Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 10 June - 31 July 1917, Part 4

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open for review
Accession number:
RCDIG0000621
Difficulty:
3

Page 1 / 10

j. 39th BATTALION The route up to the assemhly trenches on the night of 6th/7th June lay from OOSTHOVE FARM via PLOBGSTEERT Oorner and ANSCROFT AVENUE. The Battalion set out with A,B, and D Coys. less i Platoon (Battalion Resorve). C Coy. was Brigade Resorve. Considera- ble enemy shell fire hampered the progress of the Battalion almost from the beginning. At PLOEGSTEERT Corner one enemy shell burst in the middle of the leading Platoon, and this, with a heavy bombardment by gas shell in this vicinity, disorganised the Battalion. It was almost impossible for Officors and some of tho N.C.Os. to wear their maske properly owing to the necessity dor directing the men. As it was Offioers and mon wore overcome at every few yards, and their track up through BUNHILL ROW and MUD LANE was strown with men overcome by the gas. The Battalion leader was one of the casu¬ alties. A Senior Company Commander reached the R.A.P. in ANSCROWT AVENUE at about 2.20 a.m. with only about 12 men, though stragglers much dazed, gradually dribbled in afterwards. This Officer procured all available Ammonis Mapsules from the R.A.P. and distributed them amongst all the men whom he could colleot along ANSCROFT AVENUE. At about 20 minutes before ZER0 there were about 120 men (out of 360) in the Battalion assembly trenches to the left of ANTON'S Farm. These men were reorganised and it was decided that they should go to the assault in one wave instead of two. At ZERO hour the enemy barrage opposite them camo down on tho enemy ront line very heavily. It was a zig-zag barrage and the Battalion got through a gap successfully without s caqualty. The Left Flank successfully bombed several dugouts south-west of DOUVE Farm. The enemy barrago was put on his front line while his men were in that line in dugouts. The two flanke joined up about the line of the track from the DOUVE down to ULRICA Avenue at about U.9.0.6.7. Fäbres were sent up to aerpplanes to show position at about 3.45 a.m. when the Battalion was advancing at about the situation of the hedge running from the DOUVE at U.9.5.2.5. to U.9.d.4.8. Almost immediately our barrage lifted from this point to beyond GREY FARM, thus leaving unharmed 2 Machine Guns to North of GREY GARM. One of them mounted on the roof of the dugout at U.9.5.6.3. temporarily held yp the Battalion which took cover in the hedge already meantioneß and shell holes along it. The Officer in charge of the left flank shot the enemy Maohine Gunner who was working the M.G. on the roof of the dugout, and his men then rushad the position. Two machine guns were captured here. The Battalion then linked up with the 34th Battalion on the right which had advanced across ULSTER RESERVE to the right of GREY FARM, and they consolidated together on the BLACK LINE. The portion ef the Battalion when reorganisod on the BLACK LINE at about 4.30 a.m. numbered 88 men. The 34th Battalion was to have taken over from 39th Bn. at about 7 a.m. but was unable to do so until il a.m. During this time the 39th continued digging without much inter- ference by enemy firo. At 11 a.m. the 39th Battalion was ordered to stand by on the North side of the River below ScHNITZEL FARM. C Coy.(100 strong)oame up to reinforce at about 8 p.m. on the evening of June 7th. Mules came up to South of SCHNITZEL FARM on the night of June 7th and brought hot food. P. T. 0.
9 On the morning of June 8th the Battalion was collec¬ ted in an abandoned enemy trench botween ULNA AVENUE and DOUVE Farm - whether the ditoh trench dug by the 40th Bn., or the drain shown just east of that is not cleax. During the day of June 8th and the night of June 8th /9th the Battalion continued digging communication trench in vicinity of ULCER RESERVE towards SCHNITZEL and BETLHMEM FARMS. This trench ran parallel with ULNA AVENUE and just south of it. Battalion was relieved early morning June 9th.
10 -6. Sons BAypitlos. D Coy. of 40th Bn. made the assault with the 38th Battalion. One Platoon of A, and one Platoon of B, made the assault with the 37th Battalion. This left 40th Battalion for the assault with 10 Platoons, 6 of which (0 Coy. and 1 Platoon of assembled North of the DOUVE, and 5 (3 Platoons of A and 2 of B) South of the River. The 5 Northern Platoons went up to their assembly trenches by the RROWN route. There was much shelling on the way which caused some temporary disorganisation and delay. They arrived in their assembly trenches about 10 minutes beforo ZERO and 50 strong. The Company Commander re-allotted objectives - he and his Baten, for example, took one, and the others were distri- buted en similar proportions. They reached UNLA Support 27 strong. The right hand Platoon of the Northern Patty laid bridges across the DOUVE between MESSINES Road and the enemy old front lino and maintained them. The Southern 5 Platoons assembled between SEAFORTH Farm and the MESSINES Road. Tley crossed NO MAN'S LAND and reached ULNA SWITCH without diffioulty a t about 3.30 a.m. The 10 Platoons having joined up then advanced and dug in along s ditch between ULNA AVENUE and DOUVE FARM running almost due North of the Farm. Their total casualties between assembly trenches and this point were about 100. By 10.0 a.m. the ditch trench was dug and some beginning made with a communication trench running forward to ULCER RESERVE. Some casualties were caused by enemt machine guns - one on the tip of ULNA BEAK on the MESSINES Road, and one in ULNA SUPPORT near UENA SWITCH Junction. Another Machine Gun was captured in ULNA SwITCH. Most of our casualties, however, were due to the eagerness of the men who ran into our own barrage, especially one Platoon of B Coy. This was due to inexperience, as was also the fact that in advancing across NO MAN'S LAND some of the men of the Southern 5 Platoons put on gas masks, believing that fumes from the shell holes were asphyxiating gas fumes. There was not much fighting, and the enemy surrandered rather than ran. After digging the ditoh line the 40th Battalion went up to the BLACK LINE to reinforce. There was no enemy barrage short of his old front line until about 10.30 s.m. although there was occasional shooting along ULNI AVENUR and the DOUVE. Some of the men went on through our barrage as far as UNGODLY Trench and came back through it. Most of them were re-collected in the ditch trench by about 5 a.m. The 10 Platoons were re-organised at about 3 p.m. and at about s p.m. went up to BLACK LINE to reinforce. They had to get through enemy barrage, but reached the BLAOX LINE without heavy loss, and were then about 100 strong. The BLACK LINE was then e good trench. At 3.0 a.m. Battalion retired to the ditch trench in U.8.b. and remained there until relieved (early morning June 9th). The 10 Platoons came out of the fight 70 or 80 strong.
"1 Boraade 1 . 41ST BATTALION. alst Battalion was in reserve throughout the battle in our old lines.
12 S2ND BATTALION. At 1 e.m. on night of June sth/th the Bettalion zeccived orders te take oves BLACX LINZ from the 10th Brigade and cloar up the situstion between BLACK and GREEN LINES. The Bettalien marched from CATACOMBS up the MESSINES Rocå te the enomy old front line. A and 0 Companies moved overland south of SCHNITZKL Farm, B Coy. North of SOHNITZKL Farm and D Ooy. into Reserve in the ditch between ULNi Avenue and the DOUVE previously consolidated by 39th and 40th Battalions. A Coy. took over from the River DoUVE to the SUNXEM Roaa U.3.4.65.10. B Coy. took over the line left of A up te hedge corner U.3.d.8.6. C Coy. took over remainder up to boundary with Loft Division just South of WHITE SPOT SOTTACE. This was about 3.30 a.m. June 8th /?th. There was a slow fire of l5em. shell going en et the time, which ceased about an hour later. The fire wes directed principally on SCHNITZEL and BETLHXEM Farme. The Battalion continued organising the BLAOx LINE which wes completed te 6 st.deep, fire-etepped and revetted all along. good fire-bays. Strong points were established at There were U. 3.b.75.00. U. 3.4.65.50. U.3.4.65.30. U.9.b.5.9. These were in good order by the efternoon of June oth. From 4.30 to 8 a.m. June 9th enemy fire wes very quiet. These was some intermittent chelling up to early afterneon. At 3 p.m. e very heavy enemy fire opened and lasted until ebout . .m. June 10th. UnGODLY Trench and BELXXEM Farm, alse the DOUVE VALLEY, were especially bombarded. By 5 p.m. June 9th wire had been put out in front of BLACK LINE to a depth of about 12 ft. with tracks through it. A captured enemy Machine Oun with 2,000 rounde of ammunition was installed at U.9.b.45.93. and used against the onemy. 6 Vickere guns were set up along the BLAOXK LINE. Enemy bombardment continuod all day on June loth and during the night of Nune 10th/Ilth. The morning of June 11th wes quiet, but st noon bombardment was resumed and lasted with short intervale throughout the night. Battalion was relieved on the night of June 11th /12th by the eth Australian Division. Casualties during the three daye 200. were about During the night ef June 10th/lIth petrole were sent out along the middle line from SEPTLEMS BARE to the DOUVE Bridge. Dach morning and evening (about 4 s.m. and 8.30 p.m.: enemy ceroplanes flew at about 300 feet over the BLACX LINE spotting for Artillery fire and on et lesst one ocoasion firing into eur trenches with his machine gun. There was no interference with this by our seroplanes. The Battalion directed heavy fire on these seroplanes with machine guns and Lewis guns and it could be seen that his wings were riddled with bullets but other- wise the fire appeared to have no effect. P.T.0.
13 s. SSRD BATTALION. The t3rd Battalion relieved 4eth at about 10 p.m. June 10th/llth. While A and C Coys, were relieving the 44th, D and B Coys. were ordered et 11 p.m. to the ettack on UNDULATING Trench. One Platoon of D on the left was detailod to take the collection of houses st U.4.b.2.3. The other 3 Platoons and the whole of B Coy. were to assault UNDULATING Trench and establish Lewis Gun posts beyond. There was a strong communica- tion trench not shown on the map running from about U.4.d.5.7. to about U.4.0.95.30. UNDULATINC Trench was taken without much diffioulty by 12.30 a.m. and blocks were made forward of it in the communioation trench just mentioned, in another communi- cation trench parallel with it about 200 yards to the North, and in UNDULATING Support at about U.4.b.0.1. Lowis Gun posts were established at U.4.c.§.8. and U.4.d.2.1. The Platoon of D Coy. on the left was unable to take the houses for which it was detailed owing to the fact that both our barrage and the enemy's was on this spot. On the next day (June 1lth) a patrol from A Coy. gound a large number of our dead belonging to 37th and 38th Battalions in these ruins. These men must have got out beyond our barsage on the first day of the battle and been unable to return. Communication trenches were dug on Juno 11th from about U.4.0.9.4. to U.4.c.4.4., and from about U.4.o.8.7. to U.4.c.76.55. By the morning of June 1lth UNDULATINC Trench cas cleared to 6 ft. deep, traversed, and fire-stepped, down to the DOUVE, where touch was made with the 9th Brigsie. 2 Lewis Guns were captured from the enemy in this trench during the night and a 7.7 om. gun was found on the DOUVE at U.10.b.10.95. A Battery of abandoned guns of the same calibre could be seen in STEIGNAST Ferm, but were not firing. The enemy however was still in this place, for several machine guns oponed fire during the morning from the Farm upon one of our seroplanes. The Artillery barrago during the night's opera- tion was excellent. On the morning of June 11th patrols reported UNDULATING Support as far as U.4.d.7.4. to be unoccupied by the enemy.
14 send Blynallom. The 44th Battalion was on the night of June 7th attached to 10th Brigade for eperations and at 11 p.m. on the night of June 7th/8th they were ordered to ppoceed from Reserve in CATACOMBS and retake the GREEN LINE North of the DOUVE. The Battalion marched up HiH Treno a ONLY W, crossed NO MAN'S Lann and entered old front line about PETIT DOUVE Farm. They proceeded across country south of ULNA Avenue, and deployed et SCHNITZEL Farm, taking their lino by the trees of BETLHEEM. The order was - 0 Coy, to take UNCANNY Trench; B Coy, to leapfrog them and take UNCANNY Support, and the trench junctions at UNCANNY CORNER; A Coy, to take the GREEN LINS on the right and link up with s Company of the 40th Bn. which was supposed to be on the GREEN LINB just North of the DOUVE. D Coy. was in reserve, but half of D Coy, was detailed to swing in to the right of A in case the Company of the 40th should not be in the position North of the DOUVE where they were expeoted. At 3.30 a.m. C Coy. went forward and reached UNCANNY Trench. They began digging in on a line almost due South of SEPTIEME BARN from about U.4.a.5.5. to U.4.a.4.1. At this time the 48th Battalion on their left had not made touch and as the left flank of C Coy, was in the air, B Coy, was ordered to form s defensive flank which bent beck from 0 Coy's left almost due west towards the BLACX LINK. Meanwhile A Coy. made good the line on the right from 0 Coy's right flank from a distance of about 500 yards south. The half of D Coy. already detailed came out from BETLHEEM FARM (the reserve position) and established on A COy's right flank doun to DOUVE Bridge. This position was main- tained till about 1 p.m. on June 8th, when patrols reported that the 48th En. had got up to OWL Trench. B Coy. then swung round from their defensive flank and connsoted with the 48th near SPTIEMS BARN. During the night of June 8th/9th the 48th on the left apparently went forward into OWL Support, Patrols of the 44th reportod their situation there with right flank in the air at about 10 a.m. on June 9th. At noon B Coy, were ordered to advance to UNCANNY Support and connect up with the 48th,and C Coy. to swing round half right and join up with B. This position was successfully established by 4.30 p.m. Patrols put a block forwan in UNDULATING Trench where the track crosses it at about U.4.o.6.7. During the night June 9th/1Oth a Patrol worked down UNDULATING Trench to about U.4.d.00.35 and reported Southern end strongly held by the enemy. A patrol from the right flank which went out south of UNGODLY AVENUE were driven back by rifle and machine gun fire. The original GREEN LINE, however, was established during June 10th, and on the night of June 10th/llth the Battalion was relieved on it by the 43rd, in small parties under hoavy enemy bombardment. On the afternoon of June 8th at about 4 p.m. considerable numbers of the enemy were seen massing for counter- attack between GAPAARD and STEIGNAST Farm, but they were smashed by our barrage. On the following afternoen there were evidences of enemy massing in the little copse in U.ll.a. but these also were dispersed. At about 5 p.m. on June 9th B Coy. was pbliged temporarily to withdraw from the GREEN LINE by our own barrage which was short. An hour later however on our Artillery lengthen- ing they returned to it. On the evening of June 10th at about 7 p.m. the Coys. on the right flank had similarly to retire for about 150 yards besause our Heavy Artillery was falling short. After they had retired some of our heavy rounds fell still shorter and they retired again almost to the BLACK LINE. They returned however to the GREEN LINE about an hour later.
a ALEXANDRIE I
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SARTE FEADOUARTERS, CONFIBEUTIEL 19AUN.193n 10th. AUST. INF. BDE., 1.104 16th. June 1917. 19 AUSTRALNN O Pradonarters, Drd. Aust. Drrr I have the honor to bring to your notice some circumstances concerning the work of the 44th. Battalion, under Lieut-Col. W.O. MANSBRIDGE D.S.O., while attached to this Brigade on the 8th. and 9th. of June 1917. As the information regarding the position of the 44th. Battalion conflicted with that which came from the 12th. Australian Brigade on my LEFT I sent a message marked "A" at 10.7 a.m. on the 8th. asking for definite location. As no reply was forthcoming I sent a further message marked "B" at 11.40 a.m. emphasising the necessity for seizing an important trench junction. The position s till remaining obscure I sent at 1.22 p.m. a third message marked "C" asking for a verification of the front line position. During the afternoon several pigeon messages were received from Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE - one marked "D" stating that he would require the assistance of the whole of the 37th. and 38th. if he were counter attacked. Another marked "E" stated "Cannot hold much longer; more strength wanted to link up; casualties heavy."; a third marked "E 2 " saying "Cannot hold position", and a fourth marked "F" stating "We are driven out of trenches. All wires cut ". Subsequent enquiry has convinced me that the Brigade Section of the GREEN LINE was not counter attacked, and that the bulk of the 44th. Battalion held it continuously. During the late afternoon Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE rang me up from Lieut- Col. SMITH'S Headquarters at ADVANCED ESTAMINET. I then sent an order marked "G" instructing Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE to proceed to the vicinity of the BLACK LINE to command his Battalion. Two further messages "H" and "I" will indicate the fact that Lieut- Col. MANSBRIDGE was absolutely out of touch with the doings of his Battalion, and that I had great trouble in having my orders carriex out, and in obtaining an accurate knowledge of the cir¬ cumstances from time to time. Afomsafhetued Anss.10 S.O.314//93 Brigadier-General, Commanding l0th. Aust. Inf. Ede. Go.g. 415 Rürede Vreteretitzm frr frütte stut Obvrrtvronaats Major General, c.O.C. Third Australian Division 1167

3. 8
39th BATTALION.
The route up to the assembly trenches on the night
of 6th/7th June lay from OOSTHOVE FARM via PLOEGSTEERT Corner and
ANSCROFT AVAENUE. The Battalion set out with A, B, and D Coys. less
1 Platoon (Battalion Reserve). C Coy. was Brigade Reserve. Considerable
enemy shell fire hampered the progress of the Battalion almost
from the beginning. At PLOEGSTEERT Corner one enemy shell burst in
the middle of the leading Platoon, and this, with a heavy bombardment
by gas shell in this vicinity, disorganised the Battalion. It was
almost impossible for Officers and some of the N.C.Os. to wear
their masks properly owing to the necessity for directing the men.
As it was Officers and men were overcome at every few yards, and
their track up through BUNHILL ROW and MUD LANE was strewn with
men overcome by the gas. The Battalion leader was one of the casualties.
A Senior Company Commander reached the R.A.P. in ANSCROFT
AVENUE at about 2.20 a.m. with only about 12 men, though stragglers,
much dazed, gradually dribbled in afterwards. This Officer procured
all available Ammonia Capsules from the R.A.P. and distributed them
amongst all the men whom he could collect along ANSCROFT AVENUE.
At about 20 minutes before ZERO there were about
120 men (out of 360) in the Battalion assembly trenches to the
left of ANTON'S Farm. These men were reorganised and it was decided
that they should go to the assault in one wave instead of two. At
ZERO hour the enemy barrage opposite them came down on the enemy
front line very heavily. It was a zig-zag barrage and the Battalion
got through a gap successfully without a casualty. The Left Flank
successfully bombed several dugouts south-west of DOUVE Farm. The
enemy barrage was put on his front line while his men were in
that line in dugouts. The two flanks joined up about the line of
the track from the DOUVE down to ULRICA Avenue at about U.9.c.6.7.
Flares were sent up to aeroplanes to show position at about 3.45 a.m.
when the Battalion was advancing at about the situation of the
hedge running from the DOUVE at U.9.b.2.5. to U.9.d.4.8. Almost
immediately our barrage lifted from this point to beyond GREY FARM,
thus leaving unharmed 2 Machine Guns to North of GREY GARM. One
of them mounted on the roof of the dugout at U.9.b.6.3. temporarily
held up the Battalion which took cover in the hedge already mentioned
and shell holes along it. The Officer in charge of the left flank
shot the enemy Machine Gunner who was working the M.G. on the roof
of the dugout, and his men then rushed the posItion. Two machine
guns were captured here. The Battalion then linked up with the
34th Battalion on the right which had advanced across ULSTER
RESERVE to the right of GREY FARM, and they consolidated together
on the BLACK LINE.
The portion of the Battalion when reorganised
on the BLACK LINE at about 4.30 a.m. numbered 88 men.
The 34th Battalion was to have taken over
from 39th Bn. at about 7 a.m. but was unable to do so until 11 a.m.
During this time the 39th continued digging without much interference
by enemy fire.
At 11 a.m. the 39th Battalion was ordered to
stand by on the North side of the river below SCHNITZEL FARM. C
Coy. (100 strong) came up to reinforce at about 8 p.m. on the
evening of June 7th.
Mules came up to South of SCHNITZEL FARM on the 
night of June 7th and brought hot food.
P.T.O.

 

4. 9
On the morning of June 8th the Battalion was collected
in an abandoned enemy trench between ULNA AVENUE and DOUVE
Farm - whether the ditch trench dug by the 40th Bn., or the drain
shown just east of that is not clear. During the day of June 8th
and the night of June 8th/9th the Battalion continued digging
communication trench in vicinity of ULCER RESERVE towards SCHNITZEL
and BETLHEEM FARMS. This trench ran parallel with ULNA AVENUE and
just south of it.
Battalion was relieved early morning June 9th.

 

5. 10
40TH BATTALION.
D. Coy. of 40th Bn. made the assault with the
38th Battalion. One Platoon of A, and one Platoon of B, made the
assault with the 37th Battalion. this left 40th Battalion for
the assault with 10 Platoons, 5 of which (C Coy. and 1 Platoon of
B) assembled North of the DOUVE, and 5 (3 Platoons of A and 2 of
B) South of the River.
The 5 Northern Platoons went up to their
assembly trenches by the BROWN route. There was much shelling on
the way which caused some temporary disorganisation and delay. They
arrived in their assembly trenches about 10 minutes before ZERO
and 50 strong. The Company Commander re-allotted objectives - he
and his Batman, for example, took one, and the others were distributed
in similar proportions. They reached UNLA Support 27 strong.
The right hand Platoon of the Northern Party laid bridges across
the DOUVE between MESSINES Road and the enemy old front line and
maintained them.
The Southern 5 Platoons assembled between
SEAFORTH Farm and the MESSINES Road. They crossed NO MAN'S LAND
and reached ULNA SWITCH without difficulty a t about 3.30 a.m. The
10 Platoons having joined up then advanced and dug in along a
ditch between ULNA AVENUE and DOUVE FARM running almost due North
of the Farm. Their total casualties between assembly trenches and
this point were about 100. By 10.0 a.m. the ditch trench was dug
and some beginning made with a communication trench running forward
to ULCER RESERVE.
Some casualties were caused by enemy
machine guns - one on the tip of ULNA BEAK on the MESSINES Road,
and one in ULNA SUPPORT near ULNA SWITCH Junction. Another Machine
Gun was captured in ULNA SWITCH. Most of our casualties, however,
were due to the eagerness of the men who ran into our own barrage,
especially one Platoon of B Coy. This was due to inexperience, as
was also the fact that in advancing across NO MAN'S LAND some of
the men of the Southern 5 Platoons put on gas masks, believing
that fumes from the shell holes were asphyxiating gas fumes. There
was not much fighting, and the enemy surrendered rather than ran.
After digging the ditch line the 40th 

Battalion went up to the BLACK LINE to reinforce. There was no
enemy barrage short of his old front line until about 10.30 a.m.
although there was occasional shooting along ULNA AVENUE and the
DOUVE.
Some of the men went on through our barrage
as far as UNGODLY Trench and came back through it. Most of them
were re-collected in the ditch trench by about 5 a.m.
The 10 Platoons were re-organised at about
3 p.m. and at about 9 p.m. went up to BLACK LINE to reinforce. They
had to get through enemy barrage, but reached the BLACK LINE without
heavy loss, and were then about 100 strong. The BLACK LINE was then a
good trench. At 3.0 a.m. Battalion retired to the ditch trench in
U.8.b. and remained there until relieved (early morning June 9th).
The 10 Platoons came out of the fight 70 or 80 strong.

 

11th Brigade
11
9.
41ST BATTALION.
41st Battalion was in reserve throughout the battle
in our old lines.

a.m. 

12
7.
42ND BATTALION.
At 1 a.m. on night of June 8th/9th the Battalion
received orders to take over BLACK LINE from the 10th Brigade
and clear up the situation between BLACK and GREEN LINES. The
Battalion marched from CATACOMBS up the MESSINES Road to the
enemy old front line. A and C Companies moved overland south
of SCHNITZEL Farm, B Coy. North of SCHNITZEL Farm and D Coy.
into Reserve in the ditch between ULNA Avenue and the DOUVE
previously consolidated by 39th and 40th Battalions.
A. Coy. took over from the River DOUVE to the SUNKEN
Road U.3.d.65.10.
B Coy. took over the line left of A up to hedge
corner U.3.d.8.6.
C. Coy. took over remainder up to boundary with Left
Division just South of WHITE SPOT COTTAGE. This was about 3.30 a.m.
June 8th/9th. There was a slow fire of 15cm. shell going on at
the time, which ceased about an hour later. the fire was directed
principally on SCHNITZEL and BETLHEEM Farms.
The Battalion continued organising the BLACK LINE which
was completed to 6 ft. deep, fire-stepped and revetted all along.
There were good fire-bays. Strong points were established at
U.3.b.75.00.
U.3.d.65.50.
U.3.d.65.30.
U.9.b.5.9.
These were in good order by the afternoon of June 9th.
From 4.30 to 8 a.m. June 9th enemy fire was very quiet.
There was some intermittent shelling up to early afternoon. At
3 p.m. a very heavy enemy fire opened and lasted until about
4 a.m. June 10th. UNGODLY Trench and BETLHEEM Farm, also the DOUVE
VALLEY, were especially bombarded.
By 5 p.m. June 9th wire had been put out in front of
BLACK LINE to a depth of about 12 ft. with tracks through it.
A captured enemy Machine Gun with 2,000 rounds of
ammunition was installed at U.9.b.45.95. and used against the
enemy. 8 Vickers guns were set up along the BLACK LINE.
Enemy bombardment continued all day on June 10th and
during the night of June 10th/11th. The morning of June 11th was
quiet, but at noon bombardment was resumed and lasted with short
intervals throughout the night.
Battalion was relieved on the night of June 11th/12th
by the 4th Australian Division. Casualties during the three days
were about 200.
During the night of June 10th/11th patrols were sent
out along the middle line from SEPTIEME BARN to the DOUVE Bridge.
Each morning and evening (about 4 a.m. and 8.30 p.m.)

enemy aeroplanes flew at about 300 feet over the BLACK LINE spotting
for Artillery fire and on at least one occasion firing into our
trenches with his machine gun. There was no interference with
this by our aeroplanes. The Battalion directed heavy fire
on these aeroplanes with machine guns and Lewis guns and it
could be seen that his wings were riddled with bullets but otherwise
the fire appeared to have no effect.
P.T.O.

 

13

8.

43RD BATTALION.

The 43rd Battalion relieved 44th at about 10 p.m.

June 10th/11th.

While A and C Coys. were relieving the 44th, D and

B Coys. were ordered at 11 p.m. to the attack on UNDULATING

Trench. One platoon of D on the left was detailed to take the

collection of houses at U.4.b.2.3. The other 3 Platoons and

the whole of B Coy. were to assault UNDULATING Trech and

establish Lewis Gun posts beyond. There was a strong communication

trench not shown on the map running from about U.4.d.5.7.

to about U.4.c.95.30. UNDULATING Trench was taken without much

difficulty by 12.30 a.m. and blocks were made forward of it in

the communication trench just mentioned, in another communication

trench just mentioned, in another communication

trench parallel with it about 200 yards to the North,

and in UNDULATING Support at about U.4.b.0.1. Lewis Gun posts

were established at U.4.c.9.8. and U.4.d.2.1. The Platoon of

D Coy. on the left was unable to take the houses for which it

was detailed owing to the fact that both our barrage and the

enemy's was on this spot. On the next day (June 11th) a patrol

from A Coy. found a large number of dead belonging to 37th

and 38th Battalions in these ruins. These men must have got out 

beyond our barrage on the first day of the battle and been

unable to return.

Communication trenches were dug on June 11th from

about U.4.c.9.4. to U.4.c.4.4. and from about U.4.c.8.7. to

U.4.c.75.55. By morning of June 11th UNDULATING Trench was

cleared to 6 ft. deep, transversed, and fire-stepped, down to

the DOUVE, where touch was made with the 9th Brigade. 2 Lewis

Guns were captured from the enemy in this trench during the

night and a 7.7 cm. gun was found in the DOUVE at U.10.b.10.95.

A Battery of abandoned guns of the same calibre could be seen

in STEIGNAST Farm, but were not firing. The enemy however was

still in this place, for several machine guns opened fire during

the morning from the Farm upon one of our aeroplanes.

The Artillery barrage during the night's operation

was excellent.

On the morning of the June 11th patrols reported

UNDULATING Support as far as U.4.d.7.4. to be unoccupied by the

enemy.

14 

14

6.

44TH BATTALION.

The 44th Battalion was on the night of June 7th

attached to 10th Brigade for operations and at 11 p.m. on the

night of June 7th/8th they were ordered to proceed from Reserve

in CATACOMBS and retake the GREEN LINE North of the DOUVE. The

Battalion marched up HEATH Trench and ONLY WAY, crossed NO MAN'S

LAND and entered old front lines about PETIT DOUVE Farm. They

proceeded across country south of ULNA Avenue, and deployed at

SCHNITZEL Farm, taking their line by the trees of BETLHEEM.

The order was - C Coy. to take UNCANNY Trench; B Coy. to leapfrog

them and take UNCANNY Support, and the trench junctions at

UNCANNY CORNER; A Coy. to take the GREEN LINE on the right

and link up with a Company of the 40th Bn. which was supposed

to be on the GREEN LINE just North of the DOUVE. D Coy. was in

reserve, but half of D Coy. was detailed to swing in to the

right of A in case the Company of the 40th should not be in the

position North of the DOUVE where they were expected.

At 3.30 a.m. C Coy. went forward and reached

UNCANNY Trench. They began digging in on a line almost due South

of SEPTIEME BARN from about U.4.a.5.5. to U.4.a.4.1. At this time

the 48th Battalion on their left had not made touch and as the

left flank of C Coy. was in the air, B Coy. was ordered to form a

defensive flank which bent back from C Coy's left almost due

west towards the BLACK LINE. Meanwhile A Coy. made good the line

on the right from C Coy's right flank from a distance of about

500 yards south. The half of D Coy. already detailed came out

from BETLHEEM FARM (the reserve position) and established on A

Coy's right flank down to DOUVE Bridge. This position was maintained

till about 1 p.m. on June 8th, when patrols reported that

the 48th Bn. had got up to OWL Trench. B Coy. then swung round

from their defensive flank and connected with the 48th near

SEPTIEME BARN.

During the night of June 8th/9th the 48th on

the left apparently went forward into OWL Support, Patrols of

the 44th reported their situation there with right flank in the

air at about 10 a.m. on June 9th. At noon B Coy. were ordered to

advance to UNCANNY Support and connect up with the 48th, and C

Coy. to swing round half right and join up with B. This position

was successfully established by 4.30 p.m. Patrols put a block forward

in UNDULATING Trench where the track crosses it at about U.4.c.8.7.

During the night June 9th/10th a Patrol worked down UNDULATING

Trench to about U.4.d.00.35 and reported Southern and strongly

held by the enemy. A patrol from the right flank which went

out south of UNGODLY AVENUE were driven back by rifle and machine

gun fire. The original GREEN LINE, however, was established during

June 10th, and on the night of June 10th/11th the Battalion was

relieved on it by the 43rd, in small parties under heavy enemy

bombardment.

On the afternoon of June 8th at about 4 p.m.

considerable numbers of the enemy were seen massing for counter-attack

between GAPAARD and STEIGNAST Farm, but they were smashed

by our barrage. On the following afternoon there were evidences

of enemy massing in the little copse in U.11.a. but these also

were dispersed.

At about 5 p.m. on June 9th B Coy. was obliged

temporarily to withdraw from the GREEN LINE by our own barrage

which was short. An hour later however on our Artillery lengthening

they returned to it. On the evening of June 10th at about 7 p.m.

the Coys. on the right flank had similarly to retire for about

150 yards because our Heavy Artillery was falling short. After

they had retired some of our heavy rounds fell still shorter and

they retired again almost to the BLACK LINE. They returned however

to the GREEN LINE about an hour later.

 

ALEXANDRIE
Photograph - see original document

22 RUE CHÉRIF-PACHA ET LA BOURSE   LL

 

 

16/6/17
6th April
Yallaunee

This is to wish you "Many

more anniversaries of the

8th of April & that you

will celebrate it, in

your own home next year.

Vic Monash -

Bert Monash.

Ulrike Roth

Mat. Monash

Mat. Roth

Sophie Roth

Best love 

from

all of the

above.

UNION POSTALE UNIVERSELLE

CARTE POSTALE

Cartolina postale — Levelezo-lap — Postcard — Postkarrte

Briefkart — Tarjeta postal — Omkpbmoe nuch MO

 

HEADQUARTERS

16 Jun,1917

No. [[?]] 104/271
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

CONFIDENTIAL  

HEADQUARTERS.

10th AUST. INF. BDE.,

16th. June 1917.

Headquarters, 3rd Aust. Div.

I have the honor to bring to your notice 

some circumstances concerning the work of the 44th. Battalion,

under Lieut-Col. W.O. MANSBRIDGE D.S.O., while attached to this

Brigade on the 8th and 9th. of June 1917.

As the information regarding the position of

the 44th. Battalion conflicted with that which came from the 12th.

Australian Brigade on my LEFT I sent a message marked "A" at

10.7 a.m. on the 8th. asking for definite location. As no reply

was forthcoming I sent a further message marked "B" at 11.40 a.m.

emphasising the necessity for seizing an important trench junction.

The position still remaining obscure I sent at 1.22 p.m. a third

message marked "C" asking for a verification of the front line

position. During the afternoon several pigeon messages were

received from Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE - one marked "D" stating that

he would require the assistance of the whole of the 37th. and 38th.

if he were counter attacked. Another marked "E" stated "Cannot

hold much longer; more strength wanted to link up; casualties

heavy."; a third marked "E 2"" saying "Cannot hold position", and

a fourth marked "F" stating "We are driven out of trenches. All

wires cut ".

Subsequent enquiry has convinved me that

the Brigade Section of the GREEN LINE was not counter attacked, and

that the bulk of the 44th. Battalion held it continuously. During

the late afternoon Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE rang me up from Lieut-Col.

SMITH'S Headquarters at ADVANCED ESTAMINET. I then sent

an order marked "G" instructing Lieut-Col. MANSBRIDGE to proceed

to the vicinity of the BLACK LINE to command his Battalion. Two

further messages "H" and "I" will indicate the fact that Lieut-Col.

MANSBRIDGE was absolutely out of touch with the doings of his

Battalion, and that I had great trouble in having my orders

carrierd out, and in obtaining an accurate knowledge of the circumstances

from time to time.

Encs.10 

S.C.324/193 /

W.Ramsay McNicoll.

Brigadier-General,

Commanding 10th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

G.O.C

11th Brigade

Referred to you for further report

John Monash Major General,

G.O.C. Third Australian Division

16/6/17

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 






 

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