Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 10 May - 9 June 1917, Part 3

M.O. Circular No 10 
14/5/17 SECRET
[* G1/258/2
GOC*]
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
Conference held at Divisional Headquarters on 13th May,1917.
PRESENT
G.O.C. 9th Aust. Inf. Bde., G.O.C. 10th Aust. Inf. Bde.
and their Brigade-Majors., G.S.O. 1, and B.M., R.A.
1. The G.O.C. explained that the intention was to make the old
BLACK Line the BLUE Line, and to move forward to a new BLACK Line
with a view to helping the New Zealanders in their task of capturing
guns east and North-east of MESSINES.
The new BLACK line was roughly indicated as running from OWL
Support Trench at O.34.d.2.1. in front pf UNCANNY SUPPORT, thence to
the point where the DOUVE River crosses the road at U.10.a.05.60, this
point being the boundary between Brigades. From here on, the BLACK
line would run east of GREY FARM, west of FACTORY FARM,including the
mine crater north of FACTORY FARM, and finishing on our front line
somewhere near HULLS BURNT FARM.
The consolidation of the BLACK line north of HUNS WALK to be
undertaken by the New Zealand Division in accordance with the statement 
made by the Divisional Commander of that Division.
The new BLUE line to join the New Zealand Division on our left
boundary where it is crossed by the hedge from BETHLEHEM FARM to the
ZAREEBA, to run thence roughly due south passing to the west of the
GREY FARM system of trenches, joining our front line in the vicinity
of BROKEN TREE HOUSE.
It was pointed out that the new Brigade boundary between 9th
and 10th Brigades would run from the bend in the road at ANTONS FARM
in a straight line to where the DOUVE RIVER crosses the SUGAR REFINERY
-MESSINES Road.
2. Necessary to decide on Battalion Headquarters for G Battalion,
seeing that it will now probably have the task formerly allotted to
H Battalion.
Probably too late to make new Battalion Headquarters.
10th Brigade to give this matter early attention.
Place and mode of assembly and mode of advance, also time of
advance for H Bn. with its altered mission.
Will G Bn. take H Bn's headquarters, keep H Bn. back, ^in the
headquarters meving wich-the last vave vhen-the chole Patooten
the. Ro evr nesn ardvanre ol gorldommet andanlan okgutose gonneo
men advanced entainment and let them go forward
when objective gained.
9th Brigade to keep F Bn. in reserve. Brigadier to notify
Divisional Headquarters early how he allots Battalions, and what
tasks are given to each.
G.S.O.1 to arrange S.O.S. signals and M.G. Barrage beyond
artillery barrage.
Artillery barrage to be at least 200 yards beyond the BLACK
line for S.O.S. purposes.
6. 9th Brigade to push out one defensive post, viz, into the
CRATER. Other posts for consolidating purposes, or to gain ground, are
cancelled. Protective detachments will, however, be put out by
Brigades during xxx period of consolidation.
7. The BLACK line south of the DOUVE will be wired as early as
possible; north of the DOUVE It will not be wired unless ordered,
but all preparations will be made with a view to wiring it.
8. 9th Brigade to have an O.P. neat SEPTIEME BARN.
9. Plenty of Vickers guns to go forward to 10th Brigade BLACK
line in order to enfilade our new front.
10.............

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14/5/17.
10. Counter Attacks. It was thought at the conference that the 9th
Brigade were more likely to be counter-attacked that the 10th.
11. C.R.A. to take up the question of pushing forward our batteries.
12. 10th Brigade BLACK line 500 yards from hostile battery at
STEIGNAST FARM; this they will want to take and either destroy or
bring back.
D.I.O. to look up other gun positions and keep maps up to date,
notifying Brigades.
13. 10th Brigade experiments show that 1 yard of trench per man,
with a small portion of communication trenches, can be made
thoroughly good in 6 hours.
14. Brigades to work out new positions of assembly, approach, and
deployment, and report results early to Divisional Headquarters in
order that the whole scheme may be co-ordinated.
15.A.G. to notify all concerned of position of Divisional repair
shop for Vickers Guns &c., and to state the scope of repairs this
shop can undertake.
NOTES
(a) Destructive bombardment to be extended in scope.
G.S.O.1 to notify those concerned.
(b) Re-consider halt from plus 14 to plus 30.
G.S.O. 1 to consult New Zealand Division.
(c) Halt on new BLUE line for 2 hours. Will this line be
reached at plus 60?
G.S.O.l to consult New Zealanders.
(d) Artillery barrage during the 2 hour halt, minimum distance from
BLUE line 200 yards, maximum UNCANNY TRENCH. Never to be absent from
the 200 yard line for more than a quarter of an hour.
On S.O.S. going up, barrage comes back at once to the 200 yard
line.
G.S.O.1 to work out simple system for S.O.S. to slacken down and
quicken up.
(e) Machine gun barrage to conform in all things to the Artillery
barrage, moving slightly ahead.
4 Vickers guns for the 9th and 4 for the 10th Brigades to be
available to go forward from the outset. 4 more from each Brigade
to be available the moment the Brigadiers require them.
8 Vickers guns of the 11th Brigade to be permanently mobile, and
at disposal of the G.O.C. that Brigade.
DISTRIBUTION
G.O.C.
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.
10th   -do-
Machine Gun officer
A.G.  File
B.I.C 11 At Bde
 GOC

See Plan D. Dated
14/5/17.
J.J.C.
SECRET
Headquarters,
10th Australian Infantry Brigade.
14th May 1917.
Headquarters, 3rd Australian Division.
MAGNUM OPUS.
The following proposals are submitted in
outline.-
(a) APPROACH MARCH. (See tracing attached marked "A")
It is considered advisable to leave THE ONLY WAY
available for the exit of the trench garrison. This garrison
could be disposed of under the arrangements of Division, or Reserve
Brigade. By that time the attacking troops would be clear of the
green and brown routes to the South of MUD LANE.
(b) ASSEMBLY. (See attached tracing marked "B")
The main point for decision in this connection is
the place for the assembly of "H" Battalion and 2 Companies of "D"
Battalion. Objections may be urged against all places that could
be considered. I suggest assembling these troops in the Support
Trench at Zero Hour. If concentrated further in rear they may be
prevented by hostile fire from approaching without suffering heavy
losses. If well forward as suggested and the Support Line happens
to be heavily bombarded, the Commanding Officer will be able to move
his troops forward at an earlier hour and possibly avoid serious
damage. The action taken by the enemy in reply to our practice
barrages may supply information of value on this point.
(c) DISPOSITIONS (See attached tracing marked "C").
BATTALION TASKS IN OUTLINE.
"C" Battalion (39th) to attack ULRICA TRENCH,
ULRICA SUPPORT,LA DOUVE FARM and AVENUE FARM, with i Companies 
disposed in 2 waves.
The punishment which the front trenches will
receive from artillery, the slight diminution of the frontage, and
the fact that there is no line to be consolidated here, leads me to
decide that 2 3 Companies can carry out this task.
One Company to advance towards the GREY FARM
system,keeping touch with the 9th Brigade, to deal with ULRICA LANE,
co-operate with "G" Battalion against the switch at the South end
of ULCER RESERVE, assist in the capture of GREY FARM by flank action
from the North,and hold the portion of the blue line from the DOUVE
to the Brigade boundary until relieved by the 9th Brigade.
A portion of "C" Battalion will proceed with the
construction of crossings over the DOUVE. Three suggested places
are shown on the tracing marked "C". The remainder of the attacking
troops of "C" Battalion will be assembled and made available for
further action. One Company of "C" Battalion will be Brigade
Reserve.
"D" Battalion Five Platoons,assembled North of
the DOUVE, four of which will attack ULNA BEAK,&c., as previously
arranged, and one assist in establishing crossings over the river.
Two Four Platoons will establish crossings from the South,
one platoon following with the left of "C” Battalion's 1st wave across
the DOUVE East of the enemy's front line and operate against ULNA
SWITCH.
 

-2
"D" Battalion (Cont'd) 1½ Companies of "D"
Battalion will be at the disposal of the Commanding Officer of
"H" Battalion, one for carrying, and the other for the capture
and consolidation of the right portion of the black line.
"G" Battalion Two Platoons as a bridging
party-advance with the 2 Platoons of "D" Battalion to prepare
at least 6 bridges for-the crossing of "G" Battalion. This
Battalion will ultimately advance in 3 waves, 6 Platoons in the
1st wave, 6 in the 2nd, and 1 Company in the 3rd wave.
The objective of the 1st wave will be UNGODLY
TRENCH. The 2nd wave,preceded by its moppers up will be 
responsible for ULCER RESERVE. The Company forming the 3rd wave
will advance through the two preceding waves to BETLHEEM FARM.
Some platoons of the 2nd wave will go forward as soon as possible
to assist in the consolidation of the blue line.
"H" Battalion The 1st wave of 8 Platoons
will seize the black line from UNCANNY SUPPORT - a large portion
of the trenches are as yet traced out but not dug - to junction
of the Company of "D" Battalion. The objective of the 2nd wave
of 4 Platoons will be UNCANNY TRENCH and portion of UNDULATING
TRENCH. One Company of "H" Battalion will be in the hands of
the Battalion Commander.  
The question as to whether "H" Battalion will
cross the DOUVE by the same bridges as "G",or by additional ones
further East, or by both, requires further consideration.
More time is also desired to consider carefully
the best positions for the construction of strong points, the use
of Stokes Mortars, of smoke, and of Vickers Guns.
N Ramsey McNicoll
Brigadier-General
Commanding 10th Australian Inf. Brigade.
BM/941/14 

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE
See Plan E
dated 15.5.17
Headquarters
9th Australian Infantry Brigade.
15th May. 1917.
Major- Gen Monash
G.O.C. 3rd Australian Division.
MAGNUM OPUS.
(1). I have reconsidered the dispositions of the Brigade
in the light of amended instructions, and have now to suggest the
following plan:
(2). DISPOSITIONS.
(a). Front line of attack. (see plan).
"A" Battalion (33rd Battalion)
Right Area.
"B" Battalion (35th Battalion)
Left Area.
(b). Second line of attack.
"F" Battalion (34th Battalion)
Advanced left area.
(c). Carrying Parties, and Brigade Reserve.
"E" Battalion (36th Battalion)
(3). INTENDED DISPOSITION OF BATTALIONS.
(a) "A" Battalion.
(1). Fighting Line, 3 Coys.
(2). Working Parties (Support Line) 1 Coy.
(b). "B" Battalion.
(1) Fighting Line. 3 Coys.
(2) Carrying Parties. 1 Coy.
(c) "F" Battalion.
(1) Fighting Line. 3 Coys.
(2) Battalion Reserve. 1 Coy.
(d) "E" Battalion.
(1) Carrying Parties. 2 Coys.
(2) Brigade Reserve, 1 Battalion, less 2 Coys.
(4). TASKS
(a) "A" Battalion.
(1) Capture enemy front and support lines, and
clear ground in Right Area.
(2) Consolidate on line C.L.D.N.
(3) 1 Coy to follow in rear and dig support line J.K
(b) "B" Battalion.
(1) Capture enemy front and support lines and clear
area in left area, as far as ULSTER SWITCH,
inclusive.
(2) After "F" Battalion has passed through, and
area is cleared..
Dig.
(a! Support Line K.E.
(b) Communication trench from TORONTO AVENUE
to ULSTER AVENUE,
(c) Communication trench from ANNNSCROFT to
ULRICA AVENUE.
(3) Assist "F" Battalion in making ULSTER AVENUE
and ULRICA AVENUE passable.
(c)"F" Battalion.
(1) Capture and clear area.
(2) Consolidate in line N.P.
(3) Dig support line E.F.
AR.

(2)
(5) APPROACH MARCH
The approach march will be as shown in attached plan
of suggested routes. The red route will be used by
"A" and "E" Battalions, and the Blue route by "B"
and "F" Battalions
(6) ASSEMBLY
The positions of assembly of "A" "B" and "F"
Battalions will be approximately the same as before.
The working party Coy of "A" Battalion will however
assemble in the trench previously allotted to "E"
Battalion.
The fourth Coy of "F" Battalion will assemble in
rear of the No. 3 Coy of "F" Battalion., on the
extreme left.
The Brigade Reserve of "E" Battalion, less 2 Coys,
will assemble-
Headquarters and 1 Coy at WESTMINSTER AVENUE,
near "A” Battalion Headquarters
1 Coy in trenches near LEVAL COTTAGES.
(7). CARRYING PARTIYS.
(a) "A" Battalion.
12 Sections - provided by "E" Battalion
9 Sections, 3 to each assaulting Coy.
3 Sections to carry -
6 men, M.G. ammunition.
24 men, Stokes shells.
The working party Coy will carry its own tools.
(b) "B" Battalion.
9 Sections
3 to each assaulting Coy.
(c) "F" Battalion.
15 Sections provided by "E" Battalion.
12 Sections, 3 to each assaulting Coy.
3 Sections to carry
6 men, M.G. ammunition.
24 men, Stokes shells.
(d) Brigade Dumps.
6 Sections provided by "E" Battalion, 3 Sections
at each Brigade Dump, to carry forward to "A"
"B" and "F" Battalion Dumps, to be established
in front line after Zero.
(e) R.E.Dumps.
4 Sections provided by "k" Battalion.
2 Sections at each R.E. Dump to carry forward to
Battalion Dumps.
(f) 9th Machine Gun Coy.
2 Sections provided by "E" Battalion, to fill
belts and carry ammunition.
Alex Jobson
Brig-Gen.
Commanding 9th Australian Infantry
Brigade. A. I. F.
 P.W.B

Headquarters,
A.I.F. DEPOTS in U. K.,
Bhurtpore Barracks,
TIDWORTH:
16th May, 1917.
My dear Monash,-
I have now made time to enquire to some extent
into the matters raised by you in your letters of the 3rd and
6th instant, though I have not been able to get the facts in
every case.
In dealing with each matter in the order in
which you took the details in your letters:
1. In the first place, I am not satisfied with the system
in which Officers are disposed of on arrival from Overseas for
duty here, and am issuing instructions, which I hope will put
the matter on a proper basis. Amongst these instructions will
be one directing Group Commanders to forward to their Divisional
Commanders copies of reports sent to me in every case where
Officers sent over by you are not exchanged with Officers of the
same Battalion, whose places they are taking.
2. The next question you raise is as to the number of
Reinforcement Officers employed in your Training Group. The
Establishment of the Group in Officers as now authorised is 86,
of whom 31 or 32 only have come from France or were among those
originally detailed by you for the Group when you left for France
I understand that a number you originally detailed were
transferred to other work under Anzac Orders. I think there is some
mistake in your statement that 21 of the officers sent over have
not been absorbed, and that there is some misapprehension will
appear to you when I deal in a later paragraph with the list of
eleven names that you gave me in your second letter relating to
the 10th Training Battalion.
3. As I have already told you Prince was put in command
of the 10th Training Battalion as the only officer available when
Armfield was Boarded for Service abroad. The reasons that
Rodd was put into the 11th Training Battalion was that Campbell
(was
 

--
Was being warned for service abroad. Rodd had reported for duty with
the Group, and my A.A.G. was anxious to send you as many Officers
as he could, and thought that it would be a good thing to put
Rodd with the 11th, as otherwise there was no work for him to do
though he had reported here for duty. Both Prince and Rodd
belong to the 9th Brigade. I do not think the Group Commander
was responsible.
4. In this connection, I may mention that as soon as
Woods reports, the instructions of Anzac to put Woods in Command
of the 10th Training Battalion and transfer Prince to another
Battalion will be carried out.
5. With reference to officers sent for specific appointments, 
I will give you one instance showing you the difficulty
here, and the need for varying proposed arrangements.
We are asked for a substitute for a Bombing Officer,
and when he arrived we could not make the exchange at once, 
because the Army Council does not permit an officer to be a Bombing
Officer until he has been to a Bombing Course in England, 
consequently we had to wait until some officer did a Bombing Course,
and in order to prevent delay in completing the exchange, I propose 
to institute a system of Training a new Bombing Officer who
will be ready on the date on which the one acting will have to
return to France. This, there fore, will institute  compel at times the
allotment of officers you send over to other than the duty you
expect them to perform, but I think that you will see that it is
inevitable - at any rate the lesser of two evils,-and I am
issuing instructions that will cause you to be advised at once
of any allotment of an officer in variance from the original
plan.
6. With reference to the exchange of officers, perhaps I
could best deal with that by taking your second letter about the
10th Training Battalion. I cannot give you the particulars
(about -