Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 10 June - 31 July 1917, Part 6

44th Battalion
20.6.17.
Headquarters

20 Jun 1917

AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE
Headquarters

11th Infantry Brigade.
In answer the to the adverse report "in not
reporting on the position and work of the 44th Battalion whilst
under the orders of the 10th Brigade, I respectfully submit
that the 10th Brigade were advised at 8.45 a.m. that we ware
in touch with the 48th Battalion, who were consolidating OWL
TRENCH, as per my message marked "A". Again sketch and
message was despatched at 9.30 a.m. as per my message marked
"B" stating definitely that I had joined up with a company of
the left Battalion.
At 10.6 a.m. on the 8th inst congratulations were
receivedfrom the 10th Brigade and conveyed to my company
commanders as per my message marked "C".
Message marked "D" from myself is correct, and having
in view the unsatisfactory nature of the advance of the Brigade
on the left and the depleted numbers of the 37th Battalion
(some 90 rifles) as reported to me by Major STOREY.
Pigeon messages E, E2 and F are not mine, nor was
anyone authorised to despatch such alarming messages.
Regarding message "G" this hardly applies to
myself, for 1 did not leave the BLACK LINE or its immediate
vicinity except when I went to the ADVANCED ESTAMINET to get
in touch with the Brigade and advise them of the position.
On this being done I at once returned to another shell hole
near the BLACK LINE and right throughout the operation I
maintained the most forward Battalion Headquarters of either
the 10th or 1lth Brigade, and was personally intouch with
each of my companies. It is admitted that there was difficulty
in maintaining touch with companies, except by runners and these
suffered many casualties. In all I was shelled out of four
separate shell holes in my endeavours to be as close as
possible to my command, and these difficulties do not appear
to be appreciated.
Reference paras 16 and 17 of my own Brigadier-
General, these 1 understand refer to the alarming pigeon
messages of which I had no knowledge until shewn them at
DOULIEU on the 19th instant. I certainly never for a moment
entertained such views as conveyed in these scraps of paper.
Re para 18, I would beg to refer to my orders issued
prior to the advance wherein provision was made under the
several heads.
would crave permission to be paraded before the
Divisional Commanders.
W. O. Mansbridge.
Lt-Col.
Commanding 44th Battalion AIT.
Encl-
1 [[?]]
1 [[?]]
4 Copies msges. 

21/6/17
Interviews with Lt Col. Smith
at 10th Bde H.Q.
Dls Smith - states:
Did send order of 8.35 am to Story. -
Left trench at 10.10; H.Q at Ad. Estaminet
Battalion reached Black Line at midday
Did not move H.Q. toward till 8^th & then
moved to xxxxx shellhole in No Man's Land
On evg of 7th On morng. of 8th xx went toward, with A.M. about 1 a.m.
moving to Elds. Bgde H.Q. to near Schintzel.
Could not get thro' to speak on phone
About 10.40 _∧a.m. on 8th established _∧H.Q. forward into No Man's Land
& was himself 150 yds in advance, in vicinity
of Ulna Switch. —
Did not get up to black line on 7 of barrage. -
Considered it inadvisable to shift H.Q. further forward.
At 1 am. on 8th called on Davis – who said he hadn't
established a H.Q.
Sent to Major Story to get him to select an Adv. H.Q.
At 10.40 in 8^th sent for Story. He came down about 2 – the
Was then under the impression that he was in the green line
He said he was back toward or on the black line
on 8th Asked for a sapper & 6 men to construct a H.Q. further ahead; this
was refused by Bgde. -
^In aft of 8^th Received an order to come back & reestablish at Ads Estaminet
until forward H.Q. was fit for occupation
Got back about 6.30 (on 8^th). Mansbridge joined me there. After
talking to Bgde. he went back
Recd. message M.C. 300 & then went up to shell hole W. of
Schnitzel & established a H.Q in a shell hole with Lt Col.
Mansbridge.

2

On night of 8^th at about 11.30 Bgde sent a message
asking who responsible for 37^th - not got out green line
[[?]] replied - giving Story's reply & your instructions to him -
didn't mention name.
I believe Story accepted responsibility.
Mansbridge told him Bgd. appeared satisfied but
didn't [[ ?ture]] of report nor whether it was true
He believed that both Battalions were both on the green line
He now believes they were not on the green line.-
[Relief of 37^th & 44^th by 43^rd was completed by about 8 a.m.
on 9^th]
After 3 a.m. on 8^th, 3 people were getting the same message.
Claims that until then responsibility was not defined.
Did Hqrs give any order for D Co 40^th to more from Commt
of C.O. 37^th — Bgd does not remember doing so.-
Story informed him xxx at 2 a.m. on. 8^th that D Co
40th had been taken away - by Brigade. - Doesn't know
If this was true. - But an officer of 40^th is supposed
to have told Story. 

9

Lieut. R.J.D. Leane "D" Coy 40^th Btn states-:
"D" Coy of the 40^th Battn arrived at its objective
about 3.35 pm. on the 7^th and immediately commenced
to dig in. About 3.45 pm the aeroplane called for
flares and there were lit. They were also lit at
the appointed time.
We were in touch with "D" Coy 37^th Battn
on our left for several hours and as far as I
could see the line ran as laid down.
We connected up with the Battn on our right
by means of a liaison N.C.O.
From a wood near the RIVER. DOUVE we
were subjected to heavy Machine Gun fire
and later from the direction of the POTTERIES.
the fire from this latter direction was
not heavy. There were at least 2 Machine
Guns in the wood mentioned above.
Between about 5pm and 7 pm shells
from our own artillery were dropping
both close in front of & just to the rear at
our position, in the line which we were
consolidating.
To the best of my recollection this
ceased about 7 p.m. although I did not
notice it myself, N.C.Os and men at my
Company have hold me that our own
barrage was put in rear at our line later
in the evening, a period having elapsed
between this and she shelling just referred
to, and that it was so during portion at
least at the time occupied in our withdrawal
from the GREEN so the BLACK line, and
they attribute several casualties we
received during that withdrawal to our
own artillery fire.
At about 9 p.m. it appeared to me
that some four hundred yards or so to the
left our barrage was falling on or near
the line occupied by portion of the 37^th Bn.

10
on perceiving the 37^th Bn withdrawing
I sent an N.C.0 to Major STORY for instructions
and on receiving from him in reply an order
to withdraw to the BLACK LINE. did so at
once. This was between about 9.45 and
10.15 pm.
Sgn R J Leane
22/6/17
 

I am sorry these are not thinner
but it was the thinnest wool I
could get here, wanted to send them
quickly
With Mrs Harold Grimwade.'s
compliments
22/6/17 

37th Bn A.I.F.
Headquarters 10th At Bde
Forwarding herewith written
statement in connection with
certain questions put to me by
G .O.C. 3^rd Aust Division & marked
pages 1 to 6. Attached thereto
are: Copy of 
page 7 of statement by Lieut. Murdock
   "       8            "                       "     McNeal
   "       9 & 10.   "                       "     Leane
   "       11            "                       "     Sgt Rosing & Others
I would like to have forwarded with
the correspondence further particulars
but as this correspondence is required
at Division by 12 Midday today
& the 37^th Bn had to shift to another
bullet. Lt More froom "REGINA"
at 8A.M. I was unable to complete.
I were send in further
particulars in a supplementary
statement
M B Smith
CO
3rd Bn
3rd A.D.
Forwarding Cal Lishi's report.
M. Ramsay McLucall B.G.
23.6.17