General Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 18, 28 March - 20 April 1918, Part 15

	Strength excluding  attached	Not at disposal of C/O
	A	B	A - B
	O - OR	O - OR	O - OR
33	19 - 293	2 - 30	17 - 263 (New England)	(Morshead) White (Harkey)
34	39  714	1 - 47	38 - 667 (Maitland)	(Martin) Fry (Wheder)
35	43  634	5 - 44	38 - 590 (Newcastle)	Goddard (Grant)
36	29  701	2 - 27	27 - 674 (Sydney)
	130 - 2342	10 - 148	120 - 2194

J.H.C 16.

18/4/18

Dear General Monash

Rumour has it 

that after the side slip

of 5 Div. the 13 Bde. will 

believe me.    As my

Bns know every inch 

of this ground & can 

bring in a Hun almost 

every night & are perfectly 

happy & contented 

here I sincerely trust that same 

rumour is not correct. 
Yours sincerely

J. H. Cannan

JM
18/4/14

18/4/18

attached file rec. from Corps Commander 17/4/18

18/4/18

GOC

HQ's notes

1) the fact still remains 

that Col Tunbridge had 

not seen the Inspecting Officer's 

Report

2) Any inspection carried out 

now will be after at least 

a fortnight's work on the lorries

by an expert workshop officer

3) A lot is said which 

avoids the real

issue that the transport 

serving the Division was 

inefficient at a critical time.

(*R W

Lt Col*)

PWP.

THIRD  AUSTRALIAN  DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters,

18th. April, 1918

HEADQUARTERS
G.401/1/21.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

 

A.Q.

C.R.A.

C.R.E.

3rd.Aust.DivSignal Coy.

9th.Aust.Inf.Brigade.

10th   -do-

11th    -do-

13th    -do-

3rd. Aust M.G. Bn.

3rd. Aust Pioneer Bn.

A.D.M.S.

AUSTRALIAN CORPS (For information).

2nd. Aust. Division.               -do-

4th. Aust. Division.                -do-

5th. Aust. Division.                 -do-

The following copy of report of a very successful enterprise, 

carried out by a Battalion of the Right Brigade of this Division, is forwarded for information :-

" During the early hours of the morning of 14-4-1918, Lieut.

 C.O.BUTLER, (AERIAL), arranged to carry out a minor enterprise 

on enemy post in K.13.c., 

With a view to detracting the enemy's attention, a 4.5 How. 

Battery was to engage known enemy machine gun posts in K.13.a., 

each gun firing only one round per minute in order that the enemy's 

suspicions might not be aroused.

The party, consisting of two HeadquarterScouts, fourteen 

men and a team of three wth a Lewis Gun, left the crossroads in

J.18.d. at 1.0 a.m. and proceeded along the main road towards the

enemy wire at K.13.c.10.15.

Leaving the main party under cover, Lieut. BUTLER and five 

men crawled forward to reconnoitre.   Within a few minutes an 

enemy carrying party was seen moving along the wire, but as they 

were on the far side our party took no action but withdrew and 

rejoined the patrol.

At 2.15 a.m. our 4.5 How. Battery opened fire as arranged. 

Under cover of its noise, Lieut. BUTLER and Pte W.S.MURRAY 

cut a gap at K.13.c.20.05, and after waiting about twenty minutes,  

led the whole party through.

The patrol assembled parallel to the road, and leaving the 

Lewis Gun and team on the bank covering their exposed flank, 

crawled towards the North-east.    A great deal of noise of digging, 

coughing and of orders being given could be heard, but the patrol 

kept on.

Two posts were examined and found deserted, but as the patrol 

approached a third at K.13.c.20.70, sounds of coughing and the 

smell of tobacco smoke told them that it was occupied. Crawling 

carefully from the rear, they managed to get within fifteen yards 

before the enemy challenged and opened fire.

Lieut. BUTLER gave a quick order and the patrol rushed the 

post.   In the hand to had fight which ensued, nine of the enemy 

were killed and two taken prisoner.

Enemy machine gun posts to the North and East were firing 

heavily and out patrol withdrew, taking shelter under the bank 

one hundred yards West of the gap, while our post on the road in 

J.18.d. engaged the enemy in accordance with prearranged plan.

A roll was now called, and all being present the patrol returned 

to our lines without sustaining any casualties.

S. H. Jackson

Captain.

General Staff.

See original
Dorothy Warner. Feb 5/18

Rec - 18/4/18

*Pressed leaf and flowers*

Major General J. Monash, C.B , V.D.

Commanding Third Australian Division,

desires to convey his congratulations to

...............................

upon................................

.................................

Place..............

Date...............

[*3DRL/2316*]

Australian Corps.

Minor enterprise carried out last night by 

41^st Battalion, right Brigade  aaa   Under cover of diversion 

[by] our artillery, raiders cut wire by hand, then attacked 

enemy post in K-13-c from the rear, dragging out 

two of enemy whom they brought in and killing nine 

others   aaa   Identification 50^th Reserve Division   aaa 

our casualties nil -

Repeat to Flank Divisions

10 Bde
   ______________________

N^o L.H. J. 205.

10.2 am

18/4/18

11^th Brigade

Please convey to 41^st Battalion my 

Congratulations upon ^∧ their bold and successful enterprise 

last night which has secured an most

valuable identification of utmost value.

ADC 81

10 am

18/4

D.A.G, A.I.F.

Lt Col Morshead Commanding 33^rd Bⁿ 

evacuated, gassed  aaa  Have placed in temporary 

Command Major F.G. Grant 35^th Bⁿ   aaa   Wish 

postpone formal recommendation until Brigade 

rejoins this Division. -

A 262

Despatched

7.5pm

[[sig B?]] 
18/4/18

19/4/18

I have found in going round Battalions that 

Lt Fraser has no grip on the Intelligence 

officers of his Bde & that in his efforts to 

direct them he often hurts their feelings 

without obtaining any result.

The real position is that his IO's 

have no confidence in him and his 

lack of tact in dealing with them 

serves to aggravate the trouble. 

When I sent out the instruction 

substituting wires for the daily written 

summary Lt Fraser sent this on to Bns.

with a covering note: All that was 

required from Bns was information 

in any wire for the day on three 

or four points such as 'our [[m lsis?]]' 'Patrols'

I have reason to believe that Gen. Cannan 

does not consider Fraser fit for his 

job as he told me when I brought 

up the question of the Bde 20 being at 

forward H.Q. that he would not have 

him there as he would only be in the 

way.   He referred to him also as an 

'obstructionist'

Lt Fraser's wires to Division have 

not be in to Division up to time on ^∧ (5.30 pm) 

any occasion since the system was 

brought in.

Following are the times at which wires 

were handed in to his signal office

15^th 6pm

17- 6.55pm

16- 5.35pm

15^th 5.25om

14^th 5.46pm

13^th 6.20pm

12^th 6.50pm