General Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 18, 28 March - 20 April 1918, Part 8

Conflict:

First World War, 1914–18

Part of Quest:

Sir John Monash (General, b.1865 - d.1931)

Subject:

Documents and letters

Status:

Awaiting approval

Accession number:

RCDIG0000628

Difficulty:

9. Signing of Memos. from Sections to Company HQ. Qrs. must Memos. not

be signed by N.C.O.s, but by Os.C. Sectional personally.

10.Books, All books, pamphlets and circulars distributed to

Pamphlets, Sections are the property of the Section and not of etc. the

Officer i/c.

Officers relinquishing charge of a

Section must not appropriate these books, etc, which are

to be preserved for the unit in the stationary box

provided for the purpose.

11. Section When moving out of the Brigade area, Section

Officers Officers

must notify the O.C. as to their movements. This o does not

apply to movements within their Brigade area. In such

case, the senior N.C.O. of the section must be informed.

Sub-section officers will advise Officer 1/c Signals,

Divl. Art.

12. Opinions & When correspondence from Company Hd. Qrs.

Suggestions. opinions and suggestions from Section Officers, such

opinions and suggestions should be confined to the

subject in question. Irrelevant matters, if sufficiently

important, should be dealt with in a separate memo.

13. Personnel. Periodical reports to be made my Section Officers

on their personnel amd their work so that men most

deserving of promotion may be considered when occasion

arises. Similarly, remarks on N.C.Os. should be made

under "Personnel" in the bi-weekly diary reports.

14.Discipline. Attention drawn to the prevailing failure to

observe instructions, especially with regard to dress

of other ranks when walking out. Bandoliers and Box

Respirators not invariably worn as instructed. Officers

to impress this matter on N.C.Os. as this non- compliance

with orders is reflected on the unit.

15.N.C.Oc.i/c. It should be arranged that an N.C.O. is always in

Signal charge of a Brigade Signal Office as it is undesirable

Offices. that responsibility should fall upon a sapper. Where,

however, forward exchanges are run, the rule may be waived.

16.Exchange To still further improve the working on the working. exchanges

throughout the Division, it was instructed that definite

men should be permanently allotted to switchboard

operating. At the same time, certain other men should

be trained in the duties. Only in this way is a standard

system possible.

17.Fuller- In future the nomenclature to be used in referring

phones. to these instruments should be "Fullerphones" and not

"D.4c's".

18.Salvage of As great quantities of cable are available for

Cable. salving without interfering with communications, it was

suggested that Section Officers place Sappers in charge of

small parties of Infantry and so clear their respective

Brigade areas. The cable thus recovered would be sent

to Base and treated for reissue. Quantity and classes

of cable salved to be stated in bi-weekly reports.

19.Sick All no parading sick should be first seen by the

Parades. Section Officer concerned. This would often obviate a

man going to Hospital with a consequent loss to the Section;

consideration could be extended to the men in the matter

of duty; and the interest shown would be appreciated by

the men generally.

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20.Senders Attention was directed to the misquoting of

Numbers. senders numbers in a number of replies to certain

messages sent out recently by the O.C. This was

due to the lack of supervision by office superin-

tendents. Section Officers to take action

accordingly.

21.Prismatic Check to me made throughout the unit of all

Compasses prismatic compasses and watches and reasons given for

any deficiencies. Misappropriation of these articles

by Officers and other ranks leaving the unit was a

serious matter and offenders would be compelled to

return such equipment, or if lost, an equivalent

amount to cover replacement.

22.Messages For the purpose of traffic graphs for the war

& Sealed diary, traffic returns from Sections should show the

Packets. separate totals of A, B, and C messages; and the totals

of sealed packets in the same manner.

23.Color It was advised that a supply of color patched had just been received after a delay of seven months.

Issues would be sparingly made.

24.Greater use As Wireless, Amplifier, Power Buzzer, and Pigeons

of W/T are not being utilised fully as might be, Section

Amplifier, Officers were directed to advise C.Os. of units so

Power Buzzer that certain messages could be transmitted daily by

& Pigeons. these means. This should bring the Commanding and

other Officers into closer touch with the facilities

available, and would ultimately lead to an increased

and more confident use of these alternative means of

communication. With regard to Pigeons, no bird should

be released without a message-clip attached, and, as

far as possible, a message enclosed. The number of the

bird should invariably be placed on the message form.

25.Buzzer Units Buzzerr units and 100 pattern telephones, are

&100-pattern now difficult to obtain. Supplies are coming

' phones. forward very slowly.

26.Information Exactly what information is required from for War Sections

Diary. in their War Diary reports was set out in detail in

a circular letter distributed to the Officers of the

unit at the conference.

27. War To assist in making a unit collection in the

Trophies. Australian War Museum, Officers were instructed to send

in any trophies or souvenirs of interest.

28. Pro formas. Future supplies of pro formas for Sections returns,

etc. should be arranged for by Sections as required.

Hd. Qrs. of Brigades would probably assist in this

matter.

29. Card With a view to simplifying the unit's records, the

System. O.C. stated that a Card System would shortly be

introduced. The cards, which are now in course of

preparation, would be sent to the Sections for

verification with paybooks, etc., and returned when

to Company Office. A sample of the card was

submitted for perusal and considered satisfactory.

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Agenda Paper.

The business of the Agenda Paper was then proceeded with.-

By Capt. (1) Laying and maintenance of (a) Liaison lines.

Ferguson, M.C. (b) S.O.S lines.

- Deferred.

" (2)"Supplies to Divisional Artillery Detachment when

separated from their own Division." - Deferred.

" (3) Maintenance of Visual communication within

Artillery units - with special reference to personnel."

- Deferred.

By Lieut.

Mayman. (4) "Practice in mobile warfare when Division is in

Rest area". As Conference considered this very

desirable the O.C. proposed that Divisional and Brigade

schemes be run "in skeleton" with concurrence of Staffs

concerned. Junior officers of Infantry could

cooperate with the conduct of the tactical scheme.

By Lieut.Mayman (5) "Obselete equipement for warfare in France &2nd.Lieut, to be

Gifford,D.C.M. either pooled at Corps or returned to Base. "It was

pointed out that the unit's attitude in this matter

had already been determined in correspondence to

A.D. Signals on "Policy to be adopted by the Signal

Service on Reversion to Mobile Warfare."

By Lt.Mayman. (6) "Transport - Fewer horses; more Motor Transport."

The O.C. submitted the latest establishment showing a

reduction of two horses, and the addition of a box

motor car. By the same establishment, a G.S. limbered

wagon was authorised for each Signal Sub- section.

Lt.Mayman. (7) "Improved Carriers for Cable by hand instead of

barrows, drum,universal." No.1 Section Officers

considered that no design for carrying the heavier

classes of cable had been evolved which was an

improve-

ment

on the barrow, universal; and in the case of

lighter cables used by Sections, the light drum with a

bar carrier was equally satisfactory. The O,C.

intimated that any ideas submitted in regard to this

matter would be carefully tried out.

By Lt. Mayman. (8) " Greater use of Message Rockets." Up to the

present message rockets had, it was acknowledged,

been

very little used. By its flare the rocket discloses

its place of origin and approximately its destination-

which was an important point against its use in forward

areas. Might be useful for O.P. work. No definite

opinion was ventured as to the likely measure of its

success.

By 2ndLieut. (9) "The advisability of all Battery signallers

Houlihan belonging to the Signal Co." On this point was

submitted the Report and Genealogical Tree outlining

a "Suggested Re-organization of Signal Service within

an Infantry Division." sent to A.D Signals by this unit

on 7.12.17 in response to a request from G.H.Q. The

proposal included all Battery signallers as part of a

suggested "Divisional Artillery Signal Co."

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By Lt. Summers. (10) "Increase of establishment: 5 W/T

Operators, 5 power buzzer and amplifier

operators; 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 3

lance-corporals". The same file of papers

referred to in (9) covered this suggestion

also.

(11) a Schemes to magnify the duties

wireless personnel in mobile warfare".

Wireless operators to cooperate in "skeleton"

schemes suggested in (4).

b "Transportation of wireless gear".

Provided for by the box car mentioned in (6).

(12) "School for training power buzzer and

amplifier operators for future demands",

O.C. advised that Schools would probably be

arranged on Division going into Rest areas.

It was pointed out that under G.H.. letter

6 men from each Battalion, trained in amplifier

and power buzzer formed a Brigade pool. These

6 men, however, were nearly always the best men

in the battalion signal section, and if with-

drawn would leave the battalion section too

weak. It was suggested that the six men for the

Amplifier and Power Buzzer pool should be

distinct and separate from the regimental

signallers. The point was noted for attention

when selecting candidates for the proposed

amplifier and power buzzer school.

By 2nd.Lieut. (13) a "Informing Base Stationary Depot of

Groves and Lt. importance of stationery indents from battalions

Smith. being promptly met"; or (b) "Divl,Signal Co.

taking ever supply of stationary to battalions".

With regard to "a" the O.C. stated that it was

surely the concern of the Battalion commanders.

If, however, interruption to the Signal Service

was caused by the shortage of stationary in a

battalion and a report submitted quoting such

specific instance, the matter would be referred

to the Divisional Staff. As to "b" the proposal

had previously been tried and was most unsatis-

factory to the unit. In any case such stationary

supply was not a Signal Service matter.

By 2nd.Lt.Grroves. (14) "The advisability of having 1 lance -

corporal senior man among runners, pigeoneers,

and attached battalion signallers with Brigade

Sections". While the presence of an N.C.O.

among the attached personnel was very desirable,

unless the Secion Officer took steps to obtain

an N.C.O. then replacing casualties, no action

could be taken, the Signal Co. not having

authority to promote men attached for duty.

By Lt.Cook,M.M.& (15)"Definite understanding as to responsibility

2nd.Lt.Gifford, of Artillery and Infantry in regard to S.O.S.

D.C.M. lines." - Deferred.

Lt.Stanbury. (16). "The advisability of writing off a

percentage of canteen profits for inclusion in

Regimental Funds". - Deferred

By Lt.Smith and (17) "Transport allotted to Brigade Sections."

2/Lt.Gifford,D.C.M, Section Officer of two Brigades stated they had

R.E. Limbered Wagons which were very unsatisfactory.

The O.C. stated that when they became

unserviceable O.S. limbered wagons would be

secured in replacement. By now establishment

Sub-sections will each be supplied with a

G.S. limbered wagon.

Lt.Miller. (18) "All No.1 Section drivers to be

instructed in cable-jointing etc. to be available

under stress of circumstances." - Deferred.

By2/Lt.Gifford,D.C.M. (19) "Method of Distribution and Replacement

of signal stores for battalions and other

brigade units". Instead of the present

arrangement of drawing certain stores from

Signals and A.O.D., one source of supply was

suggested as being moro satisfactory. The

O.C. explained that no action could be taken

in that regard, as this and other similar matters

were being discussed by conference at G.H.Q.

and decisions must be awaited.

" (20) "Establishment - personnel of Brigade

Sections - N.C.O. mechanic to each unit."

The O.C. referred the conference to the papers

mentioned in (9) i.c. "Re-organisation of

Signal Service within an Infantry Division"

wherein the matter in question had been fully

dealt with.

After perusing papers mentioned om last para., Corps'

letters relating to Corps Signal Co., and now Establishment,

Conference closed at 4.30 p.m.)

RG Hamilton

Major.

3.3.1918 C.C.,3rd.Aust.Divl.Signal Co.A.E

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Aust. Corps

Inform Corps Commander that delay

in supplying socks to 11th Brigade was due

to lack of Motor Transport from Villers- Bocage

and These socks were delivered to 11th Brigade

this morning . — arr General Monash

3 Aust. Div.

Q144 11 20 AM

6/4/18

S P E C I A L O R D E R.

BRIG-GEN.C. ROSENTHALL, C.B., C.M.G. G.O.C. 9TH AUST.INF.BDE.

Brigade Headquarters,

6th April, 1918.

In connection with the heavy enemy attack on the 4th

instant, General Sir John MONASH has asked me to convey his

congratulations to the troops concerned. He is very gratified

that the Brigade has done so well, and high Commanders of this

Army (including the Army Commander himself) are very complimentary

concerning the gallant defence of VILLERS-BRETONVEUX put up by

Units of this Brigade on that day.

My own feelings are that the Brigade fought as i

expected it would, and I amore than over proud of my Command.

Charles Rosenthall

Brig-General.

G.O.C. 9th Australian Infantry Brigade.

G.O.C.

A.Q.

(EMR) A. lead

Q. SR

Return to GOC

after being seen

by above Officers.

6/4/18

Ia/48093.

GERMAN OFFENSIVE TACTICS.

————————————

NOTE BY GENERAL STAFF.

_______________________

The enemy appears to have profited during the recent battle by the instructions laid

down in the two memoranda of which translations are attached.

The chief points which have been brought to notice up to the present are the following": –

(a) The enemy's use of reinforcements at points at which

progress is being made, so

as to outflank the strong points of resistance, rather than the strengthening of

the direct attack on such points of resistance.

(b) The necessity for the fullest and most effective employment of the infantry

weapons, and for guarding against training the infantry to

rely too exclusively on

artillery support.

possible delay, to make dispositions to meet the tactical situation as it changes.

(d) The need for initiative, based on tactical skill, on the part of subordinate

(battalion and company) commanders.

2. Among the lessons to be drawn from the enemy's application

of the above instructions

during his recent offensive for use int he conduct of our defence,

emphasis should be laid on

the following : —

(a) Subject to the general scheme of defence of the
Corps or Army, the garrisons of

our line on the flanks of such localities. So long as the line holds even in parts,

and so long as the defence maintains its grip on points or area of special tactical

importance, an enemy penetrating on a narrow front between such localities is

in a no easier position than are the defending troops who hold out between two

points of penetration.

We have had ample experience on the offensive of the difficulty of retaining a

salient with a narrow base when the enemy is holding the flanks of the gap so

strongly as to resist attempts to widen it.

Indeed, the attacker in a pronounced

salient of moderate extent is a position of disadvantage in

comparison with

defending troops in a similar position, at least in respect of his communications;

for, though the defenders; communications may be in danger, the attacker has

no communications except such as he can improvise in the

stress of battle. In

the event of a local penetration, therefore, the essential

thing for the defenders

is to strengthen the flanks of the gap which the enemy has

made, to maintain

their hold on the tactical localities on either side of the gap, to resist attempts

to widen it, and to counter-attack on the flank of the salient formed by the

enemy's penetration rather than to throw troops across the head of the salient

to fill the gap.

(b) It appears that the enemy has made admirable use of his l light infantry machine

guns (which correspond to our Lewis guns)on many occasions

on all parts of the

battle front during the initial fight for fire superiority. These weapons seem to

have been used as automatic rifles ; that is , their employment

has been based on

infantry rather than machine gun tactics—a definitions which not always

sufficiently clearly emphasized. This has enabled the enemy to build up a fire

position with a minimum exposure of personnel. The enemy's

light infantry

machine gunners appear to have been well trained in the use of ground.

This is an

essential point, since it enables them to build up a firing line

in which not only

are comparatively few troops employed, but of which also little or nothing can be

seen and located.

These points demand special attention in the training and employment of our

own Lewis gunners. In open warfare at any rate, the enemy's offensive tactics in

this respect may frequently be best countered by the employment of similar

tactics on the defence, our own Lewis gunners taking full advantage of the ground

in order to adopt mobile tactics against the enemy's light machine

gunners.

enable information to be obtained rapidly by mounted staff

officers and other

means.

The battle headquarters of brigade commanders in prepared

positions should

be so placed that either they themselves can observe the progress of the fight or

are in close communication with an observation post occupied by a reliable officer.

General Staff,

General Headquarters.

6th April, 1918.

RCDIG0000628

1a/48093.

TRANSLATION OF GERMAN DOCUMENTS

———————————

A.—NOTES ON THE OFFENSIVE BATTLE.

Ia/11, Nr. 6220 (Secret). General Headquarters,

25/1/18.

The results of my tactical conferences will be issued in the "Supplement," dated 1-2-18.

to Part 14 of the "Manual of Position Warfare for All Arms."

I desire to call attention to the following points " —

1. The idea that our attacking divisions must be relieved after one days fighting cannot

be entertained. On the contrary, the infantry must, by skilful

tactical leading, preserve its

fighting strength, so that divisions are capable of carrying out

offensive battles of several days'

duration and entailing a considerable advance. I request that this

principle be made generally

known throughout the Army.

2. (a) Even in case of minor operations, the offensive must be carried 8 km. or more,

in specified sectors of attack through a hostile defensive system

and across numerous obstacles,

up to and beyond the enemy's artillery.

The attack in combination with troops on either flank must also be practiced, based on

similar principles. The scheme will, whenever possible, be set by

higher authority. Arrange-

ments for representing the enemy and for providing umpires are of importance.

(b) In these practice attacks, the principle must be clearly

emphasized that the success

of an attack does not consist only in a careful engagement and assembly o the attacking troops

and in the execution of a methodically considered attack, but that

skilful leardership on the part

of higher and subordinate commanders, in accordance with the

tactical situation at the moment,

is required in addition during the actual attack.

Our attack must differ essentially in this respect from the attacks hitherto undertaken by

the British. The British believed in the efficacy of their skilfully worked out but rigid

artillery barrage; this was to carry forward the infantry attack, which advanced without any

impetus of its own. The subordinate, and, still more, the higher

commanders ceased to have

any further influence.

In the various British offensives—Somme, Arras, Messines, Flanders, Cambrai—the initial

tactical successes, which were frequently very considerable, were not seized

upon and were not

usefully exploited. A defeat was eventually the outcome of this narrow-minded principle on

which the conduct of the battle and the leadership was based.

As in open warfare, so also in the break through, free play must be allowed, from the

opening of the artillery barrage, for the fullest independence and

tactical skill of the subordinate

commanders from company or battalion commanders upwards.

The decision will often depend

on the action of the subordinate commanders.

The higher commands (Divisions, Groups and Armies) are even more important in the

offensive. For these, the most important matters are economy of

force and the proper

engagement of the reserves. These will, as a general rule, not be

thrown into the battle at

points when the attack has been held up by strong points and centres of resistance, and

where unnecessary sacrifice is involved, but at points where the

attack is still in movement

and its progress can be facilitated with a view to breaking down the enemy's resistance in the

neighbouring sector by rolling it up from flank and rear.

This applies particularly to the bringing up and engagement of the 2nd and 3rd line divisions,

which Corps and Armies must consider as their reserves, and must bring up and engage at the

right time. Premature engagement of the reserves invariably uses up the force of the attack

and brings the offensive movement to a standstill before the break through has been effected.

On the other hand, it is the duty of every commander to keep the

reserves up so close that every

reverse can be prevented, every success properly exploited and the offensive continued.

The position of the commander is of considerable importance. All staffs, including Corps

staffs, must be on the battlefield, the divisional staffs being pushed well forward.

timely bringing up of light and

heavy artillery, with its ammunition, as well as sufficient light Minenwerfer on flat-trajectory

carriages.

(d) In particular, the artillery barrage should prepare the way for the infantry after the

latter has penetrated the 1st line. The forward movement of the barrage will depend on the

rate of the infantry advance.

Note. —The captured copy of this document is not signed, but a note describes it as a

"Verfugung von Ludendorff," and it was presumably issued under

Ludendorff's

signature.

[P.T.O.

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B.—MEMORANDUM DEALING WITH THE TACTICS OF THE OFFENSIVE.

C.G.S. of the Field Army. 8-2-18.

II Nr. 6405. Secret. op.

The endeavour to effect surprise must not lead to hasty preparations and particularly

not to excessive curtailment of the artillery preparation. In the case of an attack on a large

scale, the advantage of surprise to the attacker lies chiefly in the

fact that he is enabled to make

his dispositions first and secondly, in the uncertainty of the defender as to the actual day

hour of the attack. The attack must be framed on correct tactical principals which

guarantee success.

2. Decisive role of commanders of all ranks and arms. The attack does not go on merely

mechanically ; commanders must command ; every man must act on his own initiative.

3. . . . . . .

4. Counter-battery work, with careful observation, must be increased on all fronts before

the commencement of the attack.

5. Too little importance appears to be attached to the neutralization of the enemy's artillery during the attack.

6. The artillery preparation should not take longer than is necessary. The fact should

not be overlooked that a one hour's bombardment is not sufficient to obtain a satisfactory

destructive effect. The chief difficulty lies in the satisfactory destruction of the rearward

positions (particularly the wire).

7. . . . . . .

8. . . . . . . Emphasis must be repeatedly laid on the fact that the barrage

is only of value if the infantry keeps close up to it and continually

endeavours to advance

right into our own (artillery) fire, in the manner taught in the assault battalions.

The barrage must be lifted in accordance with a time table. If

signals are employed in

addition, they must be simple and their number must be

restricted. It is desirable that there

should be only one signal, either to cause barrage to advance

("Lift barrage") or to cause

it to halt ("Halt barrage"). The order to halt the barrage should only hold good for a short

period, for instance for 10 minutes. . . . . . .

9. . . . . . .

10. The success with which the artillery comes into action will

be decisively influenced by

good cover against air observation.

11. Batterie4s will be detailed as batteries "in positions in readiness" and to engage

fleeting targets, and will be employed as such.

12. An advance of the infantry in waves,the number of waves

corresponding to the number

of hostile lines which may be expected to offer resistance, and

during which the rearward

waves are intended to overtake the preceding waves, is to be deprecated. The foremost

infantry should, on the contrary, advance as long as it possibly can and should only be

reinforced from the rear when this is absolutely necessary. A sufficient distribution in depth

to ensure against a counter-offensive (flanks) must be continually maintained.

13. Too little importance is now attached to the fire support of the infantry with the

means at its disposal, as practised by us in peace time with our

advance of rushes. Not only

should the infantry be helped forward by the artillery firing from positions far in rear, by the

batteries accompanying the infantry and by the light Minenwerfer, but it should also be

principally assisted by the machine gun and rifle fire of the infantry itself.

Short, surprise bursts of machine gun fire, varied methodically,

and directed against

important points in the back area, will frequently be effective in

disturbing traffic and

communications, especially before the attack begins.

14. In view of the scarcity of forage, it is absolutely essential that the work to be done by

the horses should be proportional to the forage issued. This is also necessary in connection

with the preparatory work now going on, as the supply of forage, though it will be more regularly

maintained, will not be appreciably increased. It must, therefore,

be a guiding principle to save

the horses as much as possible.

(Signed) Ludendorff.

__________________________________

Printing Section Depot F.S.C.,R.E. G.H.Q. 1452x.

3DRLI2316

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