Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 13, 1 July - 16 August 1916, Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Part of Quest:
Sir John Monash (General, b.1865 - d.1931)
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG0000614
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

nad AUSTRALLAN IMPERIAL FORCE COPY) suchkns yoalh Taase lessons frow ke Capt. SPIERS. sERE(Sthmanty 8 gade JULY, 1918. to C.G.S. L.S. 98. The French success of yesterday was principally due to the following causes :- Excellent Counter Battery work. 1. Good Artillery preparation. 3. Powerful trench artillery, capable of dealing practically unaided with the first line. Efficient Laison throughout the Army. The trenches crossed by the first lines thopoughly cleared of the enemy. Local reserves held well in hand, not swelling the first line, but thrown in to gain given points. With reference to 1., the Army Commander preached counter battery work to all concerned. His principle was that he must convince Commanders of the importance of this, or his orders would not be carried out because not well understood. He gave what were practically series of lectures on the subject. The result was that the German Artillery barrages were generally inefficient or wild. With reference to 2. and 3. The trench Artillery was particularly efficient; the supply of munitions was unlimited and brought up easily and well by trench railways. The villages were thoroughly smashed by H.A. and the 75 barrages seemed to have starved the garrisons of portions of the line. Prisoners report the bombardment to have been particularly effective. The value of the thorough bombardment of villages is exemplified by the example of the XXth. Corps. They insisted on only bombarding the edges of CURLU, with the result that it was only taken in the ecening and that out of a total casualty list of 700, for the Corps, 400 were suffered in the village. With ference to 4, this point is particularly important. The liaison was so good that the Army was constantly informed of the progress of the action and was therefore able to direct at all times the operations. liaison the system of firing The weather favoured first line flares when objectives were attained worked excellently and aeroplanes gave constant information of the progress of the Infantry, by reporting the position of flares and screens, and yet I cannot say the French Infantry was particularly trained in Signalling. Liaison officers played a very important part; every higher formation had representatives with subordinate formations, these were qualified staff Officers with whom the higher formations corresponded exclusively and who carried weight with Commanders to whom they were accredited. The decisions of the Army were based on the reports of its representatives with Corps. The influence of the Army made itself especially felt in preventing a headlong advance, insisting on a methodical progression and in regulating the employment of the heavy artillerv and counter battery work, as well as the co-operation, especially of Artillery between Corps. The Liaison between the artillery and the infantry worked well, every infantry commander having an artillery representative with him. P.T.0. 9924 Mf29 (SlML. 1945
vow Si ..P. i Trelk ien IHTSaE ptLy 55 Aies 25 3 -2- With reference to 6, there was no case of parties of the enemy holding out and firing into the backs of the Infantry. Other points of importance were :- sopuse Siäe! (a) The French had a thorough mastery of the air and planes flew as low as they pleased. (b) As previously reported, maps showing the enemy's batteries in action were issued every morning by the 20 Bureau of the Army, summarising the information gained in the previous day by air photos, land observation, balloons, planes, sound, flashes, Infantry and Artillery reports. They gseatly facilitated counter Battery work. (c) Great method in the preparation, all artillery being concentrated on important points, and the first line thoroughly dealt with before the second line attempted. (d) Ruthless drive on the part of the Army during the preparatory period, thorough investigation of minutest details by the Army by means of liaison officers and conferences into the inner workings of Corps, punishment or supersession of inefficient officers. E.L. SPIERS. Sg Capt, G.S. soelel
dessend fromm R. Teghdarg i. K. Goudl g, Srane vorrs ov chwracr parnot woex, July 'sto th 1916. Previous experience has been borne out, very los flying has been possible in Battle; much work of Contict Patrol machines has been done at 600 feet; 1500 feet to 2000 feet has been Quite usual. On Jul, det, mirfofs on the men', bucks were very cleirly seen in the XIII Corpe attack. On this day the attacke were clearly followed from the a ir, but communicatione from the infantry, were not frequent, probably because the telephone syetem on the ground wae suffieient. The attack on FRICOURT FARK on July 2nd wis followci by the Contact Patrol Observers sith minute accuracy, and vas rerorted a fes minutee after it took place. After the firet day, flares, ground sheete and panele have been of the greatest use. For example after the assault on BERNAFAY voop in the late evening of July 3rd. Bittalion H.T. chowed their ground sheet, sent their Code Call, and vere reported to the Corpe Artillery H.G. by wireless within a fes seconle. Aglin the position of our troope at OVILLFRS and in LA BOISSELLE was constantly defined during the 3rd by flare. and by flare: only. There are wigne that the Germane are using some of the captured red flares for purposes of deception. We are, however, going to uee lights of other coloure for particular operation.. The system of communication betseen the Contact Fatrol machines and Corpe H.W., by wireless and mes; je dropping, hae worked efficiently. The Contact Patrol work has been carried out entirely without interference from hostile aircraft. This is possibly due to the offeneive work earried eut by the Flying Corpi before operatione began.
July 2nd, 1916. Copy.No. FOURTT ASTRALIAN INFANTRY ERIGADF. Reference Operation Order No. 14 of June 30/16, para. 6. "Officers going on leave will report fifteen minutes earlier than previously arranged; that is to say, they will report at half-past eleven this evening, July 2nd. Acknowledge by wire". ul tmme Major. Brigade Major. 4th Aust. Inf. Bde. Issued to:- 1. Capt. A.R.Cox. 2.13th Battn. 3.14th 4. No. 4 M.G. Coy. 5. 2nd Aust. Div. 6. 2nd Aust. Div. Artillery. 7. Centre Group Artillery. 8. 4th hist. Div. 9. Lt. Lane (Smoke 10. 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. 11. No. 6 L.T.M. Hattery. 12. B. M. 13. C.0.C. 14. File.
2t 2/8 16. Stat hreffensd t farsfet okone Cørmite ick Gr borten at 12.22 Saue Oet at 12-10 fim blesmne odl linent 4 Jwantrdtr forsket outoam agaust füre Fine lneng fkrefet:- Ihns nå å magpin g 20 sminte. 12-16 5-- Abst, Stuehy – + detdlien tug did rrt Gae fü Shn Füskie Jit ter Frtael tit g tite ttarapten Ot 1- 25.- Raiding frastg ar otil eonigten vmn Hienee Gra) Stig dedit itr har frigeon Ohre blne gvchet ontg Tit aeen (b angg t obsenks) Atto Frcket horddut o 13h larerst om otke tvundet hy omt ehelt
311 Zeaseo dist of Rranalar, dupphir Gon te Urf. Bigeoe 145 Bavtatov n SSaued Tüoe Gau o Tas Oe samr S19 105. Oernn an 0 he Baftaron J. . Sonton Brderotercr 8 O SolmanstA Selsphenrsts do Oomnnd I T9 Seudent rnners 7284 Runstiona GS T3 0he Ronarc ( Loull? 17 Lieint S Marvor Jeikns Gorkz, Sohutu Genn se D. 1 Jod. O4ArrrsR.C 2 O Ruttere 2 S Ch. Gonzod Davis 3 Stietches Poozzo Gasd, Gord Set GaN St. 93 Ote. Kondier 9 T.uS Uhe. 2.43604 2u. Oncto 849TTarc 6 I Grnd anss Bosandt Gart Seleikornststo 0.C. Ascault. Gernnepsto 0 R Rosct T.. Tar Oe Bastan 9.50.G Buedad 75 Groctelan S0 (i GallettR. B S3agh LDilsonG. drnennc toOC.Biscnlt Ir 5otge - Nftitisjon ffontennkttore 10TZohCct!
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ui GGaytagem Rogdina loch Conknige) Goinonggrngdodstoril of simagmneg at Varts eochié Rand' Bbps. Garärina Bart ramaarto . G. Sgte dagst (Sr shangenthot hartz (9.6r O4 GüG 95 boSeGoppeniane 63. AngerztoRS 62 " Borton 3. 66 Dechle 2. 63 SawardoRT? - 63 . Sengh RR . 67 Elrs29S 70 GES Blau 0 . 71655 R0s3 63 Gerter Har 2. Es GgA Su Rnn AR 93 O. Rodison 54 Geebles 61 Wo Kral duotu ai 85 " Olack 32 Brennde Ta St s. Sadie 130 Gresbere TraS Che Reatoneg D.Scch Ohsse 96 39I Aneteror Detdrute 99 Breutey SAoizned 6 97 98 Btfore s al: Byous 40 S W9 93 Darf. on un Sioton au S6oTs 2.
COPY. AUSTEALI IMPERIAL I S B.M. No. 305. 317/16. T0 2nd Australian Davn 3 Dl8 ah khaniy, Stgate At 11,59 got message begins they got in alright and are now coming out ends aaa Immediately after all lines cut saa. I closed gate at 12.10 and stopped artillery fire at 12.16 aaa. No hostile barrage daa. Am now endeavouring to collect information. From 4th Aus. Inf. Bde. 1s.20 a.m. (egd) J.M.A.Durrant. Majer.
COPY. To 2nd Aust. Divn. B.M. No. 306. s/7Ire. At 2 past one received through Artillery channels that raiders are still coming in but no particulars yet available. From eth Aus. Inf. Bde. 1.4 a.m. (agd) M.M.A. Durrant. majer.

(COPY)
[*4aB.*]

[*4879A *]

[*AUSTRALIAN 
IMPERIAL FORCE

JUL 9 1916

4th Infantry Brigade*]

"Lessons from the Fighting in the South of France"

Capt. SPIERS. SECRET. 2nd. JULY, 1916.

to C.G.S. L.S.98.

The French success of yesterday was principally due to
the following causes:-
1. Excellent Counter Battery work.

2. Good Artillery preparation.

3. Powerful trench artillery, capable of dealing practically

unaided with the first line.

4. Efficient Liaison throughout the Army.

5. The trenches crossed by the first lines thoroughly cleared

of the enemy.

6. Local reserves held well in hand, not swelling the first

line, but thrown in to gain given points.

With reference to 1., the Army Commander preached counter

battery work to all concerned. His principle was that he must

convince Commanders of the importance of this, or his orders

would not be carried out because not well understood. He gave

what were practically series of lectures on the subject.

The result was that the German Artillery barrages were

generally inefficient or wild.

With reference to 2. and 3.

The trench Artillery was particularly efficient; the

supply of munitions was unlimited and brought up easily and well

by trench railways. The villages were thoroughly smashed by H.A.

and the 75 barrages seemed to have starved the garrisons of

portions of the line. Prisoners report the bombardment to have

been particularly effective.

The value of the thorough bombardment of villages is

exemplified by the example of the XXth. Corps. They insisted

on only bombarding the edges of CURLU, with the result that it

was only taken in the evening and that out of a total casualty

list of 700 for the Corps, 400 were suffered in the village.

With reference to 4, this point is particularly important.

The liaison was so good that the Army was constantly informed

of the progress of the action and was therefore able to direct at

all times the operations.

The weather favoured first liaison lines the system of firing
flares when objectives were attained worked excellently and

aeroplanes gave constant information of the progress of the

Infantry, by reporting the position of flares and screens, and yet

I cannot say the French Infantry was particularly trained in

Signalling.

Liaison officers played a very important part; every

higher formation had representatives with subordinate formations,

these were qualified Staff Officers with whom the higher formations

corresponded exclusively and who carried weight with Commanders

to whom they were accredited. The decisions of the Army were

based on the reports of its representatives with Corps. The

influence of the Army made itself especially felt in preventing

influence of the Army made itself especially felt in preventing

a headlong advance, insisting on a methodical progression and

in regulating the employment of the heavy artillery and counter

battery work, as well as the co-operation, especially of Artillery

between Corps.

The Liaison between the artillery and the infantry worked

well, every infantry commander having an artillery representative

with him.

[* 4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

No G29/2
* 9 JUL. 1916 *]
P.T.O.

 

-2-

With reference to 5,. there was no case of parties of

the enemy holding out and firing x into the backs of the Infantry.

Other points of importance were :-

(a) The French had a thorough mastery of the air and planes flew

as low as they pleased.

(b) As previously reported, maps showing the enemy's batteries

in action were issued every morning by the 20 Bureau of the

Army, summarising the information gained in the previous day

by air photos, land observation, balloons, planes, sound, flashes,

Infantry and Artillery reports. They greatly facilitated counter

Battery work.

(c) Great method in the preparation, all artillery being

concentrated on important points, and the first line thoroughly

dealt with before the second line attempted.

(d) Ruthless drive on the part of the Army during the preparatory

period, thorough investigation of minutest details by the Army

by means of liaison officers and conferences into the inner

workings of Corps, punishment or supersession of inefficient

officers.

 

(Sgd) E.L. SPIERS.

Capt, G.S.

 

"Lessons from the Fighting in the South of France"

SECRET

NOTES ON CONTACT PATROL WORK, July 1st to 4th 1916.

Previous experience has been borne out, very low flying

has been possible in Battle; much work of Contact Patrol machines

has been done at 600 feet; 1500 feet to 2000 feet has been quite

usual.

On July 1st, mirrors on the men's backs were very clearly

seen in the XIII Corps attack. On this day the attacks were

clearly followed from the air, but communications from the infantry

were not frequent, probably because the telephone system on the

ground was sufficient.

The attack on FRICOURT FARM on July 2nd was followed by

the Contact Patrol Observers with minute accuracy, and was reported

a few minutes after it took place.

After the first day, flares, ground sheets and panels

have been of the greatest use. For example after the assault on

BERNAFAY WOOD in the late evening of July 3rd, Battalion H.Q.

showed their ground sheet, sent their Code Call, and were reported

to the Corps Artillery H.Q. by wireless within a few seconds.

Again the position of our troops at OVILLERS and in LA

BOISSELLE was constantly defined during the 3rd by flares and

by flares only.

There are signs that the Germans are using some of the

captured red flares for purposes of deception. We are, however,

going to use lights of other colours for particular operations.

The system of communication between the Contact Patrol

machines and Corps H.Q., by Wireless and message dropping, has

worked efficiently.

The Contact Patrol work has been carried out entirely

without interference from hostile aircraft. This is possibly due

to the offensive work carried out by the Flying Corps before

operations began.

 

 

 July 2nd, 1916.

Copy. No

13

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Reference Operation Order No. 14 of June 30/16, para. 6.

"Officers going on leave will report fifteen minutes

earlier than previously arranged; that is to say, they

will report at half-past eleven this evening, July 2nd.

Acknowledge by wire".

JMA Durrant

Major.

Brigade Major.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.

Issued to:-
1. Capt. A.R. Cox.
2. 13th Battn.
3. 14th     "
4. No. 4 M.G. Coy.
5. 2nd Aust. Div.
6. 2nd Aust. Div. Artillery.
7. Centre Group Artillery.
8. 4th Aust. Div.
9. Lt. Lane (Smoke)
10. 6th Aust. Inf. Bde.
11. No. 6 L.T.M. Battery.
12. B.M.
13. G.O.C.
14. File.

 

 

July 2/3/16.

What happened to parapet 'phone.-

Communication with Cox broken at 12-2 p.m.

Gave "Out" at 12-10 p.m. because all lines cut

& I wanted to protect our men against fire

from enemy parapet. -

This is a margin of 20 minutes.

12-16 p.m. "stop, standby". - to Artillery.

Why did not Cox fire blue rocket

Get from Fraser list of Wire interruptions

At 1-2 p.m. "Raiding party are still coming in"

from Liaison Officer

Why didn't 14th use pigeons.

One blue rocket only - not seen (by any of 4 observers)

other rocket wouldn't go off.

"Sgt Garaix & one other wounded by one shell"

 

[1]
2/7/16

Detailed list of Raiding Party supplied from the -

  • 14th Battalion 4th Inf. Brigade. -
Date of Raid   Place of Raid
Commander   Captain A.R.Cox.
Understudy   Captain F.B.Stanton
Telephonists to Commdr-    No  78  Pte Holman W.C.
      "    79    "  Snowden L.W.
Runners         "        "                 No  78  Pte Holman W.C.
Runners         "        "               

  "    79    "  Snowden L.W.

  "    72   Cpl Armstrong J.s

   "    73   Pte Howard R.E.

   "    77     "  Coull J.
Scouting Party.   Scouts on Commdg  Lieut A.T.Harvey

No. 1 Sgt. Harris A.C.                               

  "    2 Pte Hibberd H                                    

  "    3   "     Davis L.

   No. 4 L/Cps Ross T.E.
  5 Pte Davies A.
 
  Stretcher Bearers  
Left Party   Right Party.
No. 45 Pte Huse G.J.   No. 23 Pte Manders  Cq
 "     46   "     Ward C.          "   24   "    Snow J.A.G.
Assault Party Offr. Commdg. Lieu. H.B. Wanliss
Runners to O.C. Assault   Telephonist to O.C. Assault
No. 74  Pte Easton R        No 50 L Cpr Brodag B.
 "     75  Brocklebank T.        "   80 Pte Hallett R.B.
 "     83 Sgt. Wilson G.       Lineman to O.C. Assault
    No 60 Pte Griffiths M.A.

(continued over to No 2 sheet)

 

[2]
14th Bn Raiding Party (Continued)
Positions and details of remainder of the Party cont

 

Left Parties Right Parties
Officer Commdg Lieu J.B. Roderick
 		 Officer Commdg Lieu R.J. Julian
 
Bombing Party. Bombing Party.
No 28 Sgt Pearce J No 32 Pte Gray T.H. No 6 Sgt Garcia J No 10 Pte Armstrong H.J.
" 29 Pte Trevillian F " 33 " Cronin L " 7 Pte Wright A.J. " 11 " Boulton J
" 30 " Sparkes R " 34 " Boggs J " 8 " Pike W " 12 " White H.
" 31 " Donnelly J.C. " 35 " Bourke M " 9 " Quigley, G.M. " 13 " Boyle R.
Parapet Party Parapet Party
No 36 Sgt Rich A No 38 Hyatt R.J.H (Pte) No 14 Sgt Croft H No 15 Pte Watts W.H.
"  37 Pte Bruce A.H.     No 16 " Lacon I.
Blocking Party Blocking Party
No 39 Cpl Mayers J No 41 Gray J. (Pte) No 17 Cpl Ryan F No 20 Pte Best L.
"   40 Pte Sanderson W.  "   42 Keane J ( " ) "   18 Pte Bligh F "   21 Cpl Bullen G.
    "   19 Earll  
Intelligence N.C.O. Intelligence N.C.O.
No 43 Cpl Weston F.H. No 21 Sgt Anderson F
Machine Gunner No 44 Pte Smith W.A. Machine Gunner No 22 Cpl Farnbach C
Engineer No 49 Dadsey J.T. Engineer (4th Field Co No 27 Pte Paton F.
Prisoners Escort Prisoners Escort
No 47 Pte Ramsay P.J. No 48 Pte Dietrich G.A. No 25 Pte Pender J. No 26 Pte Abason F.

(continued over to No 3 sheet)

 

[3]
14th Bn Raiding Party (Continued)
Positions and details of remainder of the Party (cont)

Left Parties Right Parties.
Covering Party Covering Party
No 61 Sgt DeBrango S. (In charge whole party
"   69 Pte Copperwaite A. No 64 Pte Bell F.L.
"   62  "  Corboy T.  "   65   "  Anderson R.S.
"   63  " Edwards R.T.I  "   66  "  Deeble D.
 "  67  "  Ellis H.G.S.  "   68  "  Hough R.L.
 "  71  Cpl Ross C.F.  "  70  Cpl Blair J.C.
Position Party No 100 Cpl Fulton B.G.
    "  93 Pte Addison A.
To break down our own parapet   "  84  "  Peebles C.W.
    "  85  "  Black A.
    "  86  "  Brennan J.L.
    "  87  "  Walsh H.W.
Reserves
No 88 Pte Ord C.B. No 95 Pte Abaloney
  "  89  "  Anderson H.   "  96   "    Downie A.
  "  90  "  Crowley J.F.   "  97  "  Hames E.
  "  91  "  Brown W.A.   "  98  "  Clifford T.E.
  "  92  "  Duff W.G.   "  99  Cpl Hater H.
  "  94  "  Aboors L.  
 

COPY.  

[*4aB over 455yB*] 

[*AUSTRALIAN 
IMPERIAL FORCE

JUL 8 1916

4th Infantry Brigade*]

B.M. No. 305.  3.7.16.  To 2nd Australian Divn

At 11.59 got message begins they got in alright and 
are now coming out ends aaa Immediately after all lines
out aaa.  I closed gate at 12.10 and stopped artillery
fire at 12.16 aaa.  No hostile barrage aaa.  Am
now endeavouring to collect information.

From 4th Aus. Inf. Bde. 12.20 a.m.

(sgd) J.M.A. Durrant.

Major.

 

COPY.

B.M. No. 306.   3/7/16.   To 2nd Aust. Divn.

At 2 past one received through Artillery channels that 
raiders are still coming in but no particulars yet available.

From 4th Aus. Inf. Bde.  1.4 a.. (sgd) J.M.A. Durrant.

Major.

 

 

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