Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 13, 1 June - 1 July 1916, Part 9

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISIONS         G1/22

Secret

Very Urgent

Divisional Headquarters,

18th June 1916.

C.R.A.

4th Aust. Inf. Brigade

5th     -do-

6th     -do-

4th Aust. Division (for information).

 

The attached copy of letter received today from

Corps Headquarters is forwarded for your information.

The impossibility of the 2nd Australian Division

carrying out a raid on the 21st has been pointed out

to Corps Headquarters, as also the inadvisability of the

4th Infantry Brigade carrying out a raid on the 28th

June. It has been suggested that the raid on the 2nd

Australian Division front on the 28th June should be

carried out by a Company drawn from the 6th Brigade and that

the 4th Brigade should execute a raid later on, not earlier

than the 2nd July.

Brigade Commanders of the 5th and 6th Brigades will

arrange direct with the Divisional Artillery as to what

wire is to be cut on the 20th June. Seeing that the

Division has to submit proposals to the Corps concerning

this giving an estimate of the gun and mortar ammunition

required, it is essential that reports from the C.R.A.

after consulting the Infantry Brigade Commanders will

shall reach this office by noon on the 19th inst.

Infantry Brigade Commanders will decide in consultation

with the C.R.A. whether they wish to cut the wire one day

for a raid on the following day; there are advantages and

disadvantages in this and Infantry Brigade Commanders will

consider these in making their decision.

G.H.Jackson

Lieut-Colonel,

General Staff.

 

G.1/21

1st. A.N.Z.A.C.

S.292.

18/6/16.

SECRET

1st. Aust. Div.

2nd. Aust. Div.

N.Z. Div.

4th Aust. Div.

In continuation of my memo, of 15th. instant, the

following will be the provisional programme of raids for the

period referred to:

21st. June :     Raids by N.Z. Div.

                                       2nd. Div.

22nd. June :   Raids by 2nd. Div.

24th. June :       "         "  1st. Div.       Gas on some portion

                                                               of corps front if

                                                                wind is suitable.

25th. June :       "          "  N.Z. Div.  )

                                           2nd. Div.  )        ditto

27th. June :       "         "   1st. Div.

28th. June :       "         "   4th. Inf. Bde. )

                                            1st. Div.           )

                                            N.Z. Div.         )

The Right Division are doing one raid on a front of

some 150 yds. By going in on a broader front we may of course

be able to take more prisoners, and other divisions will

consider this possibility.

 

As it would appear that the enemy has less guns and

is showing less activity than usual, we should take full

advantage of the opportunity to inflict punishment on/him.

 

2. Divisions will inform this office and adjoining

Divisions of the places selected for raiding.

 

3. In addition to above raids it is desired during the

same period to do a certain amount of wire cutting. On the 20th.

instant wire will be cut at a certain number of places along the

front of each Division irrespective of that cut for raiding.

 

4. Divisions will submit proposals to this end and an

estimate of the gun and mortar ammunition required. It is

suggested that prior to a raid the wire might be cut in one or 

two other than the selected places for raids. It should be

possible, to, for instance, to cut the wire today at a point

selected for a raid tomorrow.

 

4. A certain amount of parapet destruction with H.E. shell

should be done at the same time as the wire cutting.

 

5. Arrangements are being made to obtain the services of

sections of the Special Brigade R.E., in order that at certain

suitable places gas may be used. Divisions will be informed

later of the places selected and instructions will be issued

regarding the construction of cylinder emplacements.

 

Sgd. R. B. SMYTHE G.S.

For Brig-General. General Staff

1st. A.N.Z.A.C.

Copy to B.G.R.A.

 

 

Copy No. 8

4th. AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

HEADQUARTERS

18th. June 1916.

AUSTRALIAN 

IMPERIAL FORCES

JUN 18 1916

4th Infantry Brigade.

 

URGENT & SECRET

A plan of Defence for the action of the FOURTH BRIGADE is being

prepared. Pending the issue of same the following action - or as

near an approach to same as it at present practicable will be

taken.

1. The Fourth Brigade is at present a Reserve Brigade. It is available

   either as a Reserve to Second Division, or as a Corps Reserve.

    

2.  If employed as a Corps Reserve, the Brigade concentrates at

     WATERLANDS, - Square 36.B.27.

 

3.  If employed as a Divisional Reserve, the Brigade, - in the first

     place - occupies certain reserve trenches near LA ROLANDERIE Farm.

     Square 36.H.11.

 

4.  On receipt of an order to "Stand By", each unit remains in its

     billets, fully equipped ready to fall in, with 280 rounds per

     rifle, two S-andbags, Iron rations, Waterbottles filled.

 

5.  On receipt of an order to "Fall in", each unit assembles at its

     A-larm Post, and reports to Brigade H.Q. when ready to move.

 

6.  On receipt of an order to "March", Units move as follows :-

            Machine Gun Co. & 13th. Battalion to LA ROLANDERIE Farm

            14th. Battalion to road crossing of LAIE BLANCHE brook in Square

            36.H.16.b.

             15th. Battalion to road intersection at 36.H.16.b.2.10.

             16th. Battalion to road intersection at 36.H.4.d.7.7.

 

7.  In the vicinity of the points indicated a Staff Officer will meet

     the unit to point out the trenches to be occupied.

 

8.  Immediately after issuing the order to "March", Brigade Head

     Quarters will move to LA ROLANDERIE H.17.b.1.9.

 

9.  Pending receipt of more detailed insructions, each unit will

     reconnoitre the most covered line of approach to its respective

     rendezvous. Units North of the River LYS will examine approaches

     to pontoon bridges over the River LYS, to be used in the event of

     either of the permanent bridges being interferred with. Each Unit

     must possess several guides competent to lead by day or night.

 

10.  On an order to "Stand By", transport animals will be harnessed

      but not hooked in. Water carts should always be kept filled at night

      and all first line vehicles should, as far as possible, have their

      proper loads.

 

WJMLocke Capt

for Major.

Brigade Major.

4th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Issued to :-

File                       copy No. 1

13th. Battalion                    2

14th.        "                             3

15th.        "                             4

16th.        "                             5

Machine Gun Co.               6

Bde. Major.                          7

G.O.C.                                   8

 

Copy No. 9

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Headquarters

19th. June 1916.

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM No. 102

As it is anticipated that FOURTH BRIGADE will take over trench

duty from FIFTH BRIGADE in the near future, the following arrangements

have been made for visits to be paid to the trenches (both Front, Support

and Reserve) now held by Fifth B-rigade.

 

Commencing on Tuesday, June 21st. the following personnel from each

of the Four Battalions will report at Brigade Headquarters Fifth Brigade

(LA ROLANDERIE. H.17.b.1.9.) at 1330, for a TWENTYFOUR HOUR TOUR OF

DUTY, viz :-

One Company Commander

One Company Second-in-command (from another Company)

Four N.C.O's.

Two Headquarters Signallers.

 

A similar party will report at same place and hour on the three

following days.

 

As it is not anticipated that this personnel will get any sleep,

no blankets will be taken.

 

Battalion Commanders will make independent arrangements (as to time)

with Brigade Major Fifth Brigade, for a personal tour (in daylight only)

of the trenches, as follows :- C.O's 13th. & 14th. Battalions on

Wednesday June 21st., C.O's 15th. & 16th. Battalions on Thursday June

22nd.

C.O. No. 4 Machine Gun Co. will place himself in communication

direct with C.O. No. 5 Machine Gun Co, and arrange a programme of

similar visits for himself, his officers and senior N.C.O's -

extending over four days.

 

C.O. Brigade Signals will visit Fifth Brigade Signal Sections on

Wednesday June 21st.

 

JMaDermant

Major.

Brigade Major.

4th. Aust. Inf. Bde.

Issued to :-

No. 1   File                     

       2  13th. Battalion   

       3  14th.        "               

       4. 15th.        "          

       5.  16th.        "                            

       6.  No. 4 Machine Gun Co.               

       7.   Brigade Signal Sec t.

       8.  Fifth B rigade H.Q.

       9.  G.O.C.       

                            

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters,

19th June, 1916.

G1/24

SECRET

C.R.A. 

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.

5th          -do-

6th          -do-

Former dates fixed for raids have been cancelled.

 

Raids will now be carried out as follows :-

By the 5th Aust. Inf. Bde. at I.26.c.9½.1½. on 25th June.

By the 18th Battalion        at I.32.c.0.7. on 26th June.

By the 6th Aust. Inf. Bde. at three points, namely. -

    I.26.b.9.8½.

    I.21.c.3¾.

    I.21.c.6½.3½.

on the 29th June.

By the 4th Aust. Inf. Bde. at a place to be decided

later, on the 2nd July.

 

In the event of the enemy putting a barrage down 

on NO MAN'S LAND while our men are out, the Divisional Commander

considers that probably the safest thing for our men

to do would be to move forward towards the enemy's wire and

lie in any cover that exists, or close up under shelter of the

enemy parapet, provided our barrage is not on that portion

of the parapet at the time.

 

In connection with raids, the Artillery between

now and the 25th are going to attempt to knock out the hostile

machine gun emplacements; they cannot guarantee to knock out

the guns themselves as they may not be there: this will be

proceeded with systematically.

Arrangements have also been made by the Artillery

with Infantry Brigade Commanders direct to cut the hostile

wire at various places. It is thought that the enemy are

easily able to observe our 2" mortars while wire cutting; this

gives them a very good idea of where we propose to raid. It

is suggested that the following might be tried. -

       (a)  Cut the wire at several places between now and 

              the 25th and prevent the enemy as far as possible

              from repairing it.

       (b)  On the night of the proposed raid, put the trench

              mortars on to cut wire opposite the diversion

              putting a small amount of gun fire on to the

              real point of entry as if it were merely a

              diversion, then suddenly increase the amount of

              fire on in the real point spreading to either

              flank to keep down machine guns, lift and form

               box and enter and leave the enemy's trenches as

               rapidly as possible. Before this can be done

               we must be quite sure that the wire has been

               effectively cut

      (c)   On another occasion we might vary the above

              procedure by having the wire cut previously in front

              of the diversion and the real point of entry,

              bombard both with great suddenness, lift, and

              rush the raiders in and out.

 

-2-

      (d)   Another plan would be to cut rather a larger gap

              opposite the diversion prior to the night of the

              raid, pay more attention to tis portion of the li

              line during the previous days, select a place

              for the raid where the wire is obviously weak,

              cut the wire opposite the point selected on the

              night of the raid and so attempt to confuse the

              enemy.

 

The above are put forward simply as sone of many

suggestions for varying our system. 

It will not be advisable invariably to put down the

one minute's intense bombardment approximately the same time

after the xx raiders have left the hostile trenches.

 

The Artillery have been furnished by Divisional Headquarters

with a complete list of hostile machine gun positions

so far as they are known. Infantry Brigade must give all

further assistance that they can.

 

The Artillery have been asked to arrange one or two

artillery raids exactly like what is done when the infantry

co-operate xx but without any action on the part of the

infantry.

These will take place between now and the 25th and it

is hoped to be able to spot hostile machine guns crossing their

fire in front of the point selected; these machine guns can

then be dealt with.

Our own Light Trench Mortars and Machine Guns should

always stand by during a raid to engage hostile machine guns

if they open.

 

G.H. Jackson.

Lieut-Colonel,

General Staff.

 

5     SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters,

20th June, 1916.

AUSTRALIAN

IMPERIAL FORCE

1/32

JUN 22 1916

4th Infantry Brigade

 

C.R.A.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde.

5th           -do-

6th           -do-

7th           -do-

The following questions have been raised. -

(a) Would it be well to define the policy to be adopted by other

      troops if our raiders do not return from the enemy's trenches

      at the appointed time and if no news of their fate can be

      obtained?

 

(b) Can a hostile raid be met by a counter-raid on our part delivered. -

      (i) In the same locality?

      (ii) Elsewhere?

 

As regards (a) the Divisional Commander has ruled that the

troops garrisoning our front line are on no account to go beyond our

front line parapet. The Infantry Brigade Commander may however,

order other troops to do so and may ask for special action on the

part of the artillery.

The O.C. Attack would decide as to the action to be taken

by the whole or part of his reserve party, informing the Brigade

Commander at the Advanced Report Centre of his decision, if wires

had not been cut. If wires had been cut it is probable he would have

to act long before the Brigade Commander could hear anything avout it.

 

As regards (b) (i) the Divisional Commander considers it

would be unsound to attempt to follow up an enemy raiding party and

enter the hostile trenches on their heels. -

(1) Because our men would not be organised for this.

(2) The action of artillery coud not be regulated as there

      would be not time for preparation.

(3) The enemy would not refrain from shooting down some of

     his own men if ours were seen to be following them up.

(4) Our flanking machine guns would probably kill our own men

     mistaking them for hostile raiders.

 

As regards (b) (ii) the Divisional Commander also considers

this would be inadvisable because. -

(1) It would entail extremely complicated arrangements.

(2) The counter raiding parties would have to be always at

      hand ready to act.

(3) The artillery might be employed on other more

     important work at the time.

(4) It would take time to cut the enemy's wire and prepare a

      way for our raiders by which time the enemy would

      probably be ready for them.

(5) Our raiding party would probably have to go out over our

      own parapet during the hostile bombardment; a thing to

      be avoided if possible.

(6) All our flanking machine guns would have to be warned.

(7) It would cramp normal action of other troops. No one

     would quite know what was going on.

 

The foregoing should be communicated to Battalion Commanders;

sufficient copies are attached.

 

-1-             P.T.O.

 

 

-2-

When an enemy raid takes place, -

(a) We must turn the raiders out at once.

(b) We must stop any more coming over.

(c) We must stop the raiders getting back.

 

With the above objects in view, we must counter-attack up to

our own parapet at once; flanking machine guns should open and

there is no reason why a Lewis Gun should not be taken over the

parapet into NO MAN'S LAND to bring flanking fire on to the hostile

raiders but it would need to be protected by standing patrols or

listening posts.

 

G. H. Jackson. Lieut-Colonel,

                             General Staff.

 

5     SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters,

20th June, 1916.

AUSTRALIAN

IMPERIAL FORCE

G25/13

JUN 22 1916

4th Infantry Brigade

 

Additional notes concerning Minor Enterprises, to be read in

conjunction with the Pamphlet O.B. 1447 which was issued by General

Staff, G.H.Q. March, 1916.

                 -------------------

Crawling must be done keeping the body flat against the ground.

Men must not get up on their hands and knees when likely to be

observed by the enemy.

 

A good way of wire cutting is for the cutter to lie on his

back, holder to hold, two other men ready to lay the wire back

without noise when cut.

Wire nippers should be so set that they do not cut right

through and so do not make a snap. Each strand when cut about three

parts through can be easily broken by the fingers.

Care must be taken in previous patrol work not to make well

defined lines through the grass up to the enemy's wire at the point

where it is intended to enter.

Leather hedging gloves have been found to be not really

suitable for use in cutting wire silently. A more pliable glove is

required.

 

When the raid is combined with artillery preparation, the

question of necessity for a support party to remain out in NO MAN'S

LAND must be considered.

 

In a silent raid a support party is usually necessary, but when

an artillery bombardment precedes the raid it is questionable whether

a support party need be so large.

 

The advisibility of the raiding lying out in NO MAN'S

LAND  must not be lost sight of.

Reasons.-

(a) To escape both our and the enemy's artillery fire and

(b) To be close enough to take advantage of our artillery

        lifting in order to go forward at once.

 

Endeavours should be made to break down the enemy's parapet

at point of entry after our men have got in so that they may have an

easy ramp to come up on the way out.

Men should be detailed for this work.

 

The signal for withdrawal from the enemy's trenches requires

duplication and special attention.

e.g.- A ll ranks to be warned to leave at a definite clock

hour. Supplementary signals - Flares fired by O.C. Assault.

Whistles or horns blown.

 

G.H. Jackson Lieut-Colonel,

General Staff.

2nd Australian Division.

 

 

SECOND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Divisional Headquarters,             G1/24

20th June, 1916.

SECRET

C.R.A.

4th Aust. Inf. Bde. 

5th          -do-

6th          -do-

 

Reference my G 1/24 of 19th June, points selected for

raids therein quoted are not absolutely accurate.

The following are more accurate but even these are not

hard and fast and are subject to minor alterations by Brigade

Commanders concerned, provided these alterations appear in their

orders in time for the Artillery plan to be made out and carefully

checked as to accuracy. -

                                         Date                          Place

5th Aust. Inf. Bde       25/26th June           I.26.c.9½.1½.

18th Battalion             26/27th June           I.32.c.0.7.

6th Aust. Inf. Bde.      29/30th June           I.21.c.7.2.

                                                                           I.21.c.3.0½.

                                                                           I.26.b.9½.8.

4th. Aust. Inf. Bde.       2/3rd July               at a place to be

                                                                           notified later.

 

G. H. Jackson.

Lieut-Colonel,

General Staff.