Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 13, 1 June - 1 July 1916, Part 6

FIRST AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

 

CENTRAL REGISTRY

49 ^A.

Date 17-6-16

A&NZ ARMY CORPS

 

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

No Q 12/130

18 JUN. 1916

A.A.G.,  A.I.F.
1st A. & N.Z.A.C.

26/17

(*D*)

 

Headquarters,

8th  June,  1916.

 

Headquarters, 

2nd Aust. and N.Z. Army Corps.

 

In reply to your minute 49A, covering an enquiry 

by Brig.-General J. MONASH, and previous correspondence, 

relative to the rate of pay of officers of the A.I.F

holding the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, I may 

say that the Defence Department, MELBOURNE, to whom the 

matter was recently submitted by A. I. F. Headquarters, 

has ruled that such officers be paid as Colonels. 

[[?signature?]]  Lt. Col A A ?,  A I F

for Lieutenant-General, 

Commanding 1^st Aust. and N.Z. Army Corps

 

(*HQ 4th Aus. Div

Forwarded for your information. 

FW Pickering

Capt [[?]] & 2mg

2 ANZAC*)

15-6-16

 

Paris book club - 11 rue de Chateaudun, Pari 9

(Cadet on Metro

(N. D. De Lovette in N&S)

Henry. 148 rue Lafayette 2^o et. 2t 7. (Gare du Nord)

8 rue Colbert (Bourse)


10/6/16

 

Arc de Carousel √

Palais Royal. √

——————————

Hotel de Ville - √

Notre Dame - Cité √

La Sainte Chapelle. √

——————————

Sacre Coeur. Lamarque or Anvers

Musée Carnavalet. (Rue des Archives) 

——————————

Musée Grévin. (Opera or [[Bourse?]] )

——————————

Tour Eiffel - Seah M Champ de Mars

Honors gained by the Fourth Infantry Brigade

Victoria Cross	Lieut. A. Jacka	14th Battalion
Order of the Bath	Brigadier-General J. Monash	Commander
	Lieut-Col G. J. Burnage	13th Battalion
	do R. E. Courtney	14th "
	do J. H. Cannan	15th "
	do H. Pope	16th "
C.M.G.	Lieut. Col. J. P. McGlinn	Brigade Major
	do F. W. Wray	Senior Chaplain
	do J. L. Beeston	Field Ambulance
D.S.O.	do L. E. Tilney	13th Bn
	do C. M. M. Dare	14th "
	Major R. Rankine	14th "
	Major W. O. Mansbridge	16th "
	do E. L. Margolin	16th "
Military Cross	Capt T. R. Eastwood	Staff
	" J. M. Rose	Machine Gun Officer
	" W. J. M. Locke	Staff Captain
	" J. Simpson	13th Bn
	" R. G. Legge	do
	" J. E. Lee	do
	" G. Cooper	14 do
	" T. P. McSharry	15th do
	" J. Hill	15th do
	" M. H. Cleeve	A.S.C.
Croix de Chevalier	Major S. C. E. Herring	13th Bn
Croix de Guerre	Captain J. M. Rose	Machine Gun Officer

Distinguished Conduct Medals

Lance Cpl. C. R. Murfitt       Cpl R. Tickner

do W. Francis           Lance Cpl. J. T. Maher

Private C. Pappas    Private R. Barrett

do W. Upton   Lance Cpl. P Black

Sergt W. A. Cross  do H. Murray

Private R. R. Chapman   Corpl. J. G. Cosson

Sergt. J. B. Kirkwood   Sergt H. Jackson

do M. J. O'Brien  Private H. Burne 

Private A. Wright   Driver L. Farlow

Sgt Major E Corbett

Private H. Edelsten

do W. S. James

Lance Cpl. J. Craven

do F. R. Cawley

 

12/6/16

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

JUN 14 1916

4th Infantry Brigade

4th Australian Division 

No G1/4

14 Jun 1916

[?]a13/[?]225

SECRET.

Headquarters, 

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,

14th JUNE, 1916

 

Headquarters,

4th Australian Infantry Brigade.

 

Herewith 2 copies "Notes on Artillery". Please

note same are not to be treated as official.

[?] Major, 

General Staff

4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

 

16/8/16 read G4

SECRET.

NOTES ON ARTILLERY.

These notes have been compiled from suggestions made by

artillery and infantry officers at the Courses held at AIRE. They

are intended primarily for the use of Battery and Battalion Commanders

belonging to now Divisions, who have not had previous experience of

the present class of warfare.

(A). CO-OPERATION OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY IN TRENCH WARFARE.

1. Arrangements for Defence. A certain force of artillery is detailed for the

support of each infantry brigade holding a portion

of the line. Batteries are then allotted to each Sector.

Arrangements are made to cover the front with rifle and machine-gun

fire, and the places are selected where artillery fire is required.

A code letter and number is given to each place on which guns are

layed, and a sketch showing the code should be kept by the company

commander in the trenches, by the battalion commander, at the O.P.,

and at the battery. A direct line is laidf from company headquarters

to the battery, tapped in at the O. P. and battalion headquarters, and

the company commander provides the instrument and personnel at his

end of the line. When fire is required at night on any particular

point, it is sufficient to telephone down the code letter and number,

and the gun concerned opens fire at once. Long discussions on the

telephone as to the exact location of the target are thus avoided,

and any correction can be made after the first round. If fire is

required on any other place, it should be described with reference to

one of the selected points. Those points are usually referred to as 

the "night lines" of the battery.

When infantry reliefs take place, battalion and company commanders

should see a round or two fired the day before they come in, so that

they may know where they can expect help.

2. A Hostile Attack. Special arrangements must be made to meet a 

hostile attack by night, in a fog, or under

cover of smoke and gas. Time is the essence of the problem, and it

is more important to start guns firing at once than to wait for

discussion on the telephone as to the exact position where the enemy

has been first seen. Every gun should be normally layed on its "night

line" when not otherwise engaged, and on receipt of a pre-arranged

signal will open fire at once on this line, "swopping" a certain

amount where necessary. The officer at the battery then endeavours to

ascertain the situation, but if the wires have been cut, he must use

his own discretion as to continuing fire.

An alarm signal is necessary and the occasions on which it should

be used must be clearly understood. Every precaution should be taken

to prevent it spreading needlessly, to neighbouring units.

It is advisable to test the alarm signal occasionally, but this

must be done with caution. The Brigade or Division Commander, in

consultation with the C. R. A. should alone be empowered to apply a test.

The telephone communications between the artillery and infantry

should be tested frequently by day and night.

The infantry must clearly understand that, on receiving the alarm

signal, the guns open fire on their pre-arranged "night lines", and

that this signal is therefore only to be used while our infantry

are in their present positions.

In our infantry have captured a hostile trench and require

artillery support at short notice, some other form of code should be 

used, as the use of the ordinary alarm signal in this case would lead

to fire being directed on our troops. V. V. V. followed by the

name of the Regiment requiring assistance is suggested as a suitable

code when fire is required in front of a captured trench.

(2)

3. Aggressive Action. In order to reap full benefit from aggressive 

artillery action, it is essential that, as on

all other occasions, the infantry and artillery should co-operate

closely in the work of destruction. We must use every means to 

entice the enemy from his dug-outs, and then catch him with 18-pdr.

shrapnel, machine-guns and rifle fire. Various methods are:-

i. (a). To damage the enemy's front parapet with H. E. from

howitzers and field guns, and cut his wire with 18-pdr. shrapnel.

He will then have to come out from behind cover to execute repairs,

of which advantage should be taken by both artillery and infantry.

(b). Enfilade fire on communication trenches, especially

at their junction with the main trench, and on front trenches at

intervals both by day and night. Two or three rounds at a time

or a couple of battery salvoes might easily do considerable damage, 

and are less likely to give away a battery at night. After the

first few rounds the enemy will probably take cover and further

shooting is waste of ammunition. A single gun placed well forward

to enfilade the enemy's front line trenches has been found very

effective, and the flash can be entirely screened, expect from the

place at which it is shooting.

(c). Occasional rounds or salvoes of shrapnel as above,

fired on cross-ronds, billets, or known headquarters especially at

night on reliefs, ration parties, working parties, etc.

(d). Destruction of hostile observing stations, strong

points etc., with H. E.

ii. The enemy probably stands to arms as we do, at dusk and dawn.

It is suggested on given evenings and mornings, our infantry should

be warned and all the field guns covering a brigade front should

fire a couple of rounds of shrapnel per gun, at a pre-arranged signal,

on the enemy's front trenches. After the first two salvoes, he will

probably take cover.

iii. Anything usunual which will make hime look to see what is

happening and will have the effect of making him man his parapets, e.g.

burning fires all along the British line at a given hour - red

fuzes used in the same way, - cheering or a groan along the line -

cardboard figures all along the parapet - loud ringing of bells,-

rapid bursts of infantry fire. In every case the artillery must

be warned and two or three rounds of shrapnel per gun fired on a 

given signal. This will probably kill more Germans, and is a more

effective means of "retaliation" than prolonged bursts of fire which

are expesive in ammunition.

When the enemy's infantry are in their trenches, firing at

one of our own aeroplanes, a suitable opportunity for artillery to

open fire on their front or support trenches will probably present

itself.

Shrapnel could also be usefully employed at a house burning

in the enemy's lines, at points from which Very lights are usually

fired, or at places where heavy rifle fire is heard.

When a portion of the enemy's line is being bombarded he oftens

withdraws the garrison to either flank. A rapid switch might often

inflict casualties.

Trench mortars should fire in co-operation with artillery when

possible.

4. Information. The artillery require all the assistance they can

get as to the location of targets and the effects of

their fire. Every endeavour should be made by the infantry to

assist, and artillery observing stations should be connected to the

front trenches and to divisional and artillery observation posts, 

for this purpose.

Young infantry officers should be instructed in artillery

methods of describing position of targets, and it is a great

advantage to both branches of the Service, if every infantry

officer in turn spends a few hours in the artillery observing

station overlooking his part of the line. It helps him to known the

country from an artillery point of view, knowledge of which would be 

especially useful when the time came for an attack.

(3)

In describing targets, reference should always be made to xx points

in the enemy's line, not to portions of our own line, and

consequently all prominent objects in the enemy's line should be

given the same name by both artillery and infantry.

A series of photographs are being taken from all artillery

O.Ps. They will enable infantry and artillery officers to study

the ground together, and will be invaluable to battalions and

batteries coming into the line on reflief. Combined with a large

issue of air-photographs, they will enable all officers to get a

good idea of the ground over which they may have to advance.

5. Position of Battry Commanders and Observing Officers.

An officer from each of those

batteries must be at his O.P.

while there is daylight, and an 

Officer or N. C. O. must always be on the lookout. During the present

trench warfare, a subaltern should normally perform this duty

and the battery commander reserve himself for special shoots; he

should usually be employed in training his Officers to direct and

observe fire, and in keeping in close touch with battalion and

company commanders. The personal element is of great importance

in the cooperation of artillery and infantry.

By night, an officer of the battery must be in close touch

with the battalion he is supporting. It depends upon circumstances

whether he should be at his O.P. or at battalion headquarters, but

in any case he must be in communication with the latter. See also

B. para. 3.

(B). CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY IN THE ATTACK.

1. Plans for Attack. Should be made in consultation with the 

   artillery, as the actual point selected for

   attack must depend largely on where artillery support can be most

   effective. It is especially necessary to consider where wire can

   be cut and where it is impossible on account of the configuration

   of the ground.

   2. Artillery Preparation. A series of bombardments and lifts over a

   wide front and lasting several days is

   a useful method of concealing the front selected for assault.

   The preliminary bombardment, which is to prepare the way for an

   attack, should vary in duration and intensity, so as to give the

   enemy no indicated as to the actual moment of assault. A prolonged

   intensive bombardment with a sudden "lift" is a sure sign to the 

   enemy that an assault is about to tak eplace, especially if

   accompanied by heavy rifle fire from the flanks of the attacking

   troops. During the bombardment, the infantry should creep as near

   to their objective as possible, and the assault should be delivered

   without any sort of (flourish of trumpets).

   Trench mortars should take their part in the preliminary

   bombardment, and in helping to cut wire in certain places. Definite

   tasks should be allotted to them when the plans are being made.

   3. Position of Brigade and Battery Commanders. 

   The Commander of the Artillery Brigade

   or "Group" supporting an infantry

   brigade should be in close touch with

   the infantry brigadier, and if possible actually with him.

   Battery Commanders must be where they can best see the

   general situation (usually their O. Ps). Once the attack has been

   launched the situation changes so rapidly that there is often no 

   time to receive orders from the rear, and battery commanders must

   be prepared to act instantaneously on their own initative. It is

   not fair to shift the responsibility for the conduct of fire on to

   the shoulders of a junior officer, and this applies to all batteries,

   whether Field, Heavy, or Siege.