Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 12, 2 May - 31 May 1916, Part 2

3

A thorough system of good communication throughout the division is of the first
importance, and every kind of alternative form of communication from front to rear, including
parties of men, under specially selected officers, detailed as runners, must be continually
practised throughout every exercise both by day and night. All ranks must be warned of the
vital importance of forwarding accurate and speedy information. This portion of the training
will receive the special attention of the higher Commanders.

11. With regard to the latter part of the paragraph 2 (a), attention is directed to the 
memorandum on the consolidation of trenches and localities after assault and capture (O.B. 
1629, dated 4-5-16) already issued.

12. With regard to the second category of training (paragraph 2 (b) ), the general principles 
laid down in our training manuals hold good, and special attention is directed to Chapters V, 
VI, VII, and IX, Field Service Regulations, Part I. Special exercises should be carried out by 
divisions to practice the continuation of the advance after a hostile system of defences have 
been broken through. 

Such an advance will probably take the form of a series of attacks on tactical points which 
are still held by the enemy by portions of the force, whilst other portions continue a vigorous 
advance (105.5).

Special attention should be given during some of these exercises to the methods of 
establishing a defensive flank to the division as it advances, and in all exercises the general
principles of securing the ground gained must be carried out (see paragraph 11 above). 

13. In all exercises the following points require special study on the part of Brigade and
Battalion Commanders :-

(a) The employment of Brigade Machine Gun Companies and Lewis guns, to ensure
that full advantage is taken of this great increase in fire power.

In particular, opportunities should be looked for to practice pushing forward Lewis
guns to precede the attacking infantry or to reinforce an advance which is held up. 

Attention is directed to " Notes on the Use of Lewis Guns in an Advance," dated the 
18th March, 1916, and " Notes on the Tactical Employment of Machine Guns and Lewis 
Guns" (S.S. 106).

(b) The use of bombers (see S.S. 398 " Training and Employment of Bombers "). 

(c) The use of Trench Mortars.

(d) The arrangements for getting all the above forward as rapidly as possible and 
keeping them supplied in action. 

14. The service of supply, also, both as regards ammunition, food and water, should be 
carried out thoroughly in every detail, at least one exercise of this nature being carried out 
after dark. 

15. The following points have proved the chief stumbling blocks to a complete success in 
past attacks, and every effort must therefore be made to overcome them :-

(a) Failures in mutual support. Every endeavour must be made to maintain lateral
communication ; when a gap occurs in the line, whether caused by the failure of some
portion of the force to reach its objective or otherwise, the troops on either side of the
gap, who have reached their objective, must at once close the gap by extending inwards, or
by pushing into the gap their nearest available reserves, and in this way both re-establish
lateral communication and isolate any hostile detachment which is holding out. 

The value of machine guns to fill a gap of this kind should be borne in mind. 

(b) Failures in passing on information as to the situation. The vital importance of
information and the responsibility of everyone in assisting to obtain and forward it must
be impressed on all ranks. 

(c) Failure to re-organize and to consolidate the ground won in time to resist a
counter-attack. Every effort must be made to retain control and cohesion, and every
suitable opportunity of reforming must be taken. Consolidation, on the principles laid
down in the memorandum referred to in paragraph 11, must be carried out with all speed
and determination. 

(d) Unnecessary crowding of the assaulting columns, with the consequent increase in
casualties and congestion. It must be borne in mind that beyond a certain point the
addition of more men merely results in hampering an attack. 

(e) Premature using up of reserves. Every commander must make arrangements to
retain control of his reserves till they are required for some definite purpose, and must
not allow them to drift into the fight piecemeal and with no clear guidance as to their
objective. 

16. The strictest attention must continue to be paid to the cultivation of the power of
command in young officers, also to discipline, dress, saluting, cleanliness and care of billets,
and the importance of strict obedience to instructions as regards arrangements for supply,
preservation of iron rations, water, etc., must be impressed on all ranks. 

Self-denial in the matter of water in particular must be practised ; men must accustom
themselves to not drinking out of their water-bottles without orders, and control over the men
in this respect will be exercised by officers during operations. 

Too great stress cannot be laid on developing good moral, a soldierly spirit, and a determination
in all ranks to achieve success at all costs. 

17. Troops once launched to the attack must push on at all costs till the final objective
is reached. 

It must be impressed on all ranks that " decisive success in battle can be gained only by a
vigorous offensive" (F.S.R. 99.1), and in no operation of war is rapidity and determination more
important than in exploiting a success after breaking through a hostile system of defences. 

To ensure success it is impossible to exaggerate the vital importance of thorough training
of all ranks, so that all may feel convinced that " when we fight we win." 

G.H.Q., 

L.E. KIGGELL, Lieut.-General, 

CGS

8th May, 1916

Diagram - see original document

 

[*8/5/16*]

[S.S. 109.]  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO FRONT LINE TRENCHES.

Training of Divisions for Offensive Action.

1. The time available for divisions when out of the line to train as divisions is short. It is 
necessary that the utmost use should be made of it, and that the object of the training
should be clearly understood by all concerned.

2. Success depends on preparations for all the phases of an attack, viz.:-

(a)  The organisation of trenches for the assembly of the attacking force;

(b)  The artillery bombardment;

(c)  The crossing of the area between our front trenches and the enemy's;

(d)  The capture of the enemy's defensive systems and artillery positions,
and the consolidation against counter-attack of ground won

(e)  Exploitation of success.

The training ground must be carefully reconnoitred beforehand, and a detailed programme of
the whole period must be prepared. If possible, every brigade should be exercised in each form
of training.

2. The training of the division can be conveniently divided into two categories:-

(a)  Training for the attack from trenches against a hostile system of trenches and
strong points, including the consolidation and occupation of the position won.

(b)  Training for exploiting a success when the hostile systems of defence have been
broken through.

3. A complete system of hostile trenches and at least the first line of a second system together
with the defended localities between these two systems, should be marked out on the ground to 
full scale from trench maps and aerial photographs, to represent as far as possible an actual
system of trenches and strong points. The assault over the areas so marked out should be 
practised several times by the division as a whole; the division being disposed in depth on a 
narrow front with two brigades, and also with one brigade in the front line.

A suitable assaulting front for a brigade against a strong objective may be taken at from 400

to 600 yards. The average front of a division forming part of a larger force in an attack,

however, must be governed by the nature of the country to be traversed, the difficulty of the

task allotted, the intervals to be allowed between formations, the number of important

objectives to be assaulted, and the number of brigades to be employed in the front line. It may

be taken at from 1,000 to 1,800 yards, or an average of about 1,500 yards for several divisions

in a decisive attack.

4.  The attack must aim at continuity and must be driven home without intermission, so that the

attack gradually works forward till the endurance of the enemy is broken down.

Every attacking unit must be given a limited and clearly defined objective, which it is to

capture and consolidate at all costs; the assaulting columns must go right through above

ground to this objective in successive waves or lines, each line adding fresh impetus to the

preceding line when this is checked, and carrying the whole forward to the objective. The

cleaning up and consolidation of positions passed over by the assaulting columns in their

advance, the formation of protective flanks, and the preparation of strong supporting points in

the captured area will be carried out by other troops of the attacking force, following the

assaulting columns and specially told off for the purpose. Local reserves must be held to

reinforce those parts of the line which are checked, to fill gaps opening in the front and to

relieve troops which are exhausted and whose endurance has gone. 
From the moment when the first line of assaulting troops leaves our front trenches, a 

continuous forward flow must be maintained from the rear throughout the division. Up to

our own front line this flow may be either above or below ground, according to topographical

conditions, the nature of the enemy's fire, and the number of communication trenches available,

but once the assaulting troops have left our trenches and are pushing on to their objective,

their movement will be carried out above ground.

The movement of the Divisional Reserve may be controlled when required by ordering beforehand 
that its forward flow is to be checked on reaching some definite line (such as our original

first line of trenches), in which it will await orders.

5. When a particular line or succession of lines have reached an objective assigned to them, for

the consolidation of which preparations have already been made, it will usually be inadvisable

to order these troops to push on to a further objective. It follows, therefore, that, to secure

continuity in operations on a large scale, it may be necessary to arrange for fresh troops to pass

through others.

Occasions may also occur in which there is, beyond the first objective, a second objective e.g., 

another system of hostile trenches or centre of resistance, which the Commander of the

formation intends to attack, conditionally on the first attack succeeding, with a fresh body of

troops, but as part of the same operation.

Divisions must, therefore, be practised in the passing of a fresh body of attacking troops

through the troops which have carried out the first assault and have reached their objective.

The second attack will be carried out on the same principles, the assaulting columns going

straight through to the objective in successive lines.

The passing of one body of troops through another during an attack is, however, an extremely

difficult operation, and should only be attempted when there is a reasonable opportunity 

of seizing and holding the second objective by immediate attack, as for instance

when the first attacking force has succeeded in gaining the whole objective it was ordered to

consolidate, the artillery preparation on the second objective has been adequate and effective, 

and the force detailed to attack it is well in hand.

[*cancelled*]
 

The conditions of every attack vary, however, and a special solution must be found for

each individual problem. It depends on whether the furthest objective that has been allotted

to a division can be reached in one continuous advance, or whether it is necessary to 

capture and consolidate some intermediate objective before the final one can be assaulted.

6.  With regard to the above, it is impossible to lay down any definite rules as to the strength

of assaulting columns, the number of lines of which they consist, or the distance apart of

these lines.

The depth of the assaulting column depends on the distance of the objective, and on the

opposition that has to be overcome in reaching it. Its strength must be calculated so as to

give sufficient driving power to enable the column to reach its objective and to provide sufficient

remaining energy to enable the objective to be held when gained. The distance apart of the

lines will usually be regulated by the rate at which the successive lines can be formed up and

moved forward over the parapet. The men in each line should be extended at two or three

paces interval. In this connection it is worthy of consideration that in many instances

experience has shown that to capture a hostile trench a single line of men has usually failed,

two lines have generally failed but sometimes succeeded, three lines have generally succeeded

but sometimes failed, and four or more lines have usually succeeded. 

7.  In these exercises the attack or part of it should frequently fail to reach its objective, and the

commanders of the units thus checked be confronted on the spot with a new situation and

practised in making rapid decisions based on the original plan.

Every brigade in turn should be called upon to move from reserve to the capture of an objective, 

in front of which the assaulting troops have been held up, or against which an attack has

failed. The orders for this operation and a description of the artillery support that will be

available will be given to Commanders on the spot.

8.  Any division may be in reserve to one or more assaulting divisions. Such a task requires as

careful previous preparation and study as does the task of the divisions actually detailed for

the assault.

The staffs and regimental officers of the division in reserve on any portion of the assaulting

front must make themselves familiar by personal reconnaissance with the trench systems over

which they may have to operate and with every detail of the ground. They must be provided

with the same maps as those used by the assaulting division. The Staffs and higher

Commanders of the division in reserve must study the plans and preparations of the assaulting

divisions as closely as if they were their own. In this way only will they be able when the

time comes to take up the attack without hesitation, and with a clear understanding of the

task before them. 

From the moment the operation beings, the closest liaison must be established, in accordance

with arrangements made beforehand; and responsible Staff Officers from the Reserve Division 
should be attached to the Headquarters of the Divisions in front so as to follow every

development of the action. As soon as it is known where the reserve division is to be put in,

the proper place for the Commander of the Reserve Division and his Staff is at the Battle

Headquarters of the Division Commander, who is controlling the operations in that particular

portion of the battlefield.

9. Special exercises should be held during the period of training by Divisional and Brigade

Commanders with all their staffs and subordinate commanders--

(a) To consider in detail the preliminary arrangements for an attack on a large scale;

and

(b) To consider the action to be taken by subordinate commanders when local unexpected 

situations arise, such as occur when a portion of a line is held up, impassable obstacles are

encountered, or it becomes necessary to deliver or repel a local counter-attack.

With regard to (a), attention is direction to the memorandum on the preliminary arrangements

in case of a large attack, issued with O. B./1207, dated the 2nd February, 1916. The artillery

programme and co-operation should be worked out in all exercises and explained to all

concerned. 

With regard to (b), it must be remembered that officers and troops generally do not now possess

that military knowledge arising from a long and high state of training which enables them to

act promptly on sound lines in unexpected situations. They have become accustomed to 

deliberate action based on precise and detailed orders.

Officers and men in action will usually do what they have been practised to do or have been told 
to do in certain situations, and it is therefore all the more necessary to ensure that a clear

understanding should exist among all ranks as to what action is to be taken in the different

situations that may arise in battle. In this connection every endeavour should be made to

inculcate mutual confidence and the spirit of combination directly towards the achievement of

the task set. During an advance under fire men must possess the habit of looking

spontaneously to their leaders for direction; more often than not leaders have to look for and

find their men. Even this in itself is not sufficient. Situations will constantly arise when 

there is no officer or non-commissioned officer present with groups of men, and the men must

realise that, in such a case, one man must assume leadership on the spot and remainder act 
under his control.

All must be prepared for heavy casualties, and must realize that the magnitude of the interests

at stake necessitate the greatest self-sacrifice from one and all.

10.  Brigade Headquarters, as well as Battalion Headquarters, must be practised in moving forward

during the progress of an attack, and it is essential that communication from front to rear must

not be lost. It is, therefore, necessary that the route to be followed by Headquarters should be

well defined and known, so that runners both from front and rear will known the route to follow 

in order to pick up the Headquarters should it be moving. In the case of Brigade and Battalion

Headquarters it will usually be inadvisable to state a place to which the Headquarters will move,

as that place may be inaccessible or untenable.

A thorough system of good communication throughout the division is of the first importance

and every kind of alternative form of communication from front to rear, including parties of

2

men, under specially selected officers, detailed as runners, must be continually practiced

throughout every exercise both by day and night. All ranks must be warned of the vital 

importance of forwarding accurate and speedy information. This portion of the training will

receive the special attention of the higher Commanders.

11.  With regard to the latter part of paragraph 2 (a), attention is directed to the memorandum on

the consolidation of trenches and localities after assault and capture (O.B.1629, dated 4-5-16)

12. With regard to the second category of training (paragraph 2 (b) ). the general principles laid

down in our training manuals hold good, and special attention is directed to Chapters V., VI.,

VII., and IX., Field Services Regulations, Part I.  Special exercises should be carried out by 

divisions to practice the continuation of the advance after a hostile system of defenses have
been broken through.
Such an advance will probably take the form of a series of attacks on tactical points which are
still head by the enemy by portions of the force, whilst other portions continue a vigorous

advance (105.5).

Special attention should be given during some of these exercises to the methods of establishing

a defensive flank to the divisions as it advances, and in all exercises the general principles of 

securing the ground gained must be carried out (see paragraph 11 above).

13. In all exercises the following points require special study on the part of Brigade and Battalion

Commanders:-

(a) The employment of Brigade Machine Gun Companies and Lewis guns, to ensure

the full advantage is taken of this great increase in fire power.

In particular, opportunities should be looked for to practice pushing forward Lewis

guns to procede the attacking infantry or to reinforce an advance which is held up.

Attention is directed to "Notes on the Use of the Lewis Guns in an Advance," dated the 
18th March, 1916, and "Notes on the Tactical Employment  of Machine Guns and Lewis

Guns" (S.S.106).

(b) The use of bombers (see S.S. 398 "Training and Employment of Bombers").

(c) The use of Trench Mortars.

(d) The arrangements for getting all the above forward as rapidly as possible and 

keeping them supplied in action.

14.The service of supply, also, both as regards ammunition, food and water, should be carried out

thoroughly in every detail, at least one exercise of this nature being carried out after dark.

15. The following points have proved the chief stumbling blocks to a complete success in past

attacks, and every effort must therefore be made to overcome them:-

(a) Failure in mutual support. Every endeavour must be made to maintain 

lateral communication; when a gap occurs in the line, whether caused by the failure of 

some portion of the force to reach the objective or otherwise, the troops on either side of

the gap, who have reached their objective, must at once close the gap by extending inwards,

or by pushing into the gap their nearest available reserves, and in this way both re-establish

lateral communication and isolate any hostile detachment which is holding out.

The value of machine guns to fill in a gap of this kind should be borne in mind.

(b) Failure in passing on information as to the situation. The vital

importance of information and the responsibility of everyone in assisting to obtain and 

forward it must be impressed on all ranks.

(c) Failure to re-organise and to consolidate the ground won in time to

resist a counter-attack. Every effort must be made to retain control and cohesion, 

and every suitable opportunity of reforming must be taken. Consolidation, on the 

principles laid down in the memorandum referred to in paragraph 11, must be carried out

with all speed and determination.

(d) Unnecessary crowding of the assaulting columns, with the consequent increase in causalities and congestion. It must be borne in the mind that beyond a

certain point the addition of more men merely results in hampering an attack.

(c) Premature using up of reserves. Every commander must make arrangements

to retain control of his reserves till they are required for some definite purpose, and must  

not allow them to drift into the fight piecemeal and with no clear guidance as to their objective.

16. The strictest attention must continue to be paid to the cultivation of the power of command 

in young officers, also to discipline, dress, saluting, cleanliness and care of billets, and the 

importance of strictest obedience to instructions as regards arrangements for supply, preservation

of iron rations, water, etc., must be impressed on all ranks.

Self-denial in the matter of water in particular must be practiced: men must accustom

themselves to not drinking out of their water-bottles without orders, and control over the men

in this respect will be exercised by officers during operations.

Too great stress cannot be laid on developing good moral, a soldierly spirit, and a determination

in all ranks to achieve success at all costs.

17.  Troops once launched to the attack must push on at all costs till the final objective is reached.

It must be impressed on all ranks that "decisive success in battle can be gained only by a 

vigorous offensive "(F.S.R. 99.1), and in no operation of war is rapidity and determination more

important than in exploiting a success after breaking through a hostile system of defenses.

To ensure success it is impossible to exaggerate the vital importance of thorough training of all

ranks, so that all may feel convinced that "when we fight we win."

[*cancelled*]

L. E. KIGGELL, Lieut. General, 

C.G.S.

G.H.Q.,

8th May, 1916.

3 

Diagram - see original document

LIST OF OFFICERS                                                          
10/5/16
 

No 4 Machine Gun Coy
Major	E.A.   Wilton
Lieut	A.M.   Mitchell	HQ 2 [[?]]	Transport
''	A.L.   Langbourne	o/c 3 Sect
2/''	A.R.   Carse	"   4 Sect
''	V.G.   Veness	o/c 1 Sect
''	K.S.   Ross  xx	MG Sectn
''	H.J.   Skyes	o/   2 Sect
''	F.   Hicks	ns   4   "	Transport
''	G.   Kirkland	"     1    "
''	F.R. Watts	"     3   "
13th. Battalion
Lieut-Col	L.E. Tilney	D.S.O	Hqrs
Major	L.E. Twynam		"
Captain	D.G. Marks		"
Lieut	A.W. Davis		"
Lieut-Col	F.W. Wray		"
Captain	W.J.E. Phillips		"
Captain	F.M. Barton	O.C.	"A" Coy
"	H.W. Murray		"
Lieut	T. Wells		"
"	H.F. Murray		"
2/ "	R.H. Kell		"
"	R.J. Henderson		"
Captain	A.G. Fox	O.C.	"B"    "
"	H.L. Henley		"
Lieut	S.J. Mc PHillamy		"
"	G.W. Adams		"
"	C.B. Meyer		"
2/  "	C.S. Cooling		"
Major	H.C. Ford	O.C.	"C"   "
Captain	J.K. Henderson		"
Lieut	J.D.D. Henry		"
2/ "	A. Lanagan		"
"	J.G. Geary		"
"	W.W. Worner		"
Captain	H.D. Pulling	O.C.	"D"   "
Lieut	D.P. Wells		"
"	R.H. Browning		"
2/"	K.N. Pattrick		"
"	N. Wallach		"
"	E. Randell
	W.U. Clasper	M.G. Officer
	McKillop
14th. Battalion
Lieut-Col	C.M.M. Dare		C.O.
Major	N.D. Fethers		Hqrs
Captain	A.R. Blainey		"
Lieut	W.G. Laver		"
"	C.R.T. Cole	M.G.	"
Captain	R.C. Winn		"
"	J.L. Cope		"
Captain	A.R. Cox O.C	O.C.	"A" Coy
"	R.W. Orr		"
Lieut	H.B. Wanliss		"
2/  "	J.B. Roderick		" 3/8
"	R.D. Julian		"
Major	O.C.W. Fuhrmann	O.C.	"B"  "
Captain	W.R. Wadsworth		"
Lieut	A.T. Harvey		"
2/  "	F.C.W. Symonds		"
"	A. Jacka	"V.C."	"
Captain	S.M. Hansen		"C"  "
"	B.T.Smith		"
Lieut	M.R Walker		"
"	P.J. Hayes		"
2/  "	N. Wilson		"
"	A.R. Dean		"
Captain	C.R.M. Cox		"D"  "
"	F.B. Stanton		"
Lieut	G.McK. Williamson	[*Dobbio*]	"
"	A. Williamson		"
"	J. MacKay		"
2/ "	R.W. Jones		"
	Rogers		"
15th Battalion
Lieut-Col	J.H. Cannan	C.B.	C.O.
Major.	T.P. McSharry		H.Qrs.
Lieut.	Cummins  W.	M.G.Officer
Capt.	A.H. Powell	M.O.
Capt.	F.W. Craig	Q.M.
Major.	G.F. Dickinson	O.C. [*Capt of ?*]	"A"
Capt.	W.T Mundell		"A"
Lieut.	M. McGhie [*Transport*]		"A"
2/Lieut.	B.S. Atkinson		"A"
"	J.M. Watson		"A"
"	D.S. Jopling		"A"
"	F. Martyr		"A"
"	E.K. Carter		"A"
Capt.	W.W. Coombes	O.C.	"B"
"	C.E. Snartt		"B"
Lieut.	J.C. Browne	[*2Lt WJ Gunison*]	"B"
2/Lieut.	R?.I. Arnold	[* "    "  Neffer*]	"B"
"	J.H.W. Fraser		"B"
Capt	C.M.Johnston	O.C.	"C"
"	H.R. Koch	(Actg. Adj)	"C"
Lieut.	W.H. Nicholls		"C"
"	R.B. McIntosh	[*D Winworth*]	"C"
2/Lieut.	N. McGhie		"C"
"	R. Glasgow.
Capt.	J.J. Corrigan	O.C.	"D"
"	W.J. Cooper		"D"
Lieut.	H. Brettingham-Moore		"D"
2/Lieut.	A.A. Plane		"D"
	[*A.B. Neving*]	[*?*]	"D"
Chaplin	[*F J Tiche*]	[*Chaplain*]	"D"
	16th. BATTALION
Major.	E.L. Margolin		H.Qrs.
Capt.	E.J. Parks	Adjt	H.Qrs.
Lieut.	A.Edge	Q.M.	"
Capt.	D.M. Steele	M.O.	H.Qrs.
Lieut.	H.J. Cook	M.G.	"
"	W.J. Lynas	Gde. Off.	"
Capt.	R. Harwood	O.C.	"A"
"	H.S. Hummerston		"A"
2/Lieut.	F. Wadge		"A"
"	G.A. Whiting		"A"
"	V.B. Wilton		"A"
Major.	P. Black	O.C.	"B"
Capt.	A. Ahearn	[*leave*]	"B"
Lieut.	R.C.H. Slater	[*'Transport*]	"B"
2/Lieut	L.A. Stephenson		"B"
"	L.I. Goldstein	[*leave*]	"B"
"	H. Smith		"B"
Capt.	A. McLeod	O.C.	"C"
"	J. MacPherson	O.C	"C"
Lieut.	A.W. Potts	[*R of ?]	"C"
2/Lieut.	H. Wilson		"C"
"	F.F. Woods		"C"
"	J. Hutton		"C"
Capt.	H.C. Parker	O.C.	"D"
Capt.	V. Tucker		"D"
Lieut.	R.S. Sommerville		"D"
2/Lieut.	J.K.Robins		"D"
"	B.S. Penny    [*Aaorons*]		"D"
"  .	J.E. Johnson		"D"
Capt	[*W J Strahan*]	[*Chaplain*]	"D"

          

                                            

ORDERS FOR A.M.C.

4TH Division.

by Lieut-Col.   G.W. Barber, A.D.M.S.  4th Division.

13th FIELD AMBULANCE.

O.C. will establish a Dressing station at Roadhead

at the point where the road to the left junctions with

the main road. The sphere of action of this station

will extend from and inclusive of Camp 3 to Camp 57.

One Sand cart can be kept at Gebel Habeita Camp, the

remainder (5) with Camels and Cacolets kept ready at

the Dressing Station to proceed to any point required

in this area. Patients will be evacuated to the 13th

Field Ambulance at Railhead by returning supply

Waggons, Ambulance Waggons or other transport.

12th FIELD AMBULANCE.

O.C. will be prepared to establish an Advanced

Dressing Station at a spot in rear of Post 7 and the

sphere of action for this station will extend from

Camp 3 to the left flank. Patients will be

evacuated either by return supply waggons from the end

of the left road or direct to Railhead by Camels to

the 12th field Ambulance. One sand cart can be kept 

at Camp 7 if necessary.

4th FIELD AMBULANCE.

O.C. must be prepared to send his Camel Transport

with a few Bearers to evacuate patients from and 

inclusive of Camp 57 to Camp 62 to Railhead. For the

precent this line will be served by the 12th Field

Ambulance who have a Sand cart at Camp 58 until

relieved by the 4th Field Ambulance.

3rd L.H. FIELD AMBULANCE.

O.C. will have his Desert Ambulance and Convey

ready to proceed with the Column. The Mounted

Bearers will be ready to co-operate with the Light

Horse at Railhead and if necessary will remove their

patients by Sand Carts or Camels which they must

obtain by application to Dressing Stations before

mentioned. The Horsed Ambulance will be kept in 

readiness to evacuate patients from Road or Railhead

to the 54th C.C.S.

NOTE.

As far as possible the horsed Ambulances of the 12th

and 13th Field Ambulance will be kept in readiness to

assist in the evacuation of patients from Road or

Railhead to the 54th C.C.S.

Arrangements will also be made for the 12th and 13th

Field Ambulances to evacuate into the train which will

take patients to the 54th C.C.S.

GW Barber 
Lieut-Colonel.

A.D.M.S.
4th Division. 
A.D.M.S. 
Date 11/5/16    

A.I.F 4th Division.

Copies to:-

G.O.C.     4th Division.

G.O.C.     Railhead.

G.O.C.     4th Brigade.

G.O.C.     12th Brigade.

G.O.C.     13th Brigade.

C.D.A.

D.D.M.S.  2nd Anzac.

O.C.         54th  C.C.S.

O.C.         4th Field Amb.

O.C.         12th Field Amb.  

O.C.         13th Field Amb.

O.C.         3rd  L.H. Field Amb.

[*A.D.M.S
No......
Date 11/5/16
4^th  DIVISION, A.I.F.*]                                                   

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE ORDERS.
by

Lieut.-General Sir W.R.  BIRDWOOD.  K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.., C.B.,C.I.E.,D.S.O.,

Commanding Australian Imperial Force.

Headquarters 

11th May, 1916

Appointments & Promotions

138. List No. 54 of Appointments, Promotions, etc.,

which have been approved, is issued herewith.

Establishments

139.  Machine Gun company - War Establishments - The

following additions have been approved to the War Establishments

of a Machine Gun Company - 

1   Officer (Captain or Lieutenant) as Second in

Command, with one riding horse

1    batman

(Authority - A.O.  131 of 1916)

140.  The following temporary increases to Establishments

have been approved  -

Artillery  -  1 Subaltern per Battery:

Infantry  -  1 Subaltern per Company:

(Authority -  Defence Telegram W.7676 of

8th May  -  A.A.C.   47/2)

Leave

141.  Officers and other ranks proceeding on leave

of absence will, on arrival in the United Kingdom,

report themselves, either personally or in writing.

(stating the period of leave and their address) to

The Staff Officer,

Australian Military Administrative Offices,

130, Horseferry Road,

Westminster,  London,  S.W.

Pay

142.  A Base Pay Office of the A.I.F. has been established

at ROUEN.

This office will deal with all advances to   -

(i) Divisional Field Cashiers:

(ii) Imprest Holders who cannot obtain advances

from the Field Cashiers:

in the following manner  -

Divisional Field Cashiers  -

Requestions for cash required by Divisional Field

Cashiers for distribution to the Division should be forwarded
to reach the Base Pay Office at least three days

before the date fixed for payment.   Wherever possible, a

cheque on the nearest Branch of the BANQUE DE FRANCE

capable of suppling the cash will be forwarded, through

Despatch Rider Letter Service.   Requestions for cash

should show the Branch at which it is desired the cheque

should be made payable.

Divisional Field Cashiers will make advances to

Divisional Imprest Holders, who should forward all Acquittance

Rolls for pay disbursements to the Field Cashier

from whom the advance has been received within 48 hours

of the receipt of the advance.   Vouchers for disbursements
other than pay should be forwarded as early as possible

after such disbursements have been made. Acquittance 

Rolls and Vouchers representing the total of the advance

made to the Field Cashiers should be immediately forwarded 

by them to the Base Pay Office.

Forms 1531A covering all transactions of Imprest

holders for the month should be forwarded to the Field

Cashiers by the Imprest Holders on the first of the

ensuing month.

/Imprest

(2)

Pay 

142, - continued -

Imprest Holders who cannot be supplied by Field Cashiers-

Imprest Holders who cannot receive advances direct

from the Field Cashiers should make application to the

Base Pay Office for cash required, and whenever possible,

a cheque on the nearest Branch of the BANQUE DE FRANCE

capable of suppling the cash will be forwarded by Despatch 
Rider Letter Service direct to the Imprest Holder.

Requisitions for cash should show the Branch at which it

is desired the cheque should be payable.

Acquittance Rolls for pay disbursements should be 

forwarded direct to the Base Pay Office within 48 hours of

the receipt of the advance.  Vouchers for disbursements

other than pay must be forwarded as soon as possible after

such disbursements have been made.

Forms 1531A covering all transactions for the month

should be forwarded direct to the Base Pay Office on the

first of each succeeding month.

Issues of cash to individual soldiers will not be made

by the Base Pay Office.   Such advances are to be made by the

Imprest Holder of the soldier's unit, or, if that is not practicable,   
by the nearest A.I.F.  Imprest holder.

Clothing - Distinctive Colour  Patches  -

143.  The following Colour Patches have been approved -

AUSTRALIAN ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS. 

Diagram - see original document