Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 16, 9 October - 31 October 1917, Part 13

G.O.C.
20/10/17
xxxxxxxxxx2.
Revue of the Enemy’s Actions and Changes of Disposition Opposite II Anzac
Front during the period 28th September 1917 - 16th October 1917.
(Vide attached Map)
========================================
1. The attached map shows the position of our front line when the Corps
took over the sector on 28th September.
The Corps was then opposed by the 4th Bavarian Division and a portion
of the 236th Division (457th I.R.) who were holding the sector about
ZONNEBEKE.  The 4th Bavarian Division was fresh having only arrived ib
the area on the 26th September, but its moral had been lowered by a
prolonged stay on a quiet front.
It will be seen that our line still ran considerably W. of Hill 40 thereby
rendering our hold on ZONNEBEKE extremely precarious.   This fact was
obviously realised by the enemy who on the evening of the 28th attacked
from Hill 40 under cover of a heavy barrage with a view to forcing the
evacuation of the Village.   This attack was, however, easily beaten off.

2. October 1st. A prisoner taken by the Corps on our Right revealed the
fact that the 45th Reserve Division had relieved the 236th Division
on the immediate right of the Corps front and on the night of the 1st/2nd
it was discovered that the 20th Division had relieved the 4th Bavarian
Division opposite the Corps.
The 20th Division was undoubtedly one of the most distinguished Divisions
in the German Army.   Early in August 1914 it was responsible for the
assault and capture of the fortress of LIEGE and in April 1915 took a
prominent part in the Great German Summer Offensive on the Russian front.
Successful fighting against the French in CHAMPAGNE in September and
again against the Russians in June 1916 -- when they were largely instrumental
in bringing the Russian advance to a standstill - increased the
reputation of the Division.   On retransfer to the Western front it was
engaged in extremely hard fighting from the 20th April to 6th May 1917
in the great French attack on the AISNE and after a short rest was again
despatched to the Eastern front where it took part in the Austro-German
offensive between BRODY and the CARPATHIANS which forced
the Russians to evacuate GALICIA and part of the BUCKOWIEA.
The Division was composed entirely of Hannovarians and called themselves
the "STEEL DIVISION", boasting that they had never lost a single trench
throughout the War.

3. This is the Division which was opposed to us on the 4th October.
At 6 am. on that morning we attacked from ZONNEBEKE to AVIATIK FARM
in conjunction with an attack by flank Corps. Our objective was roughly
the line D.23.a.8.9. - DASH CROSSING (D.17.c.) - KRONPRINZ FARM entailing
an advance over a front of 3,200 yds to an average depth of 1 mile.
In spite of bad weather conditions and the fact that ^∧ the enemy put down a
fairly heavy barrage over our right Divisional front from 5-30 am onwards
the attack started well and was carried through with complete success.
Some severe fighting took place during the early stages of the battle
and in the final capture of the high ground in D.17.c. and D.16.b.,
but in the majority of cases the enemy -who appeared to be completely
overwhelmed by the vigour of our assault - surrendered freely.
As a result of the operation, no less than 59 Officers and 2,052 O.Rs
were captured, of which 13 Officers and 383 O.Rs were wounded.   The 20th
Division was completely smashed.   They had adopted the new Gorman tactic
of concentrating all the fighting troops of the Division into the forward
area with a view to contesting every yard of ground, (Vide appendix 1
which gives the German Divisional Commanders views on the subject) and
consequently the depth of our advance had enveloped not only his supports
but also all his reserves with the exception of one Battalion which
still remained unidentified.
Owing to the rapidity

(*R 9.40 am 21/10/17. *)
 

- 2 -
Owing to the rapidity of our advance counter attacks by local
troops were broken up before they could develop, and the only
attack which materialised from the counter-attack Division
(4th Bavarian Division) during the day was a feeble attempt
by the 5th Bavarian R.I.R North of the YPRES-ROULERS
Railway 2-35pm, though several large concentrations between
PASSCHENDAELE and MOORSLEDE were reported at various times by
the R.F.C. and dealt with by the Artillery.   From later evidence
it appears that a second Regiment of this Division (9th Bavarlan
I.R.) was also thrown into the fight, but probably failed
to reach our line since no prisoners were taken.
Our Artillery success was practically as complete.   Hostile
batteries which were supposed to cover the front had been
carefully located and very effectively neutralised and consequently
throughout the day his shelling was conspicuously feeble and
erratic in spite of the excellent ground observation still
afforded to him by the PASSCHENDAELE Ridge.
There can be l1ttle doubt that if it had been in accordance
with the wishes of the Higher Command we could have captured
PASSCHENDAELE this day with slight opposition.

4. A mixture of the 20th Division and the 4th Bavarian Division
apparently continued to hold the line until the 7th, when they
were relieved by the 195th Division which had been hastily
brought up from the South.   The whole relief was only completed
by the morning of the 9th.

5. 9th October.
At 5-20am we attacked again in conjunction with Corps
on our flanks. Owing to extremely bad weather conditions
the movement of troops up to their assembly positions was
attended with the greatest difficulties and low lying areas
were found to be practically impassable.   In spite of this
we made considerable progress advancing our line over a very
difficult piece of country to an average depth of 500 yards,
and, at the end of the day, our line ran from the level crossing
D .17 .b.4.3. through KEERSELAARHOEK and MARSH BOTTOM to the
Western edge of the cemetery in D.3.b.
The 6th and 8th Jaeger Regt. who were responsible for the
defence of the BELLVUE Spur made a very determined resistance
but on the right the 233rd R.I.R. (also of the 196th Division)
fought indifferently and large numbers surrendered to weak
detachments of our men.
This Division probably in view of the experiences gained
on the 4th, had reverted to the old German method of holding
the line in depth.   The actual battle zone was apparently
lightly held;  the Support Battalions 1000/1500 yards in rear
and the Reserve Battalions were East of the PASSCHENDAELE
Ridge.   No counter attacks were reported during the day and
the fact that practically no prisoners of the support Battalions
were captured would appear to indicate that no effort was
made by those to regain any of the ground lost.
The total number of prisoners captured by the Corps as
a result of the advance was 4 Officers and 303 O.R.

6. 12th October.
From the 10th inst the enemy had adopted the policy of
putting down a fairly heavy concentration, including a considerable
proportion of Gas shells from about 4-30 am till dawn on our
possible assembly positions.   Those tactics in conjunction
with a very wet dark night made the assembly of our troops
a matter of considerable difficulty.   Moreover the state of the
ground was so bad that our artillery work was seriously hampered.
At 5-25am we attacked.   On our right along the high ground
considerable
 

- 3 -
considerable progress was made and detachments undoubtedly
penetrated E. of TIBER (D. 12d.) but on the left we were held
up almost at once by very heavy M.G. fire and some uncut wire.
Very heavy fighting ensued throughout the morning but little
progress was made and finally our Right, which had suffered
severely from enfilade fire from M.Gs. - especially from the
Southern slopes of the BELLEVUE SPUR - had to withdraw.
Our present front line, which has remained practically
unaltered since the above is shown on the attached map.
The 195th DIV. was still holding the line on the 12th
and the order of Battle remained the same, i.e. N. to S.
6th Jaeger Regt.
8th        "         "
233rd R.I.R.
Their dispositions, however, had been altered; each Regt.
had pushed forward 2 Battalions into the forward area and their
Reserve Battalions had been moved up to the Western slopes
of the PASSCHENDAELE Ridge. Whether this was done to conform
with the new defensive policy laid down by the German Higher
Command about the beginning of September or simply due to the
fact that the Battalions were by this time much reduced in
strength is still doubtful.   Their Battalions were by this
time undoubtedly weak, and in the case of the 233rd R.I.R.,
not only had all three Battalions been put in the front line
but it was thought necessary to further reinforce them by 2 Coys
of Pioneers and the Regimental Trench Mortar Detachment.
As regards the Division, it must be admitted that it was a
formidable defensive unit, containing 2 Jaeger Regts who were
equipped with a double allowance of M.G.s, both light and heavy.
Those M.G's., aided by the commanding position of the BELLEVUE
Spur and the waterlogged condition of the ground, were undoubtedly
a very valuable asset for the defence.
As a result of this attack, 24 Officers and 520 O.R.s were
captured by the Corps.

N.C. Huddleston
2/Lieut.
for Brig.-General G.S
II ANZAC CORPS.
20th October 1917.

This picture is a very fair illustration of the
ground over which we attacked on Oct 4 & Oct
[[ 2.  ?]] – The buildings in the background
are Bosch "pill boxes", i.e. Reinforced
Concrete cabins, in which he shelters during
our bombardments, & out of which we have to
bomb & bayonet him during our attacks

JM
23/10/17 

F I G H T I N G    S T R E N G T H     20/10/17.

PLUS  REINFORCEMENTS  MORBECUE.

Divisional Headquarters,
24th. October,  1917.
(PL).

(* BM

Lt.Col *)

(* Total Infantry
Off.                        ORs.                      Total
382                        7189                       7571

____                       _____                      _____ *)

9^th Aust. F. Ambulance
24/10/17.
Major General Monash.
G.O.C. 3^rd Aust. Division.
Sir
I am returning herewith the file
re. Pte Rutherford.   I have informed
him exactly how the matter stands
& he has decided to let matters
stand as they are, & not try for
a transfer to the Light Horse.
The file has been delayed on
account of the recent activity, as
Rutherford has been on detached
duty.
I am, Sir
Yours truly,
FA Maguire. 

HEADQUARTERS, A.I.F.
Attached 1st Anzac Corps,
26-9-17.

Dear General Monash,
With reference to your letter of 23rd Sept. 1917, relative
to an application from Pte. B.D. RUTHERFORD of your 9th Field Ambulance,
for a commiss ion in the Light Horse, I regret to state that there is
very little likelihood of ^∧ his obtaining his wish. As far as the Light
Horse Regiments of I and II Anzac Corps are concerned, we already
have a considerable surplus of officers, besides six reinforcement
officers awaiting absorption and for some time I have been endeavouring
to arrange the transfer of some of them to other arms.   The Light
Horse Regiments in Egypt are similarly well supplied with officers, and
there is practically no opportunity for a man from another arm to
receive a commission, as General Chauvel very naturally jealously
retains any vacancies for the promotion of his own senior N. C. O's.
If Private Rutherford cared for a transfer to either
the I Anzac or to the II Anzac Mounted Regiment, I think there would
be no difficulty.
Your file is returned herewith.
Yours sincerely,
T H Dodds

Major-General J. MONASH, C.B., V.D.
Commanding 3rd Austn. Division.

(* Action taken &
Rutherford informed
FA Maguire
Lt Col
24/10/17. *)

(* Lt Col. Maguire
9^th Field Ambulance
Please let Rutherford Know what D.A.G, A.I.F has
to say. - You will see that I can do no more. Please return file
John Monash 29/9/17
M.G. *)

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
23rd September, 1917.

Colonel T.H.DODDS, D.S.O.,
D.A.G., A.I.F. (Attached 1 ANZAC).

My dear Colonel, -
Would you please, when when have a leisure moment,
glance over the attached correspondence.
Very briefly, Private RUTHERFORD of my 9th
Field Ambulance is a brother of an old comrade in arms of my
Corps Commander, General GODLEY, who requests me to do what I
can to secure for this man a Commission in the Light Horse.
Solely because I cannot ignore General GODLEY'S
wishes in the matter without exhausting all channels open to me,
I write to ask you whether you could in any way facilitate Private
RUTHERFORD achieving his ambition.   Is there for example any
procedure by which this man could be sent by me to ENGLAND to
qualify as a Cadet Officer for Light Horse?
Will you kindly return the file with your reply
when convenient.
Yours sincerely,
John Monash
 

 9th Aust. Field Ambulance.
21^st Sept^r. 1917.

Major General J. Monash, C.B., V.D.,

Sir.
Pte. Rutherford applied through me in May
last for consideration for a commission in
the Australian Light Horse.    I forwarded the
application to D.H.Q, with a strong recommendation.
About two months ago Pte.
Rutherford was paraded to Colonel W [[?]] A.D.M.S.
& since then I have heard nothing further
of the matter.    Nor do I know whether the
matter has progressed further since then.
Pte. Rutherford is a fine type of man, quiet
& reserved, but absolutely reliable in every
way.   He is tall & spare in build & should
be suitable for Light Horse work.   He is about
forty years of age, but during the recent [[winter?]]
& the work at Messines his health has
been excellent throughout.
Early this month Rutherford paraded to me
& asked my advise in the matter.   I explained
to him that the matter was sure to take some
time to go through as possibly it would have
to be referred to Egypt, He then told me