Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 13, 16 August - 30 September 1916, Part 1

WARLOY.

16/8/16.

Headquarters,

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

With reference to the successes of the 4th Australian Infantry

Brigade during the period it was in the front line at POZIERES, from

6th-13th August inclusive , itis convenient to divide this report

into - (a) Training before going into the line.

(b) The actual operations.

(c) General remarks.

TRAINING. Each battalion was trained on the same lines. An exercise

was carried out by day and repeated at night. The Brigade was

also exercised as one unit. Before starting off, all ranks were made

acquainted with the exercise, and at the conclusion a little constructive

criticism by the Brigadier or Commanding Officer in the hearing of all

ranks followed . Almost every man had thrown a live Mills Bomb. Lewis

Guns had 5 or 6 reserve crews, all of who had actually fired the gun

on 30 yards ranges made near billets. Rapid wiring was practiced. Each

platoon had its squad.

ACTUAL OPERATIONS. Units reached their objectives on five successive

nights, the actual operation being the same as the exercise practiced.

The chief points were as follows:-

(a) Early information of the task set by the Divisional Commander

was passed on to Battalion Commanders without waiting for

formal operation orders, By this means C.Os. had a chance

to pass on ; right down to the men in the ranks, the objective,

frontage and direction, several hours before zero time.

(b) Discussion between Brigadier (or Brigade Major) and C.Os.

concerned as near the objective as advisable.

(c) Personal reconnaissances by every Officer or N.C.O. if their

Battalion was not in the front trench.

(d) Resolute patrolling of NO MAN'S LAND immediately it became

dark, thus keeping the enemy ignorant of our movements.

(e) Under cover of these patrols (d) stronger patrols were pushed

out, followed by Lewis Gun with Bombs as escort. This party

slipped into shell holes before the first wave left our parapet.

(f) Men with small electric torches went out with this party (e)

to mark the flanks of Companies. Earth was banked up and torches

placed in a hollow scooped out. The torches were put in position

by compass bearing.

(g) Knowing the enemy always sweeps our jumping-off trench with

machine guns from flanks and from his support lines, and at

the same time is quick at putting up his barrage (usually on or

a short distance in front of our parapet), the first, second and

third waves were  got into position in NO MAN'S LAND before

zero time. Distance between waves about 50 yds. Shell holes

formed good cover.

(h) The frontages for each Battalion varied from 250 yds. to 500

yds. On one occasion, 600 yds. had to be covered. With our

extended front 2 platoons per Company were placed in first

wave and 2 in the second wave, thus 
D     C    B    A 

– –  – –  – –  – –

– –  – –  – –  – –

Usually a Company from another Battalion was detailed as a

reserve, and remained in the jumping-off trench to go

P.T.O.

– –2 – – 

forward as another wave. If the objective was a stiff one, then depth

was essential: thus D C B A or D    C     B       A

                                     – – – –         – –  – –  – –  – –

                                     – – – –          –     –      –     –

                                     – – – –          –    –       –      –

                                     – – – –

the frontage, of course, being correspondingly decreased.

(i) The first wave was, as a rule, thicker than the succeeding

waves; for instance, it was found better to put 2 platoons

in front wave, another in second, and the other in third wave.

The idea that the third first wave should be thin is not altogether

sound. The first wave must get its objective; if it hesitates

then chaos follows in rear. Men want to feel that their mates

are on their left and right. The necessary cohesion is secured.

Only human nature for men to hesitate when alone and ignorant of

what is taking place. Good leaders are essential in front line.

A few calm words from them stop men from pushing forward into our

own barrage.

(j) The first wave always kept well up under our barrage and ready

to spring the instant the lift took place. Confidence in the

artillery was an important factor. The first wave was thus able

to overpower the German machine gunners xxfore before they knew what

was happening.

(k) Second wave kept close to the first wave, each man carried a pick and

shovel, and if the situation demanded it, the tools were dropped

just outside the captured trench.

(l) Third wave also carried tools. This wave was used for removing

the dead, wounded and prisoners, rather than put on to consolidation

work. Afterwards the third wave commenced opening up new

communication trenches to our "jumping-off" trench or improve the

existing German communication trenches.

(m) The fourth wave (if there was one) or the Reserve was always

left in the "jumping-off" trench. Prior to zero time digging

parties were organised from this unit. Their orders were to start

digging as soon as possible after zero time. The work was organised,

i.e., one party started from our trench, another some yards

further on in NO MAN'S LAND. "Dig for your lives" was the word.

(n) When the objective was reached, the patrols and Lewis Guns

pushed on for another 100 or 150 yards, and thus insured protection

for the consolidating parties. Great moral effect to these

parties to know they had protection in front.

(o) The first wave and second wave as it arrived lost no time in

re-modelling the captured trench. Any N.C.O. took charge, and

soon had his own party. The organising of these parties beforehand

is impossible; the men must be organised as they reach the

trench.

(p) The rapid wiring parties of each platoon were unable, except on

two occasions, to do any good. Difficult to get material up

in time.

(q) As soon as the consolidation was nearing completion, the first

line was gradually thinned and men put on to communication

trenches or sent back to the jumping off trench. C.Os. often

fou nd too many men on the job were only in other's way.

– – 3 – –

(r) Every man carried - (i) 5 Sand Bags. In addition a couple

of dumps were made at convenient places in our trenches.

(ii) 2 to 4 Bombs per man.

Essential every man should throw a live bomb before going

into action.

(iii) 2 days rations besides iron ration.

(iv) Water bottles full.

(s) Each platoon had its own organised bomb squad. The Battalion

Bombing Platoon was held in hand or detailed to deal with

special points which the C.O. invariably knew of beforehand as

the result of patrol reconnaissance.

(t) Tin discs or white patches on back were discarded. They only

helped the enemy.

(u) The extra 100 rounds S.A.A. on man were invariably handed over

to the Lewis gunners with whom were reserve carriers.

(v) After the first and second wave had left the jumping-off trench

in which they had formed up, guides stationed in the trench at

intervals marked the platoon frontages for the third line as it

approached the trench from which the other two waves hopped out.

(w) No lengthy orders were issued. The objective, frontages and

direction were known to all ranks. All knew what to do.

Practice before coming into the line helped them act as if

by instinct. Each battalion had confidence that the other

on his right or left would reach its objective. If a gap

existed when the objective was attained, patrols were at once

sent out from each Battalion and soon were linked up.

(x) The aeroplane photographs were an excellent help. Trenches

invisible from our front line were clearly shown on the photo .

and were found when units advanced.

(y) The establishment of Regimental Aid Posts well forward from

whence the Bearers of Field Ambulances evacuated, worked

splendidly. Wounded were evacuated quickly. In no case

were wounded left unattended in NO MAN'S LAND. The leaving

of wounded men out after a unit has been relieved has a

demoralising influence, especially on fresh troops. The

excuse that the barrage is too heavy should not be tolerated.

Regimental stretcher bearers from this Brigade worked unceasingly

through the heaviest barrages.

GENERAL REMARKS.

(a) More men trained in the pigeon service.

(b) Pistols and flares to indicate our forward position to aircraft

should not be carried by leaders who are likely to become

casualties. They should be carried by 2 or 3 men in each Company.

(c) Closer co-operation between Commanding Officers and F.O.O.

Two thick cables at least should be laid to Battalion H.Q.

(d) Send important messages by 2 or even 3 runners.

(e) Improvement of communication trenches up to the jumping-off

place.

(f) Double the Lewis Gun crews when they advance.

P.T.O.

– – 4 – –

GENERAL REMARKS (Contd.)

(g) Allot 2 or 4 Vickers Machine Guns to Battalion Commanders

who are responsible for giving the Officers their tasks etc.  e

Of course, the Machine Gun Officer will naturally assist in th

operations, but he must not be fettered by other instructions

from O.C., M.G.Co., who often is not fully seized with

the situation.

(h) Distribute Stokes Mortars to Battalions in the front line

to use as they think necessary on the advice of the

Stokes Mortar Officer.

(i) Earlier synchronising of watches before zero time.  Normally

3 hours should be allowed from Brigade Headquarters onwards.

One operation nearly proved a failure, owing to an alteration

of 1¼ minutes in time received at Brigade Headquarters just

one hour before zero time. Luckily, no enemy barrage was up

at the time the runners were carrying the time to the Company

Commanders in the front line.

Colonel.

Comdng. 4th Aus. Inf. Bde.

[*Copy to Genl Sir Newton Moore

Col Anderson

17/8/16*]

1st Anzac Corps, 16th August, 1916.

Major-General E. M. Woodward, C.B.,

D.A.G., W.O.

My dear Woodward,

With reference to our conversation about

reinforcements yesterday, I have since been able to see

one of my  Australian staff officers, who came back last

night after having seen Brigadier-General Sir Newton Moore

on Salisbury Plain. I gather from him that the reason

why such a few reinforcements are immediately available

is owing to the order (and a very right one)that no men

are to be sent forward until they have had fourteen weeks'

training, vide Army Council Instructions No. 1103. of

31st May. This order was I presume issued entirely to

meet the case of men enlisted in England who would require

fourteen weeks' training from the day of enlistment. In 

the case of the Australian troops, however, I understand

that practically all of them have a considerable amount of

training before leaving Australia, and some of them as

much as three and four months. I gather that this is not 

taken into consideration on arrival at home, and that they

are/

– 2 –

are expected to complete fourteen weeks in England before

they can come out of this country. If this is really the

case, I think you might see if it is possible to take it

up, especially in a time like the present, when we want men

so urgently during heavy fighting.

I enclose for your information a statement of

the numbers actually available as infantry reinforcements

for our different divisions. From this you will see that

the following are available:-

			Officers	Other Ranks
1st Division	..	..	53	2,621
2nd Division	..	..	23	3,912
4th Division	..	..	11	1,055
5th Division	..	..	22	1,367
3rd Division	..	..	4	658
			113	9,613

In addition to the above, I understand that

587 men of the 14th training battalion (5th Division) are 

now en route from Egypt.

There/

– 3 –

There are also other numbers besides infantry

available, and I have given instructions to Sir Newton

Moore to transfer them all to infantry, as shewn hereunder.

		Officers	Other Ranks
4th Light Horse	..	3	100
13th Light Horse	..	4	73
14th Light Horse	..	6	162
Cyclist Battalion	..	8	531
		21	866

The reinforcements shown for the 3rd Division

could of course, and should be transferred to meet the

requirements of the divisions in this country.

These totals should give us something like

11,000 men who should be available shortly to reinforce

our divisions in France, and who, with the return of the

many slightly wounded men, would I hope keep us going for

a considerable time.

As you know, I merely send you all this, as I

think/

– 4 –

think it will be of help to you in meeting our difficulties.

Very glad to have seen you yesterday, and with

all good wishes.

Yours ever,

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.

Copy No3 - Adjutant.

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

OPERATION STANDING ORDERS.

In anticipation of the promulgation of Revised Operation Standing

Orders, the following arrangements for Transport on Lineof March

come into eg at once.

FIRST LINE  TRANSPORT.

1. The bulk of the First Line Transport will usually march brigaded, 

as hereunder :-

2. A Commander for the brigaded portion will be named. Hewill

usually be one of the Transport Officer of Battalions, selected

in order or seniority, as available. The Transport Officers and

Sergeants of Units must render him every assistance. He is

responsible for march discipline and order march.

3. The same officer will usually be in  command of the Brigade Ammunition

Reserve.

4. First Line Transport will march in the following order :-

(a) In rear of each Battalion :- 

Two M.G. Waggons ) in

Two S.A.A. do           ) order

Maltese Cart             ) named.

(b) In rear of whole column in successive groups - (the vehicles of

each group marching in the same order as the units)thus :-

GROUP A.	Brigade Ammunition Reserve :-	Three S.A.A. waggons per unit.
GROUP B.	Tools :-	Two Tool waggons per Unit - followed by Brigade Tool Reserve (two G.S. Wagons)
GROUP C.	Sundry :-	Water Carts) Mess Carts) in order named, in Cookers)      order of Units Spare Animals)

Note :- Brigade Cook's Cart marches at the head of Group G.

Machine Gun Coy's vehicles march with the Company - except that its

water cart and cooker march in Group C in its correct order of march. 

Company Ammunition Parks march in rear of their Companies.

5. When other Units are attached to the Brigade, their 1st Line Transport

conforms in every way to above, as if attached Units werea

part of the Brigade.

NB. All Transport Officers and Sergeants, and all officers of Units

liable to be detailed as Transport Officers must have in their

possession and Carried on the person :-

(a) A copy of this order.

(b) A copy of the Register of First Line transport issued

with B.O. 511.

The prescribed order of march of vehicles should be committed to

memory by these officers.

sgd J.M.A DURRANT Major.

Brigade Major 

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.

Confidential

FIRST ANZAC CORPS HEADQUARTERS,

17th August, 1916.

A.A.G., A.I.M.

31/49

Dear General MONASH -

The Lieutenant-General Commanding has instructedme

to forward, for your information, the enclosed copy of

a communication which he has forwarded to the A. G. at the War

Office, relative to reinforcements for the A. I. F. in FRANCE-

Yours sincerely,

[[??]]

Brigadier-General JOHN MONASH, C.B., V.D.,

G. O. C., Third Australian Division.