Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 16, 1 August - 3 September 1917, Part 5

7.
16. To sum it up, it is considered that with adequate and
deliberate preparations ^for a hostile counterattack with a definite ^+ limited objective ^fw out attack, with
a properly designed defensive barrage of fire, and with
effectual liaison between the arms, the troops taking part
in the original assault should be able to advance to the
extreme ^practicable limit of our own artillery, without reaching such
a state of exhaustion as to, within the first 15 to 20 hours, 
as would make it possible for the enemy to counterattack
successfully, with ^any hope of success; but that it is
essential after that time to relieve and rest these troops,
and that ^therefore frontages of attack should be fixed with a view to providing sufficient reserves for the purpose of carrying
out a relief, if possible during the first night, but never
later than the second night after the assault. -
17 [[shorthand]]
18 [[shorthand]]
 

[[shorthand]]
 

Copy for G.O.C.
SECRET.
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
8th. August, 1917.
HEADQUARTERS
No 5.G.43/33
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Headquarters,
2nd. A. & N. Z. Army Corps.-
In reply to your No. S.G. 534 of August 8th. 1917, I
beg to submit the following memorandum upon "Enclosure to Second
Army G. 402 of 7-8-17":-
1. This paper raises the two independent, yet closely related,
questions, viz. - (a). Dispositions for the Attack., and
(b). Dispositions for the Repulse of the Counter-Attack. -
The final dispositions, in any given case, will be those which
afford the best compromise between the requirements of each problem, considered separately, insofar as these requirements are, as will often be the case, mutually conflicting. -
2. The conditions upon which the success of a hostile counter-attack 
depends are:-
(a). Surprise, due to want of vigilance of our Infantry.
(b). Disorganization of our Infantry, owing to casualties among leaders, and mixing up of Units.
(c). Improper or irregular distribution of our Infantry along
our new front.
(d). Absence of, or defects in, our communications.
(e). Our uncertainty as to the position of our Infantry.
(f). Defective liaison with our Artillery.
(g). Absence of a defensive machine gun barrage.
(h). Demoralization of our Infantry by preliminary enemy bombardment.
(j). Exhaustion or fatigue of our Infantry; reducing their
offensive spirit.
3. Any or all of these conditions may be present; some of them,
if present alone, will render probable the success of the counter-attack.-
It is fundamental that, in order to ensure a successful
defensive, our arrangements for repelling a counter-attack should
be as carefully and minutely worked out, as those which are now
P.T.O.
 

(2).
usual for our own offensive. Such care is equally ^as necessary
within the smaller Units, even down to Companies and Platoons,
as within the larger formations. - There are, moreover, special
difficulties, arising in part from the loss of the leaders to
whom the plans have been communicated, and in part to the much
greater uncertainty as to time, place and manner of the hostile
counter-attack than exist as to the conditions governing our own
attack.-
The first principle therefore is that no arrangements for
an attack, large or small, can be regarded as complete, unless
they also include minute and detailed arrangements for meeting a
counter-attack, and their careful promulgation down to the men in
the ranks.-
4. The measures to be taken, in general terms, are those which
will eliminate the factors which tend to favor the enemy. - In
most of the factors enumerated above the remedy suggests itself;
but some of them require fuller consideration. -
5. While want of vigilance on the part of our foremost troops
is often the result of fatigue or exhaustion, there is no question
that the Commanders of smaller Units, such as Companies, Platoons
and Sections, frequently fail to realise their responsibilities as
regards the provision of measures of security, to their front and
flanks, by means of observers, covering troops, sentries, etc. -
Only too often will Platoon Commanders employ every available man
with pick or shovel, often beyond reach of their rifles, hurrying
on their work of consolidation to the detriment of their ^security protection against surprise.-
6. Great importance attaches to the proper siting of our new
defences, whether in shell holes or on a defined trench system. -
Many troops fall to digging themselves in, the moment their advance
comes to rest, and exhaust themselves in useless effort; whereas
half an hour spent by leaders, in deliberately and carefully siting
the defences they propose to construct, with due regard to their
field of fire, and to the Units on their flanks, would immeasurably
increase the strength of our defences along our whole front.
P.T.O.
 

(3).
7. The most effective answer to a determined and organised
counter-attack on a large scale, is undoubtedly the defensive, or
protective, fire barrage, whether by Artillery or by Machine Guns, - 
or both. - It may be taken for granted that with normal vigilance,
our Infantry can effectually deal, by rifle and Lewis Gun fire,
with the enemy's leading line or wave which will usually, (unless
observation is good and prompt) elude our barrages; but an
efficiently placed and punctual Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage
should thoroughly disorganise and bring to a halt all the following
waves. - In this, the important considerations are the time and the
place of the protective barrage. -
No satisfactory arrangements for barrage fire are possible so
long as the position of our own Infantry is indefinite or obscure. - 
The position of our Infantry can never be definitely ascertainable -
even by the use of Contact Aeroplanes - for many hours after our
assault, unless the orders to the Infantry strictly and very definitely
limit the utmost extent of their advance. - While we cannot be
certain that they have reached the objective set, we ought, - by the
nature of our preparations - always to be certain that they have not
passed beyond that objective. - We can, therefore, predetermine the
protective barrage line, and ensure that all our forward troops know
where that barrage will come down, before ever they move out to the
assault. - The practice, therefore, of pushing out reconnoitring
patrols, far in advance of the furthest objective gained, should be
discouraged, until after the defences of our new line have been
thoroughly organised, and exhausted troops have been relieved. -
Such premature patrolling invariably hampers the freedom of Artillery
action, and destroys our chief protection against counter-attack upon
our still unorganised defences. -
8. The value of the defensive, as distinguished from the offensive,
Machine Gun Barrage is still not widely not recognised, but all
experiences in this Army point to its undoubted value. - While it is,
expensive of ammunition and of barrels, such expendiure is justified
by the security afforded. -
P.T.O.
 

(4).
9. A portion both of Artillery and Machine Gun Barrages should
invariably search in depth. coming back at short intervals to the
"Protective" line which marks their minimum ranges. To render a
Machine Gun Barrage sufficiently dense to be effective, and also
to provide for a satisfactory reserve of guns and crews (to replace
casualties and for rest) it is usually necessary and desirable to
bring into it the Machine Gun Companies of all available reserve
formations.
10. There is often great delay in establishing forward artillery
observation, either to detect an incipient counter-attack by direct
observation, or to transmit to the batteries the S.O.S. signals of the
Infantry. - In a deep advance, relay repeating stations, to take
up and pass on S.O.S. calls to the Batteries should he established
at the earliest possible moment. To do this, a thorough liaison
between Artillery and Infantry upon this matter is indispensible,
and all arrangements should be worked cut beforehand.-
11. Although the enemy has planned to precede both his "counter-attack in depth" and his "methodical counter-attack" with an annihilating bombardment of our forward troops, so as to demoralize them, he is necessarily disadvantaged by not knowing precisely the position of our forward lines, unless we assist him in this by consolidating upon the site of his old trenches or upon well marked and easily recognizable features of the ground. - We must therefore avoid both courses, and must also avoid regularity in depth in the lines of our new defences. - The enemy will be largely dependent upon his Contact Aeroplanes for his reconnaissance of our new positions, and if these cannot be driven off by normal anti-aircraft measures, our Infantry must assist concealment in every possible way by remaining perfectly motionless during the flight.-
12. The most important factor, however, likely to assist the enemy,
is the fatigue or exhaustion of our Infantry. This exhaustion will
result, not nearly so much from the depth of our advance, nor directly
from the demands made upon the physical powers of the troops
during the advance, as upon the length of time the troops - after
coming to a halt - are obliged to remain asleep, and without
P.T.O.
 

(5).
hot drink and hot stimulating food. - A comparatively easy advance
followed by two sleepless nights under shell fire will exhaust the
troops far more than an intense physical effort followed by a few
hour's sleep and hot food to quickly restore the body tissues. -
Therefore, to leave assaulting troops to garrison and defend
captured territory for more than one whole night after the day of
assault is to be avoided. - They should be withdrawn to rest and
reorganize not later than the second night after the assault, and
would then be available for a fresh task within 24 hours after.
If the withdrawal can take place during the first night, so much
the better; and in such case the defensive garrison would, on the
second day, consist of fresh, rested troops,- instead of the fatigued
troops which the enemy (as per his captured orders) definitely
counts upon meeting. -
13. It has been said that troops who expect to be speedily relieved,
after the capture of an objective, cannot be got to dig
themselves in energetically, preferring to leave this work for the
troops who are to relieve them. - This is purely a matter of
organization and discipline. - Experience has shown that, with
Australian troops, exactly the opposite is the case, and that, if
we can guarantee to the forward troops a speedy relief, they can
be relied upon for a concentrated 24-hour effort, at top speed, in
the construction of defences. -
14. The ability to relieve troops in the manner proposed depends
upon available reserves, and this in turn depends upon the tasks
set to the Formation. These tasks should be so adjusted as to
frontage and depth, that they can be carried out in their entirety
by one half of the formation, leaving the other half available
partly as a garrison for the captured territory and partly for
employment in local counter-attack. - In such a distribution of
personnel either the Division, or the Brigade should be taken as
the Unit, so that the reserves referred to would not be superimposed. - 
Thus, if only one half of a Brigade is employed in the
assault, the other half being held in reserve, there would be no
P.T.O.
 

(6).
necessity for the Division to hold a further reserve for identically
the same purposes.-
15. It is considered, therefore, that in planning an attack it is
the frontage and not the depth that should be limited by considerations of the hostile counter-attack; that the depth should be
limited only by the factor of the range of our Artillery, in relation
to its final protective barrage; and that the frontage should be
limited - (apart from the necessary influence, upon the problem,
of local conditions) - by the desideratum to keep in reserve sufficient 
troops to provide, at an early stage, an adequate garrison for
the captured territory and to meet the anticipated counter-attack. - 
Troops employed in the preliminary stages of an assault, as moppers-up, local supports, carrying parties, escorts, &c., &c., could, with
advantage, be withdrawn from the fight and reorganized, at a much
earlier stage than is usually the case, and methodically rested and
prepared for such garrison duty on the day following the assault. -
16. With regard to 'mopping up' a shell hole area, this differs
from the ordinary task of moppers-up, inasmuch as the troops allotted
for the duty have actually to clear the area, not merely picquet it
until other troops come up. The numbers detailed for 'mopping up'
must therefore be proportionately greater, and should be absolutely
distinct from the leading lines or waves, whose duty it is to closely
follow the barrage. Two methods of 'mopping up' suggest themselves -
(a). The moppers-up moving in successive lines.
(b). Small Units told off into little groups ready to spread in
every direction and reorganize, and go forward as their
tasks are completed.
As direction is bound to be lost during 'mopping up', the latter
seems to be the best system. It should be practised during peace
training, and good control by leaders ensured.
17. Enemy Machine Guns in shell holes can be dealt with by -
(a). Rifle Grenades.
(b). Lewis Guns.
(c). Stokes Mortars.
(d). Smoke.
P.T.O.
 

(7).
If they are difficult to locate the last, viz.- Smoke, appears to
be the easiest method, provided a long range smoke bomb can be taken forward by the Infantry. A smoke bomb which could be fired from the 3" Stokes Mortar would be useful.
A combination of Lewis Gun action and Stokes Mortar action has,
in this Division, been found useful. On the 31st. July our Stokes
Mortars bolted the enemy from their shell holes, whereupon the Lewis
Guns were able to come into action with effect.
18. To sum up, it is considered that, with adequate and deliberate
preparations for a hostile counter-attack, with a definite and limited
objective for our attack, with a properly designed defensive barrage
of fire, and with effectual liaison between the arms, the troops
taking part in the original assault should be able to advance to the
extreme practicable limit of our own Artillery, without reaching such
a state of exhaustion, within the first 15 to 20 hours, as would make
it possible for the enemy to counter-attack with any hope of success;
but that it is essential after that time to relieve and rest these
troops, and that therefore frontages of attack should be fixed with
a view to providing sufficient reserves for the purpose of carrying
out a relief, if possible during the first night, but never later
than the second night after the assault. -

JM Monash
Major-General. -
Commanding Third Australian Division.

 

8/8/17
Conference with Brigadiers
Aug. 9/17

Introductory:- Out out of line -
2 Conferences (a) Administrative (b) Tactical. - Machine.
Can't address whole Division.
Waste of time unless (a) agenda.-
(b) repeat to units.-
Personnel. (1) Battle Casualties 10250 = all new Infy.
(2) Correction of States & records. - Form B213 the basis.
(3) Replenishments - 1^st & 5^th Divs are transferring -
All 3^rd Div, men from 16^th & 17^th Bdes
Our own Tq, B^ns
Our own Convalescents.
(4) Gather up personnel - decentralize
(5) Man Power saving - safeguard the platoon.
(6) Rapidity of action in - seconding - & new appointments.
(7) Assistant Adjutants - how working - what role?
(8) Promotion in M. G. C^o
(9) Promotions of Officers - seconded officers 
(10) Statistics re men now with units, who came from France.
Arrivals. - (1) Replenishment
(2) Health
Training Battalions. (1) Completing Cadres.
(2) Monthly interchanges. - reward, not punishment.
(3) Correspondence with E group & Tq. Bⁿ
(4) Keep Division advised.
Discipline Crime generally - healthy public opinion
Depends on internal discipline.
Personal soldierly appearance - shaving, cleanliness, walking out dress.
Saluting; Drivers Saluting; Saluting Cars. -
Riding on Vehicles.
Self-inflicted wounds - 17 cases
Court Martial Presidents to be spoken to again.