Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 14, 6 October - 30 November 1916, Part 7

-6-

nobody knew whether a man was killed, a prisoner, dangerously

wounded or not, and there was endless confusion. Numbers were

labelled as missing but turned up afterwards and rejoined their

Units, or were only slightly wounded.

Every Commander wants to keep a close supervision

on the work of reporting casualties. Get your reports in

early, and have them carefully checked so that great and deep

grief is not caused relatives unnecessarily. See that a man's

Regimental No. and initials are correct, and only when they are

correctly given can you be certain of preventing unnecessary

worry and trouble to the relatives. Do not imagine men killed.

Make sure. Private Smith will tell you that he saw Private Jones

carried away on a stretcher, and that he was sure he was dead; You

will put him down as "Killed in action2, or "died of wounds", when

afterwards he will turn up smiling and only slightly injured. This

bad casualty reporting causes a great deal of disturbance to the

National morale. I would like to see this Division distinguish

itself in the promptness and accuracy of its casualty returns. If

you have to report a manx missing you want, as soon as you possibly 

can, to have investigations made as to whether the "missing" are

really "missing" or can be reasonably supposed to be in the hands of

the enemy. By careful enquiry amongst a man's mates you can generally

find out whether there's any likelihood of a "missing" man being

a prisoner of war. Through carelessness at the time of casualty

it is afterwards impossible to find out what has become of a man,

and as in the Gallipoli Campaign it drags on for months and months

and even now some of the Gallipoli casualties have not been cleared

up. In this atmosphere you have not had anything said to you

before about this, but on the eve of going on Service, I want to

impress upon you the necessity for correct casualty returns. Also

you are bound to supply at short notice estimated casualties. The

invariable tendency in this instance is to exaggerate. It is

invariably too high. If a man cannot be found, you invariably put

him down as a casualty. You say you have had 100 casualties, or 50

and so on, and you report 3 or 4 hundred casualties, and after a 

few hours men come in from all over the place, stragglers slightly

wounded, and sometimes, but I am glad to say not often, shirkers.

A large number of men usually get detached and some get attached

to other units and carry on alright, but you do not hear that, and

they are immediately labelled "casualties". At first casualties

are invariably over the mark. You say to yourself "I think I have

stated them moderately", but with all your care you will find

that they will come down to 100 or so, and generally very much less

than you anticipated. Never think they look as bad as they at

first appear. They always look worse at first and get better as

you look into them.

One other matter I want to speak about. It

may be premature but I will probably not have an opportunity again

of speaking to you on the subject before going into action. That

is the question of honors and rewards. We must try and have a unit

policy throughout the Division, and a standard manner applied in

making our recommendations. I wish to explain to you, though I do

not know much about it. There are two classes of awards. One the

Army award made specially on the report of a responsible Commander

and the other the "honors" list which is made in batches, now, I

think, twice a year, i.e. on the King's Birthday and at Xmas time.

The former is generally for the lower rank and seldom for the high

ranks. But what I want to do is to bring home to you that no man

can get any reward of distinction or honor at all unless his most

subordinate Commander of all recommends it. It will then go though

the Battalion or Battery and Brigade Commander in due course. What

I mean is, it is not competent for the higher Commander to say "I

think you are a good man, I will recommend you;" And I would remind

you that it is the Army Commander's responsibility to supply a wise

a just, and a perfectly fair discretion in the awarding of distinctions. 

And you will find that in the Australian Forces there 

are a very large number of menx who do very well indeed, who show

great initiative, are very enterprising, and so it is very difficult

to discriminate between one man and another, that the number of

men available for rewards is higher than the greatest possible

number of distinctions that are likey to be given. A man should

-7-

not be recommended merely for doing his duty well, that is, his

normal duty well. If, for example, a Garrison at a fire bay is

suddenly attacked and shows great offensive spirit, and great

bravery. That is what they are there for. That is their normal

duty. If on the other hand a few men distinguish themselves

and the remainder show the white feather, and these men by force

of example hold the position saying "Come on lads we'll keep them

out" etc., then it is alright. But if all do normally what they are

put there to do, that is scarcely a matter which requires special

distinction. Consider the reasons in making a recommendation. You

must consider the example that his action gave to others at the

time, the factor it was in the success of the particular thing

that he and his comrades did and, in short, you have got to be

able to apply a criterion to the value of this work, before you are

justified in recommending him for an army award. There is another

award, it is for consistent and prolonged service. That is not

confined to fighting. There are many men who do grand service and 

admirable work, who do not get an opportunity in the field. Medical

Services, Staff Officers, Administrative positions, and so on.

They do not fight, but very often do work of the very highest

gallantry. The immediate rewards are confined to striking examples

of personal courage. The immediate rewards are confined to striking

examples of personal courage. The "Honors list" is the place to

make your recommendations for consistent good work which has

materially contributed towards the success of your unit. The

higher the rank of the individual the less should he look for reward.

The rank carries with it responsibility, and one expects more from

the Senior than the Junior, therefore, the act which from a 

Private would bring reward is not necessarily the act which will

bring reward for the Officer. For him it would be only his duty,

and discipline of leadership. The higher the rank the severer

should be the standard of judgement. Another point; it may

sound perfectly easy tom pick out a number of men and make 

recommendations, but no man wants to convert his Unit into a breeding

ground for aspirants for honours in the wars, but each man does

want to see his unit getting fair play, and a fair share of any

distinguished word done. In 90% of cases Units failx to achieve

distinction because of the bad way in which recommendations are

made; that is by bad recommendations. The manner in which a recommendation is prepared goes largely towards the success of it. This

may not seem fair, but it is a fact. A Commander very often spoils

the thing by the phraseology of the incident. The next time you

see in any of the London papers a long page full of rewards, cut

it out as a suggestion of the manner in which reports are made.

They want to be specific, descriptive, not long, but say exactly how

the thing was done, and the effect it had. For instance, "No. 345,

Pte. A.B. etc., during an attack on such and such a trench on

such and such a day, when the enemy had counter-attacked and were

in danger of breaking in, this man single-handed attacked them

with bombs, and by his example and courage kept the enemy at bay

until 6 o'clock in the evening when he was relieved, and thus

saved this important trench from falling into the hands of the

Germans" and so on. This is a form of precis which commands

itself to an authority who has got to have his judgement on your

recommendation. The recommendation has got to go through them

and see whether he will endorse them. At Division the same thing

happens. Sieve after sieve, and scrutiny after scrutiny, and so on,

before the final decision. The Unit which puts up its recommendation

in a neat, legible, understandable and precise form, has the

best chance of getting them though these obstacles, and achieving

for the man the reward he should have. It is not merely that he has

got to remember the deserts of the man. He recognises but preserved

the rights of the other man; that he does not award praise or

recommend for honor men who are less deserving than others, but

gets the award through after inquiry raising little trouble. Original

evidence is indispensable, but a local reward can be given and

generally is given on the spot, but for the V.C. and D.S.O. it is

expected that original evidence, signed by witnesses, must be 

forthcoming, so that there is an assurance that the right man is getting

his reward. The utmost accuracy is required in names, ties, dates

-8-

and numbers for identification. Any errors and carelessness in

preparation by units, cause trouble in ascertaining the facts, and

will surely militate against a man getting his reward at all.

Remember that all recommendations are confidential,

and that you should take nobody into your confidence, or let anybody

know who has been recommended. You will make the recommendation

and keep your own counsel until the decision is known. If 

you recommend him and he does not get a reward, tell nobody. Do

not say anything. Keep a notebook in which you should keep a

record of what recommendations you have made. Circumstances alter

and vary so much. Units may be hotly engaged, and on each occasion

men may do very well. You may have another chance. But for a 

rough guide, and being fairly specific, a Commander would scarcely

be justified in bringing under notice more than one per cent of

recommendations. If more come through it will only be said "this

man is looking for too many rewards", and will cut down the recommendations very stringently. If a few striking examples of gallantry

are carefully made out and submitted, you have a chance of

getting the recommendations through and approved; and the reward

will come through in good time.

That, Gentlemen, concludes all the matters I have

to speak to you about. They have been words of advice to Commanders

only. Matters which are familiar to most of you, some of you at

any rate.

My object has been two fold. First of all to

cover the field in front of us, to extend my advice and admonition

and to afford such help, such moral sustenace as will assist you

as far as possible under the difficulties which will confront you.

And, secondly, to remind you that we are fighting force without

any experience of fighting, and we have a reputation still to

make, but I entertain the hope that by lack of experience, and in

spite of it, we will achieve success by unity of purpose, unity

of principle and unity of policy.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

G.O.C.

"G" Branch.

A.Q. Branch.                                             

9th, 10th and 11th Inf. Bdes.                   

A.D.M.S.      C.R.A                                     

Divisional Headquarters,
Larkhill
Oct. 28th, 1916.

With reference to my O.C., 57/11, of 11th instant.

Please make the following alterations.-

For X2A, Y2A and Z2A Trench Mortar Batteries, A.F.A.

read X3A, Y3A and Z3A Trench Mortar Batteries, A.F.A.

 H. Farmar

Lieut-Colonel.

A.A. & Q.M.G. 3rd Australian Division

(R.M).  

54

Lark Hill
28/10/16

Dear Halter

As with yourself, anything in the nature of a puzzle affords a welcome

distraction for me. I quite admit the point you seek to make about that Roulette

system. It is of course not impossible to exhaust your capital, & pass the Casino's limits, but it is very highly improbable: - Following is only a partial investigation, following your line which ran in the direction of reviving a series of losses, just when one win would clear the game. [By the way, there is an error in your 17^th throw, & the 18^th throw in your experience would have won that game]

The quickest way of making the required capital mount up is if there were to occur a series of recurring cycles, at the end of which each of which the capital invested, being the lowest figure on the ward, will be double what it was at the beginning of the cycle.-

Assume, as a particular case, that the luck is all against the player, & that in every3M throw, 2M are losses & only 2m are wins. To comply with above ^this condition & bring about the above process of doubling will require 6 throws, thus
 

					alternatively
	a	left on card & started - result	-	}	-
1.	a + a	"	-	}	-
2.	a + a + 2a	"	-	}	-
3.	a + a + 2a + 3a	"	/	}	-
4.	a + 2a	"	-	}	/
5.	a + 2a + 3a	"	/	}	/
6.	2a

If this cycle were repeated 7 times, the capital involved will be a x 2ⁿ

Now, xx 6 successive throws, in which 4 are t be  - and 2 +, can occur only in

L6/2 x L⁴ ways i.e. 15 ways. And of these 15 ways, only 2, xx as shown above

can lead to loss. Hence the probability against losing in, such a cycle of 6 throws

(even though there are twice as many losing throws as winning throws, is 71/2 to 1 The probability against this being 70 72 successive adverse repetitions of this nature is therefore (71/2)ⁿ to 1. = To meet such a contingency the capital required is a x2n

As a test, let a = 4, & the total capital available = 256 = 4 x 2⁵. The

chances against such capital being exhausted, under the particular adverse conditions laid down is (7 1/2)⁵ to 1 = (about) 12000 to 1.

The point is that a player can expect to play 12000 such cycles before starting

a succession of 5 such adverse cycles. While he is playing the other 11995

cycles, he may expect an enormous number of wins, which will overshadow the

total loss of his whole capital on one rare occasions.

The whole thing is a question of available capital, or the Casino's limit - If

you double your capital you enormously decrease the probability of losing it.

 JM.