Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 1 April - 10 May 1917, Part 9

SECRET
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
Divisional Headquarters,
15/4/17.
MAGNUM OPUS

[*HEADQUARTERS

G. 1/258/49

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION*]

  C.R.A.
√C.R.E.

√9th  Aust. Inf. Bde

√10th          -do-

√11th           -do-
  "G"    Staff.

x File

√ Spare (1)
1. Herewith copy of Provisional Divisional Plan for Magnum Opus
and Provisional Barrage Plan as submitted to Corps:-
2. Herewith also sundry notes, including the tasks and objectives
proposed for the 8 assaulting Battalions.-
3. These notes and plans are provisional. They are liable to
alteration to meet the requirements of Corps, and the coordination
of action with the Division on our Left. - Moreover, Brigadiers
are to feel at liberty to submit suggestions for modifications
of details, especially as regards the internal dispositions of
the Units.
4. Brigadiers may now discuss plans with their Unit Commanders,
being careful not to disclose, for the time being, more of the
general plan than is necessary to enable Unit Commanders to deal
intelligently with the tasks proposed to be allotted to them.-
5. It is, however, of the utmost importance that each Commander,-
whether Battalion, Company, or Platoon, - should be fully cognisant 
of the whole of the tasks and plans of the Units on his
immediate flanks, and front or rear; so that he may, throughout
the whole attack, render intelligent co-operation with them.
This applies particularly to flank Units of Brigades and Divisions.
.6 While the first consideration, for each Unit, large or small,
is to rapidly overcome all opposition within the area allotted
to it, every unit must next be prepared, immediately that this
has been done, to assist its neighbours, in every possible way
to achieve success, as, for example, by attacking from the
flank an objective which is seen to be holding up its neighbour's 

advance.
7. It must also be fully realized by every Commander that it is
just as important to rapidly overcome, within his own area, all
enemy offensive directed against neighbouring units, as the
offensive which may be directed against his own advance.- In
other words, the whole operation must be regarded in no other
light than a combined, attack by the whole force, in which eve
Unit, large or small, acts in full co-operation with the remainder.
 8. This memo and annexures are not for direct promulgation to
Units. - Much of the matter which they contain will not be
repeated in formal orders. - But I rely upon Brigadiers to see
that, in their own orders, instructions and preparations, all
points raised herein are adequately dealt with.-
John Monash
Major-General,
Commanding Third Australian Division.
 

-1-          15/4/17.
NOTE re ENGINEERS and PIONEERS.
Reference to Provisional Plan, para.10, while the Engineers
and Pioneers allotted for the operation remain under the orders
of the C.R.E., this will not preclude Brigadiers from requisitioning 
upon the C.R.E. for special technical assistance from
these Units, under the following heads. - (provided that such
requirements are reduced to the absolute minimum). -
(a) Preparatory work required by the Infantry, such as
Bridging material, Knife rests, ec.
(b) During actual assault. - Specify purposes. -
(c) Immediately after assault, such as to assist in
defensive organization of specified points or
localities. -
It is under consideration whether the execution of the Communication
Trenches across NO MAN'S LAND will be left exclusively to the
Pioneers, or whether the Infantry will participate or undertake
these entirely.-
All preparatory engineering work which requires Divisional
Organization will be carried out by the C.R.E. under direct orders,
and not through Infantry Brigadi
MISCELLANEOUS
The following questions will be settled Divisionally:-
(a) Allocation of routes for Approach March from Billets to
Assembly places.
(b) Allocation of Assembly Places to Brigades & Battalions.
(c) Employment of Machine Guns until after final capture
of objectives.
(d) Organization of S.O.S. action, during consolidation. -
SIGNALLING
Brigadiers should think out and submit suggestions for supplementary
light, smoke, flag or other signals, to be employed for reporting
the progress of the Infantry during the advance, in case there is
a breakdown of communications by runner or telephone.- It will
be of the utmost importance that Brigadiers should be in a position

 to report accurately and promptly the extent of ground actually
captured and held at any time during the first 5 or 6 hours after

Zero. -
MAP NOMENCLATURE.
The following names are proposed to be allotted to trenches
&c. which are not named, or not shewn, on the map, viz:-
"ULRICA LANE", the Communication Trench running Easterly from
South of LA DOUVE FARM past the north of
GREY FARM.

"ULTINO ROW", the communication trench running Easterly, 250
yards south of and parallel to ASH AVENUE.-

"ULTINO ALLEY", the road from BROXEN TREE HOUSE to

THATCHED COTTAGE.

"BOUNDARY ROAD", the road running from WESTMINSTER AVENUE to

AU CHAUSSEUR CABt.

"UPSET TRENCH", the new trench system shewn on photos of 24/3/17

as running N.W. and S.E. midway between

SCHNITZEL and BETLHEEM FARMS. 

-2-
15/4/17.
COMPASS BEARINGS.
In connection with any bearings mentioned in these papers,
as "true" bearings, it is to be understood that the North and South
lines on our Map Grids have been taken as True North. - In
reality, these lines are not correct, being 1 degree West of
True North.-
The Magnetic Variation of this Locality is 13⁰-34' West.
Hence, to find the magnetic, or compass, bearing, of any "true
bearing" as mentioned in these papers,- add 12½ degrees -
not 13½ degrees.
Thus 20° East of True North = 32½⁰ East, on the Compass. -
CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENCES.
The estimates of men and tools required, as stated in
these notes, are put on a minimum basis; arrangements should
be made to have an ample margin, both of tools and labor,
available.-
 

-5-         15/4/I7.
"C" BATTALION
39th Battalion (Lt-Col. HENDERSON)
In view of the extended frontage and number of objectives
of this Battalion, it will be desirable to employ all its four
Companies in the attack, disposing them in line. - In view,
however, of the blowing of the Mines in U.9.c., the defence at
the right or southern end of the objectives of this Battalion
will be much disorganized, for a distance of at least 150 yards
from the Mines. - The right of the attack need not, therefore, be
so dense as the remainder. - On the other hand the left of the
attack will have to be designed with special attention, and with
a careful allocation of mopping-up parties to each of the several
defined objectives.
The direction of advance of this Battalion will be 54⁰ East
of true North.
The objectives of this Battalion are the ULRICA TRENCH,
the ULRICA SUPPORT (which is a double line), the ULRICA ROW,
LA DOUVE FARM and MOAT, and AVENUE FARM ruins. - The halt of the
Artillery Barrage will be east of all these objectives, so that
the whole area containing all these objectives can be taken in one
continuous advance. - But the troops must not advance East of a
line which skirts the Eastern edge of the MOat and Avenue Farm,
or East of the ULRICA SUPPORT, until G Battalion has passed through.
- They will then advance to the Line G,H, and dig in. - If, as may
be inferred from the photos, there is a hedge al ong the East margin
of the moat, the leading wave of C Battalion would assist to clear
passages for G Battalion through it.
The junction with B Battalion on the South will be made at
G, where the Brigade boundary crosses the line of the hedge; and
with D Battalion on the North at H on the LA DOUVE River near the
North-East corner of the Moat - The River DOUVE will be inclusive
to C Battalion. -
The Battalion will be responsible for the defence of the
line G,H, against counter-attack, in the event of our forward line
being driven in. -
LA DOUVE FARM and AVENUE FARM may be expected to be a
harbor for enemy snipers and Machine guns; the mopping up parties
allotted to these objectives must, therefore, act very promptly,
the moment the creeping barrage has lifted off them. -
A special party, not less than 30 strong, should be told off
from D Battalion ^to follow close behind the left leading Platoon wave of
C Battalion to make straight for the point where the enemy's front
line crosses the DOUVE, to leap the enemy front trench, and effect
a crossing of the DOUVE within enemy territory. This party to then
work westerly, along and behind ULRICA TRENCH in the stretch between 
the DOUVE and ULNA BEAK, so as to meet the other party of
D Battalion which is to work East from the BEAX along and behind
the enemy front trench. - The special task of these two parties
is to facilitate for D Battalion the crossing of the DOUVE,- by
overcoming enemy opposition at the earliest possible moment. -
Carrying parties for this Battalion should be found from
within the Battalion. The length of the journey from our front
line averages 600 yards - say, a trip out and back every 30 minutes.
The length of main and communication trench to be dug
is about 1,100 yards, i.e. 220 men working continuously for 48
hours. - Tools required -200 shovels, 100 picks.
 

-6-       15/4/17.
"D" BATTALION
40th Battalion (Lt-Col. LORD)
The special task of this Battalion is to seize and make good
the crossing of the DOUVE and to capture all the country between
it, the Divisional boundary BB, and the line H,J.-
In order to rapidly overcome the opposition to the crossing
of the DOUVE, by the seizure of the enemy trench extending
between the ULNA BEAK and the point where ULRICA TRENCH crosses
the DOUVE, it is suggested to launch to the attack, a special
party from this Battalion, - from a position of assembly within
our lines, just north of the River - comprising one Company, four
Platoons in depth. - Of this Company, the leading platoon wave,
extended on a front of 100 yards would make for and seize ULNA
SUPPORT trench, the next wave would seize the front line between
LA PETIT DOUVE FARM and the BEAK. The third platoon, advancing
preferably in section columns, close to the river bank, would leap
the front trench and attack, in rear, the enemy East and West
front trench which faces the DOUVE, working towards and meeting the
special party accompanying C Battalion, told off to attack the same
rench from its eastern end, - while the fourth Platoon crossing
the ULNA SUPPORT would attack the ULNA SWITCH from the north-west,
with view to diverting any garrison left in it from interference
with the crossing of the DOUVE. -
Two other Companies of D Battalion to make a frontal attack
on the line of the DOUVE, placing, at not less than 6 points,
bridging material, carried out, under cover of darkness, some hours
before Zero, to the right bank of the River; crossing the river by
such bridges and advancing to the line H,J, to complete the
capture of its objectives. -
This leaves one Company of D Battalion available for disposal
as the Brigadier may decide. - On his decision on this point will
depend the organization of carrying parties of the Battalion

The dispositions of this Battalion will necessarily be complicated, 
owing to the convergence of the two lines of attack, and
the complex location of the objective trench system. This difficulty 

can only be met by a careful allocation of objectives to the
various platoons, and full instructions as to the employment of the
various means of offence available to the troops. -
ULNA SWITCH will be destructively bombarded prior to Zero. -
All that part of ULNA AVENUE which lies East of the line H,J, will
remain under a heavy artillery barrage until Zero plus 25 minutes,
so that little interference to D Battalion, from this direction
need be anticipated. -
The troops must not move East of line running North and South
through the eastern extremity of ULNA SWITCH until H Battalion has
passed through. They will then follow the last wave of H Battalion,
to the line H,J, and dig in thereon. - D Battalion is responsible
for the defence of the line H,J, against counter-attack, in the
event of our front line being driven in. -
Contact with C Battalion on the South will be established at
H, on the DOUVE, near the North-east corner of the MOAT, and with
the right Battalion of the New Zealand Division, at J, on the
ULNA AVENUE at a point the exact position of which has not yet
been definitely decided, but approximately where shown on the plan.
The C.O. of D Battalion will be responsible for establishing
liaison with the New Zealand Battalion on his left. - The route and
timing of the approach march of the company of D Battalion which
will operate North of the DOUVE- will be arranged between Divisional
Staff of this and the New Zealand Divisions. -
D Battalion will have to dig about 300 yards of fire trench
and about 400 yards of communication trench. - This will take
140 men 48 hours. - Battalion requires 110 shovels and 60 picks.
 

-7-     15/4/17.
"E" Battalion
36th Battalion (Lt-Col. MILNE)
The objectives of this Battalion are the capture of the triangular 

shaped country between the lines E,F, and E,K, the
establishment of Outpost positions at T and U, and the mopping
up of the country between the line of consolidation E,K and
the Outpost line T,U. -
It is thought that these objectives can be adequately dealt
with by two companies advancing on a total frontage of 250 yards
with the left resting on ASH AVENUE, i.e. 4 platoons in line;
the leading platoon wave halting on the line E,K. This line
can be very simply described as a line running North and South
just west of, and within 50 yards of, the Moat in U.16.a.
The second wave of four platoons would pass through the first
wave to be allocated thus : - Right platoon to change direction
to south passing to the right of the Moat towards T and establishing 

a post at T, next platoon to mop up the Moat, and its vicinity,
working around the North of the Moat; next platoon to make for
and establish post at U with sentries to the East; left platoon
to act in support of latter and to mop up the country as far as line
U,V. - As soon as the posts are established, the two spare
platoons to withdraw behind the line of consolidation.
bombing block must be established in ULTIMO ROW, East of line E,K.
These dispositions leave available two companies, one as a
Brigade Reserve, and one as a Battalion reserve and for supply
of Battalion carrying parties.
The Battalion digs in on the line E to K, and is responsible
for the defence of this line against counter-attack. - It must
establish a junction with "A" Battalion at E, opposite the

the North-west corner of the Moat, and with F Battalion on
at K, on ASH AVENUE. - ASH AVENUE will be inclusive to E Battalion.
- E Battalion will be responsible for the establishment (with
Engineer assistance) of a "Strong-point" at E.
ULTIMO RESERVE TRENCH and THATCHED COTTAGE KNOLL are points
from which trouble may be expected, but our Standing Barrage will
assist to keep this down.-
The length of trench and communications to be dug does not
exceed 600 yards,representing the continuous labour of 120 men
for 48 hours. - Required say 100 shovels and 60 picks. -
 

-8-     15/4/17.
"F" BATTALION
34th Battalion (Lt-Col. MARTIN)
The principal difficulty which confronts this Battalion in
the execution of the tasks allotted to it is the unavoidable
change of direction which it will have to make during its advance.-
Its tasks are to clear the country between the ULSTER SUPPORT and
the ULSTER RESERVE, to capture the latter, and to establish outpost 
picquets at V and W. -
The Battalion must advance (either in waves or in lines of
section columns) behind B Battalion, its right being directed on the
bend of the road in ASH AVENUE, near the point F. - During the halt
of the barrage the platoons will have time to deploy and swing up
their left so as to face their new direction, keeping parallel with
the barrage, as it swings round. - Both ASH AVENUE and ULSTER
AVENUE will afford useful guides for direction. - If attacking on
a 3 company frontage one company would move between ULSTER AVENUE 
on its left, and ASH AVENUE on its right. - The two left Companies
would advance by the right, with the right of the advance resting
on ULSTER AVENUE. - Moreover, the lines of the ditches and hedges
encountered are fairly square to the direction of the advance, and
this fact will assist in indicating direction. - The tendency will,
however, be to crowd towards the right, which tendency must be
checked, particularly by the left Company.
Behind the leading Platoon waves, moppers up must be provided 
to deal specially with ULSTER SWITCH, and to drop into and
clear any dugouts in ULSTER AVENUE. -
ULSTER RESERVE (so far as same lies within the ground
allotted to this Battalion - about 225 yards) may prove a difficult
objective, even although previously heavily bombarded. The
derelict trenches behind the main trench may be found occupied.
For these reasons the formation which suggests itself is four
platoons in line; leading wave to be followed by 2 lines of moppers-up; 
leading wave to advance to line K,L - simultaneously with the
leading Platoon wave of the Company operating South of the ULSTER
AVENUE. - Rear Platoon waves to complete the capture of ULSTER
RESERVE. -
When the Battalion has reached the limits of its advance,
the dispositions which suggest themselves are as follows:- One
platoon of right Company to establish a picquet at V, with one
platoon acting in support until situation is established. One
platoon of Centre Company to establish a pciquet at W, with one
platoon acting in support. One platoon of Left Company to be
prepared, by action from South to North, to assist G Battalion in
the capture of GREY FARM trench system. - The remainder of the
Battalion (less Reserve Company) proceeds with the consolidation,
on the line K,L.
The junction, for consolidation, with E Battalion, on 

the South, is at K on ASH AVENUE, at LONG RUIN, and with G Battalion,
on the north, is at L, which is on ULSTER DRIVE, just East of the
GREY FARM System.
ULSTER DRIVE at point of junction is inclusive to F
Battalion, which must also establish bombing blocks in it and
ULSTER AVENUE, east of the line K,L. -
This Battalion is responsible for the defence, against
counter-attack, of the new line K,L, from ASH AVENUE (exclusive,
to ULSTER DRIVE (inclusive). - This line has a good field of fire
towards the north, but the field of view to the East and South-east 
is limited by the Knolls at FUZE COTTAGE and THATCHED COTTAGE.
It is from behind these knolls that a local counter-attack may be
expected to develop. - The ruins of TILLEUL FARM, and the farm
150 . . . . .
 

-9-          15/4/17.
"F" BATTALION (Continued)
150 yards to the South of it afford harbour for enemy snipers. until
occupied by our own snipers.
In above suggested dispositions, only 3 companies have been
absorbed. - This leaves one Company for Battalion reserve. - In
view of the length of journey for carrying parties, (nearly 1,000
yards from our front trench) it would be well to laave the whole
of this Company under the hands of the Battalion Commander. -
The hedges and drains encountered in the advance from ULSTER
SUPPORT to ULSTER RESERVE may be expected to be wired. - A good
supply of heavy wire cutters should therefore be carried by the
leading waves. Men carrying wire cutters should be labelled as
laid down in S.S. 135 XXXII para. 3. -
This Battalion will have to dig about 1200 yards of fire and
Communication trenches, which will require 240 men for 48 hours.
Tools required 200 shovels, 100 picks. -
 

-10-       15/4/17.
"G" BATTALION
38th Battalion (Lt-Col. DAVIS)
The objectives of this Battalion are the country between the
lines G,H, and L,M, ULRICA AVENUE and ULRICA LANE, the northern
end of ULSTER RESERVE and the GREY FARM trench system; - all to
the South of LA DOUVE River.
The country between lines G,H, and L,M, appears to be fairly
clear of hedges, wire or other obstacles. - The ultimate
objectives cover a frontage of not more than 350 yards. The
maximum depth of the advance, from ULRICA SUPPORT to the line
L,M, is nearly 800 yards. Two companies, deployed on a four
platoon frontage, in two platoon waves should be sufficient for
the tasks allotted. - This will leave 2 companies, one for
Brigade Reserve, and one to provide Battalion carrying parties.-
The double journey for the carrying parties, from and back to our
front trenches, will be nearly 1½ miles; - so that numerous
parties are required in the early stages of the consolidation of
the line L,M.
The main objective is GREY FARM. - It is most important for
the success of the whole operation that this objective, and the
trenches surrounding it, shall be made good. - This locality will
be heavily bombarded by us prior to Zero. - Also, assistance from
Battalion, by a Platoon attacking from the South, is being
provided. - Nevertheless the attack on this objective by G Battalion,

both from the West and by envelopment from the North, must
be carefully worked out. - The provision of sufficient Mopping up
parties for the several lines of trenches surrounding GREY FARM must
not be overlooked.
The Battalion consolidates on the line L,M, for the defence
of which line against counter-attack it is also responsible. It
also establishes a picquet post in vicinity of point X. - Its
junction with F Battalion on the south is at L, on ULSTER DRIVE,
just East of GREY FARM, and with H Battalion, on the North, is at
M, on the DOUVE, which point must be at least as far East as a line
joining SCHNITZEL FARM and GREY FARM. -
Bombing blocks must be established in ULRICA LANE leading East
beyond line L,M.
There are no apparent dangerous strong points to the east of
the line L,M, as far as the UNCERTAIN Trench System.
The length of main trench to be dug from L to M is about 400
yards; also ULRICA AVENUE will have to be cleared and repaired
as a main communication. - This will involve the continuous
labour of, say, 150 men for 48 hours. - Tools required 120 shovels,
60 picks.
 

-11-     15/4/17.
"H" BATTALION
37th Battalion (Lt-Col. W. J. SMITH)
An advanced party of H Battalion, found from its reserve
Company, should follow close on the heels of D Battalion, in order
to perfect the emergency bridges over the DOUVE, and otherwise
facilitate the rapid crossing of the river by the 12 assaulting
platoons of D Battalion. - This portion of the advance should be
made in columns, each of the six platoons in each wave making
for one of the six crossings to be provided; special arrangements
to be made for guiding each pair of platoons to the particular
bridge allotted to it. -
The Battalion, after passing through D Battalion, must form
up under the Barrage, facing the direction of its subsequent advance,
two companies being disposed between the river and ULNA AVENUE, on
a frontage of 220 yards, and one Company on the north of the ULNA
AVENUE, this latter company being arranged in four platoon waves
in depth. -
The objective of the two companies South of ULNA RESERVE is
the South end of ULCER RESERVE, and there appear to be no ditches
or hedges to impede their advance - A special party of moppers-up,
moving near the left flank of the advance, must, however, be told
off to drop into ULNA AVENUE, as the advance proceeds, in order to
overcome any opposition still active in that trench, and to
picquet dugouts therein. - A similar mopping up party should move
forward with the right flank of the Company which is to advance
on the north side of ULNA AVENUE, in order to deal with the latter,
concurrently, from the rear. -
The final objective of the left Company of this Battalion is
SCHNITZEL FARM and the portion of ULCER RESERVE immediately on the 
West of it. - SCHNITZEL FARM locality is to be regarded as an
 objective whose capture is of the very highest importance, as it
 will form the southern pivot upon which the subsequent defence of
the MESSINES HILL will depend. - Plans for the capture of this
locality by H Battalion, and for its subsequent defensive organization 
as the flank strong point of the Division, must be very
carefully elaborated.
H Battalion digs in on the line M.N. The point M, on the
DOUVE, will be fixed in co-operation with G Battalion as defined
in their instructions. Point N, where contact with the New Zealand
Division is to be established, has been fixed in consultation
between Divisions.
H Battalion is responsible for the defence of the line M,N,
against counter-attack. It will establish outpost picquets,
covering its front, in or forward of the line of the UPSET TRENCH,
clearing the country East of the line M,N, as far as the UPSET
TRENCH (inclusive).
H Battalion has to make an advance of over 600 yards. The
length of trenches, main and communication, to be dug, will be
about 1250 yards, requiring 250 men for 48 hours, tools 200 shovels,
120 picks. Double journey for carrying parties, over 1½ miles, -
say, one trip an hour, including time to load and unload.