General Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 18, 21 April - 8 May 1918, Part 8

HEADQUARTERS
29 APR 1918
No. Q32/43
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
J.J.C.
TENTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE
Brigade Headquarters,
28th April 1918.
Headquarters,
3rd Australian Division.
I am informed this afternoon by
Colonel BLACKLOW that Captain A. W. WARDELL M.C. has been
transferred to command the 11th Aust. Machine Gun Coy, and
Captain W. M. ALGIE appointed to Command of the 10th Aust.
M.G. Coy.
I desire to recommend strongly that
this matter be readjusted,and that Captain WARDELL be returned
to the Command of the 10th Aust. M.G.Coy, and Captain ALGIE
appointed to the Command of the 11th Aust. M.G. Coy made
vacant by the fact of Captain A.W. TAYLOR M.C. fulfilling
the duties of Second in Command of the Machine Gun Battalion.
Captain WARDELL has been a member of
the 10th Aust. M.G. Coy since its inception in February 1916
and I am strongly desirous of retaining his services.
W. Ramsey McNicoll.
Brigadier-General
Commanding 10th Aust. Infantry Brigade.
BM/111/37

28/4/18
TRANSPORT AND EQUIPMENT of 36th. BATTALION.
It is suggested that the transport and equipment rendered
surplus when the 36th. Battalion is disbanded, be disposed of
as follows:-

PISTOLS WEBLEY, rendered surplus, could be absorbed by the
Brigade in like manner.
BOOT MAKERS' KITS. These could well be absorbed in the 9th.
Brigade.
OTHER MOB. STORES and GENERAL EQUIPMENT would be returned to
D.A.D.O.S. and could be utilised to make good any shortages
in the Division; the shortage of transport rendering it
inadvisable that other units be loaded with additional stores
or equipment excepting those referred to above.
Selwyn King MAJOR
D.A.Q.M.G. 3^RD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
28/4/1918.
[*G.O.C.*]
(SK/WEB).

Australian
1ST- ANZAC CORPS.
B.E.F., FRANCE,
28th April, 191 8.
My dear Monash,
Yours of 27th: I am afraid that there is no
alternative but to carry out, as you propose, the
re-organization of your 9th Brigade. It is very sad to
think that it has come to this, but with numbers fallen
so low as they unfortunately have in that brigade, we
must just make up our minds to it, and I hope you may
have time to re-organize the brigade on its three
battalion basis before it has again to undertake heavy
fighting.
I have told Dodds that it is the 36th Battalion
which you wish to absorb.
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd) W. R. Birdwood 

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters.
29th April. 1918. -
ACTUAL CASUALTIES REPORTED. -
Reported from NOON 26/3/18 to NOON 28/4/18.
 

Total Wounded include 2 Officers and 14                                                       KILLED        396
other ranks Wounded Accidentally and 9                                                   WOUNDED 2928
other ranks Wounded - Self-inflicted.                                                              MISSING       105
                                                                                                  TOTAL CASUALTIES       -         3429
15 Officers and 88 Other Ranks                                       "Remained at Duty"       -            103
                                                                         TOTAL EVALUATED CASUALTIES        -          3326.
(FED)
G.O.C.
A.Q.
A.
G.1  

29/4/18
Dear Sir
I fear that
after our experience
on 24 April, a Bn cannot
cross Ancre if
Hun starts - so
with your consent
I prefer to leave
one Bn in my present
3 Bn formation - to be 
used either forward on 
on hand for lead - they
to be changed every
four days
[[??]]
 

Hqrs
11^th Inf Bde
There is a plane with
British markings carrying 2 streamers
(pennants), one on each wing &
bearing the Number 18 whose actions
are decidedly suspicious.
He flies frequently at a very low
altitude and is seldom fired at
by enemy A.A. defences, and returns
in the direction of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX
The observer was distinctly seen
looking over the side at our new
works near WVY switch yesterday
& he has again appeared to-day.
As we have been instructed
that planes will only carry one
streamer, may I be advised please
if he is British or otherwise; as
the temptation to shoot at him
is always before our Lewis Gunners
Alex R Heron Lt Col
CO 41^st Bn A.I.F.
 

J.H.C.30
General Monash
I have shown
Heron your letter
re aeroplanes
– but can this be looked
into please
[[?]]
 

[*per Maj. Gen. Madagan.
with his 20/4/19*]
A SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH AUSTRALIAN
DIVISION AND DETACHED BRIGADES FROM 24/3/1918 to 28/4/1918.
PRELIMINARY. (1) On the opening of the German attack on the
111 and V Armies on the 21st. of March 1918 the 4th
Australian Division was in Corps Reserve, billetted in
the MERRIS area. It had then been out of the line for
3 weeks, having been relieved by the 1st Australian
Division on the HOLLEBEKE-SHREWSBURY FOREST front on the
1st. of March. During this period of rest good training
had been accomplished. A certain amount of damage had
been xxxx xxxx suffered from enemy High Velocity shell fire.
The weather was fine and bright with hazy mornings. On
the 23rd. of March orders were received from Corps
Headquarters to move South to the BUSNES area on the 24th.
en route for the BASSEUX area.
MARCH 23rd. MOVE OF 
DIVISION TO
THE BASSEUX
AREA (2) Orders were issued (Divisional Order 102),
on the 23rd, for the move of the Dismounted
Personnel of the division to BUSNES in three
Brigade groups by bus on the 25th. of March.
Mounted Units and transport of dismounted
Units were ordered to move by road to the MERVILLE area
MARCH 24th. on the 24th of March, and the march began accordingly on
that date. Vickers and Lewis Machine Guns were ordered
to be carried with the men on the busses, as it was
considered that there might be need of them during the 
period that the personnel and transport were separated.
On the afternoon of the 24th. of March counter-orders
were received altering our destination to HERMANVILLE.
Fresh Divisional Orders were issued and the dismounted
personnel was bussed straight to HERMANVILLE on the 25th.
The Divisional Artillery and transport of Dismounted
MARCH 25th. Units were pushed on during the night 24/25 from the
MERVILLE area, where they had already settled down, to 
BUSNES, and were ordered to move to HERMANVILLE during the
25th. They reached HERMANVILLE late on the 25th. some
of them having marched over 40 miles on the 24th, and
25th.
After the issue of the counter-orders for
the move of the dismounted personnel to HERMANVILLE on the
25th. further counter-orders were received to the effect
that they should buss on to the BASSEUX area on that
date. It was thus impossible to make good arrangements
for the troops on their arrival. Fortunately the liaison
arrangements with Officers of Divisional and Brigade
Staffs who had been sent ahead worked well, and it was
possible to pass on the changes in orders without fatal
delay.
The debussing of the dismounted personnel
of the 3 Brigade Groups took place near BEAUMETZ,
(N.E. of BASSEUX), on the night of 25/26 March, and the
men were marched to billets in the BASSEUX area at once.
The transport spent the same night in the HERMANVILLE
area, (Artillery at HOUDAIN), as arranged.
On the 26th. the Artillery moved to the
MARCH 26th. BASSEUX area and the transport rejoined their Units.
The march had been very severe and the men and horses
were very tired on their arrival.
Stress is laid on the operations of this
periods, 24/25/26 March, in order to emphasize the fact
that

-2-
that the troops, Commands and Staffs had already been
severely taxed before the important operations of the
phase which began on the 26th, of March.
During the 4 days of movement culminating on the 27th.
the Division came under the Command at various times
and for various purposes of six different Corps, from all
of which orders and instructions were received, and most
of which had to be visited.
HEBUTERNE AND
THE MOVE TO THE
ALBERT DERNANCOURT
FRONT. (3) All hope of giving the troops a
short period of rest on the 26th.
vanished when the situation immediately
to the East became known. The
Divisional Commander had taken steps for
MARCH 26TH.  the local protection of the Division as soon as possible
after arrival in the area, and a line of outposts was
drawn to the N.E., E., and S.E. Reports came in during
the morning that the Enemy had broken through at
HEBUTERNE, about 7 miles South of BASSLEX, and was
moving on SOUASTRE in armoured cars. Steps were at
once taken to block certain roads and to intercept the
cars, which eventually turned out to be French motor
tractors. All this entailed a certain amount of
dissipation of energy, but care was taken not to
disorganize Units unduly, the outpost and road blocking
being carried out by strong posts and patrols.
At 1.40 p.m. an order was received
from Third Army to the effect that HEBUTERNE had been
occupied by two or three hundred of the enemy and that
the 4th. Australian Division was to reoccupy the village
as soon possible and restore the line between
PUISIEX and DUCQUOY. The 4^th Infantry 
Brigade and the 11^th. Australian Inf Fd. Arty Brigade, were at
once detailed for the operation against HEBUTERNE and ‘tho
remainder of the Infantry and Artillery set in motion in
the direction of the line PUSIEUX-BUCQUOY. Orders were
received soon after placing, the 4th. Australian Infantry
Brigade under the Command of the G.O.C. 62nd. Division
and directing the concentration of the remainder of the
Division about  POMMIERS and BIENVILLER under the Orders
of the 4th. Corps. The moves of the 12th. and 13th.
Australian Infantry Brigades, which were well under way
were cancelled, and the orders for concentration about
POMMIERS and BIENVILLERS issued.
No sooner had the concentration
movements begun when further counter-orders were received
for the move of the Division, (less 4th. Australian
Infantry Brigade) to the FORCEVILLE-SENLIS-HEDAUVILLE
area. Information was received at the same time that
the situation at ALBERT had become critical, and it was
obvious that the marching powers of the men were to be
severely tested. On representation to the Third Army
that the Divisional Artillery had already marched 27 miles
on the 26th. of March their move was postponed until the
morning of the 27th. Orders for the march wore issued
at 6.30 p.m. (Divisional Order 103). The countermanding
of orders, albeit unavoidable, caused endless work and
exhaustion to the troops generally. Staff Officers
were

-3-
were sent in cars to notify changes in orders, but the
changes came so rapidly that there were occasions when no
Officers and no cars were available at Divisional
Headquarters for such work.
Eventually, at about 10 p.m. the Division (less
Artillery and 4th. Australian Infantry Brigade) was set in
motion for the South in two Brigade groups. The head of
the leading group, the 12th. Australian Infantry Brigade
group, passed through SOUASTRE at 10 p.m. The march was
conducted as a tactical flank march in the presence of the
enemy and every possible precaution taken to guard against
surprise, as the road ran South parallel to the enemy
positions and at a distance of about 4 miles from them.
MARCH 27^TH. Great difficulty was experienced in shaking
clear of the area North of SOUASTRE during the night, as
a British Division, number unknown, began to march in from
the West as our troops and transport were getting on to
the roads. This made it impossible to foresee which
group would lead the column. It was arranged, however,
to keep the columns on separate roads as far as SOUASTRE,
(where they were compelled to converge,) and the G.S.O.3
was sent to the road junction at that place to ensure that
there was no clash.
The 12th Australian Infantry Brigade group
arrived at SENLIS at about 6.30 a.m. on the following
morning and the 13th. Australian Infantry Brigade Group at
FORCEVILLE about two hours later.
The men were very tired and most of them
preferred to sleep rather than have a meal at once. Some
Units had marched over 30 miles since the previous
morning and few had marched less than 25.
Taking into consideration these facts, and the
urgency of the situation at ALBERT at the time, it may
justly be claimed that the night march made by the men of
this Division on the night 26/27th. March was one of the
finest feats of endurance and one of the most vital
operations carried out at this period.
Early on the 27^th. the Division was placed under the Orders
of the 7th. Corps and Divisional Headquarters was
established at BAIZIEUX chateau. On arrival at BAIZIEUX
in the middle of the night the chateau was found to be
full of the personnel of a heavy battery, who declared
that the intention was to continue the retreat on the
morning of the 27^th.  and laughed at the idea of stopping
the enemy at ALBERT.
TAKE OVER ON
DERNANCOURT-
ALBERT FRONT
MARCH 27th.
OPERATIONS UP
TO APRIL 4th.
4. After 4 hours rest the 12th. and 13th.
Brigades were ordered forward to relieve the
9th. Division on the DERNANCOURT-ALBERT front.
The 12th, Australian Infantry Brigade
occupied the high ground just S.W. of ALBERT,
facing E.., S.E., and S., with two battalions
MARCH 27th. in depth in front and two in support. These battalions
moved down the forward slope to the relief in daylight in
Artillery formation, but, though under fairly heavy
Artillery fire had few casualties. At 5.30 p.m., the
47th. and 48th. Battalions, (on the Right and Left
respectively), were in occupation of the new position
with