Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 10 June - 31 July 1917, Part 7

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37^th Bn. A.I.F. 23/6/17
Headquarters 10^th A I Bde
Referring to questions asked by G.O.C.
at my interview with him on 21/6/17 I
beg to submit the following
(1) (A)  Strength of Bttn.
(A) Number actually with the battalion on 6/6/17 - 729
Number taking part in approach march - 644
Deficiency between 729 & 644 Shown hereunder
(i) Transport details.                     44
(ii) Qr Mr & Camp Duties
Qr. Mr. Sgts      4
Storemen         3
Bootmakers     3
Tailor                  1
    "    Asst           1
Batman             1
Armourer          1
Butcher             1
Cooks                 9
Camp Guard    4
Barber                1
Sanitary              1

                          ____________________
                             30      -                  30
(iii) Administrative
duties (Clerks &)                               3
(iv) Liaison Duties                            5
(v) Extra Runners for
Bde & Qrs                                                    3

                                                        ______
                     Total                              85
                                                        _______
Number of men who became casualties during
approach march.    Gassed or wounded  35
Strength in assembly trenches  644 - 35     609

2         2
B Total number other ranks returned
to billets on 9-6-17      
609 less casualties 308 380 [MCS] & excluding
casualties previously mentioned which
occured during march to assembly
trenches   =    229
C No of rifles available on night 8^th 9^th June
229 less detaild as under
Stretcher bearers                    38
R.S.M.                                             1
Squaders at Bn Hd Qrs             3
        "          & Linesmen at
Advanced Bn Hd Qrs                   14
Runners at Bn
Hd Qrs                                                    16
Runners at Advance 
on Hd Qrs                                             9
Carrying party                             12
                            __________________
                            Total                    93

                           229        less         93    =     133
II Total number of rifles available
on night 7^th 8^th June exclusive
of Signallers & Runners and including
extra stretcher bearers & carrying 
party. These following figures were
obtained from Company Commanders
as result of reorganization during
night 7^th 8^th June 
A Coy  30  II Coy 40^th Btln 86
B    "     58 50
C     "    33 mgs
D    "     60
Total     181  173  MPS
Extra stretcher bearers had to be employed
owing to the long distance cases had to be
 

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carried by 2000 yds as measured from
the map. This distance does not allow
for movement round shell holes, wire &c.
(2) Question 2 by G.OC 3^rd Divn.
Explain why 37^th Bn failed to make its
objectives.
With respect I beg to state that the
Battalion did gain its objectives
and commenced the work of consolidation
ad copies of statements made by officers
& Lt Cos concerned shew- (copies attached)
I was unable to obtain Statements
from Company Commanders who
accompanied the battalion at he
outset of the operation as (with
the exception of O6 B by 37^th) they
all became casualties early in the
engagement. May I here repeat
a statement made to me by Captain
R. Greene 37^th Bn whom I interrogated
when he was on his way
to dressing station. "A" Company
37^th Bttn was hung up by heavy
machine gun fire from a wood
in the vicinity of UNCANNY SUPPORT"
I would ask please that this
statement be read in conjunction
with that of Sgt Rosing "A" Coy 37^th Bde
(3) Question 3 My G.O.C 3^rd Bn Division
37^th Bttn having partially succeeded
was for insufficient reason withdrawn
by Order"
 

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4
The attached statements show that
during the occupation of Green Line
by 37^th Bn that the units comprising
same were subjected to fire by
our own Artillery. & further that
it is alleged by the statements
of Genls Murdoch & Sgt Rosing (& others)
that the 47^th Bn on our left
commenced to withdraw prior
to this unit
Major CB Story 37^th Bn O.C Reserve
states to me that our artillery
barrage on the evening of 7^th June
covered the Green Line for a
considerable time- He has also
told me that he personally saw
the 47^th Bn withdrawing on his
left for a distance of 3 or 400 yds
or more & that our barrage appeared
to be also on them. After considering
the foregoing conditions & also
the fact o that instructions issued
stated that the advance was to be
by the left & made in conjunction
with 47^th Bn he arrived at the
conclusion that a withdrawal was
necessary & issued orders to that
effect at about 9 pm on 7^th June
A statement including the above
has already been furnished by
the above named officer.
 

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5
It appears from Sgt Rolings statement
that "A". Coy 37th Bn actually started to
withdraw before such order was
received & for reasons stated.
(4) Question 4 37^th Bn was the only
battalion in the Division that did
not take its objective.
It is respectfully urged
that this is not the case, but that
The battalion did take its objectives
& subsequently withdrew for the
reasons previously mentioned and
as explained in attached statements.
(5) Question 5. In consequence of
withdrawal of 37^th Bn and inability
to get it to re establish itself.
the 44^th Bn had to be sent in.
context of
The following ^context of conversation over
the phone as now communicated
to me & to which Major. Story says
took place between him and the
G.O.C 10^th A I. Bde is quoted.
"The Brigadier personally spoke
to me I had asked for the barrage
to lengthen as it was very short
even for the black line. This was
about 11.30 pm ^on the night 7^th 8^th June. He asked me
how much I wished the barrage
to lengthen & I answered " Put it
on the Green line" Later the Brigade
 

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office asked did a still require
the barrage & I replied, "No!". I
did not ask for it. The barrage
was then decreased in volume.
I then a little later rang up
Bde & told them that if the
barrage turned more forward
of the Green line & if the 47^th would
come up on our left we would
resume our consolidation of the
Green line - I had discussed this
with the liaison Artillery& officer
who was with me in the line
& pointed out that it was impossible
for me to move forward without
very definite arrangements with
the artillery. He had already 
himself spoken over the phone
about the barrage I awaited an
answer to this & expected we might
receive an answer at some time
dining the early hour of the
morning But only at 2.30an
on the 8^th came the order that the
Wh 44^th were to move through
us - The foregoing is Major Storys
statement. - May I add that
I was in no way informed ^officially of the above conversation either by
retter of the above convers a yous
Major Story or GOC 10^th A.I.D during
the operation -Major Story appraised
me of it on the return of the
Battalion to billets
M G Small
GOC 37^th Bn AIF

7
Lieut AM. Murdoch "C" Coy states -
"C" Coy reached its objective immediately
after the barrage. This was about 3.30 pm on
the 7th June 1917 and the Coy linked up with the
47t^h Battn near the left Brigade Boundary.
It held the line of the UNCANNY. TRENCH, formed
a double bombing block in UNDULATING. SUPPORT
and UNDULATINC TRENCH and then held the
position of the GREEN LINE to the Coy boundary
about U4.C.45.85. There was a slight gap
between Nos 11 & 12 platoons of the Coy, about
the part U4.d. 55. 95. arrangements were made
to cover this gap by fire
The right of "C" Coy was in touch with
"D" Coy 37^th Battn on its right.
At some time between 7.30pm and 8pm.
Lieut. Murdoch states that he saw a long
line of the 47^th Battn on his left for about
400 yards withdrawing.
At about the same time our artillery 
barrage shortened on to the position that
"A" Coy was consolidating, and "A" Coy withdrew
to UNCANNY. TRENCH. The barrage gradually
shortened on to UNCANNY TRENCH.
We were under this fire for some time and
Lieut Roadknight sent a message to Major 
STORY to this effect and we were ordered to
withdraw. At about 9pm we withdrew to
a line about 125 yards east of BETHLEEM FM.
There was a wood about 150 yards
to the South East of the junction of UNDULATING
TRENCH and UNDULATING Support from which
we were being subjected to a heavy fire
from a number of machine Guns and could
not have possibly advanced against them.
In addition so the Machine Gun fire, we
would have had to advance through at
least 100 yards af our own barrage. Our
artillery barrage was falling from in
front at the BLACK.LINE. forwards towards
UNCANNY TRENCH for about 2½ hours ie until
about. I1.30 pm. Sgd. A M Murdoch 22//6/17
 

8
Lieut N.C.McNICOL D Coy 37^th
Our Coy reached its objective about 3.30 p.m. on the 7^th
and commenced to dig in. "C "Coy 37^th were on our left
and "D" Coy 40^th on our right. We were subjected to
heavy artillery fire and constant machine gun fire
both during our advance and for the period of our
stay on the GREEN LINE. During our occupation of the
GREEN LINE occasional shells from our own barrage
fell into our line.
At about 7.30 p.m. I noticed an apparent shortening-
of our barrage on the left of "C" Coy and in the region
occupied by "A" Coy 37^th. The barrage was heavy. At
about 9.45 p.m. our coy received an order to withdraw
from MAJOR STORY. and we did so falling back to the
BLACK LINE. As we fell back we saw the barrage
shortening and it remained over "C" Coy. for the whole
time they were withdrawing as a heavy shrapnel
barrage. The barrage continued to fall In front &
the line previously held by "C" Coy. In my opinion
the barrage was about 200 yards in depth, and
continued for a considerable period after we withdrew.
We passed the word of our withdrawal to D Coy 40^th
& some of them withdrew immediately, but I cannot
say wither they all withdrew.
Sgd N C. McNicol
23/6/17
 

11
Statement by Sergeant Rosing.
The furthest point reached by "A" Coy 37^th Battn,, was a
line about 30 yards this side of UNCANNY SUPPORT, We dug
in on this line. We never actually reached the GREEN LINE.
I wanted to proceed or to the GREEN LINE. but was
prevented from doing so by the 47^th Battn. digging in on my
left parallel to where we then were.
I saw two officers of the 47^th and asked them whether
they intended to go forward to the GREEN LINE. They
replied that it was absolutely impossible as they were
held up by machine guns and point-blank refused
to go forward. We reached the line which we dug
in about 430 p.m. June 7^th 1917.
At about 7.30 p.m. our own barrage fell on us
as we were digging in. Our shrapnel was bursting at
least 20 to 30 yards behind us and in front of us for
a considerable distance. It was also falling on the
47^th and in front and on the left flank of the position
which we were occupying were enemy machine-guns.
from which we were being subjected to a heavy
fire. It was in my opinion impossible to advance
under this fire. Our Coy, had taken cover in shellholes
and intended to stick it out.
About 10 minutes afterwards I saw the 47^th Battn
running back and as my men were left with no
support on their left flank, and we could see the
enemy digging in behind UNCANNY SUPPORT I
ordered my men tack and we returned to the
BLACK LINE
There were approximately 30 men left in
the Coy.
Jack Rosing. Sgt
M L Lance Sgt
J Robison Sgt
 

Confidential.
37 Bn A.I.F.
23.6.17
Headquarters 10^th A.I. Bde.
With reference to my
correspondence of even date
in which is contained replies
to certain questions of G.OC. 3r^d AD
may I be permitted to ask please
that when questions 3. 4. & 5
are being considered that my
replies be read in conjunction
with Section IV para 1 Sub-paras
1 to IV pages. 15 & 16 "Instructions
for the training of Divisions for
Offensive Action", & that the
following particulars be included.
Strength of Battalion including
II Coy 40^th Bn attached & excluding
carrying party on 6/6/17 806
This number does not include
details left behind.
Length of objective which had
to be taken & consolidated
was considerable area 1200 yds
exclusive of 2 strong points which
were to be constructed in addition
M J Smith
CO 37^th Bn A.I.F
3rd A.Div
Forwarded
H Ramsay McNicoll BG
23. 6. 1.