Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 13, 1 July - 16 August 1916, Part 6

4AB/4773

STRICTLY PERSONAL.

4th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS.

July 6th,1916.

My dear Dare,

I wish, in an informal way, to help you with advice

on one or two points, which will make for increased efficiency.

While it is, of course, desirable to make the

fullest possible report on every event of importance, and as

promptly as possible, yet one should take care not to give

oneself away in one's own reports.

When I received your report of the 4th instant,

on the events of the preceding night, I noticed a number of

matters which raised questions, but as the report was already much

overdue, I sent it _^∧on as it was. Unfortunately, it came under

General Cox's personal notice, and he has commented rather severely

at a conference this afternoon on these matters. I shall

mention only a couple by way of illustration.

Near the beginning of your report you say:-

"The O.C. Company immediately sent up the S.O.S signal", this

being, according to the report, before the enemy was noticed

advancing to the attack. The O.C. Company had, of course, no

business at all to send up such a signal, until he was certain that the

enemy was advancing. -

Again, later on, you state that you rang up your

reserve half Company, and found they were absent on Engineer

fatigues. How it could come about that they could be away or

beyond your reach is something of a mystery to General Cox.

There are several other instances of a like kind,

but I have quoted enough to show you how very easy it is to

give oneself away the incautions wording in one's reports.

It is only experience that helps one to obviate these things, and,

therefore, my pointing them out will probably be helpful to you.

Yours sincerely,

John Monash

1

C M D

68.

6/7/16

STRICTLY

PERSONAL

G.O.C.

4th.Aust.Inf. Bde

While thanking you for your

advice re reports. I would like to

say that this story was very

hurriedly compiled as you rang up

on the telephone for it and I

at once ran out the facts of the

whole business more in story than

report form not thinking for a 

moment it was to go on to

the G.O.C. Division. You asked

me for the facts and I gave them

in lucid form thinking you

wished to make a report from

it. If I had thought that

I was writing a report I would

have firstly kept a copy which

I did not and secondly been

more concise and I regret

exceedingly that you should

have sent such a document

on to division as a report of

mine. While recognising my

inefficiency myself, same has

now come to the notice of the

 

2

G.O.C. who will from now on look

for points to flaw me on.

I should be glad therefore

if you would explain to him

the facts of the case personally.

Regarding the statement re the

S.O.S. signal I would be glad
if you would make clear in

orders that it is only to be used

as stated in 5^th Bde Orders because

on taking over here all my

Company Commanders were informed

by the outgoing O.C. Coys that 

it was the practice in their

Division if telephone communication

was cut and artillery fire was

wanted the S.O.S. was sent, as

the only means of communication

and on taking over I was

instructed to carry on the same

as the preceeding Battalion, and

that in this case it has caused

me to get into trouble.

Regarding my statement

that the reserve ½ Coy was away

on Engineer fatigues. This is a

fact and furthermore it was known

to me, because they are absent

3

every night, but they have strict

instructions to return immediately

there is heavy firing but on

the night in question they were 

not permitted to do so and

were detained in rear  of the 23^rd

Bn, where since the dead bodies

of several of them have since been

found. Thus it was no fault

of mine that they did not return.

May I therefore ask Sir that

you will explain these matters

to General Cox otherwise he

will consider me even more

inefficient than I am.

Again thanking you, Sir

yours sincerely

Chas.M.M. Dare.

4th AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

HEADQUARTERS.

July 7th,1916.

My dear Dare,

You have taken my note of this morning altogether in

the wrong way, and I am sorry to have distressed you. There was

no question whatever of your "inefficiency" involved; not only was

the action which you took in a difficult situation perfectly correct,

but the report which you sent in was a very good one on the whole.

The General made no comments whatever which in any ^way reflected upon 
you; what he did criticise was the action of the Company Commander 
or whoever acted for him, and the action of the people who took men 
of your reserve Company out of your control. The reason your report 
or narrative got into his hands was merely this. Division was

yelling out for particulars, and sent a Staff Officer specially down

to get them just at the time your letter arrived, and on being

shown this he appropriated it for the information of the General.

My only object in writing to you this morning was,

as stated in my letter, to make you wise in the art of keeping

criticisable matter out of a report wherever possible. Of course,

you must not read this to mean that I would encourage you to

falsify the real facts.

Do not give yourself the least concern as to General

Cox's opinion about you, which always was, and still is, of the

very highest.

I have only just received Divisional Defence Scheme,

and many matters which stand at present in an obscure and indefinite

position will shortly be put right. The practice of taking away

any of your battalion for Engineer fatigues will be stopped, as

you will see from a memo. which is going out to-night.

Yours sincerely,

SECRET "Lessons from the Fighting 
in
the South of France"   

2nd Army.
G. 815.
7th July. 1916.                                                       

(1st Anzac S.405)
1st Anzac Corps.

As far as can be ascertained from the fighting in

the south of present, the following lessons may be drawn:-
(a) Assaulting troops must start from within two hundred yards

of the enemy's front line. Sap heads should be pushed out and

joined up previous to the attack.
(b) The front of the attack for a division should not exceed one

thousand yards if possible (measured along the actual line

of our trenches and not in a straight line.)

(Sgd) C.H. Harrington, M.G.G.S.

2nd Army.

COPY NO. 1 ......

4TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 16.

REFERENCE: 1/10000 MAP. BOIS GRENIER 3 6 N.W. 4 EDITION 6B REDRAWN.

7th July 1916.
1. The 13th and 14th Battalions will be relieved by the 15th and

16th Battalion respectively, on the nights of July 9/10th and

10/11th.  

2. On night of July 9/10th two platoons per company will be

relieved, the remainder of the Battalion relieving on the

succeeding night.
3. Details of reliefs will be arranged by Commanding Officers

concerned.
4. The move is to be completed each night by 12.30 a.m.

5. The 13th Battalion will use GREATWOOD AVENUE.

       "    15th        "             "     "     MOAT FARM AVENUE.

       "    14th        "             "     "     TRAMLINE AVENUE.  

       "    16th        "             "     "      SHAFTESBURY AVENUE.

6. The second in command and one Officer per Company of relieving

Battalion will proceed to trenches on the morning of July 10th,

and take over in daylight all trench stores, S.A.A., Grenades,

rockets etc. Log books will be signed for all articles included

in them. Receipts will be given for all articles not

included in log book.

7. Signallers, Lewis Gunners, Battalion Bomb Officer, and a proportion

of bombers will report to the outgoing Battalion by

2.30 p.m. on July 10th, and take over their duties. Specialists

of out-going Battalions will leave with Unit on night of

July 10/11th.

8. x Defence Schemes, photographs, plans, trench maps, log books

etc, will be taken over by relieving units and receipts given.

9. Units will move, by parties of 10, at 100 yards distance,
10. Guides at the rate of 1 N.C.O. per platoon will report both

from outgoing and ingoing battalion at places arranged between

Commanding Officers concerned.
11. No transport of units in the Brigade will cross the BAC ST MAUR-
ARMENTIERES Railway before 11.30 p.m. on either of the nights of 
the relief.

12. The service of supply passes over with the Headquarters of the

units, that is, each Headquarters looks after the rationing of

all personnel of either units living in its unit area.

13. Commanding Officers will report by wire as soon as relief is

completed. These wires will be signed with the name of the

Commanding Officer, and not by the Battalion number or signalx

call.
14. The C.O.'s 13th and 14th Battalions will remain in tactical

command until midnight July 10/11th, when C.O's 15th and 16th

Battalions will assume command.

15. Acknowledge.

JMA Durrant
Major.
Brigade Major.

4th Aust. Inf. Bgde.

COPY NO. 1. File. G.O.C.

                    2. War Diary.

                    3. 13th Bn.

                    4. 14th  "

                    5. 15th  "

                    6. 16th  "

                    7. No 4 A.M.G. Co.

                    8. No. 4 A.L.T.M. Btty.

                    9. 4th Aust. Division.

                   10. N.Z. Rifle Brigade.

                    11. 12th A.I. Brigade.

                    12. 4th Field Coy Engineers.

                    13. 24th Brigade Field Artillery.

Issued by Signals at 6.45 pm

COPY No. 1

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER No. 17.

Reference Map : 1/10000 36 N W 4  8/.7/.16.
1. On evening of 8/.7/.16. a combined offensive by Left Group

Artillery and No. 4 Australian Light Trench Mortar Battery

will be directed against FORT BRIDOUX (I 31 d ½ 2).

2. The artillery will commence a diversion on I 26 d 80 at

10.30 p.m.

3. The artillery will next open an attack on FORT BRIDOUX at

10.35 p.m.
4. At 10.45 p.m. the batteries attacking enemy's parapet 50

yards each si-de of House in FORT BRIDUX will lift.

5. At 10.45 p.m. No.4 A.L.T.M. Battery will open fire from

BRIDOUX SALIENT CHORD with four Stokes Mortars firing 25

rounds per mortar and will continue till 10.55 p.m. They

will attack a total frontage of 100 yards (50 yards each side

of house in FORT BRIDOUX) and a depth of 100 yards.

6. "A" Battalion will take necessary action in preparation for

enemy retaliation. Left Battalion of 12th Aust. Inf. Bde.

will be asked to do the same.

7. Watches to be synchronised; - Artillery with the Headquarters

4th Aust. Inf. Brigade, No. 4 A.L.T.M. Battery through "A"
Battalion with Brigade Headquarters.
8. Reports to normal Brigade Headquarters.

9. Acknowledge.

JMA Durrant

Major.

Brigade Major.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde

Copy No. 1. G.O.C.

                  2 War Diary

                  3 13th Btn.

                  4 Left Group Artillery                

                  5 No. 4 A.L.T.M. Battery

                  6 No. 4 A.M.G. Coy.

                  7 14th Battn.

                  8 15th     "

                  9 16th     "

                 10 4th Aust. Div.

                  11 12th Aust. Inf. Bde.

Issued by Signal Service at 6.30 p.m.

OPERATION ORDER NO: 2

Copy No: 4

8/7/16

Ref: Maps  -  Bois Grenier Edition 6. B. re-drawn - Scale 1/10,000

1. Operations will be undertaken against enemy's trenches at Brideoux

Salient I.31.d.1-1/2.2-1/2 to I.31.c.9-3/4.1-1/4. for the

purpose of
(a) Inflicting casualties

(b) Destroying parapets    

(c) Creating a diversion.
2. A diversion will be created as per attached Task Table on

I.26.d.8.0.

3. One light Trench Mortar Battery will co-operate.

4. All reports will be made to the Brigade Office

5. Time to be notified at Brigade Office at 7.45 p.m. when all

watches will be synchronised.
6. Time Table of Artillery Task attached.

Wm. C N Waite Lt: Col:

C.O. Left Group Artillery

No: 1 File

       2 War Diary

       3 C.R.A.

       4 X 4th A.I.B.

       5  44th Bty

       6  47th   "

       7  48th   "

       8  40th   "