Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 16, 9 October - 31 October 1917, Part 10

The 34^th Battalion detailed for 1^st Objective experienced
trouble from Block houses in AUGUSTUS WOOD and
later from Blockhouses at D11d 25-40.
The 10^th Brigade after leaving jumping off tape
did not keep touch along with Brigade boundary
but, bore away to the left, later gaining touch 
in vicinity of RED LINE.   This movement on
part of 10^th Brigade left a considerable amount
of country not mopped up and the 36^th Battalion
in consequence dealt with the area - from which
a good deal of machine gun fire was being directed
The RED LINE was taken and occupied
by 34^th Battalion and upon the RED Protectn
Barrage lifting the 35^th Battalion promptly followed

the Barrage.   Considerable trouble was experienced
on Right Flank from Blockhouses in vicinity of
TIBER COPSE - and heavy machine gun fire
was encountered on the left from vicinity of
DECK WOOD and CREST FARM.   As a consequence
the reorganised 34^th Battalion assisted the 35^th 
in clearing up TIBER COPSE on the Right and
in 36^th Battalion assisted the 35^th on the left.p
The latter battalion during the advance from
the RED to BLUE Line suffered heavy casualties -
Its left Flank Company was wiped out as
a unit also its Reserve Company which had
been detailed to assist 10^th Bde if necessary in
mopping up of PASSCHENDAELE.   Casualties caused
by machine gun fire
(2) 

On reaching the BLUE LINE the pattern was 
therefore as follows:-  On the left the 36^th
Battalion who had suffered heavy casualties
in the Centre, the 35^th who had suffered most
and on the Right the 34^th Battalion.
My reports received during the battle were
emphatic that my troops had captured the
BLUE LINE but that nothing could be 
seen of the 10^th Brigade on the Left and that
the casualties had been so heavy as to make
it impossible to advance to the GREEN LINE.
Acting on your personal instructions order were
issued at 1.30 PM that BLUE LINE was to be
consolidated and held at all cost while
my Left flank was to be refused to  join up
with the 10^th Brigade in vicinity of DECK WOOD.
These orders were definitely received by Company
Commanders in the BLUE LINE.   Lt. Col Milne was
placed in command of all BLUE LINE troops
and 33^rd Battalion was held in reserve in
 D.11.C, two of its Companies being placed at
the disposal of Lt Col Milne to assist in repelling
counter attack while the remaining two Companies
were held as Brigade Reserve.
During the afternoon information was received that
Bosch shelling and machine gun fire in BLUE LINE
was intense and that 10^th Brigade had withdrawn
to original "jumping off" line.    Later I was informed
troops of 9^th Brigade had also fallen back to
(3)

a position running from D 17 b 30.30 to
enemy blockhouses at D 11 c 30.05.
The remnants of 34^th - 35^th  and 36^th  Battalions
were posted on this line under Lt Col Milne as
OC front line - while the 33^rd Battalion was
held in reserve at D.16.b -
This was the situation during the night 12^{th  -}
13^th -
On the morning of 13^th you personally informed
me that one of our planes flying very low
and very early on 13^th reported our troops still
on the RED LINE.
I immediately sent out my Intelligence Officer
with written Orders to Lt Col Milne to personally
verify the information taking necessary covering
party with him -. This was attempted
but on reaching the vicinity of DEALINE COPSE
they were fired on by machine guns from the
Copse where Germans were actually seen.
and were also fired upon from ASSYRIA. -
All Battalion Commanders personally assured me
that all their men excepting perhaps wounded
and a few possible "stragglers, had fallen back
to line above given.
This line was in process of consolidation and
was last night handed over by Lt Col Milne
to relieving 11^th  Brigade.
Regarding the withdrawal of 9^th Brigade Troops
from BLUE LINE.   The evidence is conclusive
that the fact of 10^th Brigade failing to come
(4)

up to the BLUE LINE has no direct bearing
on our withdrawal, but our men were driven
out be Concentrated Artillery and machine gun
fire. -   The 10^th Bde not reaching the BLUE LINE
naturally left the high ground at CREST FARM
in the possession of the enemy who from this
position and also from MEETCHEELE heavily
machined gunned our BLUE LINE in enfilade.
Further the enemy had field guns firing
point blank - located in ECHO COPSE along the
roadway in E 7 a from about 30-70 to 90-50.
Gun flashes were also visible from vicinity of
ENLIST FARM and ENCORE WOOD.
The attached strength of Battalion gives a
definite idea of the heavy fighting involved
and I have formed the opinion that officers and
men of our Battalions fought valiantly and only
Concentrated Machine gun and Artillery fire
accounted for the withdrawal from the BLUE LINE.
All officers agree that the Barrage brought down
by the BOSCHE on our BLUE LINE (which being on
forward slopes could be readily located) was
the heaviest they had ever witnessed.
The lesson learnt from the attack on 12^th   
must appear to be:-
(a) Enemy had evidently plenty of guns placed for
the purpose of denying the high forward South of
PASSCHENDAELE and the village itself to us.
Also [[considerable?]] machine guns -
(5)

(b) Silent guns placed well forward to
be used only in case of attack.
(c) Special attention must be paid to high ground
in vicinity of MEETCHEELE.   Unless this is
held by us any advance on our present right
would appear to be precarious.
(d) The generally expressed opinion among our
officers of all ranks is that our own barrage
while accurate was insufficient and
many ^∧ enemy machine guns continued firing
uninterruptedly through the barrage -
(e) Pace of barrage appeared to be suitable.
(f) The nature of the country is such that at
the present time a total advance of
approximately 2500^x is too much for Infantry
to negotiate especially if any severe fighting
is necessary -
PRESENT STRENGTH OF BATTALIONS (NOT INCLUDING "B" TEAMS)

Machine Gunners and TM B^y personnel not
included
(6)

The 33^rd B^tn have had casualties 11 officers out
of 20 brought into the fight        - including
all Company Commanders
The 34^th have lost 16 our of 19     - including
all Company Commanders.
The 35^th have lost 15 out of 19       - including
3 Company Commanders-
The 36^th have lost 13 out of 20       - including
3 Company Commanders -

Charles Rosenthal
Brig Gen
G.O.C 9^th Infantry Brigade
 
(7)

14/10/17
Period I ending by dawn on Monday Tuesday 16

11^th Bde in line
9^th     "    in close support
(49^th)      in [[Potiyze?}} for available for
                 work

Period II ending by dawn on Thursday 18

    9^th  Bgde in line
X 11^th      "      in close support
  (49^th)           in [[Potiyze?]] available for
                        work

Period III ending by dawn on Satdy 20

(49^th) Bgde  in the line
11^th                  in close support
9^th                  en route for Campagne

D.M.G.O to arrange reliefs & his personnel to 
correspond, but not to synchronize 

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION    14th October 1917.

Copy for G.O.C.
D.H.Q.,
14-10-1917.
(PL). 

A.H.
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
Divisional Headquarters,
14th. October, 1917.
Major-General J. Monash, C.B., V.D.
Commanding Third Australian Division.

With reference to attached correspondence, I have again
seen Lieutenant WEDD (also other officers who had these men in their
sections), and he has told me that, as soon as these men joined the
Company, they were put through the standard tests of Elementary
Training, and not one of the men passed all of the tests.   As soon
as I arrived in FRANCE with the Company, I also had these men
tested with practically the same results.   I then had them put on
very elementary work, and I personally used to ask them questions
as to what they did whilst at GRANTHAM.
Some told me that they did a good deal of marching, and
others that they did a lot of fatigue duty and guard duty.  They
only had a very hazy knowledge of firing, and some appeared to have
been on the range once;  others twice.   Some did not know how many
points they had obtained and did not even know how many points they
had to obtain to qualify as a gunner.
As regards Major SEXTON saying that I expressed the
opinion that the Machine Gun Training was good, there seems to have
been some mistake about this, because, for the whole time that I
commanded the 9th. Machine Gun Company, I do not remember receiving
any Machine Gunners from GRANTHAM.   We always had to get men from
the Brigade and these men we trained ourselves.   I pointed this
fact out to Major SEXTON whilst I was in ENGLAND.   If these men
were qualified on leaving GRANTHAM, no records accompanied them
showing whether they were 1st class gunners or only qualified.
I consider that one method of improving the individual
training of our Machine Gunners is that only officers and N.C.O.'s
who are qualified to instruct should be sent to the Training Depot.
At present, 1 understand that as soon as an officer or N.C.O.
arrives Home for a tour of duty he is sent to do a course lasting
6 or 8 weeks, therefore this means that there is not the number of
Instructors available that there should be vide establishment of
the Machine Gun Training Depot.
One case I would like to point out :   An officer
recently left this Division after having trained a section for 7 or
8 months prior to proceeding Overseas, and since then commanded
the section in a most able and efficient manner for 9 months on
active service.   With the experience that this officer had, I
certainly consider that he would be better employed licking
recruits into shape than doing six weeks at a school of instruction.
J.M. H CW
Major. -
D.M.G.O. - Third Australian Division.