Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 10 May - 9 June 1917, Part 13

16.
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ORDNANCE,
Telephone
Picks
Shovels
complete with
UNIT.
Equipment.
carriages, Wagons
:- and Limbers.
18.-pr.
4.5" Hw.
Sets
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18 6
7th F.A. BRIGADE
aa 6
102
102
aa 6
8th F.A.BRIGADE
102
102
i2 6
Is 6
9th F.A. BRIGADE
i 6
102.
102
23rd F.A. BRIGADE;
Te 6
4
Gr 3
102
102
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Aae
 

3
Zydbe
(O.B./ 19921A.
SS1601
304
1877
Issued down to-Conpany Commanders.
Squadron Leaders,
Battery Cemmmanders
EXPERIENCES OF A DIVISION
IN RECENT FIGHTING.
ISSUED BY THE GENERAL STAFF, MAY, 1917.
Thefollowing extracts from the experiences of a Division are
published for inforniation:
"1. After the frst advance the enemy was particularly
quiet. Men were able to show thenselves on the western slopes
of the ridge without being dred at from the neighbouring village.
It was also possible to walk up to the tactical point at the Tower,
which had been previously strongly held by the enemy as an
observation post.
The Commanderof the Battalion concerned, on hearing of this,
at once went up with a view to advancing his lne. On his way
up to the Tower he caught sight of the enemy approaching it in
threes and fours, by short rushes. Without hesitation he ordered
the nearest platoon to charge the Tower and establish theniselves
East of it. The platoon dashed at the Tower and arrived there
almost simultaneously with the enemy. The platoon established
itself Eastof the Tower, külling about 20 of the enemy and taking
three prisoners.
That nightthree unsuccessful bombing attacks were made on
the Tower. During the Battalion relief the next night, the enemy
opened a heavy bombardment on the Tower and its immediate
vicinity, following it up with an attack by two companies of
Infantry. This attack succeeded, chiefy owing to the relief being
in progress. A local counter-attack delivered by the incomning
battalion failed owing to the darkness, pouring rain, and lack of
knowledge of the ground.
It wasthen decided that nothing could be done till daylight.
Al guns were ordered to be carefully ranged on the tactical
point as soon asit waslightenough tosee. The Artillery reported
all ready at 11 a.mn. The attack was ordered for 12 noon. The
batteries opened dre on the enemy at 12 noon on a front of about
200 yards, and two Companiesof Infantry re-took allthelost ground
without asingle casualty.
Lessons.
(a) Boldness of action makes for success.
(b) The presence ofan oficer on the spotwhocan grasp
a sibuation quickly is invaluable. Much les in the hands
of Battalion Commanders in this muatter.
(c) If, after a successful attack by the enemy an
immediate counter-attack is unsuccessful, it is essential
that the Artillery shall have suflcient time to register
the target carefully, before further counter attacks are
launched.
 

"2 Laterageneraladvancetook place. Theattackproceeded
satisfactorily as far as the Division was concerned, andtheobjective
was reached.
During this period, four batteries had been sent forward to be
ready to assistin the second phase.
For various reasons, however, by I1 a.mn. al the troops were
back in the original line.
It happened that in the arrangements for the advance the
supporting Brigade was totakeoverthedefence oftheline. It was,
therefore, close up and al the offcers and men knew the ground.
Five and a half hours' notice was given for a fresh attack,
and proved suflcient. The artillery barrage needed some slight
adjustmment owing to the absence of the four batteries which had
been sent forward.
The barrage started punctually at 6 p.ma. and the Infantry
commenced tomove forward.
Al went well for the frst 300 yards, when an enemy machine
gun in a rallway cutting opened dre and caused a check; im¬
mediately some ride bombers dred ride bombs into the cutting
and the machine gun ceased fre. This enabled the troops to go
forward again, but the barrage had meantime moved away from
them, and machine gun and ride fre was immediately opened on
them from a trench some distance ahead. The whole lne
commenced advancing by section rushes supported by the dre of
alternate sections. In this way the advance continued until the
left of the line had gained the dank of the enemy, when the fre
of a well-placed Lewis gun caused the enemy to surrender.
The remainder ofthe advance to the objective was carried out
in asimilar manner, byshort rushes, supported byridefre. By the
time the troops were established in the objective they had about
50rounds per man leit out ofthe 170 with which they started.
The Battalion Commander accompanied his Rear Company,
and was in conversation with some of his Company Commanders
during the whole attack. Heand the Company Commanders were
able to employ dre power as the situation demanded, and keep a
grip ofthe nght.
Lessons.
(c) Supporting troops should be so placed and have
such knowledge of the ground, that they can be employed
atshort notice.
6) Allranks mustbetaught to use their rides readily,
and to employ fre to cover movement. The artilery
barrage is to be regarded as a useful adjunct, and not a
necessity.
(c) In open nghting, Battalion Commanders should go
forward in rear of their Battalions so as to be able to take
charge in thelater stages.
ARNIY PRINTTNG AND STATIONERY SERVICEs A-5/17--S1006-21.000.
 

AUSTRALLAN DIVISION
3BORE
Divisional Headquartere.
z/e/l7.
Reshpparterr
2nd A. L N.Z. Army Corpe.
1. The original minute by the A.P.M. of this Division sppears
te have followed upon a general instruetion given to him by me
to take stepe to reduce the sale of liquor to the troope in the
towns of NIKPPE and POFT DE NIEPPE, because there were signe of
inerease in drunkenness. - I was unsware of the terms of the
minute which he wrote, er of the fact that dates were mentiened
in it, especially in relstion to preposed "important operations"
i. I consider the minute to have been most indisereet.
3. Although I have, on the occasion of previous adverse state-
mente regarding this offieer, reported favorably upon him, I am
nov of opinion that it is not desirable that he shoulå be retained
in his sppointment. -
4. In view of all the poliee arrangements for fortheoming
operations being now complete, I recommend that he be permitted
to carry on until relieved by the officer sppointed to take his
place, as I have no other suitable offieer within the Division
who has not alresdy been allotted to special duty.
5. I recommend that C.O.C.. A.I.F. may be requested to
nominate an offioer for this appointment.
Major-Ceneral,
Commanding Third Australian Division.
 

I Trhe
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
Divisional Headquarters,
3/e/17.
My dear General,
As I know you are personally interested in Sir
HENRY DERING, my A.P.M., I think a few words of explanation
about a situation which has just reached a climax, will be
welcome to you.
I am bound to say that DERINC has, from the first,
worked his hardest, to please me, that on the whole his work
has been successful, that his police are undoubtedly efficient,
and that the police supervision of the Division has been satis-
factory. - Such faults and defects as he has displayed, consist
rather of his somewhat unbusiness-like methods, than in any
lack of ability or errors in principle.
However, from a few days after his arrival here,
he seems to have fallen foul of the A.P.M. of 2nd ANZAC, and
through him of the A.P.M. of the Second Army. During recent
months, repeated complaints have come forward about trivial
matters which went wrong, and, in most cases, DERINC was able
to satisfy me that he was in no way to blame, while in connection
with the remainder, they were really too trivial to take notice
of.
I had to have one or two rather disagreeable inter-
views with the Corps authorities in order to justify both my
own point of view and DERINC'S manner of carrying out my orders.
These strained relations culminated a few days ago.
as the result of an action of DERINC's which was undoubtedly most
indiscreet. In order to carry out a general instruction which
 

-2- 3/e/17.
I had given him, to reduce the sale of liquor in crowded billets,
he wrote a letter, not marked 'Secret', to the French Authorities
specifieally referring to impending operations, and naming
dates in connection with them. - While I think that a great
deal more is being made of this lapse than it really merits,
yet. I must admit that Corps and Army authorities have, at
last, tangible grounds for holding him to blame. - I have
come to the conclusion, therefore, that the intolerable position
of strain must end, and that it is desirable, both in my
interests and in DERINC'S own, that he should no longer serve
with this Division, but that other employment should be found
for him if possible.
I would like to say, that taking his work all round,
he has done well, and that I might easily fare worse with
another man, but nevertheless, I am not blind to the fact that
after full warning from me of the necessity to achieve friendly
relations with the seniors in his own department, he has not
succeeded in doing so.
With kind regards.
Yours faithfully.
I. MGpste e
 

vision.
Avsraall
Divisional Hoadquarters,
sle/nz.
Dord
Brigadier-Ceneral A. Jobeen,
Brigadier-Ceneral U.R.Mozicoll, D.S.C...
Brigadier-General J.H.Cannan, C.B. (for information)
I desire the senior Commanders of the Division to be in
possession of ny viewe regarding the responsibilities which are
imposod upon them in connsction with the forthcoming operations,
expressed in the following:-
Your first daty is to carry through the tasks allottei to you.
Your sucoess in this will depend largely upon your oen strong
determination to achieve success, in spite of all difficulties
that may confront you, and partioolarly by overooming any lack
of determination exnibited by any of your subordinates.
When you have succeeded in your tasks, you mast next devote
your energies to establishing yourself effectivaly upon the
ground won, and after that to organize your remeining resouces
for immediate use to mect any possible contingensy.
If you do not immediately succced in all your tasks. you nust.
after reporting to me, rroceed on tho assumption that no further
help will be forthooming; and you will therefore, at onse.
employ all your resources to complete the capture of sufficiont
ground to enable your flanka to get satisfactery tactical
contact with your neighbours, and for the line ycu have reached
to be effectively defansible.
If. after you Dave establishsl rourself, you are counter-attackei
and lose any portion of your line, you will, after reporting
to me, immediately employ all your available rosources to
restore your position.
Any assistance that can be extandel to you by troope fron the
supplementary to your own
Reservo Brigade must be regarien,u
efforts, and you mnst procesi on the azgemption that such help
nay not be forthcoming.
Hajor-Ganeral
Gramandiag Thirf Anstr
lian
Dlvision.
 

3.
5.
 

a
 

st
Pier Raar
The German military authorities have been "punishing"
Australian and British prisoners lately taken by them. It
is said that this is the direct result of an order from the
German Emperor. Here are the facts:-
On April li after the 4th Australian Division had made
its heroic attack on the Hindenburg line without artillery
a number of
preparation, Australians who had been completely cut off
by a heavy machine gun barrage were taken prisomer, the rest
made
having their way back through the barrage or been
killed in doing so. On May 22nd two of these Australians
escaped and passed
-Western Australian Lewis Gunners- x
through five lines of trenches to the British line. They
the moment of their captivity until that of
said that from txxxxxxxxxxe
their escape they were never
given a blanket nor any covering
for the night except straw ; and they were underfed by the
t order of the German authorities. This became clear
on the third day when they were being
marched through the French villages to the railed. ExAt
this time, having only received from one quarter to one third
of a loaf of bread per day and two cups of coffee, they
were offered both bread and water by the inhabitants of the
French villages through which they passed. The French
behind the lines, they said, would give them anything. But
Prussian guardseen
the who formed their escort threw the bread
into the gutter. One of the guard hit in the face a woman
who tried to get the bread to them and knocked her down.
A Frenchman came out with a pail of water. The guard
threw it over him. In the ad our men shook their heads if
offered anything because they did not want to see the people
so treated.
After a spell of three days at railhead, where there
was nothing to complain of except the suspicious actions of
certain supposed "English" prisoners who were probably Ger-
mans put in amonast them, they were brought to Lille.As they
 

(2)
were marched thraugh the town a woman threw them a packet of
cigarettes. She was arrested at once and marched off. They
were taken to xxan old French fort and divided into batches
of lio to be put into the upper rooms. The room where these
men were was about 50 feet by 20; the floor was tiled. The
nights were freezing but they had no covering except straw.
for all, night and day
The only latrine/was a barrel in the corner of the
room. In this room they lived for five days and six nights,
with only one short interval each day. They were not
indadde
ther
allowed a wash, until the day they leftdx
Their food here consisted of one seventh of a
loaf per man per day with a sour fomented mixture of turnips
once in the day and a cup of coffee night and morning. There
seemed to be strict orders against their getting a glass of
water and it was refused them. At the end a corporal camein
and asked them if they knew why they were there. They said
e ea
"No". He told them tht they the because the British
Government had not answered a German protest about the employ-
ment of German prisoners under shellfire - he said they migght
write and tell their friends and their Government all about
the way they were treated and say why it was.
A company of 240 Australians picked from all states
were then brought under a guard of young Ber-
liners, who were more lenient, to work on a dump which was
aa under English shellfire. They worked there for three
weeks. The work was from 5.15 a.m. till 1 p.m. xxdaily.
For this their ration was a third of a loaf etwo cups of coffee;
and a thin stew of barley and horseflesh when they returned
from work. They used to get their guards to let them go out
Fope o
and out dandellons, or stinging nettles, and rape
they also picked up the potato peelings which the
Germans threw out. On this diet they became rapidly ill, but
the doctor seemed to go on a policy of keeping men at work
until they had to be sent to hospital.
The two men noticed the direction ofe shellbursts
came from, and the of the nearest balloon.And aathouck We
guandd ware doukled. ouung 6 de tocape of a wund dande tvakee man, Neg weorkdd
Erone aaddalvadtboopadedlypkononesreses
 

AUS
 

THIRD AUSTRALLAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
3rd. June, 1917.
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.-
10th.
do.
11th.
do.
The following precis of a narrative, by the official
Australian war reporter, Capt. C. E. W. BEAN, of the experiences of
two esoaped Australian prisoners, and which can be vouched for as
absolutely authentio, will, I trust, when read out by plateon command-
ers to their platoons, bring home to the men of Third Australian Div¬
ision that a very special duty is cast upon them, and a very special
opportunity will shortly be afforded them, of striking a heavy blow
at a cruel, inhumane enemy, in order to avenge the brutal treatment
which he has meted out to defenceless Australian soldiers, who after
lighting most bravely at BULLECOURT, had the misfortune to fall into
his hands. -
Zeontonact
Major-General.-
Commanding 3rd. Australian Division.
"On May 22nd., two Lewis Gunners of the 16th. (West Australian)
"Battalion managed to esoape back to our lines. - They were in
"a pitiable condition, and relate that together with several hun-
dred other Australians of the Fourth Brigade, having during its
Aeroio attack on the HINDENBURG LINE on April'llth., been taken
"prisoners of war, they were marched to LILLE, and for several
"weeks were nearly starved. French men and women who attempted
te give them a little food were repeatedly knocked down and mal-
Streated. - The prisoners were divided into batches of 110 and
"locked into rooms only 50 ft. by 20, where they had to live for
"five days and six nights, in freezing weather, without blankets
"and with only a barrel in a corner for a latrine. All they got to
"eat every day was a loaf of bread to every 7 mend and a sour mix¬
"ture of turnips. - Then they were made to work, and rapidly be-
"came ill on a diet of nettles, potato peelings and dandelions.
"Even though ill, they were made to go on working, until most of
"them collapsed and had to be sent to hospital. - The two men
"managed to escape, and had an arduous and eventful journey, by
night, back to our lines."-
1Eofor fr Seh.