Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 1 April - 10 May 1917, Part 7

(2).

about this.

BORWICK cannot go on leave.

It was agreed this morning that the Infantry should 

reach the point where the drain strikes ULNA AVENUE

(U.8.b.70.60) at plus 15 minutes.

That the boundary between the Division should be -

from the re-entrant just South of LA PETIT DOUVE

FARM, (U.8.b.0.40), to the corner of the fence at

BETHLHEEM FARM (U.3.d.40.82). This means that we

join hands with the New Zealanders in ULCER RESERVE

at U.3.c.62.35, at plus 38 minutes; there having

been a halt for 10 minutes between plus 15 minutes

and plus 25 minutes, i.e.- we get from the 15 minute

point to the 38 minute point - a distance of 600

yards - in 13 minutes. - This is 46 yards a minutes.

The barrage for the New Zealanders halts when they

reach ULCER RESERVE.

It starts at plus 43 minutes for the attack on

MESSINES, but remains in front of their section of

ULCER RESERVE until 90 minutes, when they and

ourselves go forward and attack the new, or UPSET 

trench, to hold it as an outpost line. -

I take this to mean that our barrage will creep

right on to UPSET TRENCH, while the New Zealanders

will have their barrage just in front of it.

The New Zealanders intend to be through MESSINES,

or through a part of it, at plus 60 minutes, and so

be ready to go at 90 minutes.

We have to work out when our barrage will reach

SCHNITZEL FARM, ULSTER RESERVE and GREY FARM.

GJ

13/4/17

SECRET.

NOTES FROM CORPS CONFERENCE ON 13TH. APRIL 1917

G.S.O. 1.

GOC

GMJ

Reconnoitre  positions of Reserve Battalions with

General CANNAN.

Get accounts from B.G.,G.S. re recent offensive, e.g.-

Canadian left was held up because mopping up was not

thorough.

B.G.,G.S. re difficulty of moppers up and assaulting

platoons, - Leap frogging correct system.

See that the 200 men of the 11th. Brigade are attached

to the Engineers three weeks before Zero.

Talk to Brigadiers, especially CANNAN, re adequate supply

of Stokes Mortar shells and Varley bombs.

Decide whether to have one 30 yard gap per platoon in

our wire, or four 6 yard gaps for the sections.

Work out how long our E.F.G & H. Battalions will be out

in NO MAN'S LAND under enemy's barrage - show diagrammatically.

See traffic map and directions of routes.

Arrange for roads to be clear for approach march.

See arrangements for converting our Universal saddles to

pack saddles and ascertain that the supply of Yukon packs

is O.K.

See to our strengths and establishments, and the number

who are left behind.

General JOBSON'S orders re overhead machine gun and the 

Sergeant who was arrested by MASSIE.

See order re move of our 7th. Brigade.

Go through new trenches with MUNRO. There are a lot

marked on our 10,000 map. After this speak O'HARA.

Did B.G.,G.S. ever define former alteration of our Left

boundary?

Note to all concerned re inter-clan bomb fight of the

New Zealanders.

Find out when New Zealanders start wire cutting, as the

retaliation will affect our work.

Have our Divisional Area put on to  10,000 map, and see

how ASH TRENCH, etc. fits in.

10th. Corps very heavily raided - lots of hostile

artillery. We must expect these raids.

Enemy took away 60 prisoners.

Brigades getting out of tunnelled dug-outs.

G.S.O. 3 or C.R.E. to say where they are.

Improbable that we shall get extra R.E. stores during

this month. Therefore do not make Brigade Hqrs.

etc. too elaborate.

P.T.O.

JM

14/4/17

(2).

How many men have we employed now. and how? -

e.g. cable burying, railway work, and what of

them are being bussed to their work?

See 9th. Brigade Training Programmes, and

arrange to visit that Brigade. -

Corps Commander and Divisional Commander to

visit later.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters,

14/4/17.

9th Aust. Inf. Bde.

10th     -do-

11th      -do-

With reference to paper G 25/216 entitled "Role of

Infantry in consolidating a captured Position &c." which has

been circulated to Infantry Brigades. I consider it of the

utmost importance that practical instruction should be given

to the troops in the actual method of consolidating a line of

shell craters. -

As it would not be practicable to exercise the whole of

the personnel in the field in the actual work of carrying out

such consolidation on a large scale, the most practicable substitute

for this would  appear to be as follows:-

Select a suitable site within easy walking distance of

the Brigade or Unit Billets.

At this site, actually dig a number of shell craters of

varying depths and diameters, representing both the crater

itself and the lip surrounding it.

These craters may be arranged in pairs in different

parts of the field at intervals of say 4 to 8 yards between

craters and 20 yards between pairs of craters. Each pair

of craters should be methodically dealt with and

advanced to progressive stages of consolidation; thus the

first pair would show the simple two man rifle pit in its

preliminary stages, one crater showing the first stage, the 

second crater showing the second stage with fire step and

floor and sandbag parapet.

The next pair of craters would show the two craters

connected up, with wings thrown back, ready for occupation as

a fire-bay by 4 or 5 rifles.

The next pair would show a rough Lewis Gun emplacement

sapped forward, with a rough communication trench sapped

back, with the wings of the fire-bay somewhat extended.

To these examples, thus fully worked out on the ground,

platoons should be marched in turn, and the men allowed to occupy

the works in rotation, an instructor explaining, on the ground,

to each party of men, the progressive development from the isolated

craters to the consolidated defended system. - The men should be

encouraged to thoroughly familiarize themselves with the method,

to discuss same, and make up their minds exactly how they would

go to work if, and when, called upon to perform such work.

I shall be glad to have a report in the near future

stating what it has been possible to do in order to carry out

the above suggestions.

Major-General.

Commanding Third Australian Division.

Messines Operations

Magnium Opus

Secret

15/4/17

30/5/17

C.R.A

C.R.E 

9^th Brigade

10^th do (1 spare copy

(file copy

(G copy

11^th do

1. Herewith copy of Provisional Divisional Plan for Magnum Opus ^Provisional Barrage Plan as submitted to Corps. —

2. Herein ^also secondly notes, xxx ^including the tasks and objectives proposed for the 8 assaulting

Battalions . — These are numbered from right to left ,  leading line A, B, C, D,

following line E,F,G,H . —

3. These noted & plans must be regarded as provisional . They are liable to alteration to

meet the requirements of Corps, & the coordination of action with the Division on our

Left . — Moreover, Brigadiers are to feel at liberty to submit suggestions for

[[?]] modifications of details , especially as regards the internal dispositions of the Units

4. Brigadiers may now discuss plans with their Unit Commanders , being careful

not to disclose, for the time being, more of the general Corps plan than is necessary to

enable Unit Commanders to deal intelligently with the tasks proposed to be allocated

to them . 

5. It is, however , of the utmost importance that each Commander , — whether Battalion

Company or Platoon — should be fully cognizant of the whole of the tasks & plans

of the xxxxx units on his immediate flanks ^& front or rear; so that he may,

throughout the whole attack, render intelligent cooperation to with them. [Here add X X at foot.]

6. While the first consideration , for each Unit, large of small , is to rapidly overcome

all opposition within the area allotted to it , every unit must ^next be prepared , immediately
that ^this has been done, to assist its neighbours, in every possible way to achieve success,
as, for example, by attacking from the flank an objective which is ^
seen to be leveling up into 
neighbours' advance. -
7. It must also be fully realized by xxx every Commanders that it is just as important to
rapidly overcome ^within his ^own area all enemy offensive directed against neighbouring units, as xxx the operation
xxxx must be regarded in no other light than a combined attack by the whole
xxxx force, in which every unit, large or small, acts in full cooperation with
the rest of the force. remainder.-
8. The papers are at present This memo & annexures are not ^previously for direct
promulgation to Units: - Much of the matter which they contain will not be repeated
in formal orders. - But I rely upon Brigadiers to see that , in their own
Orders, instructions and preparations, xxxx all points raised herein are xxxx
xxxxx adequately dealt with. -
Major General
※ ※ This applies particularly to flank units of Brigades & Divisions

37

H Battalion.
37th Bn (St Co. W.V.? Smith)
An advanced part of H Battalion, found from its reserve Company, should
follow close on the heels of D Battalion, in order to perfect the emergency bridges over the
Douve, & otherwise facilitate the rapid crossing of the river by ^the 12 assaulting platoons of D Battalion. - This portion
of the advance should be made in Columns, each of the six platoons ^in each wave making for one of
the six crossings to be provided; special arrangements to be made for finding each
pair of platoons to the ^particular bridge allotted to it.-
The Battalion, after passing through D Battalion, must form up under the 
Barrage, facing the direction of its subsequent advance, two Companies being disposed
between the river & Ulna Avenue, on a frontage of 220 yards, & one Company on the
north of the Ulna Avenue, this latter Company being arranged in xxxx four platoon
waves in depth.-
The objective of the two Companies South of Ulna Reserve in the South end of Weir
Reserve, & there appear to be no ditches or hedges to impede their advance. - A
special party of moppers up, moving near the left flank of advance must however
be told off to drop into Ulna Avenue, as the advances proceeds, in order to overcome
any opposition still active in that trench, and the piquet dugouts therein. - A similar
mopping up party should more forward with the right flank of the Company which
is to advance on the north side of Ulna Avenue, in order to deal with the latter from 
concurrently, from the rear. -
The final objective of the ^left Company xxxx of this Battalion is Schnitzel Farm & the
portion of Ulcer Reserve immediately on West of it. - Schnitzel Far, ^Locality is to be
regarded as an objective whose capture is of the very highest importance, as it will form
the ^Southern pivot upon which the subsequent defence of the Messines Hill will depend. - Plans
for the capture of this point Locality by D Battalion, & for its subsequent defensive organisation 
as the flank strong point of the Division must be very carefully elaborated. -
D Battalion digs in on the line MN. The point M will, on the Douve, will be fixed
in cooperation with G Battalion, as defined in their instructions. Point N, where 
contact with the N.Z. Division is to be established, will has been fixed ^xxxxx in consultation between
Divisions. & communicated to their xxxxxxx
→ See here, note over page. - [AAA]
D Battalion is responsible for the defence of the line MN against counter-attack. It
will establish outpost piquets in the vicinity of the points Y & Z, clearing the 
country between East of the line MN, as far as the line. X Y Z. -
Special consideration will hereafter be given to the contingency of Bethleem Farm being found to be
strongly held by the enemy ^& costly to take. - It is probable that, if this is found to be the case, its capture
will be made the objective as a subsequent operation, xxxxxxx following suitable Artillery preparation
p.t.o.

D Battalion has to make an advance of over 600 yards. -
The length of trenches, main & communication, to be dug, will be about 1250 yards
requiring 250 men for 48 hours; tools; - 200 shovels, 120 picks. -
Double journey, for carrying parties, over 1½ miles, - xxx say one trip an hour
including time to load & unload. -
Note [AAA] If the N.Z Division does not alter from its present determination
not to take the new trench, which I have called the "Upset Trench xxxxx xxxx
2 paras on preceding page would read as follows:-
AAA
"D Battalion is responsible for the defence of the line MN against
"Counterattack. It will establish outpost picquets, covering its front, 
"in or forward of the line of the UPSET trench, clearing the  country East
"of the line MN as far as the UPSET trench (inclusive)"
The follows the matter on the top of this page.

Note re Engineers & Pioneers
Reference to Provisional Plan, para 10, while the Engineers & Pioneers allotted for
participating in the operation, in the first line, remain under the orders of the C.R.E, this
will not preclude Brigadiers from requisitioning upon the C.R.E. for special technical 
assistance from these units ^under the following heads:- provided that such requirements are reduced to the
absolute minimum,
(a) Preparatory work required by the Infantry, such as Bridging material, knife
rests &c
(b) During actual assault - specify purposes:-
(c) Immediately after assault ^such as to assist in defensive organisation of
defined specified points on the line or localities. -
It is under consideration whether the execution of the Communication Trenches across
No Man's land will be left exclusively to the Pioneers, or whether the Infantry will
participate or undertake these entirely. -
All preparatory engineering work which requires Divisional organisation will be
carried out by the C.R.E. under direct orders & not xxxx through Infantry Brigades. -
Miscellaneous
The following positions will be settled divisionally:-
(a) Allocation of routes for Approved March from Billets to Assembly places
(b) Allocation of Assembly Places to Brigades & Battalions.
(c) Employment of Machine Guns up to until after final capture of objectives.
(d) Organisation of S.O.S. action, during Consolidation. -
Signalling
Brigadiers should think out and submit suggestions for supplementary
light, smoke, flag or other signals, to be employed for reporting the progress
of the Infantry during the advance, in case there is a breakdown of Communications
by runner or telephone. - It will be of the utmost importance that Brigadiers
should be in a position to report the accurately ^& promptly the extent of ground actually captured.
^& held at any time during the first 5 or 6  hours after Zero. -
Map Nomenclature
The following names are proposed to be allotted to trenches &c which are ^not name ^or not drawn on the map,
viz:- "ULRICA LANE", the communication trench running Easterly from South of La Douve Farm past the north of Grey Farm.
"ULTIMO ROW", the Communication trench running Easterly, xxxx 250 yds South of 
and parallel to Ash Avenue. -
"ULTIMO ALLEY", the road running from Broken Tree House to Thatched Cottage
"BOUNDARY ROAD", the road running from Westminster Avenue to An Chasseur Cabt
p.t.o

UPSET TRENCH - The new trench ^system shown on photo. of 24/3/17
as running N.W & S.E. midway between Schnitzel 
and Bethleem Farms.
Compass Bearings
In connection with an Bearings mentioned in these papers, as "true" bearings,
it is to be xxxxxxxx understood that the North & South lines on our Map Grids have been xxx taken as
True North. - In reality, these lines are not correct, being 1 degree xxxxx West of the 
North. -
The Magnetic Variation of this Locality is 13^o - 34' West: Hence, to find the
magnetic, or compass, bearing, of any "true bearing" ^as mentioned in these
papers, - add 12½ degrees - not 13½ degrees.
Thus 20^o East of True North = 32½^o East, on the compass. -
Construction of Defences
The estimates of man and tools required, as stated in these notes, are put on a 
minimum basis; arrangements should be made to have an  ample margin, both
of tools & labor, available. -

33
A Battalion. -
33^rd Bn, 9^th Bde, (Lt. Co. Morshead) [*(?spelling)]
The objectives of this Battalion are the Front & Support lines; - Owing to
the change in the general direction of these ^trenches which occurs on the front of this Battalion, it will
probably be desirable for the right xxxx portion of this Battalion to attack on a bearing
of xxxxx 50^o E. of true North, while the left xxxx portion of the Battalion conforms
to the direction which must be taken by the right wing of B Battalion, i.e
on a bearing of xxxxx 24^o E of ^true North. - This  may involve some danger of 
a gap being left in the centre of the Battalion ^by the time the support second objective is reached but this danger, if fully foreseen & 
explained to all concerned, can be xxxxx readily met. - On The right flank of the leading
wave will strike ^the enemy support trench to the South ^East of the line ^CDE which is to be consolidated;
but this does not matter in the least. -
As soon as the two lines are taken, bombing blocks must be established ^in their
& garrisoned, South of our new line ^CDE in all trafficable trenches leading Southwards
from the captured country. - These bombing blocks must however keep at a safe distance xxxx 
xx from our defensive barrages, which will be put down on Ultimo Avenue. -
The troops must not advance beyond the line of the ^captured support trench, until all
^the waves of E Battalion have passed through. - They^will then follow the rear wave of E. Bn
^xxxx as far as the line of consolidation, D EF
As this Battalion will be covered by xxxx Battalion on their its front, and a
barrage on their its right flank, the line of consolidation D,E,F can be carefully
& deliberately chosen, particularly as regards field of fire & suitable Lewis Gun positions.
on the section D to E. - The point of contact with B Battalion, on the north, will be at F
on Ash Avenue, just East of the bend in that road. - 
As regards the extension of the front line ^from D to C, across No Man's Land ^back to our old line while
this forms part of the task of "A" Battalion, there is no urgency about it, and if
troops are not immediately available for the work, it can be left for until the night. -
A direct communication with our old front line, - in the line of the "Russian Sap" - which
debunches from our  old front line at U 15.d.4½.8 - must, however by pushed or
energetically, to give safe passage across N.M Land. -
"A" Battalion will until xxxxxxx be xxxx responsible for the defence of the line
DCE DEF against counter-attack. -
The total length of trench to be captured by each wave does not exceed 550 yards.
This task can be adequately dealt with by 6 platoons, in line, in each wave. - Thus
one Company ^of the battalion is available for Brigade Carrying parties & Brigade Reserve; the 
remaining Companies finding their own Moppers up, and
The distance being short ^comparatively small carrying parties should fully serve the