Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 12, 2 May - 31 May 1916, Part 1

45

Confidential

4^th Aust. Inf.  Bde
May 2/16

H.Q

4^th Aust. Div. 
Reporting to a 386 & 389. - Delay in reply due to 
Inspection by G.O.C. 2nd Anzac, only just completed. - 

I recommend as follows: - 

For Brigade Major : - Capt. W.J.M Locke - Staff Captain, 4^th Bde

For Staff Captain : - Capt. S.M. Hansen - 14^th Battalion. - 

I propose that both appointments should be provisional, for a 
month's probation, & that no promotion should be made until specifically 
recommended by me. - 

Captain Locke has served with the Brigade, since its formation, on 
Brigade Staff; &  throughout the Gallipoli Campaign. He is a graduate 
of Duntroon Military College. - Mentioned in Dispatches. - Has carried 
out duties of Staff Captain for over 8 months, with entire satisfaction 
to me. - This officer possesses great industry, sound judgement &
initiative, & I have every reason to think that he would carry out 
the duties of Brigade Major satisfactorily. -

Captain Hansen served in with 14^th Battalion, throughout the Gallipoli 
Campaign. Was adjutant of this Battalion for 3 months. Now Company 
Commander. I consider him the best Company Commander 
in this Brigade. - I am of opinion that with a little training & 
experience in the duties of Staff Captain, he will be quite satisfactory. - 
His education & temperament are suitable for Staff 
work. 

John Monash B.G.

Comg. 4^th Aust. Inf. Bde.

THE SOLDIERS TEN COMMANDMENTS.

2/5/16

1. The Colonel is the only BOSS, thou shalt have no other Colonel 
   but him. 
2. But thou shalyt make unto thyself many graven images of Officers 
   who fly in the Heavens above, or Staff Officers who own the 
   earth beneath, and of Submarine Officers who are in the waters 
   under the earth, Thou shalt stand up, salute them, for the Colonel 
   thy BOSS will visit Field Punishment unto the 1st. & 2nd. 
   degree on those that saluteth not, and will shower stripes on those 
   that saluteth and obey his Commandments.
3. Thou shalt not take the name of the Adjutant in vain, for the C.O. 
   will not hold him guiltless who taketh the Adjutant's name in vain. 
4. Remember thou shalt not rest on the Sabbath Day. Six days shalt 
   thou labour and on the seventh day is the day of the C.R.E. ON 
   it thou shalt do all manner of work, thou shalt and thy Officers, 
   thy non-commissioned Officers, and sanitary men, and the 
   Kitchener's Army who are within thy trench. (For instruction). 
5. Honor the Army Staff that thy days may be long in the Corps 
   Reserve where one day they may need you. 
6. Thou shalt not kill only Huns, slugs, lice, rats and other vermin 
   which frequent dug-outs.
7. Thou shalt not adulterate thy section's rum ration. 
8. Thou shalt not steal, or at any rate be found out. 
9. Thou shalt not bear false witness in the Orderly Room. 

10. Thou shalt not covert the A.S.C's job, thou shalt covert 
    his billet nor his pay, nor his motors, nor his wagons, nor his tents,
    nor his horse nor his asses, nor any other cushy thing that he is. 

    - : 0 : -

     

    G 1/5

    Copy

    SECRET 

    G153

    Headquarters,

    4th. Australian Division.

    3.5.16.

    2nd. AN.Z.AC.

A BRIEF APPRECIATION

With reference to your G. 77. of 2nd. May 1916.

1. An enemy intending to attack, raid, or demonstrate now against 
   this part of the Canal must use UM MUKSHIEB as his last jumping 
   off place, owing to the fact that at no other place within striking 
   distance, can he get enough water for a considerable force.

   From MUKSHIEB his intentions might be :- 

   1. To threaten or to attack ISMAILIA. If his intentions are a 
      serious attack, there is more tongain by a success there than 
      anywhere else in the vicinity. The distance from MUKSHIEB 
      to ISMAILIA is 50 miles, and there is no water on the route. 
   2. To threaten or attack SERAPEUM or TOUSSOUM, as in January, 
      1915. The distance from MUKSHIEB to SERAPEM is 42 miles, 
      and to TOUSSOUM 43 miles. There is no water between. 

   3. To turn or pass the right flank of this sub-section and 
      attack DEVERSOIR or GENEFFE. Distances 41 and 30 miles 
      respectively. Neither place offers a great inducement to 
      an attacking force, and both can be powerfully protected by 
      ship's artillery. 

      This alternative may be considered the least likely 
      of the 3, and (a) the most probable.

      A fourth alternative is an intention to raid and
      overpower one (or more) of our outposts, as lately in the 
      Katia Valley. This seems to be as likely as (a) or (b). 

2. The object of our action in this part of the line in case of (a), 
   should be to place a sufficient and mobile force near the WADI 
   MUKSHIEB, in order to cut the enemy off from the only water 
   within reach when he is repulsed in front of FERRY POST. He is 
   bound to retire there after any repulse, for want of water as in 
   1915.

   In the case of (b), viz. a direct attack being attempted 
   on SERAPEUM or TOUSSOUM, it is open to us to decide how far out
   to meet him in force. This should be near the point where, while
   his troops will be fatigued and thirsty, ours will be fresh and 
   well watered. This would be somewhere between Railhead and the 
   front line outpost. It would not be sound to attempt to hold the 
   present outpost line as the main line of resistance. To do so 
   effectually would involve great dissemination of our force before 
   the enemy had shewn his intentions. The watering and feeding of a 
   considerable force in the outpost line would use up the camels, 
   which would be better employed in maintaining on offensive force. 

   As regards a possible intention to raid and empower a 
   post or posts in the outpost line; there is always some risk of 
   post or posts in the outpost line; there is always some risk of 
   this but the following measures, which will be taken at once, 
   should render it more difficult than it would be now. 

        (1) Reinforce the supports at Unit H.Q. Camps just behind 
             the line - and entrench the Camps (already ordered)

        (2) Improve existing telephonic communications. 

        (3) Improve existing used trenches in outpost line and put 
              down entanglements in WADIS between posts.

   In case (c), the object to be gained in unattractive and 
   the position of the right of our outpost line is formidable and commanding on KATAIB EL HABASHI. The support of one or two xxxxx 
   warships should render this flank secure. 
   
   
    

    

   
   3. MEASURES TO BE TAKEN
   To arrange for the largest possible force for which ration
   and 24 hours water for men can be carried to assemble at Railhead
   at very short notice - say 2 hours. This to include 3
   batteries of Artillery. (Inverness R.H.A. & 2 F.A, 4th Division
   This force would be prepared in the case of (a) to
   proceed to MUKSHIRE, (less 2 Batteries) or of (b) to move out to
   meet the enemy between Railhead and the outpost line, the most mobile part
   of it would proceed at once towards the threatened portion of the 
   line.
   The outpost line will be instructed to hold on as long as
   possible, and if forced to retire, to do so slowly towards the
   (entrenched) supporting camps. The ground offers great opportunities
   for defence while retiring.
   In accordance with your memo under reference I am
   submitting a list of requirements very shortly.
    
   Major. General
   Commanding 4th. Australian Division.
    

    

   87
   SECRET
   INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 531. ISMAILIA. 3rd MAY 1916
   
   Source of                               INTELLIGENCE.                 REMARKS.
   INTELLEGINACE OFFICE ISMAILIA   3/5/16.
   If the rumoured advance of the Turks takes place along the
   centre road during the next ten days, there will be no
   difficulty as far as water and roads, up to and including
   Hassana. West of Hassana., a good road has been made as far 
   Mirm el Hossain, after which the road surface has been
   cleared and scraped, but probably not metalled ( probably
   owing to lack of water) as far as wadi Rodh Salom.
   West of wadi Rodh Salom, nothing has been done, but the
   ground is chiefly hard lime-stone, and west of Gebel Um
   Makhassa gravel; it would present no great difficulty to
   the movement of artillery if sandy areas were avoided.
   The line of advance would presumably be the same as in
   February 1915, that is to say past Jifjafa, Gebel Um
   Makhassa, Khabret Zohra, Hubr Um Mukhshieb and Gebel
   Haboita.
   As regards water the first supply is at Bir Rodh Salem.
   some 25 miles west of Hassana. Here there are ten wells
   and a large tank, capable of XXXXXXX  supplying a large force.
   Those wells are a mile or two north of the road.
   14 miles further west is Bir Jifjafa where no water has
   xx been found after many unsuccessful attempts. 
   Approximately 25 miles west of Bir Rodh Salem, there is
   now, owing to recent rain, a very large amount of
   water stored in the ancient rock cisterns and pools of
   Gebel Um Mukhsheib. Two ancients groups of cisterns, close
   under the western face of the hill and easily accessible,
   can hold when full, roughly some 500,000 gallons.
   The Arabs say that all cisterns and pools are now full.
   In the bed of wadi Mukhsheib about 8 miles west of Gebel
   Um Mukhsheib are 4 pools of water and 8 miles further west
   still, are 3 pools. The water in those pools is rapidly 
   diminishing, so that to take an advantage of them, an attack
   would have to be made soon.
   From the most westerly pool to Serapeum to Tussun is
   roughly 23 to 25 miles.
   
    

    

   SECRET
   Headquarters,
   4th. Australian Division.
   3rd. May 1916.
   1. With a view to meeting an attack against this
   section of the line, or against the section on either
   flank, the following preparations will be made immediately.
   2. One Battalion, 12th. Infantry Brigade will be
   moved to Roadhead Camp as support to the front line,
   and will put the camp into a state of defence. G.O.C 3rd.
   A.L.H. Brigade and 12th. Infantry Brigade will discuss the
   question of altering the site of this Camp. 
   3. Two Batteries (guns and F.B. Wagons only) 4th.
   Div. Artillery will be formed at once, with sand tyres on wheels
   A trial mobilisation and a march to railhead and back will
   be carried out when they are ready. These batteries will
   then be held in a state of readiness to turn out at short 
   notice- say one hour.
   4. The 13th. Infantry Brigade with M.G. Company and
   13th. Field Ambulance less B. Section Tent Division will
   be held ready to move at short notice, say 3 hours, to Railhead
   Camp. A reconnaissance for the site of a Camp at Railhead
   will be carried out forthwith
   5.  S.A.A. of troops in outpost and supporting line will
   be increased to 400 rounds per rifle.
   S.A.A. up to 400 rounds a man for 6 Battalions and up to 
   3000 rounds a Machine Gun for 16 Machine Guns, also a first
   reserve for 3 batteries will be collected at Railhead
   during the next 7 days under the supervision of the C.D.A.
   An Ammunition Column Detachment will be made ready to carry
   more ammunition to Railhead at short notice.
   6. Four day's supplies for 5 Batteries, 9 Squadrons
   and 2 Brigades will be collected at Railhead. One Day's
   reserve supplies for a Battalion will be collected at each 
   supporting camp.
   7. Storage for water at the,3 supporting camps will be 
   made up to 24 hours' supply, in addition to normal 
   consumption.
   8. In the event of information being received that
   MUKSHEIB is occupied in force;-
   (a) 2 Batteries 4th. Division Artillery, 13th. Infantry
   Brigade and 13th. Field Ambulance (less B. Section Tent Div.
   will be moved up to Railhead.
   (b) 4th. Infantry Brigade (less 1 Battalion) will be in th
   General Reserve at Staging Camp, ready to move out
   at two hours notice as soon as 13th. Brigade.has left.
   9. Further instructions with regard to the formation
   of a mobile column for operations East of the front line
   will be issued.
    

   TK Bernard

   Lieut- Colonel,
   G.S.4th. Australian Division.
   Copies to:-
   3rd. L.H.Bde. 4th., 12th., 13th.
   Infantry Brigades.
   4th. Pioneer Bn., C.D.A., C.D.E.
   A.D.M.S., S.S.O.

    

    

   
   No 2

   [*4^th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
   No G.C. 2/5
   4 MAY 1916*]
   SECRET.
   Headquarters, 
   Australian Division.
   4th May, 1916.
   
   1. Instructions have been received that the enemy will
   be met and repulsed on the present front line. In order to make
   this possible it is necessary to strengthen the Garrison of the
   front line and move up supporting troops into closer proximity.
   2. Orders contained in Gc 2/3 of yesterdays date are
   modified as follows:-
   The front line will be held as under-
   RIGHT SECTION.  Pioneer Battalion and one Battalion
                                    12th Infantry Brigade
   LEFT SECTION.     12thh Infantry Brigade less one Battalion
                                     (one Battalion and Machine Gun Company
                                      will be held in reserve)
                                      Railhead camp will be
                                      occupied only by mounted troops.
   3. The move of the 12th. Infantry Brigade to the front 
   line will be carried out as soon as possible under arrangements to
   be made by 3rd. A.L.H. Brigade in conjunction with 12th Infantry
   Brigade. 
   Camels sufficient for the move of two Battalions from 
   Railhead to the front line are being sent up to Railhead.
   5. Work on the front line will be pushed on as rapidly as
   possible, especially as regards the construction of entanglements,
   and new works which have been ordered to increase the field of
   fire to the  front.
   Entanglements should as far as possible be made where
   they can come under Artillery fir2 from front line works.
   6. Orders regrading Artillery, S.A.A, Water and Supplies
   hold good.
    

   TK Bernard

   Lieut- Colonel,
   G.S.4th. Australian Division.
   Copies to:-
   3rd L.H. Brigade,
   4th Inf Brigade,
   12th Inf Brigade,
   13th Inf Brigade,
   4th Pioneer Battalion,
   C.D.A.
   C.D.E.
   A.D.M.S.
   S.S.O.
   
   
   
    

    

   [*4th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
   No G.C. 2/13
   4 MAY 1916*]
   Copy No. 2
   Headquarters, 
   Australian Division.
   7th May, 1916.
   1. The following mobile column will be organised at Railhead
   to operate East of Front Line.
   2. Commander,  G.O.C. , 3rd Light Horse Brigade.
   13th Infantry Brigade, (less 2 Battalions.)
   1 Section Inverness-shire Battery ( Guns only, 76 rounds
                                                                  (per run on camels.)
   2 Squadrons 3rd. L.H. Brigade.
   Detachment R.E.
   W/T Section.
   Part of 3rd. L.H. Field Ambulance.
   Medical Convoy.
   [* 4AB/4005
   AUSTRALIAN 
   IOMPERIAL FORCE
   MAY 7 1916
   4th Infantry Brigade*]
   Lewis Gun Sections will not accompany Battalions.
   Men will carry 1 blanket and no packs.    )
   120 rounds per man and 200 in reserve  )   will be carried.
   3500   "         "      M.G.   " 6000   "      "           ))
   2 days supplies for men and horses, 1 days water for
   horses, and two days water for men will accompany the 
   force.
   Full details as to transport etc. are being forwarded
   to 3rd. L.H. Brigade and 13th Infantry Brigade.
   3. Camels and fanatasses sufficient for the Column to start
   will be maintained at Railhead.

   G.O.C., 3rd L.H. Brigade will communicate direct with Units
   concerned, with a view to the column being immediately  
   organised. 1 Troop from Divisional Squadron will proceed 
   out with the Column to escort back the convoy, and 1 Troop
   will act as escort to the convoy leaving the next day.
   4. When the Column marches out Divisional Headquarters will 
   be moved up to Railhead.
   4th Infantry Brigade will detail 1 Battalion for the 
   defence of the Inner Line, as at present, and for the Remainder
   of the Brigade will be held ready to move out if necessary.
   It will operate from its present camp and no transport
   etc. will be taken.
   5. In addition to the Mobile Column detailed above, 3rd.
   L.H. Brigade will hold 3quadrons always ready for
   immediate action in proximity to the front line.
   
   TK Bernard

   Lieut- Colonel,
   G.S.4th. Australian Division.
   
   Copy No. 1     3rd L.H. Brigade,
                     2.   4th Inf Brigade,
                     3    12th Inf Brigade,
                     4    13th Inf Brigade,
                     5     Div. Calvary 
                     6     C.D.A.
                     7     C.D.E.
                     8     A.D.M.S.
                     9     D.A.C.O.S.
                    10     S.S.O.
                     11)
                     12)  Q.
                      13   2/A.N.Z.A.C 
                    14 to 20 Office Copies.
   
    

    

   SS. 109.
   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

   NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO FRINT LINE TRENCHES
   TRAINING OF DIVISIONS FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION
   8/5/1916
   1. The time available for divisions when out of line to train as divisions is short.
   It is necessary that utmost use should be made of it, and that the object of the training
   should be clearly understood by all concerned.
   Success depends on preparations for all classes of attack, viz:-
   (a) The organisation of our trenches for the assembly of the attacking force;
   (b) The Artillery bombardment;
   (c) The crossing of the area between our front trenches and the enemy's;

   (d) The capture of the enemy's defensive systems and artillery positions, and the
   consolidation against counter-attack of ground won;
   (e) Exploitation of success.
   The training ground must be carefully reconnoitered, beforehand, and a detailed programme
   of the hole period must be prepared. If possible, every brigade should be exercised in each
   form of training.
   2. The Training of the division can be conveniently divided into two categories;-
   (a) Training for the attack from trenches against a hostile system of trenches and
   strong points, including the consolidation and occupation of the position won.
   (b) Training for exploiting a success when the hostile systems of defence have been
   broken through.
   3. A complete system of hostile trenches and at least the first line of a second system
   together with the defended localities between these two systems, should be marked out on the
   hostile ground to full scale from trench maps and aerial photographs, to represent as far as
   possible an actual system of trenches and strong points. The assault over the are so marked
   out should be practised several times by the division as a whole; the division being disposed in
   depth on a narrow front with two brigades, and also with one brigade in the front line.
   A suitable assaulting front for a brigade against a string objective may be taken at from 400
   to 600 yards. The average front for a division forming part of a larger force in an attack, 
   however, must be governed by the nature of the country to be traversed, the difficulty of the task allocated, the intervals to be allowed between formations, the number of important objectives
   to be assaulted, the number of brigades to be employed in the front line. It may be taken
   at from 1,000 to 1.800 yards, or an average of about 1,500 yards for several divisions in a 
   decisive attack.
   4. The attack must aim at continuity and must be driven home without intermission, so
   that the attack gradually works forward till the endurance of the enemy is broken down.
   Every attacking unit must be given a limited and clearly defined objective, which it is to
   capture and consolidate at all costs; the assaulting columns must go right through above ground to thei objective in successive waves or lines, each line adding fresh impetus to the
   preceding line when this is checked, and carrying the whole forward of the objective. The
   cleaning up and consolidation of positions passed over by the assaulting columns in their
   advance, the formation of protective flanks, and the preparation of strong supporting points in 
   the captured area will be carried out by other troops of the attacking force, following the
   assaulting columns and specially told off for the purpose. Local reserves must be held to
   reinforce those parts of the line which are checked, to fill gaps opening in the front and to
   relieve troops which are exhausted and whose endurance has gone.
   From the moment when the first line of assaulting troops leaves our front trenches, a
   continuous forward flow must be maintained from the rear throughout the division. Up to
   our own front line this flow may either be above or below ground, according to the topographical
   conditions, the nature of the enemy's fire, and the number of communication trenches available, 
   but once the assaulting troops have lelfth out trenches and are pushing on to their objective,
   their movement will be carried out above ground. 
   The movement of the Divisional Reserve may be controlled when required by ordering
   beforehand that its forward flow is to be checked on reaching some definite line (such as our
   original first line of trenches), in which it will await orders.
   5. When a particular line or succession of lines have reached an objective assigned
   to them, for the consolidation of which preparations have already been made, it will
   usually be inadvisable to order these troops to push onto a further objective. It follows,
   therefore, that, to secure continuity in operations on a large scale, it may be necessary to
   arrange for fresh troop to pass through otters.
   Occasions may also occur in which there is, beyond the first objective, a second objective,
   e.g., another system of hostile trenches or centre of resistance, which the Commander of the 
   formation intends to attack, conditionally on the first attack succeeding, with a fresh body of
   troops, but as part of the same operation.
   Divisions must, therefore, be practised in the passing of a fresh body of attacking troops
   through the troops which have carried out the first assault and have reached their objective.
   The second attack will be carried out on the same principles. the assaulting columns going
   straight through the objective in successive lines.
   The passing of one body of troops through another during an attack is, however, an
   extremely difficult operation, and should only be attempted when there is a reasonable 
   opportunity of seizing and holding the second objective by immediate attack, as for instance
   
    

    

   2
   when the first attacking force has succeeded in gaining the whole objective it was ordered to
   consolidate, the artillery preparation on the second objective has been adequate and effective, 
   and the force detailed to attack it is well in hand.
   The conditions of every attack vary, however, and a special solution must be found for
   each individual problem. It depends on whether the furthest objective that has been allotted
   to a division can be reached in one continuous advance, or whether it is necessary to
   capture and consolidate some intermediate objective before the final one can be assaulted.
   6. With regard to the above, it is impossible to lay down any definite rules as to the 
   strength of assaulting columns, the number of lines of which they consist, or the distance
   apart of these lines.
   The depth of the assaulting column depends on the distance of the objective, and on the
   opposition that has to be overcome in reaching it. Its strength must be calculated so as to
   give sufficient driving power to enable the column to reach its objective and to provide sufficient
   remaining energy to enable the objective to be held when gained. The distance apart of the
   lines will usually be regulated by the rate at which the successive lines can be formed up and
   moved forward over the parapet. The men in each line should be extended at two or three
   paces interval. In this connection it is worthy of consideration that in many instances
   experience has shown that to capture a hostile trench a single line of men usually failed,
   two lines generally failed but sometimes succeeded, three lines generally have succeeded
   but sometimes failed, and four or more lines have usually succeeded.
   7. In these exercises the attack or part of it should frequently fail to reach its objective,
   and commanders of the units thus checked be confronted on the spot with a new situation
   and practised in making rapid decisions based on the original plan.
   Every brigade in turn should be called upon to move from reserve to the capture if an
   objective, in front of which the assaulting troops have been held up, or against which an attack
   has failed. the orders for this operation and a description of the artillery support that will be
   available will be given to Commanders on the spot.
   8, Any division may be in reserve to one or more assaulting divisions. Such a task
   requires as careful previous preparation and study as does the task of the divisions actually
   detailed for the assault.
   The staffs and regimental officers of the division in reserve on any portion of the assaulting
   front must make themselves familiar by personal reconnaissance with the trench systems
   over which they may have to operate and with every detail on the ground. They must be
   provided with the same maps as those used by the assaulting division. The Staffs and higher
   Commanders of the division in reserve must study the plans and preparations of the assaulting
   divisions as closely as if they were their own. In this way only will they be able when the
   time comes to take up the attack without hesitation, and with clear understanding of the
   task before them.
   From the moment the operation begins, the closest liaison must be established, in accordance
   with arrangements made beforehand; and responsible Stag=ff Officers from the Reserve
   Division should be attached to the Headquarters of Divisions in the front so as to follow every
   development of the action. As soon as it is known where the reserve division is to be put in,
   the proper place for the Commander of the Reserve Division and his staff is at the Battle
   Headquarters of the Divisional Commander, who is controlling the operations in that particular
   portion of the battlefield.
   9. Special exercises should be held during the period of training by Divisional and Brigade
   Commanders with their staffs and subordinate commanders-
   (a) To consider in detail the preliminary arrangements for an attack on a large scale;
   and
   (b) To consider the action to be taken by subordinate commanders when local unexpected 
   situations arise, such as occur when a portion of a line is held up, impassible obstacles
   are encountered, or as it becomes necessary to deliver or repel a counter-attack.
   With regard to (a), attention is directed to memorandum on the preliminary arrangements
   in case of large attack, issued with O.B./1207, dated the 2nd February 1916. The 
   artillery programme and co-operation should be worked out in all exercises and explained to all
   concerned.
   With regard to (b), it must be remembered that officers and troops generally do not now
   possess that military knowledge arising from a long and high state of training which enables
   them to act promptly on sound lines in unexpected situations. They have become accustomed to
   deliberate action based on precise and detailed orders.
   Officers and men in action will usually do what they have been practised to do or have
   been told to do in certain situations, and it is therefore all the more necessary to ensure that a
   clear understanding should exist among all ranks as to what action is to be taken in the 
   different situations that may arise in battle. In this connection every endeavour should be
   made to inculcate mutual confidence and the spirit of combination directly towards the
   achievement of the task set. During an advance under fire men must possess thee habit of
   looking spontaneously to their leaders for direction; more often than not leaders have to look
   for and find their men. Evern this in itself is not sufficient. Situations constantly arise
   when there is no officer or non-commissioned officer present, with groups of men, and the men 
   must realise that, in such a case, one man must assume leadership on the spot and the remainder
   act under his control.
   All must be prepared for heavy casualties, and must realise the magnitude of the
   interests at stake necessitate the greatest self-sacrifice from one and all.
   10. Brigade Headquarters, as well as Battalion Headquarters, must be practised in
   moving forward during the process of an attack, and it is essential that communication from
   front to rear must not be lost. It is, therefore, necessary that the route to be followed by
   Headquarters should be well defined and known, so that runners both from front and rear will
   know the route to follow in order to pick up the Headquarters should it be moving. In the 
   case of Brigade and Battalion Headquarters it will usually be inadvisable to state a place
   which the Headquarters will move, as that place may be inaccessible or untenable.