Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 12, 2 May - 31 May 1916, Part 2

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Part of Quest:
Sir John Monash (General, b.1865 - d.1931)
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open to contributions
Accession number:
RCDIG0000612
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

A thorough system of good comnunication throughout the division is of the frst importance, and every kind of atternative fornn of commaunication from front to rear, including parties of men, under specially selected offcers, detailed as runners, must be continualy practised throughout every exercise both by day and night. Alranks must be warned of the vita importance of forwarding accurate and speedy information. This portion of the training wil receive the specia) attention of the higher Commaanders. 11. With regard to the latter part of paragraph 2 (a), attention is directed to the memorandum on the consolidation of trenches and localities after assault and capture (O.B. 1629, dated 4-6-16) already issued. 12. With regard to the second category of training (paragraph 2 (6)), thegeneral principles aid down in our training manuals hold good, and specia attention is directed to Chapters V, VI. VII, and IX, Field Service Regulations, Part I. Special exercises should be carried out by divisions to practise the continuation of the advance after a hostile systen of defences have been broken through. Such an advance will probably take the fortn of a series of attacks on tactica) points which are still held by the enemy by portions of the force, whist other portions continue a vigorous advance (105.5). Special attention should be given during some of these exercises to the methods of establishing a defensive dank to the division asit advances, and in aß exercises the genera principles of securing the ground gained must be carried out (see paragraph 11 above). 18. In a exercises the following points require special study on the part of Brigade and Battalion Commanders: (a) The employment of Brigade Machine Gun Companies and Lewis guns, to ensure that full advantage is taken of this great increase in fre power. In particular, opportunities should be looked for to practice pushing forward Lewis guns to precede the attacking infantry or to reinforce an advance which is held up. Attention is directed to Notes on the Use of Lewis Guns in an Advance," dated the 18th March, 1916, and "Notes on the Tactica! Employment of Machine Guns and Lewis Guns" (SS. 106). (b) The use of bombers (see S.S. 898 "Training and Employment of Bombers"). (c) The use of Trench Mortars. (d) The arrangements for getting all the above forward as rapidly as possible and keeping them supplied in action. 14. The service of supply, also, both as regards ammunition, food and water, should be carried out thoroughly in every detaill, at least one exercise of this nature being carried out after dark. 15. The following points have proved the chief stumbling blocks to a complete success in past attacks, and every effort mnust therefore be mnade to overconne theur: - te) Fastores ior mutual sopport- Every endearouk muust be Tnnde to Innintain Lateral communication; when a gap occurs in the Hne, whether caused by the failure of some portion of the force to reach its objective or otherwise, the troops on either side of the gap, who have reached their objective, must at once close the gap by extending inwards,or by pushing into the gap their nearest avanlable reserves, and in this way both re-establish Jatera] connmunication and isolate any hostile detachment which is holding out. The value of machine guns to hh a gap of this kind should be borne in mind. (b) Fanures in passing on information as to the situation. The vital importance of information and the responsibility of everyone in assisting to obtain and forward it maust be impressed on all ranks. (c) Fallure to re-organize and to consolidate the ground won in time to resist a counterattack. Every effort must be made to retain controß and cohesion, and every suitable opportunity of reforming must be taken. Consoldation, on the principles laid down in the memorandum referred to in paragraph iIl, muust be carried out with al speed and deternnination. (d) Unnecessary crowding of the assaulting columns, with the consequent increase in casualties and congestion. It must be borne in mind that beyond a certain point the addition of miore men merely results in ham pering an attack. (e) Premature using up of reserves. Every comamander maust make arrangements to retain control of his reserves till they are required for some deñnite purpose, and muust not allow them to drift into the nght piecemeal and with no clear guidance as to their objechive. 16. The strictest attention must continue to be paid to the cultivation of the power of command in young oficers, also to discipline, dress, saluting, cleanHness and care of bilets, and the importance of strict obedience to instructions as regards arrangemnents for supply, preservation of iron rations, water, etc., muust be immpressed on all ranks. Self-denial in the matter of water in particular nuust be practised; mnen must accuston thenselves to not drinking out of their water-bottles without orders, and control over the muen in this respect will be exercised by oficers during operations. Too great stress cannot be laid on developing good moral, a soldierly spirit, and a deter¬ mination in al ranks to achieve success at al costs. 17. „Troops once launched to the attack must push on at al costs till the fnal objective is reached. It must be impressed on all ranks that "decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive" (F.S.R. 99.1), and in no operation of war is rapidity and determination more important than in exploiting a success after breaking through a hostile systenn of defences. To ensure success it is impossible to exaggerate the vital importance of thorough training of al ranks, so that all may feel convinced that, when wenght we win. GHO. L. E. KIGGELL, Lieut.General, 8th May, 1916. CG.S. let Prinding Co. RM. GR0.2.
91015 FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY. [SS. 1091 NOT TO BE TAKENINTO FRONT LINE TRENCHES. Training of Divisions for Offensive Action. 1. The time available for divisions whenout of the Hne to train as divisions is short. It is necessary that the utist use should,be made of it, and that the object of the training should be clearly understoyd by all concerned. Success depends on preparaßons for all the phases of an attack, uiz.: (a) The organisation of our trenches for the assembly of the attacking force; (6) Theartillery bombardment; The crossingbf the àrea between our fronttrenches and the enemys; (d) The capture ofthe enemys defensive systens and artillery positions, and the consolidation againstcounter-attack of ground won; (e) Exploitation of success. The training ground must be carefully reconnoitred beforehand, and a detailed programme of the whole period must be prepared. Vf pogsible, every brigade should be exercisedin each form of training. 2. Thetraining of the division can be coneniently divided into two categories: (a) Training for the attack fror, trenches against a hostile system of trenches and strong points, including the consolidation and occupation of the position won. (6) Training for exploiting ag success when the hostile systems of defence have been broken through. 3. A complete system of hostile trenches and tt least the drst line of a second system together with the defended localities between th tvo systems, should be marked out on the ground to full scale from trench maps and aerial ynotographs, to represent as far as possible an actual system of trenches and strong points. The assault over the areas so marked out should be practised several times by the division as a vyhole; the division being disposed in depth on a narrow front with two brigades, and also with one brigade in the front line. A suitable assaulting front for a brigade against a strong objective may be taken at from 400 to 600 yards. The average front of a diyisión forming part of a larger force in an attack, however, must be governed by the nature of the country to be traversed, the difnculty of the task allotted, the intervals to be allowed between formations, the number of important objectives to be assaulted, and the number of brigades to beemployed in thefrontline. Itmay be taken at from 1,000 t0 1,800 yards,or an average of about 1,500 yards for several divisions in a decisive attack. The attack must aim at continuity and haust be Wriven home without intermission, so that the attack gradually works forward till the endyranc of the enemy is broken down. Every attacking unit must be given a Vimit nd clearly defned objective, which it is to capture and consolidate at all costs; the assaulting colunns must go right through above ground to this objective in successive wayes or lnes, each Hne adding fresh impetus to the preceding Hne when this is checked, and oerrying the whole forward to the objective. The cleaning up and consolidation of position passed over by the assaulting columns in their advance, the formation of protective danks, and the preparation of strong supporting points in the captured area will be carried out by othèr troops of the attacking force, following the assaulting columns and specially told of for the purpose. Local reserves must be held to reinforce those parts of the line which are checked, to ol gaps opening in the front and to relieve troops which are exhausted and whose endurance has gone. From the moment when the drst lne of assaulting troops leaves our front trenches, a continuous forward dow must be maintained from the rear throughout the division. Up to our own front line this How may be either abowe or below ground, according to topographical conditions, the nature of the enemys hre and the number ofcommunication trenches avallable, but once the assaulting troops have left ohr trenches and are pushing on to their objective, their movement will be carried out abowe graund. The movement of the Divisional Reserve ma be controlled when required by ordering before- hand that its forward dow is to be checked on reachung some defnite line (such as our original frst Hne of trenches), in which it will await ordere When a particular Hne or succession of Hnes have reached an objective assigned to them, for the consolidation of which preparations have alrendy been made, it will usually be inadvisable to order these troops to push on to a furthek objechive. It follows, therefore, that, to secure continuity in operations on a large scale, it muay be hecessary to arrange for fresh troops to pass through others. Occasions may also occurin which there is, beyond tha frst objective, a second objective, eg. another system of hostile trènches or centra of ressstance, which the Commander of the formation intends to attack, conditionally on the drat attack succeeding, with a fresh body of troops, but as part of the same operation. Divisions must, therefore, be practised in the nassing of a fresh body of attacking troops through the troops which have carned out the frsó assault and have reached their objective. The second attack will be carried out on the same principles, the assaulting columns going straight through to the objective in successive lines; The passing of one body of troops through another during an attack is, however, an extremely difdcult'operation, and should only be attempted when there is a reasonable opportunity of seizing and holding the second objective by immediate attack, as for instance when the drst attacking force has succeeded he gaining the whole objective it was ordered to consolidate, the artillery preparation on the seconóbjective has been adequate and effective, and the force detailed to attack it is well in hand. srarronnnx sxnvons rarss A-S 15S Gh6 250.
10. The conditions of every attack vary, however, and a special solution must be found for each individual problem. It depends on whether the furthest objective that has been allotted to a division can be reached in one continuous advance, or whether it is necessary to capture and consolidate some intermediate objective before the dnal one can be assaulted. 8. With regard to the above, it is impossible to lay down any defnite rules as to the strength of assaulting columns, the number of lnes of which they consist, or the distance apart of these lines. The depth of the assaulting column depends on the distance of the objective, and on the opposition that has to be overcome in reaching it. Its strength must be calculated so as to give suffcient driving power to enable the colunn to reach its objective and to providesufncient remaining energy to enable the objective to be held when gained. The distance apart of the lines will usually be regulated by the rate at which the successive lines can be formed up and moved forward over the parapet. The men in each lne should be extended at two or three paces interval. In this connection it is worthy of consideration that in many instances experience has shown thatto capture a hostile trench a single line of men has usually failed two lines have generally failed but sometimes succeeded, three Hnes have generally succeeded but sometimes failed, and four or more lines have usually succeeded. 7. In these exercises the attack or part of it should frequently fail to reach its objective, and the commanders of the units thus checked be confronted on the spot with a new situation and practised in making rapid decisions based on the original plan. Every brigade in turn should be called upon to move from reserve to the capture of an objective, in front of which the assaulting troops have been held up, or against which an attack has failed. The orders for this operation and a description of the artillery support that will be available will be given to Commanders on the spot. 8. Any division may bein reserve to one or more assaulting divisions. Such a task requires as careful previous preparation and study as does the task of the divisions actually detailed for the assault. The stafs and regimental offcers of the divisjon in reserve on any portion of the assaulting front must make themselves fanniliar by personal reconnaissance with the trench systenns over They must be provided which they may have to operate and with every detail of the ground. The Stafs and higher with the same maps as those used by the assaulting division. Commanders of the division in reserve muust study the plans and preparations of the assaulting divisions as closely as if they were their own. In this way only will they be able when the time comes to take up the attack without hesitation, and with a clear understanding of the task before them. From the moment the operation begins, the closest Haison must be established, in accordance with arrangements made beforehand; and responsible Staff Offcers from the Reserve Division should be attached to the Headquarters of the Divisions in front so as to follow every development of the action. As soon as it is known where the reserve division is to be put in, the proper place for the Commander of the Reserve Division and his Staff is at the Battle Headquarters of the Divisional Commander, who is controlling the operations in that particular portion of the battledeld. Special exercises should be held during the period of training by Divisional and Brigade Commanders with all their staffs and subordinate commanders- (a) To consider in detail the prelinninary arrangements for an attack on a large scale; and (b) Toconsidertheaction tobetaken bysubordinate commanders when localunexpected situations arise, such as occur when a portion of a lne is held up, impassable obstacles are encountered, or it becomes necessary to deliver or repel a local counter attack. With regard to (a), attention is directed to the memorandum on the preliminary arrangements in case of a large attack, issued with O. B./1207, dated the 2nd February, 1916. The artillery programme and co-operation should be worked out in all exercises and explained to al concerned. With regard to (b), it must be remembered that ofücers and troops generally do not now possess that mihitary knowledge arising from a long and high state of training which enables them to act promptly on sound Hnes in unexpected situations. They have become accustomed to deliberate action based on precise and detailed orders. Omcers and men in action will usually do what they have been practised to do or havebeen told to do in certain situations, and it is therefore all the more nccessary to ensure that a clean understanding should exist among all ranks as to what action is to be taken in the different situations that may arise in battle. In this connection every endeavour should be made to inculcate mutual conndence and the spirit of combination directly towards the achievement of the task set. During an advance under fre men must possess the habit of looking spontaneously to their leaders for direction; more often than not leaders have to look for and Hnd their men. Even this in itself is not suffcient. Situations will constantly arise when there is no offcer or non-commnissioned oficer present with groups of mien, and the men must realise that, in such a case, one man maust assume leadership on the spot and the remnainder act under his control. All must be prepared for heavy casualties, and must realize that the magnitude of the intereste at stake necessitate the greatest self-sacrifce from one and all. Brigade Headquarters, as well as Battalion Headquarters, must be practised in moving forward during the progress of an attack, and it is essential that communication from front to rear must not be lost. It is, therefore, necessary that the route to be followed by Headquarters should be well defned and known, so that runners both from front and rear will know the route to follow in order to pick up the Headquarters should it be moving. In thecase of Brigade and Battalion Headquarters it will usually be inadvisable tostate a place to which the Headquarters willmove. as that place may be inaccessible or untenable. Athorough system of good communication throughout the division is of the drst importance and every kind of alternative form of communication from front to rear, including parties of
men, under specially selected offcers, detailed as runners, must be continually practised throughout every exercise both by day and night. Al ranks must be warned of the vital importance of forwarding accurate and speedy information. This portion of the training will receive the special attention of the higher Commanders. With regard to the latter part of paragraph 2 (c), attention is directed to the memorandum on 11 the consolidation of trenches and localities after assault and capture (O.B. 1629, dated 4-6-16) already issued. 12. With regard to the second category of training (paragraph 2 (b)) the general principles laid down in our training manuals hold good, and special attention is directed to Chapters V. VI, VII, and IX. Field Service Regulations, Part I. Special exercises should be carried out by divisions to practise the continuation of the advance after a hostile system of defences have been broken through. Such an advance will probably take the form of aseries of attacks on tactical points which are still held by the enemy by portions of the force, whilst other portions continue a vigorous advance (105.6). Special attention should be given during Some of these exercises to the methods of establishing a defensive dank to the division as it advaces, and in all exercises the general principles of securing the ground gained must be carried but (ece paragraph 11 above) 13. In all exercises the following points require special study on the part of Brigade and Battalion Commanders: (c) The employment of Brigade Machine Gun Companies and Lewis guns, to ensure that full advantage is taken of this great increase in fre power. In particular, opportunities should belooked for to practice pushing forward Lewis guns to precede the attacking infantry orto reinforce an advance which is held up. Attention is directed to "Notes on the/Use of Lewis Guns in an Advance," dated the 18th March, 1916, and "Notes on the Tactical Employment of Machine Guns and Lewis Guns" (S.S.106) (6) The use of bombers (see S.S.89Training and Employment of Bombers"). (c) The use of Trench Mortars. (d) The arrangements for getbung all the above forward as rapidly as possible and keeping them supplied in action. 14. Theservice of supply, also, both as regards umhnition, food and water, should be carried out thoroughly in every detail, at least one exercise of this nature being carried out after dark. 15. The following points have proved the chief stumbling blocks to a complete success in past attacks, and every effort must therefore be made to overcome them: (a) Failures in mutual support, Every endeavour must be made to maintain lateral communication; when a gap occun the Hne, whether caused by the fallure of some portion of the force to reach its objedtive or otherwise, the troops on either side of the gap, who have reached their objectivemtst at once close the gap by extending inwards, or by pushing into the gap their nearest av ablereserves, and in this way both re-establish lateral communication and isolate any hostile detachment which is holding out. The value of machine guns to flla gap ofthis kind should be borne in mind. (b) Fallures in passing on inforadtion as to the situation. The vital importance of information and the responsibility of everyone in assisting to obtain and forward it must beimpressed on all ranks. (c) Failure to re-organize and to consoldate the ground won in time to resist a counter-attack. Every effort must be made to retain control and cohesion, and every suitable opportunity of reformiag must be taken. Consolidation, on the principles laid down in the memorandum refègred to in paragraph 11, must be carried out with all speed and determination. (d) Unnecessary crowding ofthe assaulting columns, withtheconsequent increase in casualities and congestion It must be borne in mind that beyond a certain point the addition of more menynerely results in hampering an attack. (c) Premature using up ofreserves. Ebery commander must make arrangements to retain control of his reserves till they ara required for some dednite purpose, and must not allow them to drift into the fght piecenea) and with no clear guidance as to their objective. 18. The strictest attention must continue to be paid to the cultivation of the power of command in young offcers, also to discipline, dress, saluting, cleanliness and care of billets, and the importance of strict obedience to instructions as regards arrangements for supply, preservation of iron rations, water, etc, maust be impressed on all ranks. Self denjal in the matter of water in particular must be practised; men must accustom themselves to not drinking out of their water-bottles without orders,and control over the men in this respect will be exercised by offcers during operations. Too great stress cannot be laid on developing good moral, a soldierly spirit, and a deternnination in all ranks to achieve success at al costs. 17. Troops once launched to the attack must push on at all costs till the fnal objective is reached. It must be impressed on all ranks that decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive" (F.S.R. 99.1), and in no operation of war is rapidity and determnination more important than in exploiting a success after breaking through a hostile systen of defences. To ensure success it is impossible to exaggerate the vital importance of thorough training ofall ranks, so that all may feel convinced that" when we nght we win. L. E. KIGGELL, Lieut. General, GHO. CGS. 8th May, 1916.
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1IST4 ller or OrgIurne 14th.Battalion Ne1 Maehine Gun Cey C.M.M. Dare Lieut-Col E.A. Wilton Major N.D. Fethers Here Fnd Majer A.M. Mitchell Lieut ant Stett (Captain A.R. Blainey ML. Langbourne W.G. Laver yick 2/ Lieut M.R. Carse oth sett M.c. C.R.T. Cole v.c. Veness R.C. Winn rdudde Ccaptain K.S. Ross J.L. Cope eiect Sykes H.J. Hautft o.C.*A"co Captain A.R. Cox F. Hicke R.W. Orr Kirkland : H.B. Wanlise tieus ..................... 21" J.B. Roderick Battalion LSth. R.D. Julien O.C..B" Fuhrmann .Maser o.c.w. Hors L.F. Tilney O.S.O. Lieut-cel Wadeworth JCaptain W.R. nam Major Harvey :Lieut A.T. 5o. Farks Captain F.C.W. Symonds 71 Davis Lieut A.W. ev.c. Jacka F.w. W Lieut-Col O.C.C /Captain Hancen S.M. Phillips Captain w.J.E. Smith B.T. c Barton o.c. Captain F.M. Walker Lieut M.R. Murray H.W. Hayee P.J. T. Welle Lieut Wilson R/ H.F. Murray Dean A.R. R.H. Kell 21 O.C. Cox Captain C.R.W. Heerson R.J. eps Stanton Ortho F.B. o.c. A.G. Fox An t. NcK. Williamson Lieut H.L. Henley A. Williamson S.J. No PHillamy Lieut J. Mackay C.W. Adams 21 R.W. Jonee C.B. Meyer 2/" 4474 c.S. Cooling .. ........ . . . . . . . . . .. 4 H.C. Ford O.c. Wajor J.K. Henderson Captain latn, Battulion J.D.D. Henry Lieut c.o. Lieut-Col. J.A. tannan C.B. A. Lanagan 21 H.Qre. Major. T.P. MeSharry J.C. Geary M.G. Officer Lieut. Cummine w.. worner w.w. Capt. A.H. Powellv M.O. H.D. Pulling O.S. Captain Capt. F.W. Craig g.M. Wells D.P. Lieut Majer. G.F. Dickineon o.c. Browning R.H. Capt. W.T. Mundell K.N. Pattrick rehLieut. Nechie Wallach s.S. Atkineon 2/Lieut. E. Randell J.M. Wateon N.G.Offieer w.U. Clasper D.S. Jopling Trretuellsk v. Martyr l6tA. BATTALICN E.K. Carter N.dre. Major. E.L. Margelin w.W. Coombee' o.C. Capt. E.J. Parke Adjt. H.Gre. cast. C.E. Snartt Lieut. A. Edge Q.M. J.C. Browne Lieut. 72 49 Capt. D.M. Steele N.O. N.Ore. R?I. Armold. 2/Lieut. Lieut. H.J. Cock N.e. J.H.W. Fraser Gde. Off. ".J. Lynas o.c C.M. Johnston Capt. o.C. Capt. R. Harwood H.R. Koch (Aetg. Adj) H.S. Nummerston W.H. Nicholls Lieut. 2/lieut. F. Wadge R.B. Melntech ginie G.A. whiting N. MeChie 2/Lieut. V.B. Wilton R. Claegow. Major. P. Black o. c. J.J. Corrigan Capt. bg Capt. A. Ahearn w.J. Cooper Lieut. R.C.H. Sleter Lieut. H. Brettingham-Moore 2/Lieut. L.A. Stepheneon 2/Lieut. A.A. Plane L.I. Goldetein Anafüe H. Smith ao ----- --- A. MeLeed. Capt. l6th. BATTALION * J. MacPherson Capt. V. Tucker Lieut. A.". Potts Lieut. R.S. Sommerville 2/Lieut. H. Wilson 2/Lieut. J.K. Robine F.F. Woode B.SPeagond J. Hutton J.E. Johnson o.c. Capt. H.C. Parker Wraft t eD
ORDERS FOR A. M. C. 4th Division. by Lieut-Col. G.W.Barber, A.D.M.S. 4th Division. O.C. will establish a Dressing Station at Roadhead 13th FIELD AMBULANCE. at the point where the road to the left junctions with The sphere of action of this station the main road. will extend from and inclusive of Camp 3 to Camp 57. One Sand cart can be kept at Gebel Habeita Camp, the remainder (5) with Camels and Cacolets kept ready at the Dressing Station to proceed to any point required in this area. Patients will be evacuated to the 13th Field Ambulance at Railhead by returning supply Waggons, Ambulance Waggons or other transport. O.C. will be prepared to establish an Advanced 12th FIELD AMEULANCE. Dressing Station at a spot in rear of Post 7 and the sphere of action for this station will extend from Camp 3 to the left flank. Patients will be evacuated either by return supply waggons from the end of the left road or direct to Railhead by Camels to the 12th Field Ambulance. One Sand cart can be kept at Camp 7 if necessary. O.C. must be prepared to send his Camel Transport X FLELD ABULANCE. with a few Bearers to evacuate patients from and inlusive of Camp 57 to Camp 62 to Railhead. For the present this line will be served by the 12th Field Ambulance who havé a Sand cart at Camp 58 until relieved by the 4th Field Ambulance. Jrd L.H. FIELD AMBULANCE. O.C. will have his Desert Ambulance and Convoy The Mounted ready to proceed with the Column. Bearers will be ready to co-operate with the Light Horse at Railhead and if necessary will remove their patients by Sand Carts or Camels which they must obtain by application te Dressing Stations before mentioned. The Horsed Ambulance will be kept in readiness to evacuate patients from Road er Railhead to the 54th C.C.S. As far as possible the horsed Ambulances of the 12th NOTE. and 13th Field Ambulance will be kept in readiness to assist in the evacuation of patients from Road or Railhead to the 54th C.C.S. Arrangements will also be made for the 12th and 13th Field Ambulances to evacuate inte the train which will o take patients to the 54th C.C.S. paiell/.115. uNN ke Copies to:- Lieut-Colonel. G.O.C. 4th Divisiom. G.O.C. Reilhead. A.D.M.S. G.O.C. 4th Brigade. 4th Division. G.O.C. 12th Brigade. G.O.C. 13th Brigade. C.D.A. D.D.M.S. 2nd Anzac. o.C. 54th C.C.S. O.c. 4th Field Amb. O.C. 12th Field Amb. O.C. 13th Field Amb. O.C. Jrd L.H. Field Amb.
AUSTRALLAN DAPINIAL FORO3 ORDORS Lieut.-General Sir W.R.BIRDWOOD, K.C.S.I., K. C.M.G., C.B.,C.I.2. D.S.O. Commanding Australian Imperial Force. Headquarters. 11th May, 19 16. Appointments & 138. List No. 54 of Appointments, Promotions, etc., Promotions which have been approved, is issued herewith. Establishments 139. Machine Gun Company - War Establishments - The following additions have been approved to the War Es¬ tablishments of a Machine Gun Company 1 Officer (Coptain or Lieutenant) as Second in Command, with one riding horse I bätman (Authority - A.0. 131 of 1916). 140. The following temporary increases to Estab- lishments have been approved - Artillery - 1 Subaltorn per Battery: Infantry 1 Subaltern per Company: (Authority - Defence Telogram W. 7676 of 8th May - A.A.G. 47/2) Leave 141. Officers and other ranks proceeding on leave of absence will, on arrival in the United Kingdom, report themselves, either personally er in writing, (stating the period of leave and their address) to The Staff Officer, Australian Military Administrative Offices, 130, Horseferry Road Westminster, LONDON, S.w. Pay 142. A Base Pay Office of the A.I.F. has been established at ROUEN. This Office will deal with all advances to - (i) Divisional Field Cashiers: (ii) Imprest Holders who cannot obtain advances from the Fiold Cashiers: in the following manner - Divisional Field Cashiers Requisitions for cash required by Divisional Field Cashiers for distribution to the Division should be for¬ warded to reach the Base Pay Office at least three days before the date fixed for payment. Wherever possille, a cheque on the nearest Branch of the BANQCE DE FRANCE capab of supplying the cash will be forwarded, thrcugh Despatch Rider Letter Service. Hequisitions for cash should show the Branch at which it is desired the cheque should be made payable. Divisional Field Cashiers will make advances to Divisional Imprest Holders, who should forward all ic¬ quittance Rolls for pay disbursements to the Field Cashier from whom the advance has beer received withir 46 hours of the receipt of the advance. Vouchers for diskurse- ments other than pay should be forwarded as early as pos¬ sible after such disbursements have been made. Acquittance Rolls and Vouchors representing the total of the advance made to the Field Cashiers should be immedistely for¬ warded by them to tho Baso Pay Office. Forms 15314 covering oll transactions of Imprest holders for the month should be forwarded to the Field Chshiors by the Imprest Jolders on the first of the ensuing month. [Imprest
Pay (a) continued 142 Imprest Holders who cannot be gupplied by Field Cashiers - Imprest Holders who cannot receive advances direct from the Field Cashiers should make application to the Base Pay Office for cash required, and, whenever possible, a cheque on the nearest Branch of the BANQUE DE FRANCE capable of supplying the cash will be forvarded by De¬ spatch Rider Letter Service direct to the Lmprest Holder. Requisitions for cash should show the Branch at which it is desired the cheque should be pavible. Acquittance Rolls for pay disbursements should be forwarded direct to the Base Pay Office within 48 hours of tho receiot of the advance. Vouchers for disbursements other than pay must be forworded as soon as possiblo after such disbursoments havo been made. Forms 1332A oovering all transactions for the month should be forwarded direat to the Base Pay Office on the first of each succeeding nonth. Issues of cash to individual soldiers will not be made by the Base Pay Office. Such advances are to be made by the Imprest Holder of the soldier's Unit, or, if that is not prac¬ ticable, by the nearest A.I.F. Imprest Holder. Clothing - Distinctive Colour Patches The following Colour Patches havo been approved - 143. AUSTRALIAN ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS. 2nd Aust. Division 1st Aust. Division 4-------2"----- - Dark Bue ......".. Red Red 1 5th Aust. Division 4th Aust. Division -------- Dark Ewwe Dark Bwa ..-. 1"3 77 Rediä Had L

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