Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 10 June - 31 July 1917, Part 8

MESSINES SECTOR.
28-610.
DIVISIONAL WORKING PARTY TABLE NO. 1.
G. 51/28.
-----------

NOTES.
1. These parties are not to be referred to as "Fatigue parties", and men are to be told that the work
in hand has a bearing on tactical operations.
Officers and N.C.Os are to accompany their platoons.
3. Punctuality is to be observed, both in commencing and stopping work. The Officer in charge of the
party is responsible that time is not wasted.
G.O.C. ✓               C.R.E.                         11th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
A.Q.                     9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.   3rd. Aust. Pioneer Bn.

Div. Sig. Coy.    10th.          do.              File. - Spare.

8.O.O.
C.R.E.
J. H. Peck
Lieut-Colonel.-
General Staff. 

per Sgt Peck
24/6/17
Germany's Man Power.
1. Originally 25 Army Corps
4¾ millions trained
6 millions untrained
Total say 11 millions
each class gave 650,000 men
2. Started with 125 divisions expanded by ordinary
methods to 137 divisions
3. 1914/1915 Expanded to 170 divisions by
decreasing the number of Regiments and continued
until in December 1916 they had 217 so called 
divisions
4. Dispositions at various periods

5. German losses in one period of 6 months (The Somme)
1½ millions
6. Calculated resources now
Decb^r 1916

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
Divisional Headquarters,
24/6/17.
CONFIDENTIAL Divisional Headquarters
2nd A. & N.Z. Army Corps.
With reference to previous correspondence (Second Army
[[*Corps No. 9 reference to me 
was C.103*]]
A.P.23 of 28/5/17) on the subject of the suitability of Major
Sir H.E.DERING to continue in the appointment of A.P.M. of this
Division, I consider it only fair to him to report that throughout 
the recent offensive operations, extending from June 6 to 15,
all the work of his department was carried on in an entirely 
satisfactory manner, in spite of the fact that his principal assistant, 
Lieut. LOVELESS, was evacuated wounded at an early stage in
the battle. - Both the handling of prisoners of war, the return
of stragglers to their Units, and the maintenance of discipline
and order in the battle area were carried out without any hitch
so far as I am aware. - The A.P.M. was himself on duty, during
the whole period in the forward area - between OOSTHOVE FARM
and TOUQUET BERTHE.
J M Monash
Major-General,
Commandinf Third Australian Division.
 

CONFIDENTIAL.
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
24th. June, 1917.
HEADQUARTERS

24 JUN. 1917

No. 2104/271
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
Brigadier-General Cannan, C.B.
With reference to your report on Lieut-Colonel
MANSBRIDGE and other papers attached. -
(1). I note that you do not make any specific recommendation
regarding his removal from his command. - Do you propose 
to do so?
(2). If you have any comments or remarks to make upon Lieut-Colonel

MANSBRIDGE'S letter of June 20th. 1917, please
do so.
(3). With regard to an interview with this Officer, as he
has been evacuated sick, this must stand over indefinitely.
(4). With regard to the command of the 44th. Battalion, please
ascertain through medical channels whether it is probable
that Lieut-Colonel MANSBRIDGE will be absent 30 days or
more, and in that case submit at once your recommendation
for the, temporary command of the Battalion.
J M Monash
Major-General.-
Commanding 3rd. Australian Division.
 

CONFIDENTIAL.
11th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
Headquarters
25th. June, 1917.
HEADQUARTERS

28 JUN. 1917

No. 2104/271
11TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
G.O.C.,
Third Australian Division,
Reference your Q,104/271.
(1) I recommend, in view of faithful service of Lieut-Colonel
W.O. MANSBRIDGE both in GALLIPOLI and FRANCE, that his services be 
retained in A.I.F. Training Depots in U.K.
I am of opinion that Lieut.-Col. MANSBRIDGE has not the necessary 
stamina and good health to command an Infantry Battalion
in present day fighting in FRANCE.
(2) In regard to para. 18, it would appear that Preliminary
Instructions were issued by C/O 44th Battalion re construction of
communication trench (see para,9) and to exploit success of Green
Line (see para.7), but this was not done, and consequently it was
on C/O 44th Battalion to put situation right. Most of my comments 
were as result of the Battalion's operations when with
G.O.C. 10th Brigade.
(3). Noted.
(4). I am of opinion that this Officer will be absent 30 days or
more, and have consequently made a recommendation for tempoary
command of the Battalion.
J.H Cannan
Brigadier General,
Commanding, 11th Inf.Bde.,A.I.F.
(R.B.). 

To GOC
9^th Aust. Div.
Report by Lt. Col. Mansbridge
D.S.O. is herewith.
This officer also asks
for a personal interview.
J H Cannan Brig Genl.
Commanding 11th Australian Inf. Bde.
21/6/17

SECRET.
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Copy No. 1
Divisional Headquarters,
25th. June, 1917.
HEADQUARTERS
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

G. 5/119.
ARTILLERY POLICY.
In continuation of G. 32/137 of 22nd. June, Supplement to
3rd. Australian Division Order No. 47, I have to inform you that the
Corps Commander has decided to withdraw from the line, all artillery
that can be spared from defensive and counter-battery work, in order to
rest the personnel.
Each Divisional front will be covered by two Brigades Field
Artillery under command of Divisions in the line. Four Brigades of
Field Artillery will be held in reserve which will provide reliefs under
arrangements to be made by G.O.C., R.A.
Consequent on the reduction of Artillery, a less aggressive
policy will be adopted by our Artillery, especially in night firing, in
order not to provoke the enemy into harassing action during the period
in which we shall have no marked superiority of guns in action. Advantage 
will be taken of this period of comparative quiet to push on
with defence works.
Infantry activity will take the form of small raids, active
patrolling and sniping rather than of large raids.
Our mastery of NO MAN'S LAND must continue to be asserted and
careful watch must be maintained so that early steps can be taken to
prevent the enemy establishing himself firmly in any position of vantage.
G H Peck
Lieut-Colonel.-
General Staff.
DISTRIBUTION 
To all recipients of 3rd. Australian Division Order No. 47.
(D.C).
JM
G.O.C.
 

25-6-1917.
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONAL HORSE SHOW
Committee formed consisting of :-
G.S.O. I.
A.A. & Q.M.G.
D.A.A.G.
B.M.R.A.
One other Artillery Representative,
Two representatives Divisional Train,
All Infantry Brigade Transport Officers.
Secretary.
Captain PYKE.
Meeting 25th. instant, settled that Show should take place
during last week JULY.
Next meeting to take place at 6:30 p.m. in "A" Mess on the
28th. instant, to settle:-
1. Events, with conditions.
N.B.
Events to be largely collective events.
e.g., for Sections of Brigade Transport,
Pack etc. Artillery & D.A.C.
Suggested that only open event should be a Jumping
Competition.
Form that Prizes should take to be settled.
Query from what Fund prizes shall be found.

Distribute prizes - but hardly to judge
Suggested that General PLUMER shall be asked to judge, also:-
Colonel Henley,
Colonel Jackson,
Colonel Holdsworth, 4th. Australian Division.
C. R. A.
Colonel Palmer, Director of Remounts.
General Marten-Powell,
Major Jackson,
Lord Charles Cavendish Bentinck,
Lieutenant Jackson, A.D.C.
Suggested that Ground should be selected on the BAILLEUL
Training Area, and permission obtained from Corps.
Bands to play
Bunting
Other arrangements:-
A committee consisting of Major Jackson, Capts Moss & Simonson
to arrange for (1) Invitation cards & Invitations outside Division
(2) Marque & Refreshments for H.Q. guests
JM
26/6/17

G.O.C.
CONFIDENTIAL
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
26th. June, 1917.
HEADQUARTERS
No. G1/258/949.
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
Headquarters,
2nd. A. & N. Z. Army Corps.-
I beg to forward hereunder report on the recent
offensive operations in connection with the capture of the
MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE RIDGE in which this Division was engaged. -
Objective. - The objective allocated to this Division was the
capture, in two stages, of a triangular piece of country in
enemy possession bounded by a line commencing opposite WESTMINSTER
AVENUE and running generally northwards, passing east of the GREY
FARM system to the DOUVE, and thence north-easterly to the intersection 
of HUN's WALK and OWL SUPPORT trench system. -The
respective stages of the advance were marked by what was known as
the BLACK and the GREEN LINES. These lines merged into one line
south of the DOUVE, but north of this River the GREEN LINE bore
away to the east. - The total depth of the advance necessary to
capture these objectives was, on the right of the Divisional
Sector 250 yards, and on the left of the Divisional Sector 2.300
yards. - The frontage of the attack of the Division was roundly
2,000 yards. -
Preparatory Measures. - Although the Divisional Artillery, 
considerably 

reinforced by Army Brigades, targets was placed under the
general command of the C.O.C.. R.A.. yet the detailed direction
of the Divisional Artillery as to Brigades to o engaged, and as
to nature of the barrage within the Divisional zone of operations,
remained in the hands of the Division, as also the nomination of
targets for the destructive bombardment by Heavy Artillery.-
Wire cutting by Medium and Heavy Trench Mortars and by Divisional
Howitzers with instantaneous fuzes was also carried out under
close Divisional supervision.
Ten days prior to Zero Day the two assaulting
P.T.0. 

(2).
Brigades were put into the line on the Offensive Front of the
Division in order to prepare their own assembly trenches and to
clear and improve the avenues and lines of approach and the
tracks, both overland and underground, leading back to the
billets to be occupied prior to the approach march. - Dumps
for ammunition, water, rations, bombs, flares, etc., were formed 
by Brigades and Battalions, and underground Headquarters were
completed for the use of Brigade and Battalion Commanders. -
Two large Divisional dumps of Engineering material were also
formed. - Advanced dressing stations and forward Regimental aid
posts were constructed.
Plan of Battle. - The plan adopted was to attack with two Brigades 
of Infantry in line and one Brigade in reserve; the attack
following immediately upon the firing of four mines, with which
the opening of the Divisional Artillery and Heavy Artillery
barrages synchronized. The advance to the BLACK LINE was
designed as a continuous operation with two short pauses to permit 
of rear waves leapfrogging through forward waves and creeping 
close to our advancing barrage. There was a pause of about
10 hours on the BLACK LINE, whereupon the advance to the GREEN
LINE North of the DOUVE was to be carried out by an additional
Battalion which had not taken part in the original advance, and
had not moved from its assembly trenches until some 7 hours
after Zero. -
Dispositions. - The dispositions of the combatant troops of
the Division was as follows, viz. -
9th. Australian Infantry Brigade on the right, with a frontage
of 1,000 yards, attacking with three Battalions (33rd., 34th.,
and 35th.), with one Battalion (36th.) in Brigade Reserve, and
to form carrying parties. -
l0th. Australian Infantry Brigade on the left, with a frontage
of 1,000 yards, attacking with three Battalions (38th., 39th.,
and 4Oth.), with the 37th. Battalion held back for 6 hours in
order to carry out the second stage of the attack. - The 11th.
P.T.O.