To strike the enemy with an intense volume of direct fire

at the earliest possible moment in his advance against the line so as

to inflict heavy casualties on him in the initial stages of his attack,

to disorganise that attack, and to delay it at long range for as long

as possible (see also Section 13 paras. 7 & 8).

(b) To simplify the taking up of their positions by machine gun

units which are falling back from more advanced positions, or coming

up from positions of readiness in rear.

cover the GROUND on which the enemy is likely to present the beat

targets, so as to use the KILLING EFFECT of machine gun fire to the

best advantage.

3. Methods of achieving the objects.

The methods of achieving the object put forward in the foregoing

are as follows :-

(a) As a gerneral rule the machine gun should be sited in batteries

for four guns, for the following reasons : -

(i) A complete tactical unit is then employed under the control

of it own officers for a definite task.

(ii) Four guns are the least number that can be relied on to

give the necessary volume of fire at long range to fulfil

the objects put forward in para. 2. (a) above.

(iii) Fire control and general supervision are simplified and

morals assisted.

(iv) Arrangements for the preparation, stocking and occupation

of the positions are amde easier; especially is this the case

when the positions have to take up hurriedly, or even

perhaps in the dark.

(v) The Section Officer has his guns close at hand, and

directly under his command. He can, therefore, more easily

and quickly advance, retire or otherwise change the

position of his battery, or of one or more guns of his

battery, should the tactical situation require him to do

so.

(b) The battery position should, as a rule, be sited close

in rear of the line, on commanding positions if possible

with a view to the following :-

(i) Direct observation, and fire, over the ground in front

of the foremost trench to be defended, if possible up to

1500 or 200 yards.

(ii) To kill the enemy who are advancing rather than aim at

merelydefending the trench line.

/ (iii). . . . . .

- 3 -

(iii) concealment from ground and air observation if possible

either by being placed in woods, scrub, etc., or behind strong walls.

If the guns so placed come under heavy artillery fire, they can be

move to other positions which should already have been selected.

(iv) At times, in order to get the necessary fire effect it may be

necessary to site the battery actually in or in front of the trench

itself, through this is naturally not desirable if it can be avoided.

4. Defence of Valleys and Spurs.

In view of the constant use of valleys by the enemy, special

attention should be given to covering the ground between spurs, and

the side slopes of the spurs themselves. Unless the ground is exceptionally
favourable, it is very difficult to cover the 'nose' of a

spur with machine gun fire without unnecessary exposure. This should

be left to the Infantry, with their Lewis guns. No attempt should be

made to cover all the ground with machine gun fire, but it should be

reserved for protection on a larger scale, as laid down in Section 13

para 6.

5. Defence in Depth.

The resources of men and material at the disposal of the Machine

Gun Corps do not admit of defence in great depth combined with the

ability to bring the greatest possible fore power to bear on the

ground in front pf the front trench to be defended. The latter must

therefore be the first consideration, and a re-adjustment in depth

should be carried out later (vide para 7 below).

6. Indirect fire.

The value of indirect fire must not be forgotten; it has the

following advantage :-

(a) It enables fire to be directed on targets which cannot be

seen by the firer owing to darkness, fog, smoke, etc.

(b) It enables guns situated in a rear line of defence to assist

with their fire the defence of a line situated further forward, in front

of which it is impossible for them to bring direct fire to bear.

even though that target is invisible from some of the battery

positions.

(d) It enables covering fire to be given to assist an attack or

counter-attack.

Guns laid dor direct should therefore also be equipped for

indirect fire should the need arise (Sec 15). But a definite proportion
of belts only should be allotted for indirect fire, which must be

regarded as secondary.

7. Re-adjustment.

If the enemy fails to capture the trench system and 'digs in' in

preparation for the deliberate attack, the conditions will at once change,

and the considerations involved will become those of the DEFENCE OF a

FRONT SYSTEM. In this case, dispositions must be altered to suit the

new conditions, and a system of machine gun defence in depth must be

arranged in conformity with the principles laid down in Chapter 3.

(sgd) O.H.L. NICHOLSON.

Lieut-Colonel.

for Major -General.

First Army.

1st May 1918

/Appendix "C". . . . . .

APPENDIX 'C'.

(1)

1. The attached letter G.H.O., M.G./2 dated 26/4/18 is forwarded

for information and necessary action.

2. The chief role of Machine Guns during a hostile attack is always

the killing of the enemy by direct fire.

But the value of indirect and barrage fire must not be forgotten,

and the constant training of the Machine Gun Corps in such fire consequently

neglected.

Machine Gun barrage and indirect fire required to give the

Infantry the fullest support in : -

(a) Attack, Counter-attack and Raids.

(b) Harassing fire on enemy's communications, billets and

assembly areas.

and defensive measures, as laid down in S.S. 192 Part 1.

3. Indirect fire from Machine Guns is especially valuable when the

available artillery support is limited; Chapter VI of S.S. 192 Part 1

should be studied in this connection.

It should be noted that the principles laid down are practically

identical with those advocated by the enemy for the employment of

heavy machine guns in the attack (vide 'Notes on Recent Fighting'

Numbers 3 and 6, issued by G.H.Q. 10th and 19th April).

(sgd) W.H. ANDERSON.

Major-General.

General Staff, First Army.

First Army.

2nd May 1918.

(2)

M.G./2.

In order to maintain an efficient standard of training in the use

and carrying out of Indirect fire, O.C. Battalions M.G.C. should, when

out of the line, make arrangements for short periods of instruction

for officers and N.C.Os in this subject daily.

would you please communicate this to Os.C. Battalions.

(sgd) A. RINDALL LUCAS

B.G., G.S.

Machine Guns

G.H.Q.

26/4/18.

11/5/18
G.O.C.

Capt C.A.Pyke Record of divisional work.

(1) Apptd. Camel Transport Officer 13.5.16

(Serapeum)

(2) Acting D A Q M G. 4^th.Aus. Divⁿ. 26.5.16 - 14.6.16.

(3) Attached Q. 4th Aus Divⁿ. 15.6.16 - 25.7.16

(4) Appointed D A Q M G. 3rd Aus. Div. 5.8.16

(5) " D A A G. " 4.9.17.
[*Only D.A.A.G
who is a Capt.*]
[*Several cases of
junior in A.S.C
in Egypt pass over*]
[*100's in A.I.F. & in complt.*}
[*A.P.M.
D.A.D.M.S.*]
officers senior as captains in A.A.S.C.

(Pyke's. substantive captaincy dates 15.10.15)
Temp Capt Oct 1/15

Capt W.O. Stevenson 1^st Div Train

" C. Reynolds 4^th Div. Train dud

" S. Walker 2^nd Div. Train. ? dud

" S.A. Robertson 4^th Div. Train good. - outdated
Pyke Capt before
he left

It is essential that the DAAG. of the Division should

be of field rank in order to give him status this

in his dealings with field officers. The A.P.M. who

comes directly under him as a 'Major

11/5/18

REJ

Lt Col.

HEADQUARTERS

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

66/180

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

Headquarters,

11th May, 1918.

My dear General.

Would you look through this and tell me whether

you think it would be workable. Please let me have your

suggestions for villages to be classed as "lootable" under para. 2.

R A Carruthers

Brig.-General,

D.A.& Q.M.G.

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters,

11th May, 1918. -

T O :-

THE OFFICERS AND MEN of the

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION. -

In publishing the accompanying appeal of the Major

and farmers of the Commune of BUSSY-les-DAOURS, I fully recognise

the difficulties, especially in areas from which the French inhabitants

have been evacuated; but I look to every officer and man of

the Division to do everything that is possible to help the poor unfortunate

French people in the trouble which have befallen them. -

The last thing any member of this Division would wish

to see is that the misfortunes of the French peasantry should be

aggravated by our carelessness or indifference. - I prefer to

appeal to the feelings of humanity and sympathy of the Australian

troops towards the unhappy French population, rather than to issue

disciplinary instructions on this matter. ^{. .}

I have sufficient confidence in the good feeling of

the troops to believe that such an appeal will influence them much

more strongly than any threat of disciplinary action. -

John Monash

Major-General.-

Commanding, Third Australian Division.
(WEB).

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