Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 13, 16 August - 30 September 1916, Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open for review
Accession number:
RCDIG0000615
Difficulty:
2

Page 1 / 10

WARLOY. 16/8/16. Headquarters, Ath AUSTRALIAN DIVISION. With reference to the successes of the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade during the period it was in the front line at POZIERES, from õth-13th August inclusive, itis convenient to divide this report Training before going into the line. into b) The actual operations. (c) General remarks. TRAINING. Each battalion was trained on the same lines. 9-An exercise was carried out by day and repeated again at night. The Brigade was Before starting off, all ranks were made also exercised as one unit. acquainted with the exercise, and at the conclusion à little constructive criticism by the Brigadier or Commanding Officer in the hearing of all Almost every man had thrown a live Mills Bomb. Lewis ranks followed. Guns had 5 or 6 reserve crews, all of whom had actually fired the gun on 30 yards ranges made near billets. Rapid wiring was practiced. Each platoon had its squad. Units reached their objectives on five successive Orgräf1o: AOTUA1 the actual operation being the same as the exercise practiced. nights, The chief points were as follows:- Early information of the task set by the Divisional Commander (a) was passed on to Battalion Commanders without waiting for By this means C.Os. had a chance formal operation orders. to pass on; right down to the men in the ranks, the objectiver frontage/and direction, several hours before zero time. (b) Discussion between Brigadier (or Brigade Major) and C.Os. concerned as mear the objective as advisable. Personal reconnaissance by every Officer or N.C.0. if their (c) Battalfen was not in the front trench. Resolute patrolling of NO MAN'S LAND immediately it became (a) dark, thus keeping the enemy ignorant of our movements. Under cover of these patrols (d) stronger patrols were pushed (e) out, followed by Lewis Gun with Bombs as escort. This party slipped into shell holes before the first wave left our parapet. Men with small electric torches went out with this party (e) (f) Earth was banked up and torches to mark the flanks of Companies. The torches were put in posit- placed in a hollow scooped out. ion by compass bearing. Knowing the aemy always sweeps our jumping-off trench with (8) machine guns from flanks and from his support lines, and at the same time is quick at putting up his barrage (usually on or a short distance in front of our parapet), the first, second and third waves were got into position in NO MAN'S LAND before Distance between waves about 50 yds. Shell holes zero time. formed good cover. The frontages for each Battalion varied from 250 yds. to 500 (h) yds: On one occasion, 6C0 yds. had to be covered., With our extended front 2 platoons per Company were placed in first wave and 2 in the second wave, thus 2. ” ------- Usually a Company from another Battalion was detailed as a reserve, and remained in the jumping-off trench ready to go P.T.0,
4 forward as another wave. If the objective was a stiff one, then depth was essential; thus p. G --82. E - -2? the frontage, of course, being correspondingly decreased. (i) The first wave was, as a rule, thicker than the succeeding waves; for instance, it was found better to put 2 platoons n front wave, another in second, and the other in third wave. The idea that the first wave should be thin is not altogether The first wave must get its objective; if it hesitates sound. then chaos follows in rear. Men want to feel that their mates are on their left and right. The necessary cohesion is secured. Only human nature for men to hesitate when alone and ignorant of what is taking place. Good leaders are essential in front line. A few calm words from them stop men from pushing forward into our own barrage. The first wave always kept well up under our own barrage and ready (3) to spring the instant the lift took place. Confidence in the artillery was an important factor. The first wave was thus able to overpower the German machine gunners before hekn what was happening. Second wave kept close to first wave, each man carried a pick and (k) shovel, and if the situation demanded it, the tools were dropped just outside the captured trench. Third wave also carried tools. This wave was used for removing 11) the dead, wounded and prisoners, rather than put on to consolidat- ion work. Afterwards the third wave commenced opening up new communication trenches to our "jumping-off" trench or improve the existing German communication trenches. The fourth wave (if there was one) or the Reserve was always (m) left in the "jumping-off" Strench. Prior to zero time digging parties were organised from this unit. Their orders were to start digging as soon as possible after zero time. The work was organ- ised, i.e., one party started from our trench, another some yards further on in NO MAN'S LAND. "Dig for your lives" was the word. (n) When the objective was reached, the patrols and Lewis Guns pushed on for another 100 or 150 yards, and thus insured protec- tion for the consolidating parties., Great moral effect to these parties to know they had protection in front. The first wave and second wave as it arrived lost no time in (0) re-modelling the captured trench. Any N.C.O. took charge, and soon had his own party. The organising of these parties before- hand is impossible; the men must be organised as they reach the trench. The rapid wiring parties of each platoon were unable, except on (p) two occasions, to do any good. Difficult to get material up in time. As soon as the consolidation was nearing completion the first () line was gradually thinned and men put on to communication trenches or sent back to the jumping-off trench. C.Os. often found too many men on a job were only in each other's way. 00
43 (i) 5 Sand Bags. In addition a couple Every man carried - (r) of dumps were made at convenient places in our trenches. (ii) 2 to 4 Bombs per man. should throw a live bomb before going Essential every man into action. (iii) 2 days rations besides iron ration. (iv) Water bottles full. Each platoon had. its own organised bomb squad. The Battalion (s) Bombing Platoon was held in hand or detailed to deal with special points which the C.O. invariably knew of beforehand as the result of patrol reconnaissance. Tin dises or white patches on back were discarded. They only ) helped the enemy. The extra 100 rounds S.A.A. on man were invariably handed over (u) to the Lewis gunners with whom were reserve carriers. After the first and second wave had left the jumping-off trench (V) in which they had formed up, guides stationed in the trench at intervals marked the platoon frontages for the third line as it approached the trench from which the other two waves hopped out. No lengthy orders were issued. The objective, frontage and (w) All knew what to do. direction were known to all ranks. Practice before coming into the line helped them to act as if by instinct. Each battalion had confidence that the other If a gap on his right or left would reach its objective. existed when the objective was attained, patrols were at once sent out from each Battalion and soon were linked up. Trenches The aeroplane photographs were an excellent help. () invisible from our front line were clearly shown on the photo. and were found when units advanced. The establishment of Regimental Aid Posts well forward from (y) whence the Bearers of Field Ambulances evacuated, worked wounded were evacuated quickly. In no case splendidly. The leaving were wounded left unattended in NO MAN'S LAND. of wounded men out after a unit has been relieved has a The demoralising influence, especially on fresh troops. excuse that the barrage is too heavy should not be tolerated. Regimental stretcher bearers from this Brigade worked unceasingly through the heaviest barrages. GarzRil rsanvS. Nore men trained in the pigeon service. (a) Pistols and flares to indicate our forward position to aircraft (b) should not be carried by leaders who are likely to become They should be carried by 2 or 3 men in each Company casualties. Closer co-operation between Commanding Officers and F.0.0. (c) Two thick cables at least should be laid to Battalion H.Q. Send important messages by 2 or even 3 runners. (d) (£) Improvement of communication trenches up to the jumping-off place. (f) Double the Lewis Gun crews when they advance. P.T.0.
--d G2 EPAL REMAnks (Contd.) Allot 2 or 4 Vickers Kachine Guns to Battalion Commanders (g) who.are responsible for giving the Officers their tasks etc. Of course, the Machine Gun Officer will naturally assist in th operations, but he must not be fettered by other instructions from the O.c., M.G.Co., who often is not fully, seized with the situation. Distribute Stokes Mortars to Battalions in the front line (h) to use as they think necessary on the advice of the Stokes Mortar Officer. (i) Earlier synchronising of watches before zero time. Normally 3 hours should be allo ed from Brigade Headquarters onwards. One operation nearly proved a failure, owing to an alteration of 11 minutes in time received at Brigade Headquarters just one hour before zero time. Luckily, no enemy barrage was un at the time the runners were carrying, the time to the Con Commanders in the front line. Colonel. Comdng. 4th Aus. Inf. Bde. efs EU4 (ov ei nevelif .g oss pp
84 1st Anzac Corps, 16th August, 1916. Major-General E. M. Woodward, C.B., D.A.G., w.O. My dear Woodward, With reference to our conversation about reinforcements yesterday, I have since been able to see one of my Australian staff officers, who came back last night after having seen Brigadier-General Sir Newton Moore on Salisbury Plain. I gather from him that the reason why such a few reinforcements are immediately available is owing to the order (and a very right one) that no men are to be sent forward until they have had fourteen weeks' training, vide Army Council Instructions No. 1103. of 31st May. This order was I presume issued entirely to meet the case of men enlisted in England who would require fourteen weeks' training from the day of enlistment. In the case of the Australian troops, however, I understand that practically all of them have a considerable amount of training before leaving Australia, and some of them as much as three and four months. I gather that this is not taken into consideration on arrival at home, and that they are/
- 2 - are expected to complete fourteen weeks in England before they can come out to this country. If this is really the case, I think you might see if it is possible to take it up, especially in a time like the present, when we want men so urgently during heavy fighting. I enclose for your information a statement of the numbers actually available as infantry reinforcements, for our different divisions. From this you will see that the following are available:- Ofricers Other Ranks lst Division 53 2.621 2nd Division 23 S912 4th Division 1,055 1.367 5th Division 22 568 3rd Division I Sols In addition to the above, I understand that 587 men of the l4th training battalion (5th Division) are now en route from Egypt. There
- 3 - There are also other numbers besides infantry available, and I have given instructions to Sir Newton Moore to transfer them all to infantry, as shewn hereunder. Other Nanks Ofricers 100 4th Light Horse 73 13th Light Horse 162 14th Light Horse 53l Cyclist Battalion 866 a The reinforcements shewn for the 3rd Division could of course, and should be transferred to meet the requirements of the divisions in this country. These totals should give us something like 11,000 men who should be available shortly to reinforce our divisions in France, and who, with the return of the many slightly wounded men, would I hope keep us going for a considerable time. As you know, I merely send you all this, as I think!
Chink it will be of help to you in meeting our diffieulties Very glad to have seen you yesterday, and with all good wishes. Yours ever, (S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.
i x. CaesNas- Adjstant FOUTI AUSTALLIN ITANY B2IIADE. OPZRATIJN STANUING ORDER3. In anticipation of the prowulgetion of Revised Operation Standing Ordere, the folloving arrangerente for Transport on Linepf March come isto eg offect at occe. EIRS ul UEiNUFORF. The bulk of the First Line Transport vill usually march brigaded. as hereunder A Cormander for the brigaded portion vill be samed. Hewill usually be one of the Traseport Officer of Nattalione, celooted in order of seniority, ac eveilable. The Transport Officers and Sergeants of Units must render his every assistance. Meie responeible for sarch diecipline and order of sarch. The sase officer will usually be in command of the Brigade Ammunition Reserve. First Line Trassport vill march is the folloving order i- (4) I er of sach Battalion : Two M.G. Waggons) in Two s.A.4. do ) order Maltese Cart ) nased. In rear of whole colues in suecessive groupe - (the vehicles of cach group marching in the came order as the units) thus s- sReUr A. Brigade Amrvaition Reservo !- Three S.A.A. waggons per uait. eROUP D. Tools i- Two Tool veggous per Unit - followed by Frigade Tool Resorve (tvo G.J. Wagons) GROUP C. SUndry! Water Garts Mese Carts in order named, in Cookors order of Unite. Spare Asimale Note :- Drigade Cook's Cart marchee et the head of croup C. Nachin- Gun Coy's vehioles warch with the Compaay - exoept that ite water cart and cooker sarch in Group C in ite correct order of march. Company Ammunition Farks march in rear of their Companies. When other Unite are atteched to the Erigade, their ist Line Transport conforse in every way to above, ae if the ettached Units veres part of the Brigade. All Transport Officere end Serfeante, and ell offioers of Units liable to be detailed as Transport Officers must have in their possescion and Carried on tho person :- (4) A copy of this order. (b) A copy of the Register of First Line Trapsport iscued with B.O. 3ii. The prescribed order of narch of vehicles should be committed to newory by these officers. egd. J.K.A. DURRANT Major. Brigade Major ith Auet. Inf. Bde.
rrss i56 FIRST ANZAC CORPS HEADQUARTERS 17th August, 1916. 9 ch Dear General MONASH The Lieutenant-General Commanding has in- structedme to forward, for your information, the enclosed copy of a communication which he has forwarded to the A. G. at the War Office, relative to reinforcements for the A. I. F. in FRANCE. Yours sincerely, tt Brigadier-General JOHN MONASH, C.B. V.D. G. O. C., Third Australian Division.

WARLOY.

16/8/16.

Headquarters,

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

With reference to the successes of the 4th Australian Infantry

Brigade during the period it was in the front line at POZIERES, from

6th-13th August inclusive , itis convenient to divide this report

into - (a) Training before going into the line.

(b) The actual operations.

(c) General remarks.

TRAINING. Each battalion was trained on the same lines. An exercise

was carried out by day and repeated at night. The Brigade was

also exercised as one unit. Before starting off, all ranks were made

acquainted with the exercise, and at the conclusion a little constructive

criticism by the Brigadier or Commanding Officer in the hearing of all

ranks followed . Almost every man had thrown a live Mills Bomb. Lewis

Guns had 5 or 6 reserve crews, all of who had actually fired the gun

on 30 yards ranges made near billets. Rapid wiring was practiced. Each

platoon had its squad.

ACTUAL OPERATIONS. Units reached their objectives on five successive

nights, the actual operation being the same as the exercise practiced.

The chief points were as follows:-

(a) Early information of the task set by the Divisional Commander

was passed on to Battalion Commanders without waiting for

formal operation orders, By this means C.Os. had a chance

to pass on ; right down to the men in the ranks, the objective,

frontage and direction, several hours before zero time.

(b) Discussion between Brigadier (or Brigade Major) and C.Os.

concerned as near the objective as advisable.

(c) Personal reconnaissances by every Officer or N.C.O. if their

Battalion was not in the front trench.

(d) Resolute patrolling of NO MAN'S LAND immediately it became

dark, thus keeping the enemy ignorant of our movements.

(e) Under cover of these patrols (d) stronger patrols were pushed

out, followed by Lewis Gun with Bombs as escort. This party

slipped into shell holes before the first wave left our parapet.

(f) Men with small electric torches went out with this party (e)

to mark the flanks of Companies. Earth was banked up and torches

placed in a hollow scooped out. The torches were put in position

by compass bearing.

(g) Knowing the enemy always sweeps our jumping-off trench with

machine guns from flanks and from his support lines, and at

the same time is quick at putting up his barrage (usually on or

a short distance in front of our parapet), the first, second and

third waves were  got into position in NO MAN'S LAND before

zero time. Distance between waves about 50 yds. Shell holes

formed good cover.

(h) The frontages for each Battalion varied from 250 yds. to 500

yds. On one occasion, 600 yds. had to be covered. With our

extended front 2 platoons per Company were placed in first

wave and 2 in the second wave, thus 
D     C    B    A 

– –  – –  – –  – –

– –  – –  – –  – –

Usually a Company from another Battalion was detailed as a

reserve, and remained in the jumping-off trench to go

P.T.O.

 

– –2 – – 

forward as another wave. If the objective was a stiff one, then depth

was essential: thus D C B A or D    C     B       A

                                     – – – –         – –  – –  – –  – –

                                     – – – –          –     –      –     –

                                     – – – –          –    –       –      –

                                     – – – –

the frontage, of course, being correspondingly decreased.

(i) The first wave was, as a rule, thicker than the succeeding

waves; for instance, it was found better to put 2 platoons

in front wave, another in second, and the other in third wave.

The idea that the third first wave should be thin is not altogether

sound. The first wave must get its objective; if it hesitates

then chaos follows in rear. Men want to feel that their mates

are on their left and right. The necessary cohesion is secured.

Only human nature for men to hesitate when alone and ignorant of

what is taking place. Good leaders are essential in front line.

A few calm words from them stop men from pushing forward into our

own barrage.

(j) The first wave always kept well up under our barrage and ready

to spring the instant the lift took place. Confidence in the

artillery was an important factor. The first wave was thus able

to overpower the German machine gunners xxfore before they knew what

was happening.

(k) Second wave kept close to the first wave, each man carried a pick and

shovel, and if the situation demanded it, the tools were dropped

just outside the captured trench.

(l) Third wave also carried tools. This wave was used for removing

the dead, wounded and prisoners, rather than put on to consolidation

work. Afterwards the third wave commenced opening up new

communication trenches to our "jumping-off" trench or improve the

existing German communication trenches.

(m) The fourth wave (if there was one) or the Reserve was always

left in the "jumping-off" trench. Prior to zero time digging

parties were organised from this unit. Their orders were to start

digging as soon as possible after zero time. The work was organised,

i.e., one party started from our trench, another some yards

further on in NO MAN'S LAND. "Dig for your lives" was the word.

(n) When the objective was reached, the patrols and Lewis Guns

pushed on for another 100 or 150 yards, and thus insured protection

for the consolidating parties. Great moral effect to these

parties to know they had protection in front.

(o) The first wave and second wave as it arrived lost no time in

re-modelling the captured trench. Any N.C.O. took charge, and

soon had his own party. The organising of these parties beforehand

is impossible; the men must be organised as they reach the

trench.

(p) The rapid wiring parties of each platoon were unable, except on

two occasions, to do any good. Difficult to get material up

in time.

(q) As soon as the consolidation was nearing completion, the first

line was gradually thinned and men put on to communication

trenches or sent back to the jumping off trench. C.Os. often

fou nd too many men on the job were only in other's way.

 

– – 3 – –

(r) Every man carried - (i) 5 Sand Bags. In addition a couple

of dumps were made at convenient places in our trenches.

(ii) 2 to 4 Bombs per man.

Essential every man should throw a live bomb before going

into action.

(iii) 2 days rations besides iron ration.

(iv) Water bottles full.

(s) Each platoon had its own organised bomb squad. The Battalion

Bombing Platoon was held in hand or detailed to deal with

special points which the C.O. invariably knew of beforehand as

the result of patrol reconnaissance.

(t) Tin discs or white patches on back were discarded. They only

helped the enemy.

(u) The extra 100 rounds S.A.A. on man were invariably handed over

to the Lewis gunners with whom were reserve carriers.

(v) After the first and second wave had left the jumping-off trench

in which they had formed up, guides stationed in the trench at

intervals marked the platoon frontages for the third line as it

approached the trench from which the other two waves hopped out.

(w) No lengthy orders were issued. The objective, frontages and

direction were known to all ranks. All knew what to do.

Practice before coming into the line helped them act as if

by instinct. Each battalion had confidence that the other

on his right or left would reach its objective. If a gap

existed when the objective was attained, patrols were at once

sent out from each Battalion and soon were linked up.

(x) The aeroplane photographs were an excellent help. Trenches

invisible from our front line were clearly shown on the photo .

and were found when units advanced.

(y) The establishment of Regimental Aid Posts well forward from

whence the Bearers of Field Ambulances evacuated, worked

splendidly. Wounded were evacuated quickly. In no case

were wounded left unattended in NO MAN'S LAND. The leaving

of wounded men out after a unit has been relieved has a

demoralising influence, especially on fresh troops. The

excuse that the barrage is too heavy should not be tolerated.

Regimental stretcher bearers from this Brigade worked unceasingly

through the heaviest barrages.

GENERAL REMARKS.

(a) More men trained in the pigeon service.

(b) Pistols and flares to indicate our forward position to aircraft

should not be carried by leaders who are likely to become

casualties. They should be carried by 2 or 3 men in each Company.

(c) Closer co-operation between Commanding Officers and F.O.O.

Two thick cables at least should be laid to Battalion H.Q.

(d) Send important messages by 2 or even 3 runners.

(e) Improvement of communication trenches up to the jumping-off

place.

(f) Double the Lewis Gun crews when they advance.

P.T.O.

 

– – 4 – –

GENERAL REMARKS (Contd.)

(g) Allot 2 or 4 Vickers Machine Guns to Battalion Commanders

who are responsible for giving the Officers their tasks etc.  e

Of course, the Machine Gun Officer will naturally assist in th

operations, but he must not be fettered by other instructions

from O.C., M.G.Co., who often is not fully seized with

the situation.

(h) Distribute Stokes Mortars to Battalions in the front line

to use as they think necessary on the advice of the

Stokes Mortar Officer.

(i) Earlier synchronising of watches before zero time.  Normally

3 hours should be allowed from Brigade Headquarters onwards.

One operation nearly proved a failure, owing to an alteration

of 1¼ minutes in time received at Brigade Headquarters just

one hour before zero time. Luckily, no enemy barrage was up

at the time the runners were carrying the time to the Company

Commanders in the front line.

Colonel.

Comdng. 4th Aus. Inf. Bde.

 

[*Copy to Genl Sir Newton Moore

Col Anderson

17/8/16*]

1st Anzac Corps, 16th August, 1916.

Major-General E. M. Woodward, C.B.,

D.A.G., W.O.

My dear Woodward,

With reference to our conversation about

reinforcements yesterday, I have since been able to see

one of my  Australian staff officers, who came back last

night after having seen Brigadier-General Sir Newton Moore

on Salisbury Plain. I gather from him that the reason

why such a few reinforcements are immediately available

is owing to the order (and a very right one)that no men

are to be sent forward until they have had fourteen weeks'

training, vide Army Council Instructions No. 1103. of

31st May. This order was I presume issued entirely to

meet the case of men enlisted in England who would require

fourteen weeks' training from the day of enlistment. In 

the case of the Australian troops, however, I understand

that practically all of them have a considerable amount of

training before leaving Australia, and some of them as

much as three and four months. I gather that this is not 

taken into consideration on arrival at home, and that they

are/

 

– 2 –

are expected to complete fourteen weeks in England before

they can come out of this country. If this is really the

case, I think you might see if it is possible to take it

up, especially in a time like the present, when we want men

so urgently during heavy fighting.

I enclose for your information a statement of

the numbers actually available as infantry reinforcements

for our different divisions. From this you will see that

the following are available:-

      Officers Other Ranks
1st Division .. .. 53 2,621
2nd Division .. .. 23 3,912
4th Division .. .. 11 1,055
5th Division .. .. 22 1,367
3rd Division .. .. 4 658
      113 9,613

In addition to the above, I understand that

587 men of the 14th training battalion (5th Division) are 

now en route from Egypt.

There/

 

– 3 –

There are also other numbers besides infantry

available, and I have given instructions to Sir Newton

Moore to transfer them all to infantry, as shewn hereunder.

    Officers Other Ranks
4th Light Horse .. 3 100
13th Light Horse .. 4 73
14th Light Horse .. 6 162
Cyclist Battalion .. 8 531
    21 866

The reinforcements shown for the 3rd Division

could of course, and should be transferred to meet the

requirements of the divisions in this country.

These totals should give us something like

11,000 men who should be available shortly to reinforce

our divisions in France, and who, with the return of the

many slightly wounded men, would I hope keep us going for

a considerable time.

As you know, I merely send you all this, as I

think/

 

– 4 –

think it will be of help to you in meeting our difficulties.

Very glad to have seen you yesterday, and with

all good wishes.

Yours ever,

(S'gd) W. R. Birdwood.

 

Copy No3 - Adjutant.

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

OPERATION STANDING ORDERS.

In anticipation of the promulgation of Revised Operation Standing

Orders, the following arrangements for Transport on Lineof March

come into eg at once.

FIRST LINE  TRANSPORT.

1. The bulk of the First Line Transport will usually march brigaded

as hereunder :-

2. A Commander for the brigaded portion will be named. Hewill

usually be one of the Transport Officer of Battalions, selected

in order or seniority, as available. The Transport Officers and

Sergeants of Units must render him every assistance. He is

responsible for march discipline and order march.

3. The same officer will usually be in  command of the Brigade Ammunition

Reserve.

4. First Line Transport will march in the following order :-

(a) In rear of each Battalion :- 

Two M.G. Waggons ) in

Two S.A.A. do           ) order

Maltese Cart             ) named.

(b) In rear of whole column in successive groups - (the vehicles of

each group marching in the same order as the units)thus :-

GROUP A. Brigade Ammunition Reserve :-

Three S.A.A. waggons

per unit.

GROUP B. Tools :-

Two Tool waggons per Unit - followed by

Brigade Tool Reserve (two G.S. Wagons)

GROUP C. Sundry :-

Water Carts)

Mess Carts) in order named, in

Cookers)      order of Units

Spare Animals)

Note :- Brigade Cook's Cart marches at the head of Group G.

Machine Gun Coy's vehicles march with the Company - except that its

water cart and cooker march in Group C in its correct order of march. 

Company Ammunition Parks march in rear of their Companies.

5. When other Units are attached to the Brigade, their 1st Line Transport

conforms in every way to above, as if attached Units werea

part of the Brigade.

NB. All Transport Officers and Sergeants, and all officers of Units

liable to be detailed as Transport Officers must have in their

possession and Carried on the person :-

(a) A copy of this order.

(b) A copy of the Register of First Line transport issued

with B.O. 511.

The prescribed order of march of vehicles should be committed to

memory by these officers.

sgd J.M.A DURRANT Major.

Brigade Major 

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.

 

Confidential

FIRST ANZAC CORPS HEADQUARTERS,

17th August, 1916.

A.A.G., A.I.M.

31/49

Dear General MONASH -

The Lieutenant-General Commanding has instructedme

to forward, for your information, the enclosed copy of

a communication which he has forwarded to the A. G. at the War

Office, relative to reinforcements for the A. I. F. in FRANCE-

Yours sincerely,

[[??]]

Brigadier-General JOHN MONASH, C.B., V.D.,

G. O. C., Third Australian Division.

 

 

Last edited by:
Maralyn KMaralyn K
Last edited on:

Last updated: