General, Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 18, 8 May - 25 May 1918, Part 3

Headquarters,

Fourth Army,

May 10 '  1918.

 

Dear Monash.

The paragrah in the intelligence Summary

of the 9^th May caused me more annoyance
I expect even than it did you.   Of course
it was not meant to be a reflection on your
Divn as I am sure you know, but it should never
have been put in, & it was stupidly [[undw?]]
I spoke about it to the writer & jumped in him
last night as soon as I saw it.   I think he
will be more careful in future.   I am sure you
know how much the Army Cmmdr appreciates
all the men with your Divn have done so I will
say no more.

[[ ? ]]

A A [[ ?  ]]

JM

(* 11 *)
 

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
10th. May, 1918.

Memo  for  "A.Q."
Issue the attached circulars to Units of the Division (inclusive
of attached Artillery Brigades and Light Horse) in sufficient numbers
to enable those Units which have the most horses and mules to receive
the most copies.  -
Accompany this issue with a memo in my own name stating that I
fully recognise the difficulties, especially in areas from which the
French inhabitants have been evacuated; but that I look to every
officer and man of the Division to do everything that is possible to
help the poor unfortunate French people in the troubles which have
befallen them.  -  The last thing any member of this Division would
wish to see is that the misfortunes of the French peasantry should
be aggravated by their  ^our carelessness or indifference.  -  I would
prefer to appeal to the feelings of humanity and sympathy of the
Australian troops towards the unhappy French population, rather than
to issue disciplinary instructions on this matter. - I have
sufficient confidence in the good feeling of the troops to believe
that  ^such an appeal of this nature will influence them much more strongly
than any threat of disciplinary action.  -
 

First Army No. 1958 (G).
SECRET
I        CORPS
X       CORPS
XI      CORPS
XIII    CORPS
XVII   CORPS
XVIII  CORPS
Canadian Corps.
---------------------
In forwarding the attached instructions relating to the First Army
Policy regarding the employment of Machine Guns, the Army Commander
wishes to emphasise the following points ;_
(a)  The organisation of the Machine Gun Corps into Battalions has
proved even more successful than was anticipated.
(b)  The discipline, training, standard of interior economy, and
general fighting efficiency of Machine Gun Units has increased
enormously since the re-organisation, and the work of the Corps
during the recent fighting has been of the highest order.
The organisation is still young and requires every help from
Commanders of all arms to enable it to develop its full efficiency in
the shortest possible time.
It is certain that assistance will be amply repaid in future
operations, and the Army Commander feels confident that Corps Commanders
will give their personal attention to the system of training, employment
and interior economy of Divisional Machine Gun Battalions, so as to get
full value from a fighting organisation which has already proved its
worth.
 

First Army
10th May, 1918.

Sgd.  W.H. ANDERSON
Major-General
General Staff, First Army.
 [*GOC
Copy of col Lindsay's file
10/6   B*]

 

S E C R E T
First  Army  No.  1958 (G)
For distribution down to M.G. Battalions
FIRST ARMY POLICY REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUNS
(  Unless otherwise stated, references are to 
S.S. 192,  The Employment of Machine Guns,
Part I  Tactical.)

1  GENERAL
1.   Sufficient time has now elapsed since the
opening of the German Offensive
on March 21st to enable the experience gained
during the recent
operations to be studied, conclusions regarding
the lessons to be learnt
from those experiences arrived at, and a
general policy laid down.

2.   No new principles have been discovered, and
those laid down in S.S. 192 
Part I, Tactical,
have proved sound, and in all offensive and
defensive
measures will be adhered to.   There are,
however,  certain points
which require amplification, and these are
dealt with in the subsequent
paragraphs.

3.   "Notes on recent fighting No.3"  G.H.Q. No.T/9 dated 10-4-18,
with the "Translation of a German Document"
attached.   No.1a/47875) should
be carefully studied in conjunction with
Chapter VI of S.S. 192, Part I,
the principles laid down in both bieng almost
identical.
Para 3 of the above-mentioned Notes is very
important as it clearly
lays down the place in all so the scheme of all
arms taken by the Vickers
Gun, i.e. that it is a weapon with characteristics
of its own which are
not those of the weapons of either Infantry or
Artillery.
The Machine Gun Service must therefore be
regarded as a distinctive
Army with tactics of its own.   In all respects it is
intermediate, and
fills the tactical gap, between the Infantry and
the Artillery, its tactics
being radically different from the former, and
appproximating to, but not
being identical with, the tactics of the latter.

4.   "Notes on Recent Fighting No.6."  should
also be noted, for it brings
out the effect of the good dispositions and 
handling of our Machine Gun
Units during March, and also emphasises the
fundamental truth the  "IT
IS FIRE EFFECT WHICH IS DECISIVE AND NOT
NUMBERS"

5.   It must be thoroughly realised that the 
principle governing the
employment of Machine Gun Units is that it
is their duty to support the
Infantry in all phases of the fight, and to
co-operate constantly with
them.   But they are not part of the Infantry,
and must not be considered
as such.  (S.S. 192 Sec, 4 abd "Notes on Recent
Fighting No.3"  para 3.)

6.   The smallest complete tactical unit in a
Machine Gun Battalion is
the section of four guns.   The Section should,
therefore, be the smallest
Machine Gun Unit detailed for attachment to
an Infantry formation.
Apart from exceptional circumstances Machine
Guns should not be
attached to Infantry Battalions ( Vide Section 4.)
The employment of Machine Guns in units
smaller than the Section
should be avoided whenever possible.
/ 7 .....

 

 

-3-

 

7.    A Machine Gun Commander should be given definite       orders by

the Infantry Commander, to whom he is tactically attached, as to what

is required of him but he should be allowed as much freedom of action

as possible in carrying out these orders and should be kept informed

of all changes and developments of the situation which may affect his action. Initiative, enterprise, and complete knowledge of the technique

of the weapon, are essential to the effective handling of Machine 

Guns (see Section 160, para 13 - Infantry Training 1914.)

 

8. Thus the Battalion Commander will exercise his influence over

any part of his Battalion that may be detailed to a Brigade through the

Commander he has appointed to that detachment, and the Brigade Commander 

will exercise the tactical control of the Machine Guns through the

Machine Gun Commander , in accordance with the plans of the G.O.C.

Division.

 

9.   An example of a normal organisation of Machine Gun Command in a

Division is attached for guidance. (Appendix A)

 

III LIAISON

1    It is essential that good liaison be established and maintained

between Machine Gun Commanders and Infantry Commanders so that the

most effective co-operation may be endured at altimes .

 

2. The Office commanding Machine Guns attached to a Brigade will

establish his Headquarters at the H.Q. of the Infantry Brigade. If 

circumstances arise which make it necessary for him personally to leave

the H.Q. of the Infantry Brigade, he will detail an officer to act for

him in his absence.

 

3.   On relief of Machine Gun Units,or Infantry Brigades, the Machine 

Gun Commander will report fuly to the Infantry Brigade Commander on

the Machine Gun disposition, including the state of the emplacements

which are occupied, stores, ammunition, section Headquarters, telephones

and communications. He will also explain the programme of harrasing

fire in force and, if necessary, will ask for or suggest an modifications

or alterations to it.

 

4.

During the tour of duty in the Line, the Machine Gun Commander

working with the Brigade will visit the Headquarters of Infantry

Battalions immediately after reliefs and forward from time to time . 

to give Infantry Commanders full information regarding position of

Machine Guns , their take, etc. The further forward this liaison

can be established the better, since many cases of misunderstanding,

apparent lack of action at opportune moments, and other causes of

friction can thus be eliminated.

 

5.    When Machine Guns are organised for the purpose of applying

local barrage fire for offensive or defensive purposes, the Officer

Commanding Machine Guns should get into touch with the Infantry

covered.

 

6.   In a moving battle the importance of liaison isgreatly increased

On it depends the regulation of the alternative advances of Infantry

and Machine Gun Units, the opportune application of Machine Gun fire

to support the Infantry, and, in extreme  cases, the 

reinforcement

of the firing line by Machine Guns to obtain definite superiority

of fire over the enemy.

 

/ In a ............

 

 

-4-

In a retirement the definite stopping power of Machine Guns should

be utilised by Infantry Commanders to the utmost. Infantry ; should 

instinctively reform under cover of fire from machine Guns ,

which

are the natural rallying point for them. But, under the conditions

which such action necessary, it is not likely that Machine Gun personnel

will be available to make the liaison; therefore, all Infantry 

Commanders, whatever their rank, should impressed with the necessity

of initiating and maintaining liaison whi with the Machine Gun in

such circumstances.

 

7.   At all times Officers commanding Machine Gun Units should be

constantly on the alert to seize the opportunity of assisting the

Infantryand of inflicting losses on the enemy. Machine Gun Officers

mut be thoroughly in touch with all mattersaffecting their front,

and it is the duty of Infantry Commanders to keep them informed

and of all changes and developments of the siuation which may affect

their action.

 

8. It is the duty of the Commander of an Infantry force to arrange

automatically for the protection, particularly of the flanks, of any

Machine Gun units which are co-operating with him, and, in consultation

with the Machine Gun Commander, to raise definite arrangements for

any advance , counter-  attack or other tactical manouevre, at the same 

time Machine Gun detachments must be prepared to protect themselves

against surprises. (see First Army No.1888 (G) dated 25-4-18 II(a) .

 

IV   TACTICAL

1      DEFENCE

The defence must be considered fromvarious standpoints :-

(a  The defence of an elaborately prepared defensive system, in which

both sides are dug in in close proximity to each other and have had

ample time for detailed observation both- from the ground and from the

air, and for the positioning and registration of Heavy Artillery

and trench mortars .

In this case the ZONE that will come under the intense trench

mortar barrage must be considered, and experience shows that few ,

if any, machine guns should be placed in that ZONE . This ZONE 

is usually at least 800 yards in depth, and Machine Guns placed in it.

even if not destroyed, as a rule wil be overrun by the enemy infantry

before they can use their characteristic of propel prolonged fire action

with any effect. The defence  of this forward ZONE should therefore

normally be carried out by the Infantry weapons, a scheme of LEWIS Gun

Battalions. The Machine Gun Defence will thus extend from about

800 yards from the Front Line to the position at the that defends "^^the gun

line" of the Artillery covering the Divisional front , i.e. to a

depth of some 3000 yards . With a defensive frontage for a Division

of say, 5,000 to 6,000 yards , the 64 Machine Guns of a Battalion

of the Machine Gun Corps cannot efectively defend a greater depth

than this .

If a greater depth is attempted it will be found that the

available Machine Guns cannot develop sufficient fire power on any given

line to ensure hoding up the enemy. (See para (e) below) .

In a defence of this nature the principles employed will be 

those

laid down in Chapter III, with a special reference to 

section 30,

which deals with defence on " The Battery System " , i.e. the forward

guns sited in pairs with the rear guns sited in four gun batteries where-ever

the nature of the ground, etc. render this possible, vide Section 30, 

para 3. This will enable the duties of the guns as laid down in

Sections 21 and 23 to be effectively carried out, in addition to which

the rear batteries should be so sited as to enable them to strike the

enemy with a great volume of direct fire at as long a range as possible.

 

(b) .......

 

 

-5-

(b) The Defence of an elaborately prepared position situated in rear

of the Front System.

 

A position of this nature should be prepared for a defence of

two kinds :-

(i)  An initial defence when the enemy having broken through the Front

System, attacks without the support of any mass of Artillery. In this

case the Machine Guns should be in Batteries of at least four guns, and

these Batteries should be sited well forward in the defended area, so

that the full effect of their fire can be brought to bear on the ground

over which the enemy will have to pass while advancing to the attack.

(ii) A later defence, when his initial attacks having failed, the enemy

'digs in' in close proximity to the position, and brings up a mass of

artillery and trench Mortars. The Defence will then become that of a 

Front System, and the Machine Guns must be disposed in depth in accordance 

with table Chapter III.

 

(c)  The Defence, when, owing to the nature of the fighting, the

positions of the foremost of neither side are clearly defined.

In this case neither our artillery nor that of the enemy is certain

of the exact positions of either of their own or the enemy's troops and

consequently the danger of destruction to Forward Machine Guns is less.

Therefore, a larger number of Machine Guns can often be usefully

employed well forward, and every use should be made of any cover that

exists for the concealment of certain number of machine guns in positions

from which the enemy must approach our front line.

The general system will be as before; the Forward guns in pairs and

the Rear guns in four-gun Batteries, wherever the ground, etc. renders 

this possible.

 

(d) The Defence of an emergency system.

This has already been dealt with in detail in First Army No G.S. 925/65 dated 18th April 1918, a copy of which should be circulated is 

attached (Appendix 'B').

 

(e) The Defence in Depth of an elaborately prepared position.                               (vide (a) above).

(i)  The experience of the recent fighting has once more proved the

necessity of organisation of defence in depth, both as regards the

preparation of defensive systems and their occupation by definite

garrisons.

(ii)  This principle has been so thoroughly impressed on all Commanders

that there is a danger of its being exaggerated. While the organisation

of  defensive systems cannot be carried out in too great a depth,

the distribution of  the Machine Guns in depth must depend, as with other

fighting troops, on the number of guns available.

(iii) If the Machine Guns of a Division are drawn out to too great a 

depth, sufficient fire power cannot be produced on any line. The problem

is therefore how to balance the two essentials.

     (a)  requisite depth to ensure against the hostile break-                   through.

     (b)  sufficient fire power on any given line to hold up a                     hostile attack.

(iv) The number of machine guns (64) allotted to a Division

will only

allow of a sufficient volume of fire being produced up to a limited

depth. The number of guns available must be considered as well as

the ground which it is desired to protect.

(v)  In defining the depth to which the Machine Gun Battalion of a

Division holding the line cane be made responsible for defence, the

 

/following.......

 

 

-6-

following points are of importance :-

(a)  The Division must be responsible for the protection of its own

Field Artillery Gun Line.

(b)  The main hostile destructive fire will probably be carried out

by Trench Mortars and therefore the bulk of the trench bombardment

does not cover a greater depth than about 1000 yards.

(vi)  The principle outlined in the preceding paragraph therefore,

govern the depth to which a Divisional Machine Gun Battalion should

be made responsible for defence, and it is undesirable to increase 

this depth. It is with the object of covering the main field artillery

gun-line that the Second System is usually sited. Defence schemes should

therefore so distribute their resources in Machine Guns as to cover

their gun-line in sufficient strength to prevent a break through on that

line.

(vii)  In portions of the front where the Second System is close to the

Front System, the depth towhich divisions are responsible must be increased,

bearing in mind the principle laid down that a Division must

cover its own gun-line.

(viii) Thus a Machine Gun Battalion would normally be disposed in

depth over an area bounded by two lines, one about 800 yards from the

Front Line, and the other about 3000 yards.

(ix)  The increase in depth beyond the Field Artillery gun line should

be entrusted to Corps Reserves. Similarly the Machine Gun defence

behind the Field Artillery Gun-Line must be carried out by Machine Gun

Battalions of Reserve Divisions until a Corps Machine Gun Battalion is

available for this duty, which should be its normal role.

(f)  Counter Attacks.

Full use should be made of the rear Batteries to assist in

counter-attacks against any portion of the Front System that it may

be desired to re-take.

Plans for employment of over-head Machine Gun fire to assist

the Infantry in the making of counter-attacks should be a normal feature

of all defence schemes.

(g) Protection for Gun Crews.

In the sitting of Machine Guns in any area in which they are likely

to be subjected to a heavy bombardment, protection for the gun

crews in close proximity to the gun emplacement is of first importance.

The mere siting of a Machine Gun for a good field of Fire,

where no such cover exists, will only lead to the gun being out of

action when required.

(h)  Ona normal defensive front the Machine Guns available with a

Division do not admit of a complete protective barrage of sufficient

density being placed along the whole front. It is therefore essential

that the defensive barrage shall be one in which the Artillery, Trench

Mortars and Machine Guns go-operate in the closest manner, and their 

respective tasks/shown on the barrage maps (vide Section 17) should be

should be

 

/2.......

 

 

-7-

2.  The employment of Machine Guns in set-piece offensives and in warfare

of improvised defences and open fighting are fully dealt with in

Chapters 1 and  2 respectively, and need no further comment. (vide para 1

2 of this paper).

 

TRAINING.

 

1. Technical training should be carried out all the time, whether in or

out of the line. It should be understood that the efficiency of Machine 

Gunners must be measured by their ability to prepare their guns for

action, to rapidly select and occupy favourable positions, to open fire

according to orders, and to maintain that fire as long as the situation

demands.

2. The training of all ranks in indirect fire should be developed to,

and maintained at, the highest possible stan dard. It should

be kept

in mind that when we resume the offensive the overhead supporting fire

of the Machine Guns may be, at times, the only support available for the

Infantry, and it is essential that the training in indirect fire should

be maintained at the highest degree of efficiency. The technically

perfect execution of the daily programme of harassing fire is the best

method of training now practicable. (Vide First Army No 1947 (G) dated

2/5/18, a copy of which is attached (Appendix 'C').

3. Training  in indication and recognition of targets, in the direct

control of Machine Gun Batteries, in overhead direct fire with graticules,

and in the use of the Range Finder, as well as in overhead

indirect fire, are of the utmost importance.

4. Machine Gun Battalion Commanders must strongly impress on all their

subordinates the vital importance of initiative, good judgement and ruthless

energy and driving power. It must be realised that highly organised 

trench war-fare has tended to check the qualities of initiative

leadership and self-reliance on the part of subordinate commanders.

Recent operations which have been operations of movement rather than of

position have demonstrated the great importance of such qualities.

Tactical exercises on the ground dealing with open fighting form the

best method of developing these qualities in all ranks, and should be

carried out in conjunction with the Infantry whenever possible. Range

practices for bringing out the training laid down above must be made

the means of further developing ^^{quick and accurate judgement and action whenever} the opportunity for range presents itself.

5.  During tactical exercises all ranks must be practised in assuming

the duties of their superiors. This is of vital importance and it

must be thoroughly impressed on all ranks that no matter what the casualties

among the senior commanders may be, the spirit and determination

to carry out their allotted task must remain to the last survivor of the 

Unit.

6. The organisation of transport, by limber or pack animals must be

practised in the companies and battalions, under the personal supervision

of the Battalion Commanders or Seconds in command; it being

understood by all ranks that the pressing forward of ammunition and

supplies is essential if the machine guns are to be kept in action.

In a moving battle the tactical handling of limbers or of pack

animals is of great importance. Boldness, use of ground, and common

sense will often enable Machine Guns to come into action quickly by

using limbers or pack animals.

7. The "Notes on Recent Fighting" published up to date emphasize the

value of certain principles which are applicable to a moving battle.

The essential points to be studied and applied in all training are :-

(a)  Machine Guns are employed apart from the Infantry, and yet

at the same time in the closest co-operation with them.

(b) Under certain circumstances, and to a certain extent Machine

Guns can replace Artillery.

 

/(c) Machine Guns.........