Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 1 April - 10 May 1917, Part 12

Date?
APPENDIX I.
LIGHT RAILWAY CENTRES.
U.3.d.45.45.
U.11.b. - FME de la CROIX.
U.11.a.80.55.
U.11.a.05.50.
U.10.d.50.20.
U.11.c.10.65.
U.17.a.20.40.
U.17.a.55.00.
U.17.c.85.00.
U.17.0.90.80.
The bombardment of these points would wreck the
enemy's supply system through light railways, upon which his
organization apparently depends to a large extent. Suggested
that they should be shelled continually from a date to be
determined later in accordance with the general policy, after
satisfactory progress has been made with our own works -
(this in order to avoid heavy retaliatory fire).
Date?

Before "V" day.
APPENDIX II.
BRIDGES.
The bridges over the LYS at -
U.12.d.72.50.
U.18.b.00.55.
U.18.a.58.30. (light railway).
V.17.d.65.35. do.
are the routes by which reliefs habitually come into the Sector,
and should be well barraged.
There are also bridges at -
U.30.a.80.90. (light railway).
U.29.b.70.32.       do.
U.29.b. 60.25.      do.
The barraging of these bridges would interfere with
a possible enemy flank attack on our advance.
 

Date- APPENDIX III.
"V" day.
DUMPS.
Main supply dumps are - 
(U.12.b.90.45.     U.20.e.80.45.
(U.12.d.00.55.     U.29.b.40.80. 30.70
(U.18.a.40.40.     U.30.b. 15.98.
(U.17.d.40.50.
The enemy's entire light railway system, which is
extensive, runs from the first four of these dumps. Suggest
that they be shelled on "V" day.
Subsidiary dumps are - 
U.2.d.70.40.        U.22.a.45.65.
U.3.a.75.28.         U.22.c.90.85.
U.3.d.50.40.        U.23.b.00.65.
U.8.b. 55.52.        U.28.b.75.60.
U.9.a.20.10.
U.10.d.50.25.
U.15.b.40.82.

Date         APPENDIX IV.
"V" day onwards.
The Main cable junctions are - 
U. 3.b. 92.55.
O.34.c.15.05.
U.4.a.50.65.
U.4.b.65.10.
U.4.d.18.58.
U.4.d.80.10.
U.10.a.75.75.
U.9.d.72.62.
U.11.c.85.20.
U.17.b. 30.30.
U.17.d.10.25.
U. 22.b. 95.90.
U.24.a.70.80.
Suggested that these be bombarded from "V" day
onwards. This will not only break down enemy's control
communications during the whole of the preliminary bombardment,
but also will probably cause him considerable losses in
endeavoring to repair them.
 

Date - V day on wards
APPENDIX V.
COMMUNICATION ROUTES.
(a). Track from U.5.d. North-West towards MESSINES.
(b). Valley of the DOUVE throughout its length - a good
enfilade target.
(c). UNCERTAIN LANE (U.10.b.).
(d). Tramway U.11.d. and c. (forks U.11.e.60.50.).
(e). UNCHAINED AVENUE (U.17.a).
(f). UNCLE DRIVE and UMBO AVENUE. (U.17.c., 16.d).
(g). UNCLE AVENUE and UMBO DRIVE. (U.17.c., 22.b).
Suggested these be bombarded, (mostly enfilade
should be possible) from "V" day onwards.
Date - Y day. APPENDIV VI.
The main enemy headquarters areas in U. Sector are
beyond our furthest Green line ^(line of consolidation). These headquarters areas
are thought to be roughly -
(a). Area U.4.a. SEPTIEME BARN on the track of two main
cable routes, 3 important cable junctions.
(b). Area U.10.central, the double UNCERTAIN trenches,
from the DOUVE to the FUZE COT. tram line (suspected
battalion headquarters).
(c). Area U.5.a. North-West corner, STEIGNAST farm.
(suspected regimental battle headquarters and reserve
battalion headquarters).
(d). Area U.12.central, WARNETON, especially U.12.c.78.40.
and U.12.b.34.32.
(e). Area U.17.d. LA BASSE VILLE.
Suggested that areas b, c, d, e, be bombarded from
"Y" day onwards.
Company headquarters are suspected at -
U.8.b.00.70.      U.10.a.28.12.
U.3.c.85.20.       U.16.a.10.18.
U.9.e.42.15.        U.16.a.80.35.
U.9.d.7Z.62.       U.22.a.50.20.
                            U.22.d.15.22.
These presumably will come under the general bombardment.
U.23.c.00.55. is supposed to be a battalion headquarters.
 

G.O.C copy. 

File

SECRET.

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

Divisional Headquarters, 22nd 25th April, 1917.
[*HEADQUARTERS
No. G1/258/100
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION*]

2nd. ANZAC Corps R.A.
Corps Heavy Artillery. (For information).
C.R.A. 3rd. Aust. Div."
Reference your letter 2nd. ANZAC R.A. 227/15/11 G.
dated April 17th.
1. I enclose a copy of a letter sent to Headquarters,
2nd. ANZAC on 17th. instant showing which communication trenches
I did not want destroyed during the preliminary bombardment.
2. ULSTER SWITCH should, I think, receive attention,
as also the River DOUVE.
3. Special arrangements will be necessary with regard
to cutting a considerable amount of wire that exists behind the
support line in the area to be attacked by the 3rd. Australian
Division. - It is believed that there is wire in the River
DOUVE from U.8.b.80.25. Eastwards probably connected with ULNA
SWITCH wire at that point. I do not propose, however, to deal
with wire-cutting in this letter.
4. I would be glad to know how many Heavy Trench
Mortars will be made available for the 3rd. Australian Divisional
front.
5. A list of Targets was forwarded to you ^Corps for information
on 21st. instant. This was compiled from intelligence
records in this office. - It appears that the River DOUVE is
largely used as a means of communication and it is probable that
signal cables run along its banks. There is a certain amount of
evidence which substantiates this conjecture.
6. I would be glad to know the outline of the proposals
for the four days preliminary bombardment. Is it intended to
have any firing on Zero day prior to Zero hour? Will heavy
barrages be put down on the front and support lines at various
times during the four days preliminary bombardment, in order to
disclose the enemy's retaliatory action? Will such barrages be
put down, lifted off and put down again with e view to encouraging
him to bring his machine guns into action, and enabling our artillery
to blot them out? Is it intended that the Hurricane
bombardment on the enemy's front and support lines at Zero hour
shall be a surprise, or merely an incident which has often happened
before without any contributory action on the part of the infantry?
7. I attach in Appendices suggestions for the order of
bombardment of enemy communications and strong points behind the
Divisional front.
8. Concurrently with the bombardment of light railway ^traffic
centres (Appendix 1) it is suggested that some shelling should be
directed on the Localities of
DEULEMONT.
PONT ROUGE.
LES ECLUSES. -
in order to mislead the enemy as to probable front of attack. If
only the back area immediately South and South-East of MESSINES is
shelled, he will undoubtedly draw conclusions.
9. I think Heavy Artillery should include in their bombardment
scheme the whole of the double UNCERTAIN trenches in
U.10. N & S of POTTERIE Farm.

(Sgd) John Monash Fme
Major.-General
Commanding 3rd. Australian Division.
 

GOC copy
COPY. 26-4-17

NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE FIRST AN
THIRD ARMIES.
[*HEADQUARTERS

No G1/288
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION*]
1. Training.
(a) The value of platoon training under the new organization
was very marked.
G.H.Q. instructions were followed as a general guide, and the
position of the attacking waves, bombers, Lewis gunners and rifle
grenadiers, was adjusted to suit the particular tasks to be undertaken.
A rifle grenade barrage, supported by a few Stokes mortars,
was employed for dealing with strong points, which held out after
the artillery barrage had moved forward.
(b) The training of platoon commanders in the tactical handling
of their platoons under various conditions has been emphasized, and
much attention should be given to a knowledge and study of the ground,
over which the attack will take place.
(c) The careful organization and control of "mopping up"
parties should be practised during training. A systematic method of
dealing with different objectives should be rehearsed previously;
this is especially necessary in localities where mining systems have
been established for some time.
(d) The selection of visual signalling stations and the maintenance
of communication by flag and lamp requires attention.
Schemes for training should provide for the working of
signalling detachments in co-operation with infantry and artillery
during attack practices, especially as regards the establishment of
"Forward Stations".
2. Artillery.
(a) Practice barrages were carried out two or three times
previous to the attack, both by Field and Heavy Batteries. These
rehearsals were carried out at different hours during the day so as
not to indicate the hour of attack.
(b) Control of artillery fire was assisted by very careful
battery drill and by the regulation of the rate of fire during the
preliminary bombardment.
(c) The preliminary bombardment was preceded by the barraging
of communication trenches and roads by night: the demoralization
caused by the latter procedure was frankly admitted by prisoners.
The preliminary bombardment was commenced from 10 to 20
days previous to zero in a regular and continuous manner: the heavy
bombardment lasted for the last five or six days. The 106 Fuze
proved of immense value. The wire cutting was generally very good.
Rests for personnel and guns was arranged for by keeping
one gun out of four or two out of six out of action during the
bombardment period. Allowance should be made in the estimate of
the duration of the bombardment for bad weather preventing observation
of fire. Re-registration of batteries, gun by gun, was required for
every two or three days.
Counter battery work was very systematic.
(d) Each Division in the Canadian Corps had a double H.A.
Group at its disposal for dealing with machine gun emplacements,
observation posts, battalion headquarters, etc. Three days before
zero Corps took over all the Heavy Artillery, but allowed Divisions
to ask for what fire they wanted.
(e) For the last fortnight before zero all Intelligence
Officers met at the Corps Heavy Artillery Headquarters daily to
give the targets which had been discovered during the previous 24
hours. The sources of information were:-
(1). Aeroplanes.
(ii). Photographs.
(iii). Ground Observation (Infantry and Artillery).
(iv). Prisoners.
(v). Patrols.
Up to the last night, raids were carried out to obtain
prisoners: this was most valuable for the Heavy Artillery.
P.T.O.
 

(2).
(f) Arrangements were made for employing gas shell at zero hour
or zero plus 5': the weather, however, prevented their use as the
wind was too high.
(g) After the first objectives had been gained, arrangements
for sending forward Heavy Batteries as well as Field Batteries
should be put into force. These want careful thought beforehand.
It is essential for Artillery "Wireless" stations to go forward with
the batteries.
(h) In order to make use of captured guns and howitzers,
detachments from heavy batteries in rear should be detailed to go
forward when required. Breech blocks and sights were usually removed
by the enemy: duplicates from guns previously captured might,
however, be obtained from the Ordnance Department previously to
provide for this contingency.
3. Machine Gun Barrage.
Machine gun barrage proved of very good value and could
have been developed more.
This was arranged in conjunction with artillery creeping
barrage, and moved about 200 yards in front of it on account of
the flat trajectory. Lifts were timed according to the artillery
programme.
Spare barrels for machine guns should be arranged for to
replace those worn out.
4. Rate of Advance.
The artillery barrage lifted at normal rate of 100 yards
in 4 minutes.
The following halts were made on the various objective
lines:-
First Army - 35 minutes, and 2 hours.
Third Army - 1 hour, 2 hours, and 4 hours.
5. Stokes' Mortars.
A reserve of Stokes' mortars with fresh detachments should
be kept in hand, ready to be sent forward later with even a few
rounds of ammunition. These were invaluable in dealing with strong
points that were holding out.
6. Corps Cavalry.
Detachments of Corps cavalry were employed, after the first
objectives had been gained, to seize tactical points, and hold them
until relieved by infantry patrols.
7. Infantry Patrols.
Infantry Patrols, consisting of one officer and nine or ten
other ranks, were sent forward to seize tactical points and signal
back information.
These were followed up by platoons with Lewis guns.
8. Heavy Entrenching Tools.
Heavy entrenching tools were not generally carried by the
men - special parties were detailed to bring these forward.
9. Rations.
One day's ordinary rations, one iron ration, and two water
bottles were carried by the men.
10. General.
(a) Isolated attacks were generally unsuccessful. As soon
as Infantry have advanced beyond the reach of artillery support
they must go slowly and cautiously until batteries have had time
to advance to more forward positions.
After a large attack there is a tendency to carry out local
attacks on a narrow front in order to "straighten the front": this
is unnecessary as a rule, as the front will be straightened when
the next large attack is carried out. The only justification for
a small local attack of this nature is when the occupation of the
salient is imperative in order to get field guns forward to prepare
 

(3).
for the next attack, or to secure observation.
(b) Our present troops, excellent as they are for a regular
attack on trenches, are not so reliable when anything like open
warfare supervenes. They can only go forward safely covered by
an artillery barrage, and if possible, with the assistance of
tanks.
(c) Machine guns cause us the greatest difficulties in open
warfare: for these, tanks, smoke and gas shells are required to
neutralize them.
The infantry platoon, however, with its special weapons
and supported by a few Stokes mortars, should be capable of dealing
with small isolated strong points, and provided that the
initiative of the platoon commander has been developed to deal
with small tactical situations that arise in open warfare.
(d) Attention is drawn to O.B./1782/A "Notes on dealing with
Hostile Machine Guns in an Advance."
(e) Too much stress cannot be laid on the necessity for a
detailed study of the ground both from observation and photographs.
The use of models should be more extensively employed.
Special instructions regarding artillery lessons will be
issued shortly together with any later experiences received.
(Sgd). C. H. HARINGTON,
Major-General,
General Staff, Second Army.
21st. April, 1917.
 

SECRET.
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
[*HEADQUARTERS

No.G1/258/115
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION*]
Divisional Headquarters,
26th. April, 1917.
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
9th. Aust. Inf. Bde.
10th.  "         "     "
11th.   "         "     "
Div. Sig. Coy.
"Q".
1. The Divisional Commander will meet the following
at Divisional Headquarters (CROIX DU BAC) at 2.30 p.m. on
Sunday, April 29th. - viz.-
C.R.A., C.R.E., G.O.C's Infantry Brigades, O.C., Div. Sig. Coy.,
G.S.O. 1 and A.Q. - Commanders may each bring one Staff Officer.
2. Agenda paper enclosed. Commanders will be prepared
to discuss and bring forward their views upon all matters
listed, so far as they are affected.
3. Arrangements will be made for motor cars to bring
in Officers from forward areas.
G.H. Jackson
Lieut-Colonel.-
General Staff.
[*A.D.C*]
 

26-4-17.
CONFERENCE RE "MAGNUM OPUS".
AGENDA
1. Preliminary Measures:-
(a) Selection of personnel to be sent to rear. {See p.58  C.C^o views,  attitude re surplus Engrs Vickers
AQ (b)Concentration Camp; Transport parks.
AQ(c) Billeting prior to Zero day. - Rr Bgde - Left Bgde - Reserve Bgde
(d) Equipment and munitions to be carried on the man for

(e) Dumps.- 
C.R.E. (i) Engineer stores.
AQ (ii) Munitions.
AQ. (iii) Water and Rations.
C.R.A. 2. Preliminary Bombardment. - C.R.A. will explain provisional
scheme.
C.R.A. 3. Wire cutting procedure. -                        do.             do.
G. 4. Employment of Cloud or Projector Gas, prior to Zero day.
G. 5. Approach March - routes - markings.
6. Deployment and Assembly. - bridges over trenches.
C.R.A.7. Artillery Barrages and Time Table.- settle views
G. 8. Machine Gun Barrages. - General action of Vickers Guns. 4 to each Bgde. Carriers and for Div. C^o.
G. 9. Employment of Smoke Barrage during assault.
10. Dispositions of Assaulting Troops, and Tasks: -
(a) Right Brigade.
(b) Left Brigade.
11. Employment of Light Trench Mortars. - Bringing up Ammunition -
(a) with Bgdes.

(b) 100 per Co√

(c) Russian Saps - pioneers - turmeters
12. Employment of Engineers and Pioneers.
13. Consolidation of ground captured.
14. Measures to repel counter-attack. - |avoidance of surprise
(i) Infantry action. -
(ii) Artillery action. - S.O.S. calls
15. Organization, for defence of ground captured - withdrawal
of surplus personnel - relief of assaulting troops.
Sigs- 16. Communications: - inter-communication - reports - liaison.
AQ 17. Medical arrangements.
AQ 18. Supply, subsequent to Zero day - hot food - men's kits.
AQ 19. Transport questions.
C.R.E. 20. Works in progress - allocation of labour - C.R.E. works - on list
Other positions - see notes.
 

G.O.C.

SECRET.

SUSPECTED ENEMY STRONG POINTS IN "U" SECTOR.

24-4-17

Third Australian Divisional Intelligence.

SUPPLEMENTARY SHEET "A".
 

The latest photographs, Nos. 861,863 shew both wire and
trench begun from the DOUVE at U.11.a.70.85., North-East to track
corner U.5.d.24.30., thence to third line trench on road at U.6.c.38.58.
Two battery positions, the former at least occupied, are indicated on
the South bank of the DOUVE at U.11.b.85.24. and U.11.b.30.38.
(air photos 861, 865).
A little knoll in U.16.b. marked on the map with a 30
contour circle, is shewn on air photograph 859 to be a very important
position. The trench running practically North and South across the
knoll has been included in the list of suspected machine gun emplacements.
Distributed

27/4/17  

Fml