General Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 18, 28 March - 20 April 1918, Part 4

(COPY)

COUNTER ATTACK OPERATION

AFTERNOON & EVENING MARCH 30th, 1918.

33RD BATTALION A.I.F.

Battalion Headquarters,

31-3-1918.

G.O.C.,

9th Inf. Bde. A.I.F.

I beg to submit my report on the operation carried out

by this Battalion on March 30th/31st, 1918.

Reference Map:- FRANCE, Shoot 62D - 1/40,000.

POSITION OF READINESS: 

1.  At 10.30 a.m. on March 30th the 33rd Battalion

moved from billets on CACHY to a position of readiness

On the South Western edge of the BOIS D'AQUENNE,

The enemy shelled CACHY from 10 a.m., but we

suffered no casualties.

INSTRUCTIONS: 

2. At 2.15 p.m. I reported to you at the Brigade

Report Centre at [[?.33.c.35.40]] and received your

orders to capture and establish a line from the

Copse immediately South of the first C in MARCELCAVE

to ADERCOURT, and to capture AUBERCOURT which was

in possession of the enemy.

The 33rd Battalion would work in conjunction with

the 12th Lancers, who were 400 strong, and would have

the 34th Battalion in support.

DISPOSITIONS: 

3. The following orders were issued by me verbally

to Company Commanders at 2.45 p.m. -

"B" Coy. (Lieut. J.G.A. POCKLEY) will establish

a line from the Copse just South of the first C

in MARCELCAVE to a point 100 yds. East of the Cross-

roads in V.14.b.

"A" Coy. (Captain J.L. FRY) will establish a line

from  a point 100 yds East of the Cross Roads in

V.14.b. to V.b.20.00.

"D" Coy. (Captain J.W. SHREEVE) will capture

AUBERCOURT and establish a line on the Eastern and

Southern sides of this village.  As DEMUIN is held 

by the enemy particular attention is to be paid to

the roads leading over the de LUCE from DEMUIN and COUR-OELLES.

"C" Coy. (Captain F.J.O. DUNCAN, M.C.) will be in 

reserve in the valley South East of the BOIS DE HANGARD

and to be ready to capture DEMUIN.

APPROACH 

Battalion Headquarters will be with the Reserve Coy.

"B" Teams, according to S.S. 135, will not be taken

into action but will be sent to BLANGY FROMVILLE.

APPROACH MARCH: 

4. At 3.10 p.m. the Battalion marched under the command

of Major P.G. Grant from BOIS D'AGUENNE and moved across

country in column of route to the assembly position 200

yards to the West of the VILLERS-BRETONNEUOX - AUBERCOURT

Road in V.12.a. This position was reach at 4.35 p.m.

At 3 p.m. I sent forward two patrols from the

Platoon of the 9th Corps Cyclists to reconnoitre North

and South of the wood East of BOIS DE MANGARD and then 

as far forward towards AUBERCOURT AND MARCELCAVE as

possible. I regret to report that the Platoon Commander

(Lieut. Gratwiske) was killed.

The 12th Lancers preceded the Battalion and reached

the wood East of BOIS DE MANGARD at about 4.15 p.m.

(This wood will in future be referred to as LANCER WOOD).

Together with my Adjutant, Scout Officer and Cavalry

Liaison Officer I rode ahead with the cavalry and reconnoitred

the position.

(2)

STRAGGLERS AND WITHDRAWALS 

5. On our way to LANCER WOOD we passed several bodies of 

troops peculiarly and uselessly entrenched in queer places,

and large parties of stragglers. On reaching the wood we

found the whole front line garrison East of LANCER WOOD withdrawing

although there was not hostile fire of any kind and

no signs of attack. I met two Brigadiers and a Battalion

Commander in the wood and informed them what was happening

and asked them [[?]] that they got their men back to the line

at once. This they promised to do. The Cavalry Commander

also helped in the matter by sending a Squadron dismounted

to re-establish the line. The infantry went forward with

the cavalry but in a reluctant manner.

During the whole time we were forward men were constantly

leaving the line.  There seemed to be no effort to

check this straggling.

ACTION OF CAVALRY 

6. It was a proud privilege to be allowed to work with such

a fine Regiment as the 12th Lancers. Their approach march

instilled in the men the utmost confidence and enthusiasm and

I am glad to say greatly counteracted the effect of so much

straggling.  They lost no time in effectively clearing LANCER

WOOD and got there just in time as the enemy had obtained a

footing on the Southern and South Eastern edges. The Lancers

protected the edges and allowed us to move forward to the attack.

On seeing the cavalry there the enemy shelled LANCER

WOOD very heavily, chiefly with 5.9s. paying particular 

attention to the outer fringes. Fairly heavy casualties

to horses were inflicted there; the horses were soon led from

the wood to a position West of the VILLES-BRETONNEUX - AUBERCOURT

Road. The discipline during the heavy shelling was an

abject lesson.

During the attack the cavalry protected both our flanks, 

the left with two Hotchkiss guns. They withdrew at about

7 p.m.

All ranks were eager to give every possible help to us;

throughout there was whole-hearted cooperation. The experience

gained in this our first operation with cavalry was

invaluable. One was able too to judge of the splendid work

they are doing for the Army at this present time and they

cannot be too highly praised.

INFANTRY ACTION 

7. The 33rd Battalion moved forward from the position of

assembly at 5 p.m. The formation adopted by Companies was

as follows:  One Platoon in extended order, followed by two 

Platoons in line in artillery formation; the fourth Platoon

in reserve also in artillery formation.

                          *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *   

                                     *                                                *       

                               *           *                                    *          *         

                                     *                                                *

                                                            *

                                                      *           *

                                                            *          

         

"B" Company moved along the Northern edge of LANCER

WOOD and widened its front on clearing the wood.

"A" Company moved through/the wood. Owing to enemy

shelling while moving through, the whole Company was extended

into three lines and resumed the normal formation on clearing

the wood. No casualties were sustained in the wood.

"D" Company worked in single file along the bridle

track near the Southern edge of the wood and formed up under

cover of a terraced bank on the South East edge. Three

casualties were sustained on entering the wood.

(3)

INFANTRY ACTION (continued) 

"C" Company formed up on the sunken road in U.18.a. and

not where was first ordered, owing to the hostile shelling

The movement forward was splendidly carried out. On the

right slight opposition was encountered but easily disposed

of. No real opposition was met with until we were about

200 yards clear of the wood when all three Companies came

under very heavy machine gun and rifle fire. They deployed

at once and moved forward without flinching.  All ranks displayed

the greatest determination and eagerness to get to the

Bosch with the bayonet; this eagerness was to some extent

responsible for the heavy casualties as the principle of

advancing under covering fire was not sufficiently observed.

On the left most progress was made in spite of heavy losses,

and the enemy hurriedly retired but on discovering [[??  ??]]

strength he reformed.

The enemy was well entrenched and in strong force; as

we had no artillery support his fire was consequently extremely

heavy and unfortunately very accurate. Owing to such strong

opposition we were not able to reach our objective. The

attached map shows approximately the line we established.

This line is well sited and is a very good defensive position.

With determined troops the enemy could easily be held, and

any advance he attempted would be very expensive.

Owing to casualties and to the wide front I sent the

Reserve Company to reinforce the right flank at 7.5 p.m.

This Company made good the gap between the right and centre

Companies. At the same time I requested the 34th Battalion,

which was in support in U.18.a. and U.18.c. West of the VILLERS-

BRETONNEUX - AUBERCOURT Road, to send forward a Company to reinforce the left flank. I instructed the Company Commander

(Captain T.G. Gilder, M.C.) to reconnoitre the position first

and then to move forward at 6 p.m. This Company advanced in

two lines of two Platoons each and took the newly-made enemy

trenches about 250 yards East of the line then held by us,

capturing two light machine guns, one of which was damaged,

and four prisoners belonging to the 91st Oldonborg Regiment.

Captain Gilder then withdrew and made good the gap between

the left and centre Coys.

At 10 p.m. I requested the C.C. 34th Battalion to send

two Coys. forward, one to the sunken road in U.18.,a, the 

other to a position 500 yds. North East of LANCER WOOD.

At 11 p.m. the enemy attempted a local counter attack

against my left Coy. but was repulsed. Heavy rain fell

from early in the afternoon till late at night.  Working over

the ploughed fields under such conditions affected the

Lewis guns and rifles. Every man was drenched to the skin

and very cold, but this did not dampen his ardour.  All maps

were soon rendered useless and the writing of messages was

extremely difficult.

Our flanks were somewhat in the air. On our left xxx

the Warwicks were about 600 yards behind. The 66th

Division were on our right, but touch with them was not

obtained. In order to secure my right flank the right

Support Coy. of the 34th Battalion supplied a platoon for

patrolling and also to establish a post South of LANCER

WOOD on the VILLERS-BRETONNEUX - AUBERCOURT Road.

Our front was well protected by Vickers and Lewis

Guns. We haxd five Vickers guns from the 9th Aust. Machine

Gun Coy. - two covered either flank and one the centre, and 

we had 25 Lewis guns.

We were relieved by the 10th ESSEX and the ROYAL WEST

SURREY Regiment of the 18th Division this morning; the

relief was completed by 6.15 a.m.

After several attempts to choose a reasonably safe

position Battalion Headquarters were established at

V.7.d.30.95. The pre-arranged position was untenable.

(P.T.O.)

(4)

OUR ARTILLERY: 

8. NIL

HOSTILE ARTILLERY: 

9. The enemy made the most of every gun he had and shelled LANCER WOOD and the VILLERS-BRETONNEUX - 

AUBERCOURT Road very heavily with 5.9s - 4.2x - and

77's, also captured 10 pounders.

He used only  [[?]] against our line and

[[?]] very few casualties.

CASUALTIES:  

10,

Unit	Killed i/action		Wounded		Missing		Total
	Off	O/R	Off	O/R	Off	O/R	Off	O/R
33rd Bn	3	25	5	130	-	5	8	160
34th Bn.	1	3	-	24	-	6	1	33
9th H.G. Coy.	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	2
9th Corps Cyclists	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	1
Totals	5	28	5	157	-	11	10	196

The strength of the 33rd Battalion was 20 Officers

and 527 other ranks. Although our casualties were

high I consider the end gained well worth this cost.

It is interesting to note that the Reserve Coy,

had only ^one casualty and that one occurred on completion 

of relief.

MEDICAL: 

11 The R.A.P was established on the VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 

- AUBERCOURT Road, 500 yds. north of the BOIS DE

HARGARD, and was in touch with the 9th Aust. Field

Ambulance at the outset. Between 7 p.m. and 10 p.m.

there was a delay in the evacuation owing to the large 

number of stretcher cases, but this was rectified as

soon as possible. Additional stretcher bearers was

sent forward by the 33rd and 34th Battalion. From 10 p.m.

the horse ambulance came within 400 yards of the R.A.P.

and cases were send from the R.A.P. to this point by

wheeled stretchers.

It is estimated that 95% of the casualties were

caused by bullets.

I specially wish to express my deepest appreciation

of the splendid work of the 9th Field Ambulance.

This unit worked exceedingly hard, and is to be highly

commended for their efforts.

special mention: 

12. I have to bring to your notice the names of 

certain Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men

whose action deserve special mention.

Recommendations will be submitted later.

(sgd) L.J. MORSHEAD, Lt-Col.

Commanding 33rd Battalion A. I. F.

Rough sketch

showing Battn.

Dispositions

30.3.18

Front line thus:-

British positions:-

 

Diagram - see original document

 

COPY

NINTH AUSTRALIAN FIELD AMBULANCE

31.3.1918

REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS BY 33RD AND 34TH BATTALIONS

Major SMEAL was placed in charge or rear evacuations and Major SMYTH

in charge of forward evacuations.

Ambulance Headquarters were at GENTELLES

Major SMYTH's         "               "       "          "

Major SMEAL'S         "               "       "     BOVES.

 

Major SMEAL had with him the Transport, one Section of bearers, and

a Reserve made up of special duty men.

Major SMYTH had two Sections of bearers.

Captain McLEAN was send forward to CACHY with one complete Section

of bearers and 2 squads from remaining Section, the remainder being held

in reserve at GENTELLES.

Three horse-drawn Ambulances and one G.S wagon were sent forward

to Captain McLEAN at the commencement of operations.

The total number of cars in the Ambulance were four Talbot cars and

one Ford car. These were distributed as follows:-

2 Talbots and 1 Ford with Captain McLEAN and 2 Talbots

with Major SMEAL.

ROUTES OF EVACUATION.

From R.A.P. along VILLERS-BRETONNEUX - AUBERCOURT Road to junction

of CACHY-MARCELCAVE track to CACHY, thence to BOVES, thence to C.C.S. at

NAMPS, a distance of 42 kilometres roughly.

A.D.M.S. 61st Division promised to let us have further transport

if available but owing to casualties at night among Imperial troops this

was found to be impossible.

Cars were commandeered during the night from Ambulances along the

road which were at the moment slack.

Arrangements were made with Brigade to send two 3-ton lorries to

CACHY, then to BOVES and from there to C.C.S.  Those reported about

4.30 a.m.

There was considerable congestion at BOVES at times owing to lack

transport and distance to be covered.

The lorries helped considerably to clear the position and no

further trouble was expereienced.

There were no great difficulties at any stage to overcome from

R.A.P. to CACHY.

About 9 a.m. on 31.3.1918 CACHY and BOVES reported all clear.

One Section, brought up from Major SMEAL at 9 a.m. on 31.3.1918,

was sent to CACHY and all Bearers and M.Os. from forward area withdrawn

to rest.

Number of casualties put through from 4.45 p.m. 30.3.1918 to 9 am 31.3.1918 :-

5 Officers.

125 Other ranks.

2 prisoners of war.

2 deceased

In addition 46 Imperial troops were put through, making a total of 

177.

 

(sgd.) ALAN F. JOLLEY Lt.-Col.

C.O. 9th Australian Field Ambulance.

NINTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brigade Headquarters,

1st April, 1918.

My dear Sir John,

I am sending you herewith report of Counter Attack

operation on afternoon and evening of 30th March. We were

ordered to re-establish a line from AUBERCOURT inclusive to

about 100 yards south of first C in MARCELCAVE. Though AUBERCOURT

was not captured - in fact not attacked - we hold a

splendid line. No Artillery support was given us - it was not

asked for - owing to uncertainty of both British and German

line.

The action of the 12th Lancers covering our flanks was

magnificent, and our Officers and men are wildly enthusiastic

about the whole operation, and particularly their opportunity

for work with the Cavalry.

The present position here is as follows:-

The 61st Division at 2.30 a.m. this morning handed over

to 18th Division (Major General LEE) under whose orders we now

are.

The 33rd, 34th and 36th Battalions with Machine Gun

Company and Light Trench Mortar Battery are nightly billetted

in CACHY, but move northwards to edge of BOIS ABBE during day

to avoid casualties from shelling of CACHY. The 35th Battalion

is holding the line as from the night of 31/31st March between

VILLERS-BRETONNEUX - MARCELCAVE Road from point just north of

L IN MARCELCAVE to Main East and West road through ABANCOURT

point just south of letter C in ABANCOURT.  both roads

inclusive. We were put in simply to permit of tangled units

being withdrawn for reorganisation, and expect to be relieved

to-night or to-morrow. The 35th Battalion will then move back

to CACHY. The whole Brigade will then be held for counter

attack work.

Our line south of 35th Right Flank runs practically

in a straight line to HANGARD which is held by British; from

then ^to MOREUIL the line is indefinite, although MOREUIL is

reported held by us. The 18th Division troops seem steady and

I think should hold the line securely. My Headquarters remain

at GENTELLES where also is stationed the 18th Division Advances

Headquarters; their rear Headquarters being at BOVES. Our

transport is Brigaded and is stationed at INN at Cross Roads

South of B in BLANGY-TRONVILLE. In this town itself our train

Company and "B" teams are stationed, while Brigade Dump of all

Battalion packs etc. is being established at ALLONVILLE south

west from your Headquarters. Our Field Ambulance is with us 

at GENTELLES.

All my fellows are in splendid heart and fit for anything.

We are receiving the warmest welcome from British

Commanders and troops.

Would you kindly ask your Staff to send us particulars

as to where British line now is North of SOMME.

Major-General Mackenzie, G.O.C. 61st Division, sent

me a very kind congratulatory letter concerning our operation.

Yours faithfully

Charles Rosenthal

 

Major-General Sir John MONASH, K.G.B., V.D.,

G. C. G.,

Third Australian Division.

 

 **Now held by enemy 12.30 PM 1.4.18**

April 1918

G.1

 

1. Defensive Zone N & N.E. of Buire

   ? Red boundary

2. Rear lines of Defence, & order of

   Withdrawal

3. Return of 9th Bde. - Letter

   ? 2 B^ns of 13^th Bde as Div. Reserve

   of reconnaissance.

4. 13^th Bde to pass over to 4^th Div.
5. Inclusion of Bonnay in my Zone

6. Arty. reliefs to to be done in one night

 

[[?]] mean the order of Infantry

attached to Signals - 13^th Bde.

 

Reconnaissance 13th

1/4/18

Artlly liason Officer

for Forward Bn of

15th Bde

 

Drunk M.P. seen

coming thro Bonnay

carrying bag full of 

champagne

 

Batteries for Lucas

Lamps wanted by 11th Bde

 

2 stokes guns of

15th Bde w/ 11th Bde

to be returned to 15 Bde

 

B.M.No. 33/161.

Copy 7/4/18.

NINTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Brigade Headquarters,

1st. April, 1918.

G.O.C.

2nd. Cavalry Division.

In connection with counter-attack operations carried out

by my Brigade on the afternoon and evening of 30th. March,  I should

like to tell you how much my troops valued the assistance given by

the 12th. Lancers. Both Officers and men taking part in the operation

were enthusiastic in their appreciation, and we all certainly

esteem it a privilege to have been associated with and helped by such

magnificent cavalry.

Could you please let the 12th. Lancers know our feelings?.

I am sending for your information a copy of the report of

the operation.

(signed) CHARLES ROSENTHAL. Brig.-Gen.

G.O.C. 9th. Australian Infantry Brigade.