Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 10 June - 31 July 1917, Part 2

34th. Battalion.  Captain A. S. WHITLOCK,              Killed.
35th.      "               2/Lieut.F. H. DENTON-CLARKE,      "
35th.      "                       "     E.BE. CHAPMAN,                  "
36th.      "                  Lieut. G. M. GRIMSON,                    "
9th. L.T.M. Bty.        Lieut. C.H. ALEXANDER,                 "
37th. Battalion.            "     W.F. ROBERTSON,               "
38th.       "                  2/Lieut. J. J. CADUSCH,                  "
41st.         "                    Lieut.  A. DICKIE,                           "
42nd.       "                   2/Lieut.T. J. BARTLEY,                   "
44th.        "                   Captain W. T. BRYAN,                   "
44th.        "                   Lieut.    R. E. WALSH,                    "
44th.        "                   2/Lieut. G. H. HUGHES,                "
35th.         "                         "        R. D. PERRAU,                "
36th.         "                       Lieut. R. H. DOYLE,                   "
36th.         "                       Captain F. J. PIGGOTT,             "
44th.        "                        2/Lieut E. HOCKING,                "

15/6/17
General Godley's Speech to the 9th Australian Infantry
Brigade - near DOULIEU , 15th June 1917.
General JOBSON, Officers, Non commissioned Officers,
and men of the 9th Australian Infantry Brigade, I have come
here to day as Commander of the 2nd Anzac Corps, to congratulate
you on the part, which all ranks of the Brigade played, inthe
Battle of MESSINES, which is still going on.
The Brigade was the right Brigade of the whole 2nd
Army, and was the pivot on which the whole operations of the first
day depended. If this Brigade had not only done its job well
but also learned what to do, and how to do it, the operations
of an Army of 3 Army Corps, might have been imperilled. But it
proved that not only did you know, but also carried out your most
difficult task. It is a very difficult thing to pivot, as you
did on your right, and swing round on to the Black Line; but it was
done in a way worthy of the best trained Regular troops. It was
extremely well done, and that was because everyone's heart was in
the job, and they made a point of knowing what to do and how to
do it. They got on to the Black Line without difficulty.
Then you came under very heavy shelling - I think the
heaviest shelling experienced by any Brigade in the 2nd ARMY
I had many messages from all parts of the Line, but from the
right, I never had any message which showed the least doubt about
the result, or about the right of the line sticking it. It was
worth more than I can tell you to know that the right was firm.
The Brigade was then called upon to take a very intricate
highly developed, strongly fortified system known as the POTTERIES.
It was done admirably, and could not have been done better. The
effect of all this is, that we cleared the BOSCHE out altogether
on the right flank. We are in possession now, right down to the
line of the LYS, and have driven him back almost into WARNETON, 2000
yards further than you were told to go or than you actually went.
Last night we got some more, about 70 prisoners, and are within
striking distance of WARNETON now, what is going to happen in the
future, only the higher Commanders know, but the 9th Brigade cleared
the way to this result.
This is the first big fight the Brigade has been in.
It has proved itself worthy to rank with any of the Brigades of the
A.I.F. or any force in the Empire - with the Brigades that landed
in GALLIPOLI, or fought on the SOMME. And I want to tell you
how proud the Sister Corps, the First Anzac Corps, and the people
of AUSTRALIA will be, when they hear of the performance of the
9th Brigade. I feel that I can confidently trust a Brigade like
this for any further Operations which we may be called upon to
carry out.

Not to be taken into the trenches. SECRET
SECOND ARMY
SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE
1st to 15th June, 1917.
The Battle of Messines.
GENERAL.-Since the date of the last Fortnightly Summary our troops have attacked and
captured by a single concentrated effort the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, one of the enemy's
most important strongholds on the Western Front. Dominating, as it did, the Ypres salient and
giving the enemy complete observation over it, he had neglected no precautions to render the
position impregnable. He was able to overlook all our preparations and it is evident from
documents subsequently found that he had full knowledge that an attack was impending and
had moved up reinforcements of guns and troops. The battle, therefore, was a gauge of the
ability of German troops to stop our advance under conditions as favourable to them as an army
can ever hope for, with every advantage of ground and preparation.
The forward defences of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge consisted of an elaborate and
intricate system of well-wired trenches and strong points forming a defensive belt over 2,000
yards in depth. The numerous farms and woods were thoroughly prepared for defence and the
whole face of the ridge was thickly dotted with strongly constructed and well concealed
concrete machine gun emplacements and liberally sprinkled with concrete dug-outs, designed to
protect the garrison from the effect of our bombardment. Nothing that experience could
suggest or incessant labour produce was left undone to render the ridge an impregnable barrier
against which he hoped the waves of our attack would break.
ARTILLERY PREPARATION.-Systematic trench bombardment and wire cutting was
commenced on May 21st and was intensified about May 28th. The wire of the front and
support lines was cut by trench mortars and 18-pdrs. and of the rear lines by 6.-in. howitzers
with aeroplane observation. Night firing commenced on 27th-28th May. Billets, headquarters
and villages in back areas were shelled by long range pieces and a continuous barrage was
maintained on the enemy's communications. During the ten days before the assault an
unprecedented amount of very successful destructive counter-battery work was carried out in
the most thorough fashion and the last three days before the attack was devoted to intense
counter-battery work. Information as to the effect of our counter-battery work was afterwards
obtained from a captured German N.C.O., who stated that 11 guns, including 4 heavy, were
knocked out in the night of the 6th-7th near Kortewilde.
The enemy also made determined efforts to knock out batteries and for the last few days
there was a continuous artillery duel. His use of gas shell caused our artillery great inconvenience
and some casualties; one case is reported of a gun being manned and worked during the earlier
part of the barrage by the sanitary orderly and two battery cooks, the detachment being
temporarily hors de combat.
RAIDS.-Raids were made every night during the week prior to the attack, identifications
being fully obtained and the enemy's order of battle established. The most successful raids were
made by following up practice barrages on the afternoons of the 3rd and 5th, about 100 prisoners
being captured on both occasions.
GAS.-Gas was discharged and projected frequently against the enemy lines during the
period preceding the attack.
THE ATTACK.-At 3.10 on the morning of the 7th June, following the explosion of
19 deep mines containing an aggregate of 937,000 lbs. of explosive which blew up large portions
of the enemy's front and support line along the offensive front, our guns opened and the infantry
assault was launched.
The wire cutting and trench bombardment had been wonderfully effective and within a few
minutes the enemy's front line system was carried on the whole front attacked. Following closely
on the heels of the barrage our troops pressed on with scarcely a pause up the western slopes of
the ridge and within three hours after the commencement of the attack and stormed the entire
crest line from south to north. By 10 a.m. our troops and captured the villages of Wytschaete
and Messines and reached without serious check (except in the case of Battle Wood north of
the Ypres--Comines canal) a line running east of these villages, east of the Damm Strasse and
White Chateau.
At 2.30 p.m. the enemy started to launch a counter-attack, which was crushed by our
artillery and infantry fire. A halt of about five hours was made on the line east of Messines,
which was consolidated, and during the interval preceding the second stage of the attack, the
artillery was concentrated in cutting wire on the final objective, the Oosttaverne line, stretching
like a cord across the base of the Wytschaete salient. At 3.10 p.m. a further advance was made
and fresh troops pushed down the eastern slopes of the Ridge and in the course of an hour
captured and occupied the final objective of the day, the Oosttaverne line, except a small portion
east of Messines, which was taken on the morning of the 8th. During the night of the 7th and
the greater portion of the next day, the enemy made no serious attempt to recapture the lost
ground, except some spasmodic counter-attacks, and the fullest use was made of this time to
consolidate our new positions.
TANKS.-The attack was supported throughout by Tanks which did everything required of
them; the infantry, however, were everywhere so completely successful that this arm had little
opportunity of exercising its full offensive power.
The principal areas of tank activity were The Damm Strasse, east of Wytschaete and along
the Oosttaverne line.

2
COUNTER ATTACK.—At 7 pm. on the 8th, after heavy bombardment, a strong counter-attack was launched against the whole of our offensive front, but was easily repulsed with
heavy loss to the enemy.
AFTER THE BATTLE.—On the 14th we advanced our line in the neighbourhood of
Battle Wood and a deliberate advance has also been made between Oosttaverne and Frelinghien,
which was entirely successful, advancing beyond the Oosttaverne line a maximum of about
1,000 yards on to a well chosen line of defence now established. A patrol also succeeded in
entering Frelinghien on the afternoon of the 15th, obtaining prisoners.
PRISONERS AND MATERIAL CAPTURED.—The total number of prisoners taken in
operations from 6 p.m. 4th to the night of June 14th (latter inclusive) was 144 officers and
7,210 other ranks, and the material captured, 48 guns, 218 machine guns and 60 trench mortars.
Enemy's Defences.
An inspection of the Messines—Wytschaete system of defences reveals the tremendous
amount of work which the enemy had lavished upon this area. Concrete abounds everywhere-
machine gun emplacements, observation posts and large dug-outs. In the support trench of the
Spanbroek sector and to the south large concrete dug-outs occur at intervals of about 75 yards.
It was seen that in some instances structures of solid concrete had resisted our shell fire, but
where concrete blocks were used in many instances the structure was knocked over in such a
way as to render it useless and a trap for the occupants.
The general plan of his trenches indicates that he expected perhaps that we would get his
front and possibly his support line, but that he would hold up an attack in front of the line
which continues around the slopes just below the crest on the western face of the ridge, e.g., on
such lines as October, Ocean and Obvious trenches, Jump and Skip points. The arrangement
of the enemy trenches and even trench mortar emplacements, some of which were found on the
eastern edge of L'Enfer Wood and in the rear part of Wytschaete, tends to confirm this. He
did not appear to have any wire on the inside of his "all round" defences of Wytschaete at
the rear (east), nor were his trenches here arranged for fire westward; it did not appear that
he expected we might go through his defences on the west side of Wytschaete so readily.
Beaten from the Wytschaete ridge down the eastern slope and compelled by our pressure
to evacuate his front line system north of the Lys, the enemy is now occupying, at any rate
temporarily, the Warneton line, with advanced posts in shell holes in front. He has made
little attempt to repair this line which is badly shot about and almost derelict in places and
indications at present are that he does not intend seriously to resist on this line. Behind the
wire on the east of the canal recent photos show a series of holes, and he may be engaged in
hasty efforts at trench construction here. A great deal of work has been done behind the wire
of the Tenbrielen switch line running in front of Zandevoorde and Tenbrielen. Strong points
have been linked up by trenches, still shallow, practically all along the line. A little distance
behind this a support line has also been traced out.
Aerial Activity.
The following work was done by the R.F.C. prior to and during the battle:-
From 1st to 7th June, both inclusive, 32 enemy machines were crashed and 33 driven down
out of control. We lost 18 machines in 215 combats. A great amount of photographic work
was done, 231 batteries were engaged for destruction, 225 trench bombardments were carried
out, 716 zone calls were sent down, besides much miscellaneous work; 612 hours average daily
flying was done.
During operations our machines carried out continual reconnaissances reporting much
enemy movement and bombing and engaging with machine gun fire from low altitudes
concentrations of hostile troops and transport. Contact patrols were carried out continuously
from dawn to dusk. It was remarked that the number of hostile single-seater scouts had
increased considerably, his artillery and reconnaissance machines remained normal and carried
out little successful work.
Most useful work was done by kite balloon observers on the 7th, reporting the intensity and
extent of enemy barrages, progress of our own barrages, sections of hostile artillery activity
centres and the progress and location of tanks.
Artillery.
During our attack the enemy's barrage was nowhere heavy and was principally on the flanks.
Many of the enemy's barrage batteries immediately east of Wytschaete had been put out of
action or withdrawn and very little hostile fire was experienced in this area. On the day of
the attack the enemy disclosed about 12 new positions on the northern and 20 on the southern
flanks of our offensive. Subsequently most of the hostile fire has come from these flank
batteries, i.e., from Polygon Wood Group and Quesnoy Group, and has been mainly directed
against our new front lines, back areas being comparatively quiet.
Our successful attack has brought about a re-grouping of the hostile artillery. On our
northern flank the main Group is near Zandevoorde and no material withdrawal is noticeable
in this area. On the 8th of June the former Wytschaete Group was withdrawn West and
South-West of Houthem. Most of these batteries have subsequently been withdrawn East of
the Canal. The River Lys Group, immediately after our attack, concentrated East of Bas
Warneton. During the last two days this Group has been abnormally quiet and is probably
being withdrawn to neighbourhood of Comines.
There are as yet no signs of any further big reinforcements of enemy batteries. Documents
have verified our estimate of enemy guns per division, i.e., about 70, and the subsequent
increase prior to the attack to about 90.
484 destructive counter-battery shoots were carried out by our Artillery in the last ten
days before the 7th June, and 167 from the 7th to 13th. The hostile counter-battery work was
fairly heavy at the commencement of our bombardment, but decreased and became very erratic
the last few days before our attack. Since June 7th there has been very little organized enemy
counter-battery work.

3
Distribution of the Enemy's Forces.
In consequence of the operations undertaken against the positions in the Wytschaete-
Messines salient, the disposition of the enemy's forces has undergone complete change.
BEFORE THE BATTLE.—During the fortnight previous to the period under review the
enemy had re-arranged his defence, so as to bring three divisions instead of two into line
between the Ypres—Comines canal and the River Douve.
On the 1st June the 35th Division from reserve relieved the 24th Division north of
Wytschaete, and about the 4th June a re-grouping of the Bavarian units between the Douve
and the Lys took place in consequence of the withdrawal of the 5th Bav. R.l.R. (4th Bav. Div)
owing to its heavy casualties. It was relieved by the 9th Bav. I.R. (4th Bav. Div.), and the
9th Bav. I.R. was replaced in its former sector by the 21st Bav. R.I.R. (16th Bay, Div.) from
east of Armentiėres.
The 3rd Bav. Div. in reserve was brought up into close support south-east of Messines
The order of battle at 3 o'clock the morning of 7th June was thus from north to south on
the Army front:
204th Div. south of Hooge to just north of the canal.
35th Div. north of the canal to north of Wytschaete.
2nd Div. in Wytschaete sector.
40th Div. in Messines sector.
4th Bav. Div. (less 5th Bav. R.I.R.) reinforced by
21st Bav. R.I.R. (16th Bav. Div.) between River Douve and the Lys.
ENEMY'S INTENTION.—All evidence shows that the attack was fully anticipated by the
enemy, although it was made a few days before he expected it. His intention was to relieve the
three divisions in the Wytschaete—Messines salient, which had been greatly tried by our
artillery preparation, by fresh divisions. In fact, the 40th Division was actually in process of
relief by the 3rd Bav. Div. when our attack was made, as prisoners of both divisions were found
mixed up together.
IN THE ATTACK.—As it was, his troops in the line, in spite of every possible preparation,
were unable to offer the resistance he expected, and except in isolated cases, completely broke
under the attack.
CAUSES OF ENEMY COLLAPSE.—The following are the causes to which prisoners
attribute the enemy's failure to stop our attack and which brought about his collapse:
1. Our attack was not expected so soon.
2. The troops were exhausted by our artillery preparation.
3. The destruction of their artillery by our counter-battery work had been so great
that it was no longer able to adequately support their infantry, either before or
during the attack.
4. The mines exploded at zero.
5. Lack of rations and water owing to the difficulty of getting them up.
6. Our gas shells which caused many casualties.
7. Confidence in the strength of their positions to hold up the attack, orders having
been giving "to hold the Messines ridge at any cost."
Evidence of documents also shows his need for economizing ammunition.
ENEMYS LOSSES.—The 2nd, 35th and the 3rd Bav. Divisions bore the brunt of the attack,
and their great losses, both in casualties and prisoners, have effectively destroyed their value.
On the flanks, the 204th Division north of Ypres—Comines Canal lost a considerable
number of prisoners, and was chiefly concerned in the fighting in and about Battle Wood.
Elements of the 40th Division were caught during the relief by the 3rd Bav. Div. in
Messines sector.
On the south the 9th, 5th Bav. Inf. Regts. (4th Bav. Div.) suffered heavy losses also.
COUNTER-ATTACKS.—There was little interference with our establishing ourselves on
the Oostaverne line, but during the evening of 7th June a counter-attack was made E. of Messines
by the 1st Gd. Res. Div., brought up to relieve the 3rd Bav. Div. This counter-attack failed.
During the night of 7th-8th June, the 7th Div. was brought up to relieve the 35th Div. and
the 24th Div. to relieve the 2nd Div.
In the enemy's large counter-attack on the evening of 8th June, the 7th Div., 24th Div. and
1st Gd. Res. Div., with elements of the 4th and 16th Bav. Divs. all took part. This counter
attack also failed, the 7th Div. in the north and again the 1st Gd. Res. Div. in the south
according to prisoners statements having suffered particularly heavy.
ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS.— The 11th Div. was brought in on 9th June from reserve,
and its units were used to reinforce the line in three different places. The 38th Fus. Rest.
came into line north of Ypres—Comines canal, the 51st Inf. Regt. reinforced the 7th Div., and
the 10th Gren. Regt. reinforced the 24th Div.
In the extreme north, the 414th I.R. of the 204th Div., in reserve, was brought in about
Klein Zillebeke.
The disorganization of the enemy during June 7th may also be gathered from the fact that
he put into line the 38th Landsturm Inf. Regt., and certain pioneer units, which were normally
engaged on road repairs in the rear.
WITHDRAWAL.—On or about the 10th June the 24th Div. was withdrawn to rest in Lille.
Documents show the extension southward of the 4th German Army front to include
"A Lille group" of divisions.
On the 12th June, the enemy was suspected to be withdrawing from his original front line
north of the Lys, and this proved to be correct. Prisoners of 14th Bav. I.R. (4th Bav. Div.)
captured near Frelinghien reported the presence of the 9th Res. Div., north of them, but no
confirmation of this report has come in.

4

RE-ORGANIZATION OF ENEMY UNITS.—From the 11th to 14th June, the enemy was
occupied in re-organizing his defence. To accomplish this he has relieved all the divisions
which had been holding the line on the Army front.
Our operations on the night of 14th June permit an accurate identification of the hostile
divisions now facing the Army front to be made, and these are shown on the accompanying
Disposition Map.
ENEMY'S NEW POSITION.—The enemy is now occupying the Warneton line of defences
and is clearly adopting the plan of placing strong advanced posts in front of this new position,
and refraining from holding any marked forward line.
Statements of prisoners as to the method of holding of the new position are conflicting
but as the prisoners are nearly all new to the line, their statements are not to be relied on.
The number of fresh divisions now opposite this Army front shows the enemy to be in
strength, and certainly disposed in considerable depth. He also has a strong reserve of fresh
divisions.
Enemy Order of Battle, June 15th

In the absence of direct identification the divisions in reserve can only be given subject to
confirmation, but of the following any or all may be behind the Army area.
Reserves.
12th Division (Prussian and Polish). Reported as leaving eastern front and mentioned
by prisoners as being in Flanders.
23rd Res. Division (Saxon). Withdrawn from north of Ypres end of May.
36th Division. Is reported to be in reserve in front of Ypres salient, having come up
from the Scarpe area.
36th Res. Division (Prussian). From Russia, identified by two independent statements
and letters in Tournai area.
38th Division (Prussian). Reported by prisoner of 46th I.R. (119th Div.) as coming in
to relieve the 119th Division on night of 14th June. Came up from Lens area;
has seen much fighting at Arras.
39th Division (Prussian and Alsatian). Identified by prisoners statements as being in
Menin area.
48th Res. Division (Prussian). From Russia. Reported to have arrived in Flanders
in May.
2nd Bavarian Division. Reported by several prisoners to be in reserve in Comines area.
Withdrawn from Aisne battle to rest.
A Naval Division. The naval units withdrawn from N.E. of Ypres about 25th May are
still in reserve.
Divisions Heavily Engaged and Withdrawn.
2nd Div.}
35th Div.} These three divisions have certainly suffered extremely heavy losses, and in
3rd Bav. Div} the case of 35th and 3rd Bav. for the second time in two months.
7th Div. } By their counter-attack and losses in the line may be considered very much
1st Gd. Res. Div.} exhausted. Suffered severely in counter-attacks of June 7th & 8th.
40th Div.} Less heavily engaged, but their losses, especially the 204th Div., have been
204th Div.}  very considerable.
Moral.
Generally speaking the moral of prisoners taken is fairly good, even better than might
have been expected. A notable feature of their examination is their complaint against then
artillery and its lack of support. Relations between the infantry and artillery do not seem at
all happy. Many prisoners have stated that the infantry was sacrificed to save the guns.
C. H. MITCHELL, Lieut.-Col, G.S.,
for Major General, G.S., Second Army
2nd F.S. Co.-2185-700-7.6.17 

Corps Conference 16/6/17
1) Go & see the Heavy Artillery & tell them how well they have [*X*]
done for us. - See Gen. Jenour, Lewis & the Group
Commanders. -
2. Future policy - Letter from Army Commander:-
Line reached is to shall be consolidated as a Defensive line, subject to
Any local adjustments by Corps & Div. Commanders. - Readjust
-ments to be done deliberately & in combination & with other Corps. -
i.e. if I want to do anything, refer to Corps - so as to make as
much show of it as possible, - i.e. We are not to advance
our line merely for the sake of advancing it. We can raid as
much as we like, & as soon as we like.
3. A plan for the advance on Lille will be drawn up by the Army &
sent to Corps: - The more the enemy know about a proposed  [*X*]
advance on Lille, the better.
4. Establish a strong & economical line, overlooking the passages
of the Lys ∧^{from the neighbourhood of Harmeton , southwards.-}  Look for a suitable line to bring rifle & M.G. fire on the
bridge are the Lyps. Make the country between us & the river very
unhealthy & uncomfortable for the enemy. - [ Russel to consider this ]
5. Drive back enemy's guns on our front. - The extra guns now with
the Army, will leave the Army on or about July 7
6. We must prepare to be raided
7. First Army will threaten Lillele by operations in the Lens area. - We will
have out plans for it, & all our Artillery remains here till about
July 7.
8. Reinforcement Camp & Corps School.
We can absorb all we wish, & leave with Macmahon all we
wish.
Proper Coy courses will start on July 1
 

9. Corps School to be arranged to take
(a) Officers
(b) Aspirant officers - 20 per Division per month.
(c) N.C.O.'s to be trained as N.CO's.
Macmahon will provide an extra class of 40 aspirants to
meet the needs of 3rd & 4th Divisions.
(Major Reid no good - Macmahon doesn't want him] [*X X*]
10. Div Commanders to visit Corps Schools & give their views [*X*]
11. Raiding & Reconnoitring with utmost vigour. -
N.Z. will raid Pont Rouge quite soon. - Could be organized on
basis of a Corps Raid on Warneton & Pont Rouge simultaneously.
Bambridge doesn't come out for another week or so. - He will pull
off a raid on Warneton some time before 24th.-
12. Defensive Arrangements generally. -  In Divisional areas there are to
be only 3 lines of defence. – i.e. Front, Support, Reserve – without posts
switches or strong points,  Front line being the blue line, Support line being
the 300^x behind that, Reserve line being 1,000^x to 1500^x behind Front line.
Bambridge says his support line will be 150^x to 250^x behind his front
line.-
Corps Commander roughly fixes the 1st, 2nd & 3rd lines - if we do
this & dig communications that is all he will ask us to do.
13. C.E. will look after Communications West of 3rd Line, &
will retain the technical troops of the 3rd & 4th Division
14. Distribution
2 Divisions in line
1 do in [[Vieny Nerguin?]] - 3^rd Div. - Less 1 Bgde
1 do  at Reniscourt - 4th for tomorrow less 1 Bgde.

for about 1 week.
 

15. Depots & Accommodation
Tunnelling C^os are under Army, who will detail them to Corps.
they will make Bgde & Bⁿ H.Q.
Hartments will have to be moved up closer to the front.
16. Division will run their own Tramlines
17. Reallotment of Areas. - Boundary fixed on map.
Div . H.Q. In line    out of line
Steemerck.             Baillent or Doulien
Ravelsberg.           Reniscure or Westhov
18. Arrangements for resting artillery
to go [[out?]]  8 Army Arty Brigade
8 Batteries of [Heavies?]
19. Reports on operations - not required until headings are
communicated
20 4th Div relieves 25th Div.  ) not for at least a
3^rd "     "     N.Z. Div.  ) week & may be a 
few days beyond that.
4^th N.Z. Bgde is not relieved.
21. Training - do everything possible for "open warfare"
21 Messines out of bounds
 

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters.
15th. June, 1917.
NOTES FOR CONFERENCE.
1. Aircraft - ours and the enemy's.
Flares.
Anti-aircraft.
2. Numbers and formations for tasks.
3. Assembly and approach.
Rate of approach march.
Safety time limit.
4. In and out traffic.
5. Pace of barrage.
Pace crossing enemy's line. [*No mans land*]
6. Signalling.
(a). By sausage panel.
(b). By flapper.
(c). By pigeon.
(d). By runner.
(e). By wireless.
(f). By baloons.
(g). By telephone.
(h). By wire.
(i). By visual.
7. Dress and equipment.
8. Tactics of the fight.
9. Relief of tired Units.
10. Best place and best time to consolidate.
Labor necessary and time taken.
11. How Administrative arrangements stood the test.
12. How the Artillery panned out.
Short shooting of heavies.
Lifts by 1008s or 50's.
Possibility (and danger of getting through our
own barrage.
13. Work done by Engineers and Pioneers.
14. Tramline and Mule tracks.
15. How to save men man labor.
16. Action of Vicker's guns.
Numbers required forward.
Numbers required forward 3" Stokes.
17. Were smoked Bombs with 3" used at all.
18. Demolition charges.