Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 10 June - 31 July 1917, Part 5

VILLE DE NIEPPE
DEPARTEMENT
DU NORD
ARRONDISSEMENT
D'HAZEBROUCK
Nieppe, le 18 Juin 1917

OBJET:
I Monsieur Le Génerál Commandant
la 3^c Division Australians

Mon Général
Te rous prie de voulori bien accepter les meillems remercement
de la Municipalite -  pour Comprejement que rous arez bien
voulu témorgner a 'methe a' notice dispositing des automobile fous
l'éracuation des riellards, infirmex, malades a enfante a' la suite
des bombardements répétér que nous renons de subir. Gráce a'
notice zèle & a notice obligeance nous aroses pu les Sousbeavie
any dangers been grands auxguels ils accordient étc éxposér
dans les violents bombardements consécutify d hier & de
la nuit deniere
Sayez persuadé, Mon Génerál que notice raillank
division laissera in préciem souvenir dans les annaler de
la Fille de Nieppe.
Fenilly agrée once notice gratitude l' expression
de notice profounde reconnaissance.

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
MAIRIE DE NIEPPE (NORD)

Le Maire
[[?]]
 

11th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
Headquarters.
CONFIDENTIAL.
18th June, 1917.
G.0.C.
Third Australian Division.
In connection with report of G.0.C. of 10th Australian
Infantry Brigade, I have to further report as follows;-
1. At 10.30 p.m. on 7th June, Lieut.-Col. MANSBRIDGE and
his Adjutant reported to G.O.C. 10th Brigade, and at 11.19 p.m.
Capt. ROCKLIFF of 44th Battalion reported Battalion was the
filing out of CATACOMBS to proceed to recapture of Green Line.
2. At about 3.45 p.m. on 8th Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE telephoned
me from "H" Battalion Headquarters at ADVANCED ESTAMINET that his
Battalion had been driven back and that he had been driven out of
his new forward Battalion Headquarters (a shell hole).
3. I directed Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE to report to G.0.C.
10th Brigade as he was under his orders; Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE
stated that he had tried to get on to 10th Brigade but failed,
but I pointed out that "H" Battalion was a direct cable line to
10th Brigade and that he had to raise latter before getting on to
11th Brigade.
4. At about 8.p.m., as result of reconnaissance made by my
Staff Captain re rationing of 44th Battalion, I and my Staff Captain
interviewed G.O.C. 10th Brigade and stated what we knew of
situation.
5. From enquiries I have made I am of opinion that after recapture
of Green Line by 44th Battalion at about 4. a.m. on 8th
instant the 44th Battalion did not retire from the captured position.
6. At 7.a.m, on 9th June I assumed command of left Sector of
3rd. Australian Division (North of LA DOUVE River). From Brigade
and 42nd Battalion Officers’ reconnaissance, and also from Aeroplane
Maps, 1 found on taking over ^command of Sector, that 44th Battalion had Green
Line on right and centre, but from U.4.a.5.0 the line ran approximately
true North to U.4.a.5.7 on HUNS WALK.
7. I sent messages to C/0 44th Battalion at 2.4 a.m. and
5.5 a.m. on 9th June re my taking over Command of Sector and
that 44th Battalion were to hold the Green Line.
8. At 8. a.m. and again at 9.35 a.m. of 9th I sent messages to
Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE pointing out that his left flank was not on
Green Line or in touch with most advanced troops of 12th Australian
Infantry Brigade (on our left) and directed him to advance his
left flank on to the Green Line.
9. At 10.45 a.m. I telephoned Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE re capture
of whole of Green Line, and also directed him to push out
in co-operation with 9th Brigade strong patrols towards junction
of UNDULATING TRENCH with LA DOUVE River and UNGODLY AVENUE.
10. At about 11.45 a.m. my Brigade Major and Intelligence
Officer reported to Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE to find out what had
been done re capture of whole of Green Line and action re patrols.
11. As no apparent action had been taken, my Brigade Major directed
the Adjutant of 44th Battalion to send messages to one
Company re capture of left portion of Green Line and to another
Company re sending out of patrols. These messages were written
by the Adjutant and signed by Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE.
At 2.30 p.m. and again at 4.14 p.m. I asked C/O 44th Battalion
for information re above two points. 

(2)
12. At 5.13 p.m. I received a message from C/O 44th Battalion
re forward move of left Company to Green Line, and at 5.40 p.m.
Green Line was reported as captured on left flank.
13. At 5.15 pm. and again at 7.35 p.m. C/O 44th Battalion
stated no report had been received re patrols.
14. At 9.22 p.m. C/O 44th Battalion reported as per message
"X" attached.
15. No subsequent report was received on action of patrols of
44th Battalion, and on night of 10th/11th June the 43rd Battalion
relieved 44th Battalion, and 43rd Battalion advanced to a new
position East of UNDULATING TRENCH.
16. I am therefore of opinion that some messages sent by
Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE were of an alarming nature and not
warranted by the circumstances.
17. I am further of opinion that Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE did
not exercise sufficient personal supervision in clearing up some
obscure situations as disclosed in messages above referred to.
18. Furthermore, there does not appear to have been any
organised arrangement made by C/O 44th Battalion for digging of
communication trench or trenches from Black Line to the Green Line,
nor does there appear to have been any re-organisation within his
Command for thinning of front line and holding captured position in
depth. There does not appear to have been any action taken by
scouts, patrols, or posts to exploit the success East of Green Line.

Ian D Cannan
Brigadier General.
Commanding, 11th Inf. Bde., A. I. F.
 (R.B.).

11th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
Headquarters.
CONFIDENTIAL.
19th June, 1917.
G.O.C.,
Third Australian Division.
I enclose herewith report on Lieut.-Col. MANSBRIDGE, C/O 44th
Battalion,
Copies of the whole enclosed file of correspondence and
messages have been handed to Lieut.-Col. MANSBRIDGE.
a. D. Cannan
Brigadier General.
Commanding, 11th Inf.Bde., A.L.F.
(R.B.).
 

Dear H
In our day’s work we often
get some tit bits, and we read and
write many things which don't get into the
papers. - Herewith is a copy of one such. -
It was shown me by a present member of my
staff who was a leading actor in the great
fight of the 4^th Brigade at Bullecourt. -
I believe this report made a great stir at
G.H.Q. & some of the Tank people got
long holidays. -
All well
J.M
20/6/17
Keep with my papers when read.
 

[Copy]
[20/6/17]
Official Report
on Co operation of 'Tanks' - night 10^th/ 11^th April 17.
Tanks
The tank co operation in the attack made on the
Hindenburg Line on the night 10/ 11^th April 1917
was useless or worse than useless as shown below:-
A) Tanks were late in arriving at Rendezvous, which
means that they were late in getting to the jumping
off place. In fact only 3 got to the latter place
at all
(B) Of the 6 tanks allotted to the Brigade 5 reached
rendezvous; 1 being out of action before that place
was reached. Of the 5. 1 disregarding guidance
by 1.0. Fad (14^th) tried to cross a deep sunken road
& in consequence got in & could not get out again.
A second was out of action through engine
trouble before jumping off place was reached,
leaving 3 only to cooperate in the attack.
(C) The tank crew seemed ^to know little or nothing of an
attack by infantry or nothing whatever about
the ^particular operation they were to participate in.
For instance: in the case of N^o2 tank, the tank
commander had not even synchronized his
watch; his time being 5 minutes behind true
time as given to Infantry. Further, tank crew
did not even know the direction of enemy
 

up to their objectives were found in various
places on fire altho' they had not been hit by
shells. One crew in particular when asked
why they had vacated their tank stated that
it had caught fire, but gave no reason for same
This same crew returned carrying 2 sand bags
1 containing enamel ware & the other food.
Personal safety and comfort seemed their
sole ambition. Another crew was asked why
they did not go forward to help clear a
communication trench. They replied, "They had no
Officer so could not do so". This showed
a great lack of initiative and that the
whole affair as far as this this tank was
concerned seemed to be the responsibility of one
man & that man gone, the tank could do no
more, though undamaged. One tank
returned almost to the reserve Battalion HQrs,
pulled up right on the skyline, in full view
of Bullecourt, thereby making a splendid
aiming mark & drawing severe enemy gun
fire which made the route very dangerous
for troops.
F The whole out-fit showed rank inefficiency.
and in some cases Tank crews seemed to lack
'British Tenacity' and pluck & that determination
 

This is verified by the fact that they opened
fire on our own troops thereby causing us
many casualties. One tank in particular
opened fire on our men in the jumping off
place, killing four, and wounding others
D The organization seemed to be bad, & no one
appeared to be in direct command of the
show. This was shown by the fact that the
Tanks wandered aimlessly about in every
direction thereby drawing enemy fire on
us & on all our trenches
E One Tank only reached the objective & did
good work but was almost immediately
put out of action by direct hits from a
gun in Reincourt. Commanders & crews
of other tanks seemed to make no effort
whatever to reach their objectives & altho' their
Tanks were, ^in no way damaged even after the
attack was well under way & Tanks could
have given the greatest assistance in helping
to connect up between us the brigade on our
left they made as effort to go forward out
wandered back, moving along the front
of our jumping off place & finally pulling
up alongside one of our dressing stations
& their Tanks which had made no effort to get
 

So go forward at all costs", which is naturally
looked for in Britishers.
In my opinion Tanks manned by the bravest
of crews and placed directly under the Inf. Officers
concerned in operations would be of great help
but they should never be relied upon as the sole
arm of support in an attack by infantry
Further, when tanks are being got into position
we think it absolutely necessary that a heavy
barrage be put up by our guns to deaden the
sound of the Tanks.
In our case, not a shot was fired when Tanks
were taking up their positions so the whole
operation was given away to the Enemy.
Sgd A Jacka Cpt Fad
& F Wadge Lt File.
Forwarded I concur and confirm the above
remarks.
Sgd JH Peck Lt Col
C.O. 14^th B^d A.I.F.
Now my G.S.O. II
 

46
(182)
June 20/17
Herewith is rather an interesting
Souvenir. - Mat. will translate.
When the enemy commenced to shell
the town of Nieppe, I took up all
the motor cars, motor lorries, and
waggons I could lay my hands on,
& in one day & night we managed
to get away over 400 old people,
invalids & children, & put out several
large fires in the local factories.
My men worked with a will, as they
always do. -
Dr Vanuxem, the Mayor, was very
grateful, as you will see from his
letter. -
Much love
J.M.
[See 18/6/17)