General Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 18, 28 March - 20 April 1918, Part 14

3DRL/2316

Fairway
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xxxnde to present fighting
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"at least once a month"
My list of Services  
Mrs Gibson's letters 
Expecting Bal. Sheets  

16/4/18
Brigadiers
9^th & 10^th  
Prisoners stories - 17^th to 20^th
Saving Ammunition.
3^rd Guards.
13^th
79^th
18^th probably withdrawn
√   Cutting out  -  patrol enterprises
√   Avoidance of Arty. Casualties
√   [Clearing out Buire & Ribecourt - except for garrisons]
√   Counterpreparation.
√   Lewis Guns - & Bosch Tactics.
√   Arty. Actions  on  flanks.              
500^× bet. works at
Hailly &
to Amiens line
at 26a. 

D.M.T.S.
B/26.
16 APR. 1918
A.I.F. 
D.A. & Q.M.G.,
Australian Corps.
With reference to the letter from G.O.C., 3rd Australian
Division, attached hereto.
I have written to the D.D.S.&.T., Second Army for a copy of
the last reports on the 37 vehicles transferred to No.3 Aust. Div.
M.T.Coy referred to in Para 4 of the 4th Div. Commander's letter.
I was waiting for these reports before sending my reply, so
as to make it as complete as possible.
May I be allowed to say that I think the Div. Commander has
misunderstood the position and the organization of the M.T.
The M.T. ceased to belong to Division in 1915 and became Corps
Troops.
The S.M.T.O. has to endeavour to keep the whole of the M.T. of
the Corps as efficient as possible.
It is better to have an even good standard than to have one or
two units of very high grade and others of low grade.
The chain is
only as strong as its weakest link.
I have, therefore, since I have been S.M.T.O., Australian
Corps, endeavoured to look at the M.T. as a whole and to making this who
whole as high a grade as possible.
Paragraph 2 of the attached letter states that, as a result
of the re-organization just completed, the 3rd D.S.C. has suffered
very badly and has been made the victim of a most atrociously bad
bargain.
The General does not quite understand the position.
About 12 months ago, the first homogeneity schemes were
brought out by the Imperial Authorities and instructions were issued
that certain makes of lorries were to be taken from Ammunition
Sub-Parks and Supply columns and given to Siege Parks in exchange for the
vehicles they held - generally a worse make and in much worse condition.
I at once saw the D.D.S.&. T. and explained that Australia paid
for all vehicles as a first charge and therefore I thought that
exchanges should not be enforced with Australian units and if they had
to be enforced, then financial adjustments would have to be made.
The D.D.S.&.T informed me I could use my own discretion and,
consequently, unless I was getting a fair exchange, I did not consider
exchange Australian vehicles.
In August and September, 1917, the letters, copies of which
are attached, marked "A" and "B", were received, in consequence I again
saw the D.D.S.& T. and also the D.of T. and Colonel Young at G.H.Q.
They informed me that if I would put the matter up in the
proper way, they would send it to the War Office and would do what
they could to get Australian vehicles left out of this order.
I accordingly put in the letter marked "C", to the D.A.G.,
A.I.F. and on 10-11-17 I received from the D.A.G., the letter
marked "D".
This correspondence speaks for itself.
In face of that letter, I could no longer block the transfer
of lorries for homogeneity, much less had I anything to do with the
form or time of re-organization.

(2)
As to the "most atrociously bad bargain", may I point out that
the vehicles of this unit are now being inspected and the result, as
far as it has gone, is as follows: -
Of 37 of the original vehicles belonging to the 3rd D.S.C.,
5 are good, 9 fair, 3 poor and 7 bad.
Out of 12 of the vehicles just brought in by the exchange,
4 are good, 4 are fair, 2 are poor, and 1 is bad.
This does not go to show such a very bad bargain and I cannot
help coming to the conclusion that the General's expert adviser has not
made a thorough examination of this unit.
Of course, until the inspection is complete, I cannot say if the
position will be better or worse, but as far as it has gone, the new
vehicles seem to be coming out in as good as condition as the old ones.
Para 4 states that the "whole of these 37 "Daimler" lorries were
in the worst possible working order".
My previous para shows that these vehicles were very little,
if any, worse than the lorries brought out by the 3rd Aust. Div. Supply
Column and the numbers in Workshop prior to and since the reorganization,
point to the same thing.
From the 6th to 15th this month, the average number of lorries

off the road daily is 13.20 out of 87 working vehicles.
This, of
course, includes a considerable number for tyres and springs which has
nothing to do with the general condition of the lorry.
This figure is not as high as it was before the exchange, as, out
of the 35 working Commers, for several weeks prior to exchange, there
were from 7 to 10 in Workshop.
Para 4 goes on to state that these vehicles had been reported on
badly.   As mentioned, I have sent for these reports, but, having had
a large number of these through my hands during the last three years,
I know that generally a bad report is on the men rather than on the
vehicles.
Of course, I cannot say what the reports are, until I get copies,
but I feel sure these 37 vehicles have not been condemned.
Para 5 speaks of the interchange being rushed through on March
21st, although it had been hanging fire since October last.
The General here confuses two separate and distinct changes.  The
re-organization had been under contemplation by G.H.Q. since October,
but the interchange of lorries for homogeneity was only first mentioned
by Second Army on the 10-3-18, xxxx ten days before it was put into
operation.
Para.6 states that vehicles are gradually being evacuated.  This
is so, not because the vehicle is very bad, but because the nature of
the work required would necessitate the vehicle being in shop more than
seven days.
Para 7 raises the financial question.  This, you know, I raised
many months ago and, as a matter of fact, was in England checking
accounts with the War Office that cut out of the War Office Account:
£211,000:0:0, when the re-organization scheme was put into force and I
was recalled.
Para 8.  When the G.O.C., 3rd Division is given the above facts,
I think he will see that this para is a little severe.
As regards the vehicles taken over, I now have with Australian

(3).
Units:-
2 complete Companies "Peerless", 2 complete Companies and the
Corps Troops Company "Daimler", one complete company 
"Thornycrofts" 3 Park Sections "Peerless" and the two S.B.A.C's|
"Albion"
in place of:-
1 "Peerless", 1 "Daimler" ^{∧ & 1 Daimler & Commer,}  1 "Thornycroft", "Daimler,"

"Peerless" and "Dennis".   1 "Peerless", "Karrier" and "Daimler"
C.T.S.Coy "Dennis", 1 Park Section "Swiss Berna", "Daimler"
1 "L.H.O.C." and "Dennis", 1 "Daimler" and the two S.B.A.C's
"Albions"
 

or four makes in place of eight ^NINE, and each Unit only had ^has to
carry spares for one make in place of four makes as before.
 

This, I claim, was ^^is a very big gain to the Australian M.T., as a
whole, and does not reflect discredit on the Officer making the
arrangements, besides which, I consulted both yourself and the D.A.G., A.IF
before any definite steps were taken.
The rushed manner of putting the business through, I respectfully
submit, was not a matter that could either be forwarded or stopped by
me or any Australian Officer.
Should you desire it, I will furnish you with fxx  a complete
report on the 3rd Aust. M.T.Company in a day or two and will also
forward the previous reports on these vehicles when they reach me.
 

H.W Tunbridge. Colonel,
D.M.T.S.  A.I.F.
16th April, 1918.

(*GOC's Copy*)
SECRET     COPY NO. 8
11TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
DEFENCE  POLICY.
CIRCULAR  NO. 6.
Brigade Headquarters.
17th, April, 1918.
18 APR. 1918
NoSG401/32/14
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

RENCE( Rxxxr    Sheet 62D. 1/40,000.
( Plan attached Defence Policy Circular No. 3.
( Plan attached.
           ----------------------------------
1.  The following scheme of withdrawal from the present "Forward Zone" to a
(*second zone*) is forwarded for information and necessary action and communication
down to Company Commanders, but no maps are to be in their possession.
 

2.  Our "Forward Zone" is capable of prolonged defence against direct
attack from the EAST so long as Brigades on our flanks hold their
present positions.  It is unlikely that any withdrawals from the
"Forward Zone" will be ordered unless one or both of our flanks
are turned, or are in imminent danger of being turned.
 

3.  The policy of defence is to fight to a finish in the "Forward Zone"
and to make every effort to re-capture lost ground and eject the
enemy wherever he has succeeded in penetrating this Zone.   If
however by the insufficiency of our available garrisons or by one or
both of our flanks being turned it becomes apparent that the
"Forward Zone" can no longer be successfully defended, a definite
and complete withdrawal to the "Second Zone may be ordered by
Brigade Headquarters.
The successive lines to be occupied as rear guard positions are:-
COFY   by "A" and "B" Battalions.
EQPM  by "C" Battalion.
IUKH    by "D" Battalion.
 

4.  Withdrawal of the Infantry.
(a)  (i)  The withdrawal of "A" and "B" Battalions from the main
line to line COFY and from line COFY Westwards, will commence
from the Right.
(ii)  After passing through line EQPM "A" and "B" Battalions
will move Westwards and take over the defence of the BAIZIEUX
defences from the Composite Force as set out in Para. 5 below. -
"A" Battalion on the Right, "B" Battalions on the Left, each

Battalion taking one half (approximately, depending on the local
tactical features) of the Brigade Front.  Any troops of other
Brigades in our Sector will come under orders of "A" and "B"
Battalions respectively.
(b)  The withdrawal of "C" Battalion will commence from the Left.
After passing through line IUKH "C" Battalion will move Westwards
to and garrison the Northern half within the Brigade Area of the
FRANVILLIERS LINE.
(c)  The withdrawal of "D" Battalion will commence from the Left.
After passing through the BRIDGEHEAD LINE "D" Battalion will move
Westwards to and garrison the Southern half within the Brigade
Area of the FRANVILLIERS LINE.  "D" Battalion must not withdraw
until BRIDGEHEAD LINE is garrisoned.
(d)  The Battalion less two Companies of the Reserve Brigade
posted along the SOMME CANAL and forming the Right Flank Guard
of the Brigade will conform its withdrawal to those of "A", "C"
and "D" Battalions.  Throughout the withdrawal up to the
BRIDGEHEAD LINE inclusive, it will remain as the Right Flank
Guard, but after crossing the BRIDGEHEAD LINE, it again comes under
the orders of the G.O.C. Reserve Brigade and will assemble behind
the FRANVILLIERS LINE.
5.  Action of Composite Force of Battalion Details:
(a)  The composite Force under Major M.H. a'BECKETT, D.S.O. will,
when so ordered garrison the BAIZIEUX Defence throughout the
whole Brigade Area.  This force will remain in garrison of
these Defences until "A" Battalion relieves the Southern half
when it will sideslip to the North and assume responsibility for
the Northern half of these defences only.
P.T.O.
(*2 Copies Achd.*)

(3)
(b) It will then be relieved in the Northern Sector by "B"
Battalion and on relief will move Westwards ax to and garrison
the LA HOUSSOYE LINE within the Brigade Boundary.
(c)  Should Reserve Troops of this or any other Division be in 
the LA HOUSSOYE LINE on the arrival of the Composite Force the
Commander will get in touch with and place himself under the
orders of the Commander of the garrison already there.
6. Action of the Machine Guns.
(a)  The Vickers guns at present sited for the defence of the
"Main Line of Resistance" will assist in covering the withdrawal
of and go back with "A" and "B" Battalions respectively according
to the area in which they are now located.
(b)  The guns with "A" Battalion on arrival at BAIZIEUY Defences
will be sited for the defence of this Line.
(c)  The guns with "B" Battalion after passing through the
BRIDGEHEAD LINE will come under the orders of the Machine Gun
Battalion and will become part of the Divisional Reserve.
 

(d)  The four guns at present in reserve in BONNAY will in
conjunction with the Composite Force (Para. 5 above) when so
ordered occupy selected positions in the BAIZEUX Defences.  Then
guns may be ordered forward for defence of BRIDGEHEAD, or "C"
or "D" Battalions ^∧ LINES and will reconnoitre positions accordingly.
e(f)  The guns attached to the Right flank Guard will throughout
the withdrawal remain under the orders of O.C. Flank Guard.
7.  Action of 3" Stokes Mortars.
(a)  The mortars at present in the "Main Line of Resistance"
will be carried out by their teams and will be taken to selected
positions in the BAIZIEUX Defences.   100 rounds of ammunition
per mortar will be at once dumped in these selected positions.
Only such ammunition as can be carried by the teams will be
brought out, this being used during the withdrawal as opportunity
offers.  The remainder of the ammunition at present in the line
will be destroyed.
(b) The mortars at present in reserve will be used as ordered.
It is probable that they will be required to assist "C" or/and
"D" Battalions, in the defence of their respective lines.  They
will then probably go to selected psoition in FRANVILLIERS LINE
to fire into Valley in I.10.
(c)  The responsibility of advising O's C. Sections of Machine
Guns and Trench Mortars of a withdrawal, rests with the C.O.
Battalion with whom they are affiliated at the time of the
withdrawal.
8. ROUTES.
In withdrawing "A" Battalion will keep South of and "B" Battalion
North of the Line J.24.o.0.0., J.19.a.0.0., I.24.central, I.18.c.0.0., 
I.17.d.0.5., I.11.a.0.0.
9, Bridges over the ANCRE.
"A" Battalion will use the BONNAY Bridge at I.23.b.6.3.
"B" Battalion will use the emergency bridge at
I.18.c.2.1.
"C" and "D" Battalions may use either or both of the above
bridges.
In withdrawing the Right Flank Guard will keep south of all other
Units of this Brigade and will use the emergency bridge at
I.29.b.2.9.
Machine Guns and Trench Mortars will cross the ANCRE by the
bridges allotted to the Battalions to which they are affiliated.
The right of way over all bridges will be given to Artillery.
10. GENERAL.
No garrison is to withdraw from any position untill the Commander
on the spot clearly sees that the covering artillery has
withdrawn.
11.  All bodies of troops are, during withdrawal responsible for
their own local rear guard protection.
(Continued)

Diagram - see original document

Secret PLAN

To accompany DEFENCE POLICY CIRCULAR no 6.

1^st XXXX BAIZIEUK DEFENCES.

2^{nd  "        FRANVILLERS LINE}

3^{rd   "        LA HOUSSOYE  "}

^{BRIGADE BOUNDARY  ______}

Two Possible BRIGADE BOUNDARIES  (See Para. 13.): ____

17/4/18.
CHJ. 203.
Austr. Corps.
Patrol of right Brigade attacked
enemy post at J.24.b.7.1  at 3 

a.m. and believe Killed six enemy,
but owing heavy M.G. fire patrol with-

- drew without securing identification.
 

C.H.J  20 3

(*9.40 a.m*)
17/4/18

x.B.461. 17.4.18      A. A. M. C. (Continued)     G.
ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITALS.

TRANSFERS TO HOSPITALS.

DISCHARGES FROM HOSPITALS.