Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 15, 1 April - 10 May 1917, Part 2

(c) The line C.D. runs almost at a right angle, to
our front line, and the assembly and subsequent
deployment of a Battalion on that line would
not be an easy matter.
(d) The junction of two separate Battalions at the
apex of the salient at D would not be a good
thing.
(7). Plan "B";
Attack line R.J. with two Battalions (dividing the
area at the BROKEN TREE HOUSE Road).
Third Battalion to move on line D.H
Fourth Battalion to send 1½ Companies to 
consolidate line C.R. across NO MAN'S LAND, and
provide 2½ Companies for carrying parties and
the Brigade Reserve
(8). The arguments for this plan were:
(a) It would materially reduce the risk of failure
in the attack on the enemy's front line and
support trenches as a larger force would be
available to act quickly against any enemy
surviving our Artillery bombardment.
(b) The deployment of troops on the line C.D. would
not be so difficult. The small force allotted
to the portion C.R. could move quickly to it
while the troops for the portion R.D. could be
given a better direction.
(c) The salient at D would be under the control of
one Battalion.
(9). The arguments against this plan were mainly those in
favour of Plan "A".
(10). The advantages of Plan "B" appear to outweigh those
of Plan "A", and it has accordingly been suggested for your 
consideration.
(11). The choice of Battalions to act as A B C D was due
to the following reasons.
(a) The 33rd Battalion, being the most efficient,
was given the task of leading the attack, and
of protecting the right flank which is the
most important.
(b) The 36th Battalion, being next in efficiency,
was chosen to hold the foremost line
(c) The 34th Battalion has lost three Company
Commanders recently - Major, Foxall (threatened
with deafness),  Captain McDowell (Commanding
Officers' School) and Captain Wheeler (Adjutant
vice Brodziak) - and its efficiency is not now
as good as the 35th Battalion which has improved
materially since its arrival in FRANCE.
The 35th Battalion has therefore been set down
as Left Battalion in the leading attack, and
the 34th Battalion given the task of providing
carrying parties and the Brigade Reserve while
finding 1½ Companies for the Right flank.
Alex Jobson
Brig.-Gen.
Commanding 9th Australian Infantry
Brigade, A.I.F.
 JB.

SECRET
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.
Headquarters
9th Australian Infantry Brigade.
6th April 1917.
Major-General Monash,
G.O.C. 3rd Australian Division.
PRELIMINARY REPORT.
(I). Dispositions of the Brigade as a whole, naming units.
(a). Front line of attack.
"A" Battalion -
33rd Battalion Right Area R.D.N.P.(See plan "A").
"B" Battalion-
35th Battalion Left Area P.N.J.A.
"D" Battalion -
34th Battalion (1 Coy. and 2 Platoons) Line C.R.
(b). Second Line of Attack.
"C" Battalion -
36th Battalion Line D.H.
(c). Carrying Parties and Brigade Reserve.
""D" Battalion (Less 1 Coy. and 2 Platoons).
(d). 9th Australian Machine Gun Coy. Battle positions.
(e). 9th Australian Light Trench Mortar Bty. Battle position
(II). Internal Disposition of Battalions.
(a). "A" Battalion -
(1) Fighting line
3 Coys. in 2 waves of 2 Platoons each
(2) Carrying parties
1 Company.
(b). "B" Battalion
(1) Fighting line
3 Coys. in two waves of 2 Platoons each.
(2) Carrying Parties
1 Company.
(c). "C" Battalion-
(1) Fighting line
3 Coys. and 2 Platoons in 2 waves of 2
Platoons each.
(2) Reserve
1 Company (less 2 Platoons)
(3) Carrying Parties
1 Company from "D" Battalion
(1 Platoon per assaulting Company).
(d). "D" Battalion
(1) Fighting line
Coy. and 2 Platoons in 2 waves of two
Platoons each.
(2) Carrying parties for "C" Battalion.
1 Company.
 AJ

2
(3). Brigade Reserve
1 Coy. and 1 Coy. (less 2 Platoons).
(III) Allotment of Tasks to Battalions.
(a). "A" Battalion -
(1) First Objective to be taken by first wave - Enemy
Front-line trenches from R. to P.
(2) Second Objective to be taken by Second wave - Enemy
Support line trenches from S. to Q.
(3) Consolidate on the line R. D. N.
(4) Construct Strong points
S. P. V.   U 16 a.
                40 30
(5) Clear ground behind line of ULTIMO SWTCH from
junction with ULTIMO AVENUE U 16 c  to U 16 a.
                                                             25 95        47  54
(6) Provide outposts.
(b). "B"Battalion -
(1) First Objective to be taken by First wave - enemy
Front-line trenches P. to A.
(2) Second Objective to be taken by Second wave - enemy
Second line trenches Q. to L.
(3) Consolidate on the line N.J.
(c). "C" Battalion -
 (1) Third Objective with 3 Coys and 2 Platoons
Attack through "A" and "B" Battalions against
line D. H., clear ULSTER RESERVE and all ground
between lines D.J. and D.H.
(2) Consolidate on line D.H.
(3) Construct Strong points
S.P.W. at Ul6 a; S.P.X. at U 10 c
                 43  85                 46   26
S.P.Y. at U 10 c; SP.Z. at U 10 a
                44  68                 30  05

(4) Clear ground behind line from
N. end of  ULTIMO SWITCH U 16 a
and S.P. Z.                               47   54
(5) Provide outpost sentries.
(6) 1 Coy. (less 2 Platoons) in support on left
(d). "D" Battalion -
(1) 1 Coy. and 2 Platoons to move forward at Zero
and
(a) Consolidate line C.R
(b) Construct S.P.T. at U 16 c
                                         20  60
(c) Clear ground behind line from
FACTORY FARM U 16 c to U 16 c.
                                00 35      25  95
(d) Provide outpost sentries.
(2) 1 Coy. carrying party for "C” Battalion
(3) 1 Coy. and 1 Coy. (less 2 Platoons) Brigade Reserve
(IV) Distribution of Lewis Guns during Consolidation.
(a) "A" Battalion -
(1) Strong point S.P.V.     1 gun
(2) Outposts                     4 guns
distributed over approximate line (400 yards)
U 16 c  to  U 16 a
60 85         75  54
(3) Garrison line R.N. and forward posts in front
of line D.N.                     7 guns
(4) Battalion Reserve  4 guns.
 AJ

3

(b). "B" Battalion -
(1) Garrison line N.J. and forward posts in front
of line N.J.                        .......       8 guns
(2) Battalion Reserve                 4 guns.
(3) Allotted to "C" Battalion      4 guns.
(c). "C" Battalion -
(1) Strong points
S.P.W., S.P.X., S.P.Y. & S.P.Z. -    4 guns
(2) Outposts
Distributed over approximate line (800 yds)
U  16 a to U l0 a             .......         7 guns     
75  54        60  30
(3) Garrison line D.H.     .......         5 guns.
(4) Battalion Reserve (from "B" Bn.)  4 guns.
(d). "D" Battalion
(1) Strong point
S. P. T.                               .......         1 gun   
(2) Outposts                   .......          4 guns
Distributed over approximate line (400 yards).
FACTORY FARM to U 16 c
                                    60  85
(3) Garrison line C.R      ........        3 guns.
(4) Brigade Reserve      ........        8 guns.
(V). Employment of Vickers Guns.
(a). Before assault:
(1) During preliminary bombardment fire on
communication trenches, reserve trenches, dumps
and roads.
(2) Prior to Zero:
Barrage.
(A) Line of UNCLE, UNCHAINED and UNCERTAIN
TRENCHES from
U 16 d to U 10 a.
72 55         72 25
(B) ULTIMO LANE from
U 16 a  to U l7 a.
80 20        20 40
(C) ULTIMO RESERVE from
U l6 a to U l0 c.
80  20      45  35
(D) ULSTER AVENUE from
U 9 d to U l0 c.
72 42      80 70
(E) ULSTER RESERVE
(F) ULSTER DRIVE from
U 9 d to U 10 a.
55 90       75  25
(This may perhaps be allotted to
Left Brigade).
(b). During Assault:
Targets as above in (a) (2)lifting off all
targets except (A) as Artillery barrage moves on.
(c). During Consolidation:
(1) Continue as in final phase of (b)
(2) Enfilade--
UNCHAINED AVENUE from  Ul6 b East
                                                      80 35
Trench from U 16 b to U 17 b. 
                        80 00        15  00
AJ

4
 (d). It is assumed that the Brigade on our right will
enfilade the UMBO system of trenches running 
North-Easterly from UMBO NOSE.
(e). As the front-line Battalions will be well provided
with Lewis Guns (there will be over 33 guns on
the front C- H) the Vickers Guns should be more
useful in their battle positions from which they would
be able to open barrage fire to repel counter-attacks
than if they were sent forward to the front line or
to strong points.
(VI). Brigade or Battalion Reserves.
(a). The necessity of obtaining success at the outset and
the large number of men required for carrying parties
prevent large reserves being held.
(b). The Brigade Reserve of 1½ Companies and 8 Lewis Guns
should suffice, especially as there will be a Brigade
in Divisional Reserve at HYDE PARK CORNER. This
Brigade Reserve will be held near the Right centre
of our own front-line trenches in readiness to
reinforce the right flank which is the weaker.
(c). "A" Battalion Reserve - 4 Lewis Guns.
This with the Brigade Reserve handy in its rear
should suffice. Half of the Battalion front is
covered by "C" Battalion.
(d). "B" Battalion Reserve - 4 Lewis Guns.
The necessity for a larger reserve is not pressing
as this force will be covered by "C" Battalion.
(e). "C" Battalion Reserve - 1 Coy. (less 2 Platoons) and
4 Lewis Guns.
This should suffice, seeing that the unit is supported 
by "B" Battalion and part of "A” Battalion.
Reserve should be in support on the left in vicinity
of ditches North of ULSTER AVENUE.
(VII). Proposed Strength and Organisation of Carrying Parties.
(a). "A" Battalion -
1 Company distributed as follows:
9 Sections allotted 3 to each assaulting Company.
3 Sections carrying from Brigade Dump to "A"
Battalion Dump.
3 Sections on duty at Brigade Dump
"A" and "C" Battalion Dumps (1 section each).
1 Section carrying from Brigade Dump to' "C" Battalion 
Dump.
----
16 Sections.
----
(b). "B" Battalion -
1 Company distributed as follows:
9 Sections allotted 3 to each assaulting Company.
3 Sections carrying from Brigade Dump to "B"
Battalion Dump.
3 Sections carrying from Brigade Dump to "C"
Battalion Dump.
1 Section on duty at "B" Battalion Dump.
----
16 Sections.
----
AJ

5
(c). "C" Battalion -
1 Company from "D" Battalion allotted
1 Platoon to each assaulting Company.
(d). Forward Carrying Parties of three Sections
(1) To be ready before Zero follow behind" C" Battalion
in the advance at 150 yards distance.
(2) "C" Battalion parties to be ahead of "A" and
"B" Battalion parties and to pass through
"A" and "B" Battalions
(3) Parties to carry
1 Section 5 shovels per man
1 Section 4 shovels per man
1 Section 2 boxes grenades per man
also 10 sandbags per man
(e). Officers belonging to carrying party Companies to be
placed in charge of Dumps and surplus at disposal
of Battalion Commanders.
(f). Machine Gun supplies: If these guns are kept at
their battle positions the necessity for carrying
parties will not be urgent and the personnel of
M.G. Company should suffice.
If they are sent forward, carrying parties will
be necessary. These may have to be found from
the Brigade Reserve or Divisional Reserve as the
Battalion personnel has been fully absorbed.
(g). It is presumed that the Stokes Mortars will not be
used in the advance and carrying parties will not
therefore be required for them.
(VIII). Arrangements for prompt supply of entrenching tools, wire,
and ammunition to advanced lines and posts.
(a). Carrying parties as in (VII) (d) following in rear
of assaulting Battalions will take up a fair
supply of tools and grenades.
(b). The bayonet men section in the second wave may well
carry a pick or a shovel as far as the enemy front
line and further if not required to fight.
As bombers may only have to carry 10 bombs, bomb-throwers 
only 5 bombs, and the rifle bombers 6
rifle grenades, these men in the second wave may
well be given a tool to carry as far as the enemy
front line at least.
(c). The possible supply of tools and grenades available
per Company soon after an objective is taken
should be:
3 Sections of carriers of 9 men each,
of which 2 carry tools
1 Section 5 shovels per man = 45 shovels
1 Section 4 picks per man     = 36 picks
                                                         81 tools
2 Sections of bayonet men      18 tools
                                                         99 tools.
If the rifle bombers and bombers
carry a tool each the 4 Sections
 will provide                                  36 tools
                                                        135 tools.
 AJ

6
This should enable the Company to get to work until further
supplies come forward.
(d) Grenades and Ammunition:
Grenades -
Each man (not a bomber) in a Company will
carry 2 bombs; that is, men in 12 Sections
--108 men–- will carry up     .......      .......      .......      216 bombs
The grenade carrying section will bring up
2 boxes of 10 bombs per man.      .......      .......       180 bombs
Carried by bombing section - 5 per thrower
and 20 per man - in 4 Sections .      .......      .......     760 bombs
                                                                                       1156 bombs
Company's possible supply of which many will have
been expended in the advance.
(2) Ammunition -
Unless more men are available for carrying parties,
ammunition cannot be brought forward until the second
trip of the parties. As the main work of the advance
is usually carried out with the bayonet, the supply
carried by each man - 170 rounds - should suffice
until more can be brought up.
(3) Wire -
The carrying parties will not permit of wire being
brought up till the second trip.
(4) The Yukon pack should make it possible to carry
larger loads. At present details as to capacity, of
these packs are not available.
[IX). Methods of Assembly issuing from our trenches and Deployment.
(X). Question of keeping direction during the Advance.
(1) A plan showing suggested scheme of assembly and
advance is attached.
(2) "A" Battalion -
(a). The Companies will move out from the sally
ports and advance as per plan.
(b). Right Company -
When the Right flank of the Right Company
reaches the junction of the front line and 
communication trench at U 15 b the Company will
have to wheel to       05 85 the Right on that
point. Its left flank will continue to move
along the South of the Road running Easterly from
BROKEN TREE HOUSE and conforming to the wheel
will come to rest where ULTIMO SUPPORT crosses
that road at U 15 b.
The                  30 35 Centre  Platoons will take
up the line in between.
(c). Centre Company
The Right flank of the Centre Company, will
move along the Communication Trench North of
the BROKEN TREE HOUSE Road until it reaches where
ULTIMO SUPPORT CROSSES THAT ROAD AT U 15 b.
The Left flank of the Centre                                  30 35 Coy.
will move along the Communication Trench 
(inclusive) running from U 15 b to its junction with
ULTIMO SUPPORT.           50 45
(d). Left Company
This Company will move out from 2 sally ports
(one for the Right half and the other for, the
Left half) and form up as per plan. The right
flank of the Company will cover the Left flank
of the Centre Company. The Left flank will
enter the enemy front line trench at right of
Communication trench at U 15 b and move to the
                                                   O0 55
 AJ

7
junction of ULSTER SUPPORT with Road (running North) at
U 15 b and thence to the junction of Communication trench
30 75  with ASH AVENUE at U 15 b ASH AVENUE will
be held by "B" Battalion.      45 90
"B" Battalion will form up from sally ports as per plan
(a) Right Company
This Company will move out from 2 sally ports
(one for the Right half and the other for the Left
half) and form up as per plan.
The Right flank will cover the Left flank of the
Left Company of "A" Battalion.
The junction of the Roads at ULSTER SUPPORT will
be in its area and its Right flank will rest on the
South side of ASH AVENUE inclusive.
The Left flank will move through enemy front line
at U 15 a to U 15 b.
     75 67       12   95
(b). Centre Company -
This Company will move out from two sally ports
(one for the Right half and the other for the Left
half) and form up as per plan.
The Right flank will cover the Left flank of the
Right Company.
The Left flank will move through the enemy front
line at U 15 a to trench junction at U 9 c
            38 75                                          86  06
(c). Left Company
The Company will move out from sally ports and
form up as per plan.
The Right flank of the Company will cover, the
Left flank oft the Centre Company during the
advance.
The Left flank of the Company will move through
the enemy front line at U 9 c to U 9 c
                                           25  05      70 30.
Battalion will move out froms sally ports as soon
as "A" and "B" Battalions are clear and form up
as per plan.
(a). Right Company -
The Right flank of the Right Company will pass
through BROKEN TREE HOUSE Cross-roads at U 15 b
to U 15 b.  taking a line to                                          40 15
     98 50  South-West corner of moat in U 16 a.
The Left Flank of the Right Company will move
through enemy front line at U 15 b to U 15 b.
(b). Right Centre Coy.             40 46        92 80
This Company will move out from two sally ports
(one for the Right half and the other for the Left
half).
The Right flank of Company will keep in touch
with Left flank of Right Company.
The Left flank of Company will move through enemy
front line U 15 b and along the South edge of ASH
AVENUE  00 55 to road junction at U 9 d.
                                                                  98 20
(c). Left Centre Company .
This Company will move out from two sally ports
(one for the Right half and the other for the left
half).
The Right flank will move in touch with and
cover the Left flank of Right Centre Company.
It will include ASH AVENUE.
The Left flank of Company will move through
enemy front line at U 15 a to junction of ULSTER
                                     45 75
SWITCH and ULSTER AVENUE, and move xxx
AJ

8

North along ULSTER AVENUE to its junction with Road
at U 9 d.
     90  50
(d). Left Company:
The Right flank will move in touch with and cover the
Left flank of Left Centre Company including ULSTER
AVENUE till ULSTER SWITCH is passed and exclusing
ULSTER AVENUE after passing the junction.
The left flank to enter enemy front line at U 9 c
                                                                              25 05
and pass through Left of "B" Battalion to junction of
ULSTER DRIVE and Road at U 9 d.
                                                    75  90
(5). "D" Battalion -
1 Company and 2 Platoons will move out of two
sally ports and turn in South-Easterly direction -
Right flank on cross-roads at U 15 d and Left flank
                                                        50  40
on enemy front line at U 15 b in touch with Right
flank of "A" Battalion     80 00  It will then
move up and occupy the line C.R.
The following reference plans are attached:
Plan "A" - Tasks for Battalions.
Plan "B" - Machine Gun barrage.
Plan "C” - Assembly formations.
Alex Jobson
Brig.-Gen.
Commanding 9th Australian Infantry
Brigade, A.I.F.
JB.

(COPY) 8/4/17
II ANZAC   G48/95
No. G.110/22/99
7th April, 1917.
Headquarters,
3rd Australian Division.
1. I am to convey the Corps Commander's appreciation of the
excellent practice attack carried out by the 10th Australian
Infantry Brigade on the 4th April.
There were a very few points, however, to which the Corps
Commander wishes to draw your attention:
(i) The attack was carried out to a depth of 900 yards
only, and the objectives were at regular intervals.
The final objective of all attacks should be at a
maximum distance, i.e., rather more than the Brigade
will be called upon to do in the forthcoming
offensive, i.e., about 2,000 yards rather than 900 yards.
The objectives should as far as possible correspond
to those which will be taken xxx on the Zero day, and
should comprise the enemy's front, support and reserve
lines as well as the final objective.
(ii) The carrying of the Lewis Guns on the shoulder is
most conspicuous. It is recommended that the gun
be carried by a sling over the shoulder, the gun
being behind the back, butt up.
(iii) The Code letters Ground Signals should be 12 feet long
by 2 feet broad.
2. The following general points were noticed in the training
of the Brigade whilst in the Training Area:-
(i) The work of Companies and Platoons in the new organization 
appears to be very good and on sound lines.
The Platoon Commanders seem to have a very good grasp of
what is required. The men seemed to be working keenly
and taking an interest in their work.
(ii) It is most important that all N.C.O's who would lead
their platoons in action, should be on all parades with
their men. If required for special instruction these
N.C.O's should be given extra parades when the men
are at recreation or whilst the men are doing Bayonet
work, Musketry or Physical Training.
(iii) Lewis Guns with full teams should be on all manoeuvre
parades.
(iv) Sufficient time is not devoted to the special instruction
of Officers and N.C.O's by the Battalion and Company
Commanders previous to sending them to train their
Companies and Platoons. Every precaution must be taken to
prevent "the blind leading the blind" system of training.
(v) Long parades in a confined space, such as a small field,
are to be deprecated. Training becomes useless when
the men begin to lose interest in it.
(vi) Officers must give their words of Command smartly and
when standing to attention, as commands are usually
obeyed in the way they are given.
(vii) March discipline leaves mush to be desired. It was
noticed on the march home from the Training Area that
in many cases men were riding on limber poles and
climbing on to carts.
Repeated orders have been issued against this.
The attached report on a recent Minor Operation on the SOMME
front is forwarded for your information.
(Sd) H.E.MCRAE, Major,
for B.G., G.S.,
2nd ANZAC CORPS.
GOC copy