Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 16, 3 September - 9 October 1917, Part 11

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG0000623
Difficulty:
3

Page 1 / 9

SEPT Division Namor General T. Deverell 20c Lt Volonel WH Traill D.S0 es. Lt Colonel Hon RH Collins A6 aMC.Dto 8 26 Brigates Brsent B Genl Ginl forte Soties Stimes is 2 Eost Lancashers) 0 Doc Man Geveral Hos Sis H. Leura KCB G attol Bruowes Sa Maywhuker 199 Byd 198 it 19 Briglsenl Erytal ByBel Lavers Hunter Boint +
SBOREE. TEIED AUETRALLAN DIYISION. Divisional Headquarters 26th. September, 1917. S.6.386/10. Headquarters, 2nd. A. 8 N. 2. Army Corps. With reference to your letter Nc. S.S. 650 of today's date. - I submit the following recommendations. - Air photographs of the area not having been available, the recommendations must necessarily be regarded as provisional.- (a). The BLACK DOTTED Line on the attached tracing shews the position I would recommend as the final objective. - This line has been selected. (1) In order to include various buildings along the front which may have been strengthened, and may contain machine guns.- (11) In order to obtain a field of view into the valleys on the East and North-East.- (111) In order not to descend into the valley between DARING CROSSING and TYHE COTTAGE.— (b). I would recommend the intermediate halts being made at the following average distances from the BLUE LINE on the attached tracing. 700 yards. 400 yards. 300 yards. The actual shape of the halted lines is shewn on the attached tracing.- My reasons for the position of No. 1 halt are - (1) To include the strong points about SPRINGFLELD.- (11) In order to keep the barrage, while halted, on DESMOND TRENCH. (iii) To allow ample time for the leap-frogging Battalion to cross the upper part of the HANEREEK.- My reasons for the second halt are - (1) In order to keep the halted barrage on the GRAVERSTAEEL SWIICH. P.T.O.
121. (1i) To bring the attacking line parallel to the final line of consclidation. (0). I would recommend that the final Protective Barrage be 300 yards beyond the BLACK DOTTED Line on the attached tracing. (41. I consider the pace of the barrage should be 100 yards in 4 minutes up to the first halt, and from then on 100 yards in 6 minutes.- I would recommend that the first halt be for half an hour, and the second for three-quarters of an hour.- (el. The proposed dividing line between Brigades is shewn on the attached tracing. - It gives the Right Brigade a frontage of 500 yards throughout, and causes the Left Brigade to earry out the Lanlike movement on approaching the final objective. This I con- siderable advisable, as the Right Brigade are likely to encounter greater opposition in the final stages than the Left Brigade. - (2). I would recommend that if it be possible the boundaries of the Division may be made rather more perpendicular to the jumping off line, than as chewn on the tracing. Dhutnonash Major-General.- Commanding Third Australian Division.
27/19/1 Sipan Tuzple From Walter Exchanged at Mewm Gate lipt blen & fay aky. 256 pre trees treer mnt 1 fod ti hith Somtit brown bostet datk green thut fent. frem £ thie blick brown putaly toy White bla red 4 t Water. brown Sutitel frar 114 lyne free on wet White & freen dack goeen grass. Wate
WMTM 1o Divisional Headquarters, 27th. September, 1917. Major J. M. Wells, Divisional Machine Gun Officer. Attached hereto is a letter from Major-General McCAy in reply to a letter from me dated September 20th., based upon your report of 19th. September (M.G. 21, regarding the training of certain men of the 23rd. Machine Gun Company.- I also attach your and Lieut. WEDD'S original reports. Please let me have, as soon as you can, precise part- iculars of the character of the defects in the training of the 25 men whom you particularised, and any other comments that you wish on Major-General McCAY’'S letter, so that I may be in a position to reply to him fully.- Please do not fail to return to me personally the whole of the papers now forwarded to you, and also acknowledge safe receipt to me by Special memo. Hhnbronash Ma jor-General. - Commanding Third Australian Division.
1 11 Jpves Offensive 4 44 24 Objective as fixed, up to 11 p.mm on 28/9/17 See mip Graventapt 10000 attached. is our approse front line, on 28/9/17. - This is to be veriful or AAN amended by G.O.C. 9th Bde - The point of junction H, with 2d Anst Div. in to be taken as D. 21.d.2.1 E Boundary between 16th Bde & N.Z.Dw. ABCDEF Boundary between 10th Bde & 11th Bde. HTSLM + Boundary between 11th Bde & 2nd Anst. Dw. - The NFKOK latter will make itself responsible to whole of Mames Wood. the railway is inclusive to 11th Bden- is approsennate position of a 12 minnte halt of the barrage.- BT0 to line which infantiry, reach & halt at, during a One how halt CSF of the barrage. is appoosnnate position of the support line to be strongly consoli. DLC dated by us. - The barrage will halt for 12 minutes to cover this line, to enable last battations to Cappry, and tha battalions to start digging. This line may possibly be brought a little to the Weat is our final objective. - thes is to be captured & a line consolidated K there, with covering troops pushed a little knother east.- shows how one left is to be refused, in case N.L. Division doe not GE go as fol forward a the line FMR (Produced north as shown) Barrage or to begin 150t tast of one pump off & stop ther for 3 minuter It will then jump 100 in 4 min, a 50 every 2min. F 200 It will then pump 100 every Com, a 50t every 3 min. For remainder of it advance, except fo the thiee longer halt named above.- 84911 ohnmonash
Hmy Commander T. Defensive Orfanization & taking over. Cable buries Z. Pretiminary Horks tacks bridges oer Lonnebitle. 4.8 AA.TE 3. Battery positions o Counterbatter work 5. Bombardment of Strong Foints provements on O/f night 7. Movements on F/S night D Sppivack water, mach & assembly 9. Withdawat of 2 N 9th Bde. 10. Allotment of Objectives Barrage 11 12 Hatts 13 M.G. Barrage 14. M.G. guns with Brigades T.Ms with Brigader. Moy Poritiong H.O. 17 Signal Communiations 18 Consolidation - 2 lines - Sections 19th Anticarccraft, S guns 20 lovenng troups & S.O.D. line 21 Imployment of Peonces - roat & tacks 22 Imployment of Enginees 23. Administration Busg Map Blue map tacks chects 20000 shek w000 fite 201
Eens 1st & 2n 2F 324 + &29 #83 613 X141 x183 don 440 4-29 23 10 6731 51.30 23 4 3430 88
Conference with 10-311- Bdis BausgeRat -530 Assembly hind Appch Rost Ruint Cibl bl white none Facton o 4.8 the prop to 11t/4-23 N.42 C:44 DDesposition 28 Hopper up hesfical objection movements firl stape B/A i sond stap 12/5 night Dentination patch Recommnng be los estination htok 4th 6. Use of Mata 10th 2t A 24 B 26D. 2th Ade orpers 18th Ade pfmitin Mape Thots 20/9 red D.41 0

25 SEP 1917

3rd Division
GOC Major General T. Deverell
G. Lt Colonel WH Traill D.S.O.
AQ. Lt Colonel Hon RH Collins

CMG. DS.O.
  8th              9th       & 26 Brigades

Genls      Br Genl       Br Genl

Holmes      Potter.        Foster

66th Division

(East Lancashire). 

GOC Major General Hon Sir HA Lawrence
KCB
G. Lt Col Burrowes
AQ Major Luker
197th         198th      199th Brgde

BrgGenl  BrgGenl  BrgGenl

Borret      Hunter     Travers

G 

 

 

SECRET.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
26th. September, 1917. S.6.386/10.

Headquarters,
2nd. A. & N. Z. Army Corps.-
With reference to your letter No. S.G. 650 of today's
date. - I submit the following recommendations. - Air photographs
of the area not having been available, the recommendations must
necessarily be regarded as provisional.-
(a). The BLACK DOTTED Line on the attached tracing shews the
position I would recommend as the final objective. - This line
has been selected -
(i) In order to include various buildings along the front which
may have been strengthened, and may contain machine guns.-
(ii) In order to obtain a field of view into the valleys on the
East and North-East.-
(iii) In order not to descend into the valley between DARING
CROSSING and TYNE COTTAGE.—
(b). I would recommend the intermediate halts being made at the
following average distances from the BLUE LINE on the attached
tracing. -
700 yards.
400 yards.
300 yards.
The actual shape of the halted lines is shewn on the
attached tracing. -
My reasons for the position of No. 1 halt are -
(i) To include the strong points about SPRINGFLELD. -
(ii) In order to keep the barrage, while halted, on DESMOND
TRENCH. -
(iii) To allow ample time for the leap-frogging Battalion to
cross the upper part of the HANEBEEK. -
My reasons for the second halt are -
(i) In order to keep the halted barrage on the GRAVENSTAFEL
SWITCH.
P.T.O. 

 

(2).
(ii) To bring the attacking line parallel to the final line
of consolidation.-
(c). I would recommend that the final Protective Barrage be
300 yards beyond the BLACK DOTTED Line on the attached tracing.-
(d). I consider the pace of the barrage should be 100 yards
in 4 minutes up to the first halt, and from then on 100 yards in
6 minutes.-
I would recommend that the first halt be for
half an hour, and the second for three-quarters of an hour.-
(e). The proposed dividing line between Brigades is shewn on
the attached tracing. - It gives the Right Brigade a frontage of
500 yards throughout, and causes the Left Brigade to carry out the
fanlike movement on approaching the final objective. This I considerable 
advisable, as the Right Brigade are likely to encounter
greater opposition in the final stages than the Left Brigade. -
(f). I would recommend that if it be possible the boundaries
of the Division may be made rather more perpendicular to the
jumping off line, than as shewn on the tracing.
John Monash
Major-General. -
Commanding Third Australian Division. -
 

 

27/9/17
Jigsaw Puzzle from Walter
Exchanged at Menin Gate
light blue & grey sky.
256 pieces
Diagram - see original document
 

 

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
27th. September, 1917.
Major J. M. Wells,
Divisional Machine Gun Officer.
Attached hereto is a letter from Major-General McCAY
in reply to a letter from me dated September 20th., based upon your
report of 19th. September (M.G. 2), regarding the training of certain
men of the 23rd. Machine Gun Company.-
I also attach your and Lieut. WEDD'S original reports.
Please let me have, as soon as you can, precise particulars 
of the character of the defects in the training of the 25 men
whom you particularised, and any other comments that you wish on
Major-General McCAY'S letter, so that I may be in a position to reply
to him fully.-
Please do not fail to return to me personally the
whole of the papers now forwarded to you, and also acknowledge safe
receipt to me by special memo.
John Monash 

Major-General. –
Commanding Third Australian Division.
 

 

29/9/17

[*To be returned, with map, to

G.O.C. when dealt with. JM*]

Ypres Offensive
Objectives as fixed, up to 11 p.m. on 28/9/17
See map Gravenstafel 1/10000 attached. –
AHN is our approx. front line, on 28/9/17. – This is to be verified or
amended by G.O.C. 9th Bde. –  The point of junction N,
with 2nd Aust. Div. is to be taken as D.21.d.2.1
ABCDEF = Boundary between 10th Bde & N.Z. Div.
HJSLM = Boundary between 10th Bde & 11th Bde.
N[[O]]PKQR = Boundary between 11th Bde & 2nd Aust. Div. – The
latter will make itself responsible for whole of Thames Wood.
The railway is inclusive to 11th Bde. –
BJO is approximate position of a 12 minute halt of the barrage. –
CSP is line which infantry, reach & halt at, during a one hour halt
of the barrage.
DLQ is approximate position of the support line to be strongly consolidated 
by us. – The barrage will halt for 12 minutes to cover this
line, to enable last battalions to leapfrog, and third battalions
to start digging. [This line may possibly be brought a little to the S. West)
F[[?]]R. is our "final objective". – This is to be captured & a line consolidated
there, with covering troops pushed a little further east. –
GE. shows how our left is to be refused, in case N.Z. Division does not
go as far forward as the line FMR (produced north as shown)
Barrage is to begin 150x East of our jump off & stop there for 3 minutes
It will then jump 100x in 4 min, or 50x every 2min. for 200x. –
It will then jump 100x every 6 min, or 50x every 3 min. for remainder of
its advance, except for the three longer halts named above. –
John Monash  

29/9/17
 

 

30/9/17

Army Commander

1. Defensive Organization & taking over.
2. Preliminary Works – Cable buries
tracks

bridges over Zonnebeke.
H.Q's

R.A.P's.

3. Battery positions
4. Counterbattery work
5. Bombardment of Strong Points.
6. Movements on Q/R right
7. Movements on R/S right
8. Approach routes, march & assembly.
9. Withdrawal of 2 Bn 9th Bde.
10. Allotment of Objectives
11. Barrage
12. Halts
13. M.G. Barrage.
14. M.G. guns with Brigades
15. T.M's with Brigades.
16 Position of H.Q.
17. Signal Communications
18. Consolidation – 2 lines – Sections.
19. Anti-aircraft, 8 guns.
20. Covering troops & S.O.S. lines
21. Employment of Pioneers - roads & tracks
22 Employment of Engineers
23. Administration
 

Barrage Map

Blue map track.

1/20000 sheets

1/10000 sheets

2 files
 

[[Trenbriden]] enfilade fire
 

 

83

                         clock 5.30-
1-23
Zero   4-0 3-30 4-7
1st L.F. +29 4-29    
2nd LF
 
+83
to 130
5-23}
6-10}
___  
3rd LF +141 6-21    
F.O +183 7-3    

 

 

30/9/17

Conference with 10th & 11th Bdes
Barrage map - 50× halts.

Assembly Line.
Appch Routes Pioneers

Buried Cables
Position of H.Q. & their preparation 
           none      white        dk blue       red

11th  A = 43        B = 42        C = 44       D = 41    

               37                28               39               40

Dispositions
Moppers up for special objectives

Movements - first stage Q/R night }

second stage R/S night. }

Destination patches }

Reconnaissances for locations }

Destination patches

Use of mortars- 11th - 6 - 

10th 2 to A  2 to B  2 to D.
Use of M.G's.

10th Bde orders

10th Bde formations

Maps.

Phtotos. - 

 
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