Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 12, 3 April - 30 April 1916, Part 2

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Part of Quest:
Sir John Monash (General, b.1865 - d.1931)
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Open to contributions
Accession number:
RCDIG0000611
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

any complaints regarding quality or pricg te are He visits the latunes, washing places and other conveniences used by the mem troops and takes action in case of any inegulanty He instructs the Regtl. Orderly officers to report to him, personally on completing with their duty and furnish him of thenr, report within an a copy then hom of the conclusion work. his of any He will inform successor 10. orders issued. when conmencing his town of 11. his of tom He should conmence Field the to duty by reporting officer of the previous day home or the t report should read the He field officer for the previous day possible. soon as as
4d 6l. 66 10 1.01d. C27MIIISIO Omooat Brdmartors of the Kstern JONOOR. General Headquarters, 3th April, 1916. Readquarters Stars ord Burson. 2.716. MEMORANDUM relating to the Experience gained from the Verdim Actions. the battle in the neighbourhood of Vertim is the First defensive action which we have had to sustain for the last sixteen months; 1t Turnishess certain number of lessons, particularly with regard to defensive warfare. If the German onalaughts have proved the necessity of re-organising certain details of our defensive works, or of noting certain methods of offensive action, they have not given rise to incidents which invalidate the instructions recently issued and now in force, (I) on the contrary they have confirmed them, and have proved that grave consequences will be involved should they be dis- iregarded. The various leasons which should be brought to the notice of the forces are grouped in the following five paragraphs 1- 11) (1) Instructions on offensive actions by small units. LAOTD Instructions issued on Jan. 18 relating to the purpose and conditions of a concerted offensive action.
where they were. 4. The following mthods were noticed in the development of the Infantry attack. Relatively small forces were engaged, though sufficient to make the point d'appul attacked. Attacks were undertaken by successive lines. The first line seems to have contained a very considerable number of Dombers, accompanied by wire cutters and ploneers with small flame-throwing Or. The Germans made every offort to manceuvre during their initial attacks - to outflant the points Aappul, to creep round the rear, to depley etc., in other words to act with orderliness and ealm. Specially to be noted is their use of infiltration (advancing in drinlets) by which means they were enanled to introduce themselves into all the interstices of our defensive works. Whilst there is good reason to make careful note of these various methods, they de not in any way constitute models to be imitated in every case. A. The decision to attack on a very restricted Frent has its advantages, namely, accumilation of the artillery, great reserves in deep form- ition, successive concentrations of a very large part of the artillary on successive objectives) but an attack on a restricted front involves very great disadvantages for the assallant. The two methods of attack are based on considera- tions which cannot be discussed here, we must confine ourselves to noting the enemy’s procedure without drawing any conclusions from 1t.
(2) (1) The opening of the German Attaok. up to the present, we have launched our great attacks in the form of an assault debouching simultaneoualy along the whole of our attacking front and followed by a battle) we have always prepared previously a position from which the assault is delivered. The Germans have adopted a different provotne 1. Taking advantage of the fact that the House divides the field of battle chosen by them into two parts which permit only of artillery support, and render combined infantry action impossible, they have dealt with these two divisions of the battlefield quccessively. From 21st February to 5th March their Infantry attacks were directed exclusively on the right bank and, on this bank, they seemed at the opening of the offensive to restrict the number of their points of attack, beginning with those which formed salients in their Lines (Bois des Caures and Herbebois]. By this means they were enabled to open concentrated fire of special intensity, which bombarded the objectives of the attack, and flanked the Infantry during its advance. Latterly they adopted the same procedure on the left bank. 8. Theyconstructed no approach works, although at cartain points, the distance between the lines was between 800 and 800 metres. S. Previous to the launching of the attack, atrong officars reconnoitring parties (50 men 2 officers) were sent out, whose object it was to accertain wnether the artillery preparation had been sufficient; in cases where it was in- ccufficient, the artillery had to resume firey in all cases the reconnoitring parties had to remain more
The same consideration holds for the suppression B. of the approach works; the proceeding is a dangerous oney it can only be explained by assuming that the object of the enemy was surprise (I) at any cost, that he wished to bombard the advanced trenehes with the heaviest suns without the danger of firing into his own lines, and finally that he reckoned on the first enemy position - Infantry, machineeguns, artillery - being put out of action before the accuntt. (s) on the other hand it is almost certain that the Germans constructed in all their debouching positions, wnether before Vertum or elsewhere, mimerous subterranean shelters proof against our heavy artillery and forming depots for reserves. Their Infantry waited there in safety for the end of the bombardment and the opening of the attack. 6. Reconnaissances carried out by officers reconnoitring parties before the attack present an interesting methed of procedure in cases where the attack is started from a distance. The methodical development of the German infantry attack conforms with the ideas of our recent Instructions (small and large units, Instructions dated January 16th 1916). In these instructions it was stated that the attack should be powertul, continuous (1) There are cases in which the effect of surprise movements could not be discounted. At Verdim, the country is closely wooded, and it is, therefore, possible to establish concealed batteries; at other points on the front owing to the absence of cover, it would not be possible to conceal the emplacement of attacking artillery. (a)The German Staff had promised the Infantrymen that they would take possession of the captured ground at the goose step. At certain points the German infantry is said to have advanced with their rifles alung.
and orderly, (16th Jamuary - infantry - page 2) order before rapidity Infiltration (advancing in drinlets) is a good procedure during a battle whenever it is possible. II. Plan of Defence. Every unit commander, be his unit small or great, should dray up a plan of defence, the object of which is to evercome superior forces in the area of ground under his command. This plan is based on mowledge of this ares, from which are deduced i- The determination of the probable sones of attack. The choice of the principal defensive positions and their occupation. The preparation of counterattacks. the organisation of commmications, supplies, and the arrangements for evacuating wounded &c. He will be guided by the following principles which are clearly laid down in the recent instructions :- (a) The defence is organised in depth on successive positions which include several lines. (D) any unit chargedwith the defence of part of the ground never abandons it, whatever happens. (o) A11 lost ground is retaken by a counterattack carried out by troops reserved for this purpobe. the plan of defence is established primarily by the Army, in view of an attack by superior forces, and taking into account the supplementary material which would eventually be placed at its disposal by the Crow Army Commander or the Commander-in Chiefy it visualises the battle.
It will therefore take into account the various possibllities of attack, and deduce from these the initial distribution of troops on the ares of ground to be defended. this distribution will divide the sone of attack into a certain number of army corps sectors. 14 is of advantage to restrict the front of these sectors so as to have, in each, a formation in deptn. With an army whose frent is for the most part weakly held, 1t is of advantage to consider the transition from this formation to that chosen for the attack - that is to say, to organise the relief of the army units so as to permit the units of reinforcement to take their positions on the front. (1) The Commander- in Chief of the Army vill determine the distribution amongst the army corps of the forces at his disposal - particularly of the heavy artillery. He then defines the task to be alletted to each ary corps - the positions at which resistance will be offered; and those which must be held at all costs. He will finally indicate the conditions under which he will come to the assistance of attacked army corps. Those tactical details having been settled, the commmications, supplies, arrangements for sending wounded otce, to the rear, must be organised and provision made for depots of food, minitions and material. Whilst the means of defence are increasing the flow of 12 infantry and artillery reinforcements must be so regulated that tactical unity shall not be brokeny units detailed for reinforcement must not be split up before any engagement on the pretext of meeting the most urgent calls for heip. on the contrary each of these units must have a position on the front even at the cost of re-distribution; by this means there can be maintained in the units the advantage of mtual understanding among the men and among the chief officers, and co-operation between the different arme will be preserved.
The army corps commanders, each of whom will receive a copy of this dociment in full, will draw up their plans of defence on the same lines, These plans of defence vill contain in their general outlines the same principles as those established for the army. The Army corps commander should indicate vith special care the sones of counter-attack to be organised, the number of troops to be charged with this action, and the plan of action according to which the heavy artillery, the aray corps and the artillery of neighbouring divisions are to be enloyed. It is self-understood that a certain proportion of the heavy and field artillary should be under the command of the divisional commanders. Having thus received instructions as to their task, the divisional Generals will in turn settle their plans of defence, putting into practice the principles laid down by their superior officers. Their most important task is to organise perfect artillery support for the infantry, and therefore to estanlish a plan of action for the artillery such as that described balow. They are, further, charged with putting in a state of defence the sones of counterattack. This comprises - 12) The construction of shelters (shell-proof shelters or merely deep trenches) for the troops, with command and observation posts adjoining. (2) the construction of the necessary commmication tranches. III. Infantry Defensire Organisation. The Following improvements are to be made henceforth in the matter of our defences 1-
137 (2) A. Shelters. A shelter is only of value in so far as 14 provides adequate cover and admits of easy exit. shelters to be held against a heary bombardment, nine galleries’ also mnown as saps, propped and with a roof of Ametreaof virgin soll. To ensure quick exit there must be a looksout in an armoured recess (I) immediately beside the sheltery the look-out is provided with means for commmicating with the shelter so as to give the alarm; 1f these means of commmication are interrupted the look-out leaves his position to sive the alarm. The arrangement described in the appended note (3) could be erected at Intervals in order to give the men time to leave the gallery even if the enemy is already in the trench. In addition to the look-out, large periscopes to be manipulated from the inside should be placed in a certain number of suitable shelters. The capacity of the shelters varies from a squad to half a section; there should be two exits, three 18 possibley machines for clearing away the earth; the entry should be on a gentle alone and the descent is effected either by a demi-gallery or a planked stalrease. A nember of grenades for defensive purposes and rockets as alarm signals for the lines behind should be placed in the shelters. The authorities supply the armies in the field either with the niche should be wedged armoured recesses or look-outs, in the parapet, disguised and should be reached by an under iground passage. The construction of good shelters is a matter of practice and of special knowledge; it is also indisponsable that commanding officers however low the effective strength of their command should maintain their pioneer platoons at any rate at regulation strongthy the pioneers acting as Foremen and instructors in the construction of shelters.
B. WUAMOTT NOTSTDCO in Frent of Inportant Lines these should have as thiok parapets as possible 25 to 30 metres at least. 1t is advisable to place the auxiliary defences on a counter- islope or in a depression or in a woed. In order to upset the accuracy of the enen’s Fire, the barbed wire should be placed in position inde- spendently of the line of the trench, leaving empty spaces between the entanglements so as to increase the enemy’s area of fire without adding to the labour in placing the wire in positions the entanglement which is furthest from the trench should first be placed in position so as to protect our trenches from the enemy’s flammen werfer. The greatest use should be made of the counteralope and of depressions and woods. Bulkheads should be formed in the positions by means of entanglements. Second and third lines should be constructed in auxiliary defences and commmication trenches to Facilitate the movement of reserve troops (counter- attacks, reinforcements, otc.). Boring Dotoro The majority of the machine guns together with their personmnal should be placed in deep sap sheltersy at the end of an artillery bonbardment, the soldiers mount the guns on the amnlacements which have already been prepared, if they have not been destroyed, or simply in the trench itself. In the same way pits dug in the open quite clear of the line of tranch, but connected with it by underground passages, sive excellent results. the machine-gun detachments should be able to de all the work connected with their sheltor and with their own material.

are any complaints regarding quality or price

8. He visits the latrines, washing places

and other conveniences used by the

men troops and lakes action on

case of any irregularity

9. He instructs the Regtl. Orderly officers to

report to him personally on completing

their duty and furnish him with

a copy of their report within an 

hour of the conclusion of their

work.

10. He will inform his successor of any

orders issued.

11. When commencing his tour of

He should commence his tour of

duty by reporting to the Field

Officer of the previous day

or he   s 
He should read the x report of the

Field Officer for the previous day

as soon as possible.

 

 

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