Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 12, 2 May - 31 May 1916, Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Part of Quest:
Sir John Monash (General, b.1865 - d.1931)
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open to contributions
Accession number:
RCDIG0000612
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

45 41 Arst. dg Bda Gonfidentid Man 2/14 H Agt puet. Fi. Reren to a 386.389-- Belag in refty dur to Safeeteom bog (. O. C. 2å Hooggaa, ontg guet lovofletet.- Jrecommnent as föltove:- Tr Brigade Wafor: - laft. W.Tor. dorka i Stagf Papan, i c 5t Safflagtam:- Cagt S.o Haman - Itü Badetimn- a) prokvar thrart bott affsvtonente okonek be povvrorarel, fod or vodtis foobetron, t Srat zro posmotton ohondt be made untl ifaai- finallg peevmmendet ty ooe. - (astaidäcke kas anmved sett tk. Bripade, emnee si formaton, om Porignde Staff) 7 ttanghont ske l3aelifrsli lannfaigon. He oo a fradmate g mtovon djelitern løllege. - Sjestinat in drsfatates.- Has aareds ont dutres s SStrfg Caftan tor ovar 6 monttes, wirtt entese astos facto- 5 me.-This ogfreer hvonsses graat odtnattig, ovout yndgement v paatiatøe, v 23 tave everng peaava to Shand ftat he vvrdt aerg ovt dri duhin g Tn pale Hapos oatnsfrctsighy.- Ceftam Wannen, setved sokr lafd Heilsden, Krnfend R. Grlhiges Cännpagonr. Slas htpetant g Sis Pattation for 3 montts. tou løon- Kang lonsmomded. S corrandtet him tke beot lønfranng lonmended om Fae Brigade. - I am of ofion thot astte a loltle franngt lypreisenee in tte derti- g ksff laptan, ta oult bre gonte set. 454 faetvoog. Hrs edmaitrong lnnferasente ave orietonble frr o otmtmmnente nic linng do frnt def. tode
THE SOLDIERS TEN COMMANDMENTS. 215/6 1. The Colonel is thy only BOSS, thou shalt have no other Colonel aut him. But thou shaly make unto thysf many graven images of Officers 2. who fly in the Heavens above; or Staff Officers who own the earth beneath, and of Submarime Officers who are in the aaters under the earth, Thou shalt stand up, salute them, for the Colonel thy Boss will visit Field Punishment unto the lst. & 2nd. degree on those that saluteth not, and will shocer stripes on those that saluteth and obey his Commandments. Thou shalt not take the name of the Adjutant in vain, for the C.O. will not hold him guiltless who taketh the Adjutant's name in vain. Remember thou shalt not rest on the Sabbath Day. Six days shalt thou labour and on the seventh day is the day of the C.R.E. ON it thou shalt do all manner of work, thou shalt and thy officers, thy non-commissioned Officers, and sanitary men, and the Kitchener's Army who are within thy trench. (For instruction). Honor the army Staff that thy days may be long in the Corps Reserve where one day they may need you. Thou shalt not kill only Huns, slugs,lice,rats, and other vermin 6. which frequent dug-outs. Thou shalt not adulterate thy scetion's rum ration. 7. 8. Thou shalt not steal, or at any rate be found out. Thou shalt not bear false witness in the Orderly Room. 9. Thou shalt not covertthe A.S.C's job, thou shalt not covert his 10. billet nor his pay, nor his motors, nor his wagons, nor his tents, nor his horse nor his asses, nor any other cushy thing that he is. : O:
2. 6 Copy Headquarters, 4th. Australian Division. 6153 SECRET 3.5.16. 2nd.AN.Z. A C. A BRIEF APPRECIATION With reference to your G. 77. of 2nd. May 1916. An enemy intending to attack, raid, or demonstrate now against this part of the Canal must use UM MUKSHIEB as his last jumping off place, owing to the fact that at no other place within striking distance, can he get enough water for a considerable force. From MUKSHIEB his intentionsmight be: To threaten or to attack ISMAILIA. If his intentions are a (a). serious attack, there is more tongain by a success there than The distance from MUKSHIEB anywhere else in the vicinity. to ISMAILIA is 50 miles, and there is no water on the route. To threaten or attack SERAPEUM or TOUSSOUM as in January, (b). The distance from MUKSHIEB to SERAPEUM is 42 miles, 1915. and to TOUsSOUM 43 miles. There is no water between. (c). To turn or pass the right flank of this sub-section and attack DEVERSOIR or GENEFFE. Distances 41 and 30 miles respectively. Beither place offers a great inducement to an attacking force, and both can be powerfully protected by ship's artillery. This alternative may be considered the least likely of the 3, and (a) the most probable. A fourth alternative is an intention to raid and overpower one (or more) of our outposts, as lately in the Katia Valley. This seems to be as likely as (a) or (b). The object of our action in this part of the line in case of (a), should be to place a sufficient and mobile force near the VADI MUKSHIEB, in order to cut the enemy off from the only water within reach whn he is repulsed in front of FERRY POST. He is bound to retire there after any repulse, for want of water as on 1915. In the case of (b) viz. a direct attack being attempted on SERAPEUM or TOUSSOUM, it is open to us to decide how far out to meet him in force. This should be near the point where, while his troups will be fatigued and thirsty, ours will be fresh and well watered. This would be somewhere between Railhead and the front line outpost. It would not be sound to attempt to hold the present outpost line as the main line of resistance. To do so effectually would involve great dissemination of our force before the enemy had shewn his intentions. The watering and feeding of a considerable force in the outpost line would use up the camels, which would be better employed in maintaining on effensive force. As regards a possible intention to raid and empower a post or posts in the outpost line; there is always some risk of this but the following measures, which will be taken at once, should render it more difficult than it would be now. Reinforce the supports at Unit H.Q. Camps just behind (i) the line - and entrench the Camps (already ordered) Inprove existing telephoic communications. Improve existing used trenches in outpost line and put down entanglements in WADIS between posts. In case (c), the object to be gained in unattractive and the peeition of the right of our outpost line is formidable and commanding on MATAIB EL HABASHI. The support of one or two warships should render this flank secure.
meäburko 70 ns rakum To arrange for the largest possible force for which ration and 24 hours water for men can be carried to assemble at Rail- head at very short notice - say 2 hours. This to include 3 batteries of Artillery. (Inverness R.H.A. 2 F.A. 4th. Division This force would be prepared in the case pf (a) to proceed to MUKSHIEB, (less 2 Batteries) or of (b) to move out to meet the enemy between Railhead and the outpost line - or in case of a raid on posts in the outpost line, the most mobile part of it would proceed at once towards the threatened portion of the line. The outpost line will be instructed to hold on as long as possible, and if forced to retire, to do so slowly towards the (entrenched) supporting camps. The ground offers great opportun- ities for defence while retiring. In accordance with your memo under reference, I am submitting a list of requirements very shortly. Major. General Commanding 4th. Australian Division.
AU S E O R E T. INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 531.ISMAILIA. 3rd MAY 1916. VTTY Y Y VLELLIGENCE. REMARKS. Source of vrrre INTELLIGENCE If the rumoured advanco of the Turks takos plaoo along tho OFFICE AILIA oontre road during the noxt ton days, there will be no 3/5/18. diffioulty as far as water and roads, up to and inoluding Hassuna. West of Hassana, a good road has been made as far as Mirm el Hossain, after whioh tho road surface has been oloarod and sorapod, but not properly metalled (probably owing to laok of water) as far as wadi Rodh Salom. West of wadi Rodh Salom, nothing has been dono, but the ground is chiefly hard lime-stono, and west of Gebel Um Makhassa gravel; it would present no great difficulty to tho movement of artillery if sandy areas wero avoided. Tho line of advanoo would prosumably be the same as in Fobruary 1915, that is to say past Jifjafa, Gebel Um Makhassa, Khabret Zohra, Hubr Um Mukhsheib and Gebel Haboita. As rogards wator the first cupply is at Bir Rodh Salem, Horo there are ten wolls some 25 miles west of Hassana. and a large tank, oapable of supplying a largo foroe. Thoso wolls are a mile or two north of the road. 14 miles further west is Bir Jifjafa whero no water has xx beon found after many unsuooossful attempts. Approximately 25 miles wost of Bir Rodh Salem, thore is now, owing to tho reoont rain, a very large amount of water stored in the anoiont rook oisterns and pools of Two anoient groups of cisterns, close Gebel Um Mukhsheib. under the westorn face of tho hill and oasily accessable, oan hold whon full roughly some 500,000 gallons. Tbe Arabs say that all oisterns and pools are now full. In the bed of wadi Mukhshoib about 8 milos west of Gebel Um Mukhsheib are 4 pools of water and 8 miles further wost still, aro 3 pools. The water in those pools is rapidly diminishing, so that to take advantago of them, an attack would have to bo made soon. From the most westerly pool to Sorapeum or Tussun is roughly 23 to 25 miles.
e- Headquarters, ant. 00 4th. Australian Division. õrd. May 1916. th w to-movhiruf an sttack against this section of the lino, or against the soction on elther flank, the following preparations will be made immodiatoly. Ono Battalion, 12th. Infantry Drigade will be 2. moved to Roadhead Camp as a support to the front line, õrd. and will put tho camp into a state of defence. G.O.C. A.L.H. Brigado and 12th. Infantry Brigado will discuss the question of altering the site of this Camp. Two Batteries (Guns and F.B.Wagens only) 4th. Div. Artillory will be formed at once, with sand tyres on wheols A trial mobilisation and a march to rallhead and back will bo carried out whon they aro ready. These batteries will then bo hold in a stato of readinpes to turn out at short notice - say ono hour. The 13th. Infantry Brigado with M.G. Company and 4. 13th. Fiold Ambulanco loss B. Soction Tont Division will be held roady to move at short notico, say 3 hours, to Railhead Camp. A reconnaissance for the site of a Camp at Railhead will be carried out forthwith. S.A.A. of troops in outpost and supporting line will 1bo increased to 400 rounds per riflo. S.A.A. up to 400 rounds a man for 6 Eattalions and up to 3000 rounds a Machino Gun for 16 hachine Guns, also a first rosorve for 3 batterios will be collected at Railhead during the next 7 days under tho supervision of the C.D.A. An Ammunition Column Detachment will be made roady to carry moro ammunition to Railhead at short notice. Four day's supplios for 5 Battorios, 9 Squadrons 6. One Day's and 2 Brigados will be collected at Railhead. reserve supplies for a Battalion will be collected at each supporting camp. Storage for water at the.3 supporting zamps will be made up to 24 hours' supply, in addition to the normal consumption. In the ovent of information being received that MUKSHEIB is occupiod in fopco :- 2 Battesies 4th. Division Artillory, 13th. Infantrw (a) Brigade and 13th. Field Ambulance (less B. Section Tent Div. will be moved up to Railhoad. 4th. Infantry Brigade (loss 1 Battalion) will be in th 6). Genoral Roserve at Staging Camp, ready to move out at two hours notico as soon as the 13th. Brigade. has left. Further instructions with regard to the formation of a mobile column for operations East of the front line will be issued. Koer Copies to :- Lieut-Colonel. Jrd. L.H.Bde. 4th., 12th., 13th. G.S. 4th. Australian Division. Infantry Brigades. éth. Pioneer Bn., C.D.A.,C.D.E. A.D.M.S.,S.S.0.
K. 7 nge (Ms STCRTT. Headquarters, 4th Australian Division. 4th May, 1916. Instructions have been received that the enemy will be met, and repulsed on the present front line. In order to make this possible it is necessary to strengthen the Gerrison of the front line and move up surporting troops into closer proximity. Orders contained in Go 2/3 of yesterdays date are modified as follows :- The front line will be held as under - Tm g Pioneer Battalion and one Battalion wlO. 12th Infantry Drigade. TEo 12th Infaht Ty Brigade less one Fattalion LRINI. (one Bartalkon and Machtne Tun Compuny i i ee Rredhead camp will be occupied only by mounted troops. The move of the 12th Infantry Brigade to the front line will be carried out as scon as possible, under arrangements to T be made by 3rd A.L.n Brigade in "conjunction with 12th Infantry Brigade. Camels sufficient, for the move of two Battalions from Railhead to the front line are being sent up to Railhead. 13th Infantry Brigade lese two Battalions will move ur to Railhead on 8th instant. Work on the front line will be pushed on as rapidly as possible, especially as rege ards the construction of entanglements, and new works which have been ordered to increase the field of fire to the ront. Entanglements should as far as possible be made where they oan come under fire from front line works. Orders regarding Artillery, S.A.A, Water and Supplies hold good. i Lieut-Colonel; General Staff. 4th Australian Division. Cories to :- 3rd L.H.Brigade, Ath Inf. Birgade, 12th Inf.Brigade, 13th Inf.Brigaie, 4th Pioneer Battaion, C.D.A. C.D.T. A.D.F.S. S.S.0.
t .(IMat13/6) Heidquarters, Cory No. ..2...... a 4th Australion Division, 7th May 1915. The following mobile column will be organised at Railhead 1. to operate Mast of the Front Line. Commander, G.O.C., 3ri Light Morse Brigade. 2. tMA NOOS 13th Infantry Brigade, (less 2 Battalions.) 1 Section Inverness-shire Battery. (Guns only, 76 rounds AUSTRALIAN (per gun on camele.) IMPERIAL FORCE 2 Squudtons 3rd. L.H.Brihade. Detachment R.E. MAY 7 1916 W/T Section. Part of 3rd. L.H. Field Ambulance. 4ch Intantry Brigade. Medical Convoy. Lewis Gun Sections will not accompany Battalions. Men will carry one blanket and no packs. 120 rounds per man and 200 in reserve will be carried. " F.G. " 6000 3500 2 days supplies for men and horses, 1 day's water for horses, and two days water for men will accompany the force. Full detailsas to transport etc. are being forwarded to 3rd. L.H. Brigade and 13th Infantry Brigade. Camels and fantasses sufficient for the Golumn to start will be maintained at Railhead. G.O.C.,3rd L.H. Brigade will communicate direct with Units concerned, with a viey to the Column being immediately organised. 1 Troop from Divisional Squadron will proceed out with the Column to escort back the convoy, and 1 Troor will act aa escort, to the convoy leaving the next day. When the Column marches out Divisional Headquarters will be moved up to Railhead. 4th Infantry Brigade will detail 1 Rattalion for the defence of the Inner Line, as at present, and the remainder of the Brigade will be held ready to move out if necessary. It will orerate from its present camp and no transport etc. will be taken. In andition to the Mobile, Column detailed above, 3rd. L.H. Brigade will hold 3 Squadrons always ready for immediate action in proximity to the front line. ei.) T33 Jrd L.H. Bde. Cory Ho. Lieut-Colonel, ith Inf. Bde. General Staff th Inf. Bde. 3th Inr. 3de. 4th Australian Division. Div. Cavalry C.D.A. C.D.E. 8 A.D..S. D.A.D.0.S. 10 S.S.0. 133 0. a t 0 6iiee oies
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SS. 109. NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO FRONT LINE TRENCHES. 91515 TRAINING OF DIVISIONS FOR OFFENSIVE ACDION. The time available for divisions when out of the Hne to train as divisions is short. It is necessary that the utmost use should be made of it, and that the object of the training should be clearly understood by al concerned. Success depends on preparations for al the phases of an attack, uiz.: (a) The organization of our trenches for the assembly of the attacking force; (b) The artillery bombardment; (c) The crossing of the area between our front trenches and the enemys; (d) The capture of the enemys defensive systeous and artillery positions, and the consoldation against counter attack of ground won; (e) Exploitation of success. The training ground must be carefully reconnoitred, beforehand, and a detailed programme of the whole period must be prepared. If possible, every brigade should be exercised in each form of training. 2. The training of the divisjon can be conveniently divided into two categories:- (a) Training for the attack from trenches against a hostile system of trenches and strong points, inchuding the consolidation and occupation of the position won. (6) Training for exploiting a success when the hostile systems of defence have been broken through. 8. A complete system of hostile trenches and at least the frst Hne of a second system together with the defended Jocalities between these two systems, should be marked out on the hostile ground to ful scale from trench maps and aeria! photographs, to represent as far as possible an actua systenn of trenches and strong points. The assault over the area so marked out should be practised several times by the division as a whole; the division being disposed in depth on a narrow front with two brigades, and also with one beigade in the front line. A suitable assaulting (ront for a brigade against a strong objective may be taken at from 400 to 600 yards. The average front of a division formning part of a larger force in an attack, however, must be governed by the nature of the country to be traversed, the difnhculty of the task allotted, the intervals to be ahowed between forunations, the numnber ofim portantobjeetives to be assautted, and the number of brigades to be employed in the front Hue. It may betaken at from 1,000 t0 1,800 yards, or an average of about 1,500 yards for severa! divisions un a decisive attack. The attack must aim at continuity and must be driven home without intermission, so that the attack gradualy works forward t!! the endurance of the enemy is broken down. Every attacking unit must be given a Mmited and clea-ly defned objective, which it is to capture and consohdate at al costs; the assaulting coluons mnust go right through above ground to this objective in successive waves or Hnes, each Hne adding fresh impetus to the preceding Hne when this is checked, and carrying the whole forward to the objective. The cleaning up and consoldation of positions passed over by the assaulting columns in their advance, the formation of protective Hanks, and the preparation of strong supporting points in the captured area wih be carried out by other troops of the attacking force, fohowing the assaulting columns and specially told of for the purpose. Local reserves must be held to reinforce those parts of the lne which are checked, to ih gaps opening in the front and to relieve troops which are exhausted and whose endurance has gone. From the moment when the frst Hne of assaulting troops leaves our front trenches, a continuous forward dow mnust be maintained from the rear throughout the division. Up to our own front Hne this fow maay be either above or below ground, according to topographica) conditions, the nature of the enemys hre, and the number of communication trenches available, but once the assaulting troops have lelft our trenches and are pushing on to their objective, their movement will be carried out above ground. The movement of the Divisiona! Reserve may be controlled when required by ordering beforehand that its forward dow is to be checked on reaching some dennite Hne (such as our orginal drst Hne of trenches), in which it will await orders. 5. When a particular Hne or succession of Hnes have reached an objective assigned to them, tor the consoldation of which preparations have already been made, it will usualy be inadvisable to order these troops to push on to a further objective. It fohows. therefore, that, to secure continuity in operations on a large scale, it mnay be necessary to arrange for fresh troops to pass through others. Occasions may also occur in which there is, beyond the hrst objective, a second objective. e.g, another system of hostile trenches or centre of resistance, which the Commander of the formation intends to attack, conditionaly on the Hrst attack succeeding, with a fresh body of troops, but as part of the same operation. Divisions must, therefore, be practised in the passing of a fresh body of attacking troops through the troops which have carried out the frst assault and have reached their objective. The second attack will be carried out on the same principles, the assaulting coluons going straight through to the objective in successive lines. The passing of one body of troops through another during an attack is, however, an extremely difncult operation, and should only be attempted when there is a reasonable opportunity of seizing and holding the second objective by immuediate attack, as for instance
when the frst attacking force has succeeded in gaining the whole objective it was ordered to consoldate, the artillery preparation on the second objective has been adequate and efective, and the force detailed to attack it is well in hand The conditions of every attack vary, however, and a special solution must be found for each individua! problem. It depends on whether the furthest objective that has been allotted to a division can be reached in one continuous advance, or whether it is necessary to capture and consolidate some intermediate objective before the ñnal one can be assaulted. 6. With regard to the above, it is impossible to lay down any defnite rules as to the strength of assaulting coluns, the number of Hnes of which they consist, or the distance apart of these lnes. The depth of the assaulting coluomn depends on the distance of the objective, and on the opposition that has to be overconne in reaching it. Its strength must be calculated so as to give suffcient driving power to enable the column to reach its objective and to provide sufücient remaining energy to enable the objective to be held when gained. The distance apart of the Hnes wi)) usually be regulated by the rate at which the successive lnes can be formed up and moved forward over the parapet. The meen in each Hne should be extended at two or three paces interval In this connection it is worthy of consideration that in mnany instances experience has shown that to capture a hostile trench a single lne of men has usualy failed, two lines have generally failed but sometiches succeeded, three Hnes have generally succeeded but sometimes falled, and four or more Mnes have usualy succeeded. 7.— In these exercises the attack or part of it should frequently fail to reach its objective, and the commanders of the units thus checked be confronted on the spot with a new situation and practised in making rapid decisions based on the original plan. Every brigade in turn should be called upon to move from reserve to the capture of an objective, in front of which the assaulting troops have been held up, or against which an attack has failed. The orders for this operation and a description of the artillery support that will be avallable will be given to Commanders on the spot. 8. Any division may be in reserve to one or more assaulting divisions. Such a task requires as careful previous preparation and study as does the task of the divisions actualy detailed for the assault. The stafs and regimental offcers of the divisjon in reserve on any portion of the assault- ing front muust make themselves farniliar by persona] reconnaissance with the trench systenis over which they may bave to operate and with every detall of the ground. They must be provided with the same maps as those used by the assaulting division. The Stafs and higher Commanders of the division in reserve maust study the plans and preparations of theassau ting divisions as closely as if they were their own. In this way only will they be able when the time comes to take up the attack without hesttation, and with a clear understanding of the task before thenn. From the moment the operation begins, the closest Maison must be estabMshen in wocord¬ ance with arrangements made beforehand; and responsibte Staff Oficers from the Reserve Division should be attached to the Headquarters of the Divisions in front so as to follow every development of the action. As soon as it is known where the reserve division is to be put in, the proper place for the Commander of the Reserve Division and his Staf is at the Battle Headquarters of the Divisional Commande:, who is controhing the operations in that particular portion of the battledeld. 9. Special exercises should beheld during the period oftraining by Divisional and Brigade Commanders with al their staffs and subordinate comimanders- (a) To consider in detail the pretiminary arrangements for an attack on a large scale; and (b) To consider the action to be taken by subordinate cormanders when local unex¬ pected situations arise, such asoccur when a portion of a Hne is held up,impassable obstacles are encountered, or it becomes necessary to deliver or repel a Jocal counter-attack. WVith regard to (a), attention is directed to the memorandum on the prehiminary arrange- ments in case of a large attack, issued with O. B./1207, dated the 2nd February, 1916. The artillery programme and co-operation should be worked out in all exercises and explained to al concerned. With regard to (b), it must be remembered that oficers and troops generally do not now possess that muilitary knowledge arising from a long and high state of training which enables them toact promptly on sound hnes in unexpected situations. Theyhave become accustomed to deliberate action based on precise and detailed orders. OHicers and men in action will usualy do what they have been practised to do or have been told to do in certain situations, and it is therefore a) the more necessary to ensure that a clear understanding should exist among aß ranks as to what action is to be taken in the different situations that may arise in battle. In this connection every endeavour should be made to inculcate mutual confdence and the spirit of combination directly towards the achievement of the task set. During an advance under dre men must possess the habit of ooking spontaneously to their leaders for direction ; mvore often than not leaders have to look for and ind their men. Even this in itself is not suffcient. Sttuations wil constantly arise when there is no oficer or non-comss oned oficer present with groups of mnen, and the men must realse that, in such a case, one man maust assume eadershipon thespotand the remainder act under his contro! A must be prepared for heavy casualties, and must realize that the magnitude of the interests at stake necessitate the greatest self-sacrißce from one and all. 10. Brgade Headquarters, as wel as Battalon Headquarters, muust be practised in moving forward during the progress of an attack, and it is essential that communication from front to rear must not be lost. It is, therefore, necessary that the route to be folowed by Headquarters should be well defned and known, so that runners both from front and rear will know the route to follow in order to pick up the Headquarters should it be moving. In the case of Brigade and Battalion Headquarters it will usualy be inadvisable to state a place to which the Headquarters will move, as that place mnay be inaccessible or untenable.

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