Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 14, 1 December 1916 - 10 February 1917, Part 14
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101
SECRET
G 6/1
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
Divisional Headquarters,
30/1/17.
AGENDA FOR ENTERPRISE BY 10th INFANTRY BRIGADE.
Reference G 6/1 of 17/1/17.
(Objective has been decided upon. - Raiding force has been
organized and is billeted at ERGUINGHEM)
G Staff.
-
Obtain air photographs of the zone to be attacked, and enlarge-
ments of the portion to be actually entered - 3 copies of
each, 1 for D.H.Q., 1 for C.R.A., 1 for 10th Bde.
2. Prepare from enlarged photos, a scale map of the trenches to be
raided, say 1:2500
3. Get Air-photo. expert to identify M.G. and T.M. emplacements,
dugouts, stores, disused trenches, wire behind front line,
&c., &c., and mark them on this map.
4. Decide on "Points of entry" through enemy wire and let C.R.A.
know.
5. Decide on position of Commander's dug-out and let C.R.E. know
6. Draft applications to Corps for Co-operation of Heavy Artillery
an Army Brigade, and the Divisional Artillery of flanking
Divisions.
7. Draft general plan of operation, as a guide to 10th Brigade to
plan the Infantry action.
8. Secure the ground for the replica trenches.
9. Decide on co-operation to be given by No. 9 and 11 M.G. Cos.
and L.T.M. Batteries.
10. Draft of final orders, - to be ready for discussion and decision
at least 10 days before date of operation, to permit of ample
time for careful revision.
11. Draft proposals for a secondary operation - simultaneous or
otherwise.
12. Consideration of points raised in G 6/1 of 17/1/17, para. 16.
C.R.E.
-
Construction of Commander's dug-out at point decided upon, See
G 6/1 of 17/1/17 para. 11.
2. Provide technical assistance for marking out the replica
trenches
3. Preparation of demolition charges.
C.R.A.
-
Arrangements for wire-cutting at points of entry decided upon,
and on other points to the flanks.
2. Arrangements for concentration of the greater portion of the
Divisional Artillery in accordance with the Infantry plan,
and the employment of the remainder on Diversions.
3. Arrangements for employment of (a) Artillery of flank Divisions
on Diversions. (b) Heavy Artillery. (c) An Army Brigade of
Artillery, - provided Corps makes all these available.
4. Preparations for the employment of 12 Mortars, on the flanks,
during the operation.-
P.T.O.
- 2 -
Div. Sig. Co.
-
Bury two alternative lines, from nearest existing buried
terminals to the Commander's dugout. -
9th Inf. Brigade.
-
Concert measures to systematically keep open gaps cut by us
in enemy wire, by methodically telling off patrols to locate
and direct fire upon enemy wire repairing parties.
- Prepare exits at points required by 10th Brigade.
10th Inf. Bde.
-
Prepare draft plan of Infantry action, in accordance with general
plan of operation.
- Arrange for marking out the replica trenches.
- Draft of Brigade order for the operation as a whole.
- Organization for movement of personnel, all preparatory measures,
equipment, stores, munitions, and collection of information
after the raid, also medical arrangements, &c., &c. - Arrangements with 9th Inf. Brigade for all co-operation
required, both before, during, and after the operation.
O.C. Raid.
- Physical and technical training of Raiding Force.
- Organization of force into parties, in accordance with
Infantry plan. - Team Training - prior to practice on replica trenches.
- Digging of replica trenches.
- Training on replica trenches.
N.B. - Above Agenda List is not exhaustive, but is intended as a
guide only.
JOHN MONASH,
Major - General.
Commanding Third Australian Division.
Issued to .-
"G" Staff.
"Q" "
C.R.A.
C.R.E.
9th Aust. Inf. Bde.
10th -do-
11th -do-
A.D.C.
SPARE (2)
SECRET
Ia/27737
Second Army
Information received to-day indicates that the Germans
are putting about the report of an intended concentration in
the SOISSONS area.
A definite statement has been received from a very
reliable source that there is another concentration of troops
in Southern Germany.
A Swiss Military authority informed me to-day that
they do not anticipate active operations to be initiated
by the Germans in the vicinity of the Swiss frontier.
A deserter has mentioned the probability of an attack
in the ARRAS sector and in the YPRES sector.
(Signed) J. CHARTERIS,
General Staff. Brigadier for Intelligence
G.H.Q
G.H.Q. I.
30th January, 1917.
SECRET
Ia/27737
Second Army
Information received to-day indicates that the Germans
are putting about the report of an intended concentration in
the SOISSONS area.
A definite statement has been received from a very
reliable source that there is another concentration of troops
in Southern Germany.
A Swiss Military authority informed me to-day that
they do not anticipate active operations to be initiated
by the Germans in the vicinity of the Swiss frontier.
A deserter has mentioned the probability of an attack
in the ARRAS sector and in the YPRES sector.
(Signed) J.CHARTERIS.
General Staff.
G.H.Q. I.
30th January, 1917.
Second Army Intelligence
I.G. 131
SECRET.
2nd ANZAC Corps.
The attached is a copy of a statement prepared by B.G.,
G.S. "I" at G.H.Q. for the information of the C-in-C.
Since it was written there is evidence of the XLth Corps
being withdrawn from the line further South. There is also
evidence of leave having been stopped and also of those on leave
from at any rate portions of the Western Front having been
recalled.
There is also evidence of a new German defensive line
having been strongly wired from the east side of HOUTHULST Forest
southward between VYFWEGE and WESTROOSBEKE. It is quite as
likely that the enemy is apprehensive of being attacked, the
frame of mind we are anxious to get him into and by our artillery
and offensive policy to keep him in.
(Sd) C.H. Harrington,
M.G., G.S.
Second Army.
31st January, 1917.
SECRET Ia/27664
POSSIBILITY OF AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE YPRES SALIENT.
The salient points of the information available are as follows.-
(a) Information from train watchers discloses the movement of
about 111 trains of constituted units (i.e. over 2 Divisions)
into Belgium from Germany.
(b) Reports from other sources confirm the above.
(c) Reports from diplomatic sources to the effect that an
offensive between the sea and ARTOIS is intended for the end
of January. The 25th of January was mentioned as the probable
date.
(d) Report from Belgian General Headquarters that the Germans
have shelled their artillery immediately on the left of our
line, and that the Germans have also taken steps to lower the
water in the Canal.
The information from our front regarding the activities of
the enemy which appear to bear upon the question are the following.-
1st. At least 12 heavy batteries have moved from the SOMME to
the YPRES area. There are probably more which have not yet
been identified.
2nd. There has been a general increase in artillery activity
all round the Salient. Guns have been registering. Counter-
battery work has been markedly on the increase.
3rd. Aeroplane activity round the YPRES Salient has been very
much on the increase. On the North end of the Salient every
effort in the air is made to prevent our machines crossing the
line. On the South of the Salient there is a good deal of
fighting in the air, but the definite aeroplane barrage against
our machines crossing the line is not so marked. Still further
South, in the LILLE area, our aeroplanes are allowed to go
anywhere they wish.
4th There is a marked increase of wireless activity, both
south and north of the Salient.
The above in themselves might possibly not be sufficient to do
more than give us cause for watchfulness.
But it has to be remembered that the period of active operations
is now drawing close. On general strategical principles[[,?]] it is
very probably that the Germans will endeavour to launch one or more
attacks on the Western front with a view to deranging our plans.
The YPRES Salient always offers a tempting bait for such operations.
The Germans have command of the posts of observation. Their guns
command the areas behind the front line. A break through the
front at any one place would be dangerous to the safety of the Salient.
The name is well known to the whole world, so that any advance would
have an effect on prestige out of proportion to its military advantage
The area North of the Salient is[[,?]] moreover, the junction of
two Armies, and the previous tendency of the Germans has always been
to strike the point of junction.
n so far as it concerns the British front, there is no other
portion in which any of the signs of activity have been so apparent
as in the YPRES area.
Hence it is deduced that the YPRES Salient is the most probable
point at the present moment for any attack which the Germans might
launch against our troops.
Moreover, the indications available render such an attack not
only possible but probable.
(Sd) J. CHARTERIS.
28/1/17.
Second Army Intelligence
I.G. 131
SECRET.
2nd ANZAC Corps.
The attached is a copy of a statement prepared by B.G.,
G.S. "I" at G.H.Q. for the information of the C-in-C.
Since it was written there is evidence of the XLth Corps
being withdrawn from the line further South. There is also
evidence of leave having been stopped and also of those on leave
from at any rate portions of the Western Front having been
recalled.
There is also evidence of a new German defensive line
having been strongly wired from the east side of HOUTHULST Forest
southward between VYFWEGE and WESTROOSBEKE. It is quite as
likely that the enemy is apprehensive of being attacked, the
frame of mind we are anxious to get him into and by artillery
and offensive policy to keep him in.
(Sd) C.H. Harington,
M.G., G.S.
Second Army.
31st January, 1917.
SECRET Ia/27664
POSSIBILITY OF AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE YPRES SALIENT.
The salient points of the information available are as follows. -
(a) Information from train watchers discloses the movement of
about 111 trains of constituted units (i.e. over 2 Divisions)
(b) Reports from other sources confirm the above.
(c) Reports from diplomatic sources to the effect that an
offensive between the sea and ARTOIS is intended for the end
of January. The 25th of January was mentioned as the probable
date.
(d) Report from Belgian General Headquarters that the Germans
have shelled their artillery immediately on the left of our
line, and that the Germans have also taken steps to lower the
water in the Canal.
The information from our front regarding the activities of
the enemy which appear to bear upon the question are the following.-
1st. At least 12 heavy batteries have moved from the SOMME to
the YPRES area. There are probably more which have not yet
been identified.
2nd. There has been a general increase in artillery activity
all round the Salient. Guns have been registering. Counter- battery
work has been markedly on the increase.
3rd. Aeroplane activity round the YPRES Salient has been very
much on the increase. On the North end of the Salient every
effort in the air is made to prevent our machines crossing the
line. On the South of the Salient there is a goo deal of
fighting in the air, but the definite aeroplane barrage against
our machines crossing the line is not so marked. Still further
South, in the LILLE area, our aeroplanes are allowed to go
anywhere they wish.
4th There is a marked increase of wireless activity, both
south and north of the Salient.
The above in themselves might possibly not be sufficient to do
more than give us cause for watchfulness.
But it has to be remembered that the period of active operations
is now drawing close. On general strategical principles it is
very probable that the Germans will endeavour to launch one or more
attacks on the Western front with a view to deranging our plans.
The YPRES Salient always offers a tempting bait for such operations.
The Germans have command of the posts of observation. Their guns
command the areas behind the front line. A break through the
front at any one place would be dangerous to the safety of the Salient.
The name is well known to the whole world, so that any advance would
have an effect on prestige out of proportion to its military advantage
The area North of the Salient is moreover, the junction of
two Armies, and the previous tendency of the Germans has always been
to strike the point of junction.
In so far as it concerns the British front, there is no other
portion in which any of the signs of activity have been so apparent
as in the YPRES area.
Hence it is deduced that the YPRES Salient is the most probable
point at the present moment for any attack which the Germans might
launch against our troops.
Moreover, the indications available render such an attack not
only possible but probable.
(Sd) J. CHARTERIS.
28/1/17.
THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
Divisional Headquarters,
31st. January, 1917.
G. 1/172.
GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 31A.
The Divisional Commander has noticed that there are
still a very considerable number of casualties occurring daily.
He wishes you to bring to the notice of all your Officers that it
is their responsibility to see that adequate precautions are taken
to avoid waste of personnel. Needless loss, as opposed to legitimate
expenditure, of personnel is the most serious form of wastage
that can occur. All other forms of war equipment are more
easily and more quickly replaced.
To reduce the abnormal loss now occurring, the
following measures will be strictly adhered to.-
- All ranks will be warned in ample time of any action on
our part likely to produce retaliation by the enemy. - All ranks will be warned as to action they are to take in
case of (1). - All ranks will be warned of action they are to take in the
event of unexpected hostile shelling. - Working and carrying parties will only work in small
bodies. - Men will not be allowed to congregate, or stand about in
groups. - All working parties will, as far as possible, have two
sets of tasks.- the one to work at when conditions are
normal, the other during enemy shelling. - Brigade Commanders when organizing their wire cutting
enterprises, will give due consideration to their working
parties, and will allot work accordingly. - Brigade Commanders will endeavour, as far as possible, to
carry cut wire cutting at one and the same time along the
line, so that the working parties of "X" Brigade may not
be killed by the retaliation brought on by "Y" Brigade's
wire cutting.
All Artillery and Trench Mortar action, except S.O.S.,
Retaliation, and that directed aginst fleeting targets,
should start and stop at a definite time, thus enabling
working parties to gauge exactly how to act. At the present
time there is too much desultory shooting in the way
of registration, etc. The Artillery will endeavour to
warn Brigades concerning registration by saying - "It is
proposed to register targets on the "X" Brigade front between
Z a.m. and Y a.m. on the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - The Divisional Commander wishes it to be clearly understood
that though casualties are to be avoided, he does
not intend that on the first hostile shell being fired,
working parties shall march back to ARMENTIERES. In fact
P.T.O.
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