Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 1 April - 10 May 1917, Part 3

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Part of Quest:
Sir John Monash (General, b.1865 - d.1931)
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open for review
Accession number:
RCDIG0000619
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

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(COPr) 8/4/17. REPORT ON A RECENT MINOR OPERATION. At 11 p.m. on a certain night in February last, a Battalion of Infantry on the SO attacked a German Trench under cover of a short Artillery Bombardment. The Trench was occupied without a single casualty and 46 prisoners, one machine gun and one trench mortar taken. The enemy's opposition was very feeble but within an hour fresh troops counter-attacked. The fighting was almost entirely with bombs. The night was dark, and the captured position being on the plateau top of a small hill the enemy was able to approach within bombing range without being seen. The attack slowly dwindled away. About 2 a.m. the captured trench was again attacked from the left flank and a desultory bombing fight continued for about 2 hours. Our men seemed to have the best of it, being able to out- throw the Germans, with the Mills Grenade, in spite of his using egg bombs. It was believed that the right flank was quite secure and all precautions were taken to strengthen the left. Shortly before dawn the left flank was again attacked and whilst this occupied the attention of our men a strong attack suddenly developed on our right and forced our men back. It now appeared that the Germans were out-ranging our men with the egg grenade, probably because our men had become tired and the supply of bomos also was failing. The Germans eventually drove our men from the trenches and also followed them back across the original NO MAN'S LAND. At the enquiry held next day it transpired that the Lewis and Vickers Guns, which had been put out to cover the consolidation of the captured trench had been withdrawn and were not forthcoming to meet the counter-attack. Also, that the majority of the bombers had put their rifles down during the bombing fights and that they could not find them again in the dark and so being short of bombs and not having rifles, had to vacate the trench. The position was recaptured two nights later by a fresh Battalion, when over 40 prisoners and a trench mortar were taken. This Battalion was not only able to hold its own but during the next few nights captured another 400 yards of trenches. Subseq- uently about 700 British rifles were salved in this neighbourhood. DEDUCTIONS 1. Bombers must not forget that they are also riflemen and that battles are not won by bombs but rather by the rifle and bayonet. 2. Lewis and Vickers Guns must be kept in position to meet counter-attacks and if temporarily withdrawn owing to heavy shelling must be ready for instant action to repell counter-attacks.
(coPY) 8/A/17. Notes by Lt.-Colonel Murray, G.S.O.1 Training, on Brigade Attack by 10th Australian Brigade, 2nd April. ------------------------------- There were few points to note with regard to the attack. The object was to drill the Battalions in a formal attack in accordance with O.B.1919 T. The ground selected was South of QUELMES. The attack was made in four waves on a two-Battalion frontage on four lines of enemy trenches. First Wave to 2nd objective. Moppers up to lst objective. Second Wave to lst objective. The barrage then was for 10 minutes on 3rd and 4th objectives. Third Wave to 4th objective. Moppers up to 3rd objective. Fourth Wave to 3rd objective. The frontage allotted to each Battalion was not quite sufficient and the result was that the lines were rather crowded. The first two waves were collected in a sunken road and at Zero each line moved out without confusion and in good order The first wave went rather too quickly over the ground up to the first objective and had to wait until the barrage (men with white flags) had moved on, and there was a slight loss of direction in one or two cases. The sections throughout were correctly organized and the men worked extraordinarily well in spite of the weather. The third and fourth waves followed the first into the sunken road and halted there for a time. The Brigadier agreed that this would have been dangerous in reality and that they should have got closer up to get inside the barrage. After the fourth objeciive had been taken strong patrols were sent forward preceded by scouts to get on to the high ground found QUELMES. The patrols contained a proportion of all weapons. The consolidation was quickly undertaken about 50 yards beyond the captured lines. I think this should have been in this case rather more, say 100 yards. I spoke to a number of N.C.O's and men and they had without exception a clear idea of what they were doing and what was expected of them. ---------
Headquarters, S.3.0. 10th Australian Infantry Brigade. Stn April 1917. Major-General J. MöNASH C.B.,V.D. 3rd Australian Division. Dear General, The Divisional letter calling for the enquiry which I spoke abeut to you yesterday is Q 132/15 of February 9th. My letter ferwarding Proceedings of the Court is BM/415/40 dated 13th February. Capy of the Finding of the Court is attached. Yours obediently, Lopoonsen ootneåd
(C PY) The Court having examined the witnesses vlDuNG and considered the evidence find that the list of stores alleged to have been abandoned by the 39th and 40th Battalions vide 3rd Division Headquarters Memo Q 132/15 dated 9th February 1917 and 10th Brigade Routine Order No. 68 dated 10th February 1917 were not abandoned by the Units named and responsibility cannot therefore be traced to any individual belonging to the 39th or 40th Battalions. The weekly report as submitted t D.0.0. 3rd Australian Division by the Salvage Officer (Attached and marked exhibit "A") does not definitely show if any or all of the items mentioned were salvaged from the 39th or 40th Battalions but that they were found in various places,viz the Asylum and LE BIZET. The evidence shows that the 39th and 40th Battalions were never billeted at the ssylum or LE BIZET. In respect to the alleged abandonment of 5 Lewis Gun Carts by the 40th Battalion, the evidence shows that these carts were returned to the D.A.D.O.S.,under instructions issued by 10th A.I. Brigade Headquarters and G.H.Q. memos copies of which are attached and marked exhibit "B". None of the articles except the Lewis Gun Carts can be produced for inspection by the Court. SIGNED at RUE MARLE,ARMENTIERES, this thirteenth day of FEBRUARY 1917. (Sgd) W.J.SMITH Lieut-Col. President 37th Battalion A.I.F. (Sgd) H.F. SELLECK Captain. Member 38th Battalion A.I.F. (Sgd) R.E.TREBILCOCK,Captain. Member 38th BattalionA.I.F.
shtu Traganmn ofu Eptraet offrating Thrint Doeins. - + Not LKK. Addopt om ont Hape to tyast ilene line ov Gorfo Naf. Barrage o 1. 2. Buv 3 Amat. Din.to drpmehvonige Büv i Plana to 2 0I,- hrelndednafo: Borpaledadarie- Sudavein ktømadnnk otpastu Srine-tatle far Raftrne asannblg pat attat Bpd Ho a Comsmade Fanske Tonasd-Daf Dvesang Platome tr. K Hask o Blank dhinr - tir antsegmnnt sktache" - He fst it Asan outtst li koldung om k ont poste thrs t daga bombarsdment pris br. Zera. - kara at dansn: Ha Bü. Camnsk. - N.r. Hesttef far 257 Ravchoberg. Soto fta bont Sgaltr dvea, ton å Anst. Dad. o fom Krane Pin. Shisd Ddd. avack - 2 Bipadi tehie - ome inteane - Caftenee fr Ptnekone -mehlng lyag fasmv Sekvitget farm v Alae Avenne. voim uf nitt Si2. ou ad laft (Tru ir Kr ofreint vesfomintstigg tokse Dii. peans fod Cftere g, drtemetinte olpratver nit te eovdinatet ty løsfo Sprolet prastientle panses om petesmedinte obpastse- Tir Comandis fon fan driset eatt av destam bulleie avtarte TiineTate l. Bavaget ba avanget Ort attack avanskt ty tøne.: lras velanset o defenaie fort Sg ot doos. Tonibdg t Sookes, + Gas tropastov- wile be vaet. A.D.A.S. Covrdunste diguet- Sroe Safo by levng. -)otor hy løsfs. - daitg prafe boy lf. a" ht a a? a ai dh Gunste lafe:- 28, 24.64, 36, 105, 324,42,4.2
Sies. Won Gutting i PSombardmaant Fort Rkode S Dee Forto-Hürtsagtavt O80TT te 832 £58 3 Die: Fomt hrum U. 8.b.o.. t KonlRg Thtg fan Cagad) Nartt honnlang O.2.b.est, lelnadwennev Seheritget Inst Bekkladm Tasm b Saptinne Tase (agel) Saette, de. Ringzaitg fam U.1S.d. Ro.f0 6 Au Classeng dat -10.Ta. 20. 30 Degensur Bptr Font hrüe - Tvat.W. g Taatog Tasn O.IS.G. 8.S hRin hy Par Ramntan U.15.d.S.StUTaZo3 donttre tobe detemmet Torete e 20 t Hinlnting Hør fom Bpesemen thri (Freg tasn torg tt.S ffors vlå Hne
A Sas. ARTILLERY PROGRAmE. - 18 Pounders. At Zero - standing barrage is on enemy's front line,- creeping barrage in NO MAN'S LAND. standing barrage lifts to support line. At plus 9 - At plus 10 - creeping barrage reaches and passes enemy's front line - Infantry reach front line. standing barrage lifts to line of ULSTER RESERVE At plus 14 - and ULCER RESERVE. Creeping barrage reaches and passes enemy's At plus 15. support line, and Infantry reach support line. creeping barrage halts on a line approximately At plus 20 parallel to and 150 yards beyond enemy's support line. - Remains halted for 10 minutes. creeping barrage resumes advance. At plus 30 standing barrage lifts to UNCANNY TRENCH and re- At plus 55 mains there. At plus 58 - creeping barrage reaches ULCER RESERVE and Infantry enter ULCER RESERVE. creeping barrage reaches ULSTER RESERVE and GREY At plus 68 . FARM, and Infantry enter. creeping barrage reaches its final position about At plus 95 150 yards beyond the line BETHLEHEM FARM - TILLEUL FARM and comes to a halt. A diagram is attached shewing how it is proposed the barrage shall move, pivoted to a certain ex¬ tent on the South and swinging round to the North. -------------------------- ACTION OF 4.5" HOwITZERS. 136 available). 24 allotted for creeping barrage, to creep 8 minutes ahead of the 18-pr. creeping barrage, paying special attention to ULNA AVENUE. This barrage will finally rest on UNCANNY TRENCH, not on the line where the 18-pr. creeping barrage comes to a halt. P.T.0.
(2). The 12 howitzers allotted for standing barrage will be employed as follows:- Fire will be concentrated on the following Localities in accordance with the special time-table. ULNA SWITCH: LA DOUVE FARM: AVENUE FARM: Strong Point at Road Junction ULSTER SWITCH: CREY FARM and ULSTER RESERVE. SCHNITZEL FARM and ULCER RESERVE: after that to UNCANNY TRENCH. It is recommended that the proportion of creeping to standing barrage of 18-prs. shall be two to one, i.e.- about 66% creeping. ------------------- LINES OF APPROACH. The following communication trenches are being made good for use during the Approach March and subsequently. ASH LANE: THE ONLY WAY: ANNSCROFT AVENUE: ONTARIO AVENUE: TORONTO AVENUE: ST. YVES AVENUE. This will allow three for each Brigade. ASH LANE will cross LA HUTTE-MESSINES Road by means of a tunnel. Special precautions will be taken to make this so strong that the roadway will not be interfered with and will be capable of carrying heavy traffic. In addition to the above communication trenches, special lines over the top of the ground will be laid out. ------------------------- ASom Bll TRENOARS. So far it is not intended to dig any fresh Assembly trenches, but work is proceeding on reclaiming all existing trenches, and making good the various small trenches between the firing, support and reserve lines. -----------------------

Notes Re Stores left at Tatinghen by 10th Bde

7-4-17

On night of 5th Staff Captain phoned to

say there was about 4.M. Lorrie loads

of Salved stones being left behind by

10th B'de & would we arrange transport.

I decided to go & see what they were,

with DADOs yesterday (6th.)

The stores consisted of:

Ammunition (S.A.D. & Grenades)

New Web Equipment, (had never been

worn.)

10 Magazines for Lewis Guns.

New Periscopes in cases

other Periscopes.

Of Sniperscopes

Rifles for firing Grenades.

Chaffcutter- (told Dados staff) (Harrington or Downes)

Many sacks of Clothing.

about 6 new oil cans, each

as used for M.Guns.

Cases of Box Respirators (damaged)

& other stores.

I have arranged for them to be

 

brought up to the GumBoot Store^ Armentieres

& for an inventory to be taken,

They will be up late tonight 7th [?]

7/4/17   Ca Pyke Cap

Staff Captain stated that he left

a guard with stores, but there

was no representative of the B'de

there when I visited the store.-

Cap

N.C.O. of 40th & 1 pte from Q.M. Staff

[??]

Ask for report re 10th Bde & Salvage

 

( COPY )  8/4/17.

REPORT ON A RECENT MINOR OPERATION.

At 11 p.m. on a certain night in February last, a Battalion

of Infantry on the SOMME attacked a German Trench under cover of

a short Artillery Bombardment.

 

The Trench was occupied without a single casualty and 46

prisoners, one machine gun and one trench mortar taen.

 

The enemy's opposition was very feeble but within an hour

fresh troops counter-attacked. The fighting was almost entirely

with bombs. The night was dark, and the captured position being

on the plateau top of a small hill the enemy was able to approach

within bombing range without being seen. The attack slowly dwindled

away.

 

About 2 a.m. the captured trench was again attacked from the

left flank and a desultory bombing fight continued for about 2

hours. Our men seemed to have the best of it, being able to outthrow

the Germans, with the Mills Grenade, in spite of his using

egg bombs. It was believed that the right flank was quite secure

and all precautions were taken to strengthen the left.

 

Shortly before dawn the left flank was again attacked and

whilst this occupied the attention of our men a strong attack

suddenly developed on our right and forced our men back.

It now appeared that the Germans were out-ranging our men with

the egg grenade, probably because our men had become tired and

the supply of bombs also was failing. The Germans eventually

drove our men from the trenches and also followed them back

across the original NO MAN'S LAND.

 

At the enquiry held next day it transpired that the Lewis

and Vickers Guns, which had been put out to cover the consolidation

of the captured trench had been withdrawn and were not forthcoming

to meet the counter-attack. Also, that the majority of the bombers

had put their rifles down during the bombing fights and that they

could not find them again in the dark and so being short of bombs

and not having rifles, had to vacate the trench.

 

The position was recaptured two nights later by a fresh

Battalion, when over 40 prisoners and a trench mortar were taken.

This Battalion was not only able to hold its own but during the

next few nights captured another 400 yards of trenches. Subsequently

about 700 British rifles were salved in this neighbourhood.

 

DEDUCTIONS - 1. Bombers must not forget that they are also

riflemen and that battles are not won by 

bombs but rather by the rifle and bayonet.

2. Lewis and Vickers Guns must be kept in position

to meet counter-attacks and if temporarily

withdrawn owing to heavy shelling must be

ready for instant action to repell counter-attacks.

 

( COPY) 8/4/17

Notes by Lt. -Colonel Murray, G.S.O.1 Training, on

Brigade Attack by 10th Australian Brigade, 2nd April.

 

There were few points to note with regard to the attack.

The object was to drill the Battalions in a formal attack

in accordance with O.B.1919 T.

The ground selected was South of QUELMES.

The attack was made in four waves on a two-Battalion

frontage on four lines of enemy trenches.

First Wave to 2nd objective.

Moppers up to 1st objective.

Second Wave to 1st objective.

The barrage then was for 10 minutes on 3rd and 4th

objectives.

Third Wave to 4th objective.

Moppers up to 3rd objective.

Fourth Wave to 3rd objective.

The frontage allotted to each Battalion was not quite

sufficient and the result was that the lines were rather crowded.

The first two waves were collected in a sunken road and

at Zero hour each line moved out without confusion and in good order

 

The first wave went rather too quickly over the ground up to

the first objective and had to wait until the barrage (men with

white flags) had moved on, an there was a slight loss of

direction in one or two cases.

 

The sections throughout were correctly organized and

the men work extraordinarily well in spite of the weather.

 

The third and fourth waves followed the first into the

sunken road and halted there for a time.

 

The Brigadier agreed that this would have been dangerous

in reality and that they should have got closer up to get inside

the barrage.

 

After the fourth objective had been taken strong patrols

were sent forward xxxxxxx preceded by scouts to get on to the high

ground found QUELMES. The patrols contained a proportion of all

weapons.

 

The consolidation was quickly undertaken about 50 yards

beyond the captured lines. I think this should have been in this

case rather more, say 100 yards.

 

I spoke to a number of N.C.O's and men and they had

without exception a clear idea of what they were doing and what

was expected of them.

           -------------------------------------------------------------------

 

J.J.C.   

Headquarters,

10th Australian Infantry Brigade.

8th April 1917.

Major-General J.MONASH  C.B., V.D.

3rd Australian Division.

 

Dear General,

The Divisional letter calling for the

enquiry which I spoke about to you yesterday is Q 132/15 of

February 9th. My letter forward Proceedings of the Court

is BM/415/40 dated 13th February.

 

Copy of the Finding of the Court is

attached.

Yours obediently,

W Ramsay McNicoll

 

(COPY)

FINDING. The Court having examined the witnesses

and considered the evidence find that the list of stores alleged

to have been abandoned by the 39th and 40th Battalions vide

3rd Division Headquarters Memo Q 132/15 dated 9th February 1917

and 10th Brigade Headquarters Routine Order No.68 dated 10th February 1917
were not abandoned by the Units named and responsibility cannot 
therefore be traced to any individual belonging to the 39th or 
40th Battalions.

 

The weekly report as submitted t D.O.O.

3rd Australian Division by the Salvage Officer (Attached and marked

exhibit "A") does not definitely show if any or all of the items

mentioned were salvaged from the 39th or 40th Battalions were never billeted at the Asylum or LE BIZET.

 

In respect to the alleged abandonment of 5

Lewis Gun Carts by the 40th Battalion, the evidence show that these

carts were returned to the D.A.D.O.S., under instructions issued by

10th A.I.Brigade Headquarters and G.H.Q. memos copies of which

are attached and marked exhibit "B:.

 

None of the articles except the Lewis Gun

Carts can be produced for inspection by the Court.

 

SIGNED at RUE MARLE, ARMENTIERES, this

thirteenth day of FEBRUARY 1917.

 

(Sgd) W.J.SMITH Lieut-Col. President

37th Battalion A.I.F.

(Sgd) H.F. SELLECK Captain. Member

38th Battalion A.I.F.

(Sgd) R.E.TREBILCOCK, Captain. Member

38th Battalion  A.I.F.

 

Magnum Opus    8/4/17

Extracts affecting Third Division.- & Notes

XX. Adopt on our Maps the exact blue line on Corps Map.

Barrages of N.Z. Div & 3d Aust.Div. to synchronize.

Div. Plans by 20th,-include map:- Brigade Boundaries

Successive Intermediate Objectives

Time-table for capture.

Assembly positions

Battalion & Bgde H.Q.

Communication Trenches

Forward Dumps

Dressing Stations &c.

 

XX Mark the Black Line - for "subsequent attacks."-[We go to it As an outpost line holding on to our posts there ]

4 days Bombardment prior to Zero. - Zero at dawn.

H.Q. 3d Div.Steenwerck. - N.Z. Westhof Farm 25th Ravelsberg.

Troops for front S of St Ives, from 3d Aust.Div. or from Reserve Div.

Third Dvn attack - 2 Brigades in line - one in Reserve- capture to Blue Line - including

Grey Farm & Schnitzel Farm & Ulna Avenue.

Join up with N.Z. on our left. - [This is the special responsibility of 40th & 38th]

Div. plans for capture of Intermediate Objectives will be coordinated by Corps

Shortest practicable pauses on intermediate objectives.

Div.Commander will have direct call on certain batteries outside TimeTable.

M.G. Barrage to be arranged.

Our attack assisted by Mines.

Gase release on Defensive front S of St Ives.

Possibly 4" Stokes, & Gas projectors will be used.

A.D.A.S. Coordinate Signals

1/5000 Maps by Army. - 1/1000 by Corps. - Daily Maps by Corps.

Guns for Corps:-  28 9.2", 24  8", 64  6How.,  36 60th,  108  4½", 324  18th, 48  2"p.m, 1  15", 2  12", 4 6"pm,  12  60 pm

 

 

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