Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 1 April - 10 May 1917, Part 5

SECRET                      O.B./1837.

POLICY IN THE AIR

1.  The whole value of the Royal Flying Corps lies

in its co-operation with the other arms and in the

assistance it can give to the conduct of operations on

the ground. Fighting in the air is not and end in itself,

but under present conditions it is a necessity to enable

this assistance to be given.

2. Fighting on the ground from the strategical 

point of view may be offensive or defensive, or a 

combination of the two, but in the air the offensive is

the only policy which cane give success. The aeroplane

is essentially  an offensive and not a defensive weapon.

Owing to the unlimited space in the air which permits

of free manoeuvring in all three dimensions, to accidents

of wind and cloud, and to the difficulty of one machine

seeing another, no number of aeroplanes acting on the

defensive will prevent a hostile pilot with initiative

and determination from reaching his objective.

Appeals are often put forward for the direct

protection of our Corps Squadron machines by escorts of

fighting machines. Apart from the fact that this would

entail a complete dissemination of our fighting strength,

this policy would not achieve the desired results. This

has been proved in actual practice. At the commencement

/ of the
 

of the VERDUN offensive last year, the French adopted

the offensive with their fighting machines.

Superiority in the air resulted at once, and their Corps

machines were enabled to do their work without undue

interference. As is happening now in our own case,

however, demands arose in some quarters for the direct

protection of these machines by escorts. These demands

were met, with the result that the enemy took the

offensive and turned the tables on the French. The

mistake was realised and rectified, and again the French

rapidly gained the ascendancy. Last Autumn the French

again tried the system of escorts, attaching four fighting

machines to each Corps squadron. Again, the policy was

found a mistake, and had to be abandoned.

3. Profiting by the French experience at VERDUN, we

pursued a relentless and incessant offensive in the air when

the operations on the SOMME front commenced last July.

This policy was completely successful, and gave us a market

ascendancy for several months during which our Corps machines

were but seldom interfered with.

As was early foreseen to be inevitable, the enemy

took steps to re-equip his fighting squadrons with better

machines, and to introduce a more resolute and offensive

policy with the result that in the autumn of last year he

began to restore the balance, and during the winter we were

no longer able to claim the ascendancy we enjoyed last summer.

This situation was fully considered in August last 

year, when it was first seen to be likely to arise, and it

was at once realised that the only possible way of meeting

it, and of once more obtaining the ascendancy, was to continue

 / the offensive
 

the offensive policy which had been so successful in

both our own case and in that of the French.

4. During the last two months our fighting

strength has been increased by the arrival of new

fighting squadrons, the replacement of old by new type

machines in other squadrons, and by the loan of some

Naval squadrons of  up-to-date type.

These squadrons have not been used as they

arrived, since to do so would only have resulted in

frittering away our strength piecemeal. They were

consequently held in hand until the commencement of

offensive operations.

5. Our offensive policy is carried out by means 

of

(i) Offensive patrols.

(ii) Bomb raids by night and day.

(i) Offensive patrols have a purely fighting role,

namely, to seek for, fight, destroy and drive down the

enemy's machines. Their area of activity extends from

beyond the zone of operations of the Corps squadron

machines for a depth of at least 20 miles, and they

automatically protect the latter by causing the bulk

of the fighting to take place at a distance behind the

lines. The work they accomplish is proved by the fact

that since our aerial offensive commenced early this

month, the losses among fighting machines has been more

than five times as many as among Corps machines, and the

work of the latter has been very little interfered with.

(ii) Bomb raids by night and day, in addition to

inflicting material damage, are designed to cause a 

 / demand
 

demand to arise for local protection of the enemy's

communications, depots, and headquarters, which will

result in the withdrawal of aeroplanes and anti-aircraft

artillery from the battle area. They were very

successful in this respect last year on the SOMME.

They must be pushed out to long distances in order to

achieve their object.

6. A harder task undoubtedly confronts our aerial

forces than was the case last summer, owing to the

increase in the enemy's resources and to their more

efficient direction.

We must, therefore, pursue an even more vigorous

offensive, and send our forces further afield. To draw

back and adopt a partially defensive attitude would be

playing into the enemy's hands, and doing exactly what he

is trying to force us to do. Hard fighting is inevitable,

and heavy casualties are bound to occur, but it is

confidently anticipated that the same policy will produce

the same results as soon as a spell of settled fine weather

enables the offensive to be pursued over a period sufficient

to subject the enemy to a continuous strain. Continual

pauses due to spells of bad weather, as of late, give the 

enemy to recover.

[*9APR1917*]
 

[COPY]        SECRET

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION            G1/258/32

Divisional Headquarters,

10/4/17.

Ref.Map.-

PLOEGSTERT,

1/10,000,            

28 S.W.4,

Edition 4 A.  
MAGNUS OPUS
OUTLINE OF PLAN.

1. DISPOSITIONS  of BRIGADES :-      
in Frontage - Two Brigades in line - each Brigade   

on a frontage of two Battalions. -

in Depth -        Each Brigade in two lines - two

Battalions in each line.

2. DISPOSITIONS of BATTALIONS    
in Frontage -    Each Battalion attacks with 3 or with

4 companies in line - (according to

frontage and nature of objectives).

Each Company forming two platoon

 waves on a two platoon frontage.

3. BOUNDARY BETWEEN RIGHT and LEFT BRIGADES 
A line running from the point where ANSCROFT AVENUE 
joins our front line, through M in GREY FM.

4. OBJECTIVES.     
Leading four Battalions capture 1st objective (which

is enemy's front line) and 2nd objective (which is

enemy's support line; and digs in on the line

D, E, F, G, H, J (see plan attached) which is 60

to 100 yards beyond enemy's support line and takes

 in LA DOUVE FARM MOAT, and AVENUE FARM.

Rear Four Battalions pass through leading four Battalions

(during a short halt of the Creeping Barrage) and

 then follow the barrage to capture ULNA AVENUE and

the line of the ULCER RESERVE and ULSTER RESERVE                                   
trenches, including SCHNITZEL FARM  and GREY FARM. - 
These four Battalions dig in on the line E, K, L,

M, N, (see plan), and also establish an outpost line

with picquets at points T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z marked

on plan.
 

-2-                10/4/17.

5. REFERENCE LETTERS of BATTALIONS
The Battalions are lettered from right to left:

the leading Battalions being A, B, C and D, the

rear Battalions being E, F, G, H. On completion

of the operation, the Battalions will occupy the

relative positions shown thus: -

H, G, F, E  )                

D, C, B, A  )

6. PROBABLE DISPOSITIONS of BRIGADES & BATTALIONS  
The probable dispositions will be as follows : -

 A Bn. 9th Inf. Bde. 33rd Bn.    (Lt.-Col.MOREHEAD) 

B Bn.          do.          35th Bn.    (Lt.-Col.GODDARD)

C Bn.  10th Inf. Bde. 39th Bn.  (Lt-Col.HENDERSON)

D Bn.          do.          40th Bn.   (Lt-Col.LORD)

E Bn. 9th Inf. Bde.   36th Bn.   (Lt-Col.MILNE)

F  Bn.          do.           34th Bn.   (Lt-Col.MARTIN)

G Bn. 10th Inf. Bde. 38th Bn.    (Lt-Col.DAVIS)

H Bn.          do.           37th Bn.    (Lt-Col.SMITH)

7. RESERVES        
11th Brigade furnishes Divisional Reserve, one Battalion                                  
to move up ^before Zero to vicinity of PROWSE POINT and one 
Battalion to vicinity of  PUSILIER FARM, xxxx ^immediately that 
assaulting trenched;  ^Battalions are clear; remainder of Reserve

Brigade to remain under arms at the CATACOMBS.

With the exception of G and H Battalions (which owing

to frontages and Objectives allotted will attack

 with all four companies),  ^at least one 

 Company of each Battalion will be held available as

 Brigade Reserve and to provide Brigade Carrying Parties.- The 
moppers up and Battalion carrying parties will be

drawn from the Assaulting Companies themselves. -
 

-3-              10/4/17

8. ARTILLERY BARRAGE  & TIME TABLE     
It being understood that "Zero" is the time

when the leading Infantry leave our trenches,                                                  
the following time-table is proposed. -

[*SUPERSEDED  -SEE BARRAGE NEXT ATTACHED*]

ACTION OF 18-pounders.

At Zero - Standing barrage is on enemy's front line.

Creeping barrage in NO MAN'S LAND.

At plus 9 - Standing barrage lifts to support line.

At plus 10 - Creeping barrage reaches and passes

enemy's front line - Infantry reach

front line.

At plus 14 - Standing barrage lifts to line of

ULSTER RESERVE and ULCER RESERVE.

At plus 15 - Creeping barrage reaches and passes

enemy's support  line, and Infantry

reach support line.

At plus 20 - Creeping Barrage halts on a line approximately 
parallel to and 150 yards

beyond enemy's support line. Remains

halted for 10 minutes.

At plus 30 - Creeping barrage resumes advance.

At plus 55 - Standing Barrage lifts to UNCANNY TRENCH

and remains there.

At plus 58 - Creeping barrage reaches ULCER RESERVE

and Infantry enter ULCER RESERVE.

At plus 68 - Creeping barrage reaches ULSTER RESERVE

and  GREY FARM, and Infantry enter.

At plus 95 - Creeping barrage reaches its final

position about 150 yards beyond the

line BETHLEHEM FARM -TILLEUL FARM

and comes to a halt. 

 A diagram is attached showing how it is proposed

the barrage shall move, pivoted to a certain

extent on the South and swinging round to the North.

ACTION OF 4.5" HOWITZERS.

 (36 available)

24 allotted for creeping barrage, to creep

8 minutes ahead of the 18-pr. creeping barrage,

paying special attention to ULNA AVENUE.

This barrage will finally rest on UNCANNY TRENCH,

not on the line where the 18-pounder creeping

barrage comes to a halt.
 

  -4-      10/4/17

The 12 Howitzers allotted for standing Barrage

will be employed as follows :-

Fire will be concentrated on the following

Localities in accordance with the special time-table.-                                   
ULNA SWITCH: LA DOUVE FARM: AVENUE FARM:  
Strong Point at Road Junction ULSTER SWITCH: GREY FARM AND ULSTER 
RESERVE: SCHNITZEL FARM and ULCER RESERVE: after that to 
UNCANNY TRENCH.

It is recommended that the proportion of creeping

to standing barrage of 18-prs. shall be two to one. i.e.-

about 66% creeping.

9. MACHINE GUN COMPANIES  
One M.G.Co. will be held in reserve at the CATACOMBS.
 - Prior to and during the assault, the other three 
M.G.Companies will be employed to  barrage objectives, 
selected in consultation with Corps Machine Gun Officer 
-After capture of al l objectives, (and when ^at a clock time decided 
by Divisional Commander) one M.G.Company will pass under 
orders of each front line Brigade for defence against 
Counter-attack; the Divisional Machine Gun Co. being 
held in Reserve in vicinity of ST YVES P.O. near our 
outer flank, also for defensive employment.

10. ENGINEERS & PIONEERS  
One Field Company, and Pioneer Battalion less 2

 companies will be held in reserve. - The remainder

 will remain under the orders of the C.R.E. One Field

 Co. and one Company Pioneers will be employed by him

 with each of the attacking Brigades. - One Hundred 

 Infantry from 11th Brigade will be al lotted to each of

 these two Field Companies.  
 

-5-         10/4/17

10. ENGINEERS & PIONEERS (Contd.)      
Special Tasks. - Communications across NO MAN'S

LAND Formation of Strong Points

in our new lines.

Clearing overland routes in captured

territory.

Bridging LA DOUVE RIVER.

Defensive wiring (if ordered) in

front of right Brigade.

11. MEDIUM TRENCH  MORTARS
These will be employed in cutting wire prior to

Zero; during the "time-table" they will participate

in the barrage of enemy front line from Zero to

Zero plus 5 minutes.

12.LIGHT TRENCH  MORTARS         
One Battery is held in reserve. - One Battery 

remains at disposal of each attacking Brigade,

to move forward, under Brigadier's orders, into

 captured territory, for employment defensively,

and to engage any suitable targets within range, -

particularly on the new front of the right                                                            Brigade.

13. APPROACH MARCH & ASSEMBLY    
The following communication trenches are 

being made good for use during the Approach March and subsequently.
 - ASH LANE: THE ONLY WAY: ANNESCROFT 
AVENUE: ONTARIO AVENUE: TORONTO AVENUE: ST YVES 
AVENUE.

This will allow three for each Brigade.

ASH LANE will cross LA HUTTE-MESSINES Road

by means of a tunnel. Special precautions will be

taken to make this so strong that the roadway will 
not be interfered with and will be capable of

carrying heavy traffic.

In addition to the above communication

trenches, special lines over the top of the ground 
will be laid out. 
 

-6-         10/4/17

13. APPROACH MARCH & ASSEMBLY  (Contd.)            

So far it is not intended to dig any fresh

Assembly trenches, but work is proceeding on

reclaiming all existing trenches,  and making good 
the various small trenches between the firing, 
support and reserve lines.

14. METHOD OF ISSUING FROM  TRENCHES.        
Leading wave issues from firing line, special

facilities having been arranged. At least 25

per cent of our own wire will be cleared; this

should give room, and each platoon will have its

gap opposite its own objective. It will not be

necessary to lay tapes in NO MAN'S LAND, as our

trenches are practically parallel to the enemy's

front line; apart from this, our creeping barrage

in NO MAN'S LAND  will control the situation, and

leading waves will go as close to it as they can.

 As soon as leading wave leaves front line, second

wave will also get on the move and follow the

leading wave into NO MAN'S LAND, both taking

advantage of the creeping barrage in approaching 

the German line. As soon as these two waves of

 A. B. C. and D Battalion are clear of the front

 line, their places of assembly in front and

support lines will be ^immediately taken by E, F, G, and H 
Battalions.; (these Battalions will commence to move 
forward at about Zero plus 10 in order not to 
become confused with the leading Battalions) and yet 
to be in position to go forward to attack their 
allotted objectives when the barrage recommences 
creeping after the 10 minute halt.