Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 12, 3 April - 30 April 1916, Part 2

are any complaints regarding quality or price

8. He visits the latrines, washing places

and other conveniences used by the

men troops and takes action on

case of any irregularity

9. He instructs the Regtl. Orderly officers to

report to him personally on completing

their duty and furnish him with

a copy of their report within an 

hour of the conclusion of their

work.

10. He will inform his successor of any

orders issued.

11. When commencing his tour of

He should commence his tour of

duty by reporting to the Field

Officer of the previous day

or he   s 
He should read the x report of the

Field Officer for the previous day

as soon as possible.

[*4th AUSTRALIAN OFFICE
No GC 6/6
27 MAY 1916*]

40/W.O./3061.                             4a

General Headquarters               General Headquarters

of the Eastern                               5th April, 1916.

Forces.

__________

Headquarters Staff

3rd Bureau.

2.716.

_________

MEMORANDUM relating to the Experience gained from the

Verdun Actions.

_________________________________________________________

The battle in the neighbourhood of Verdun is the

first defensive action which we have had to sustain for

the last sixteen months; it furnishes a certain number

of lessons, particularly with regard to defensive warfare.

 ______________________

If the German onslaughts have proved the necessity

of re-organising certain details of our defensive works,

or of meeting certain methods of offensive action, they

have not given rise to incidents which invalidate the

instructions recently issued and now in force; (i) on the

contrary they have confirmed them, and have proved that

grave consequences will be involved should they be disregarded

The various lessons which should be brought to

the notice of the forces are grouped in the following five 

paragraphs:-                                            (1)

___________________________________________________

(1) Instructions on offensive actions by small units.

            "                   "      "            "              "    large     "

Instructions issued on Jan. 16 relating to the purpose

and conditions of a concerted offensive action.

where they were.

4. The following methods were noticed in the

development of the infantry attack.

Relatively small forces were engaged, 

though sufficient to make the point d'appui attacked.

Attacks were undertaken by successive lines.

The first line seems to have contained a

very considerable number of bombers, accompanied by

wire cutters and pioneers with small flame-throwing

apparatus.

The Germans made every effort to manoeuvre 

during their initial attacks - to outflank the points  

d'appui, to creep round the rear, to deploy etc.,

in other words to act with orderliness and calm.

Specially to be noted is their use of infiltration 

(advancing in driblets) by which means they were

enabled to introduce themselves into all the

interstices of our defensive works.

Whilst there is good reason to make careful

note of these various methods, they do not in any way

constitute models to be imitated in every case.

A. The decision to attack on a very restricted

front has its advantages, namely, accumulation

of the artillery, great reserves in deep formation,

successive concentrations of a very large

part of the artillery on successive objectives;

but an attack on a restricted front involved

very great disadvantages for the assailant.

The two methods of attack are based on 

considerations which cannot be discussed here, we must

confine ourselves to noting the enemy's procedure

without drawing any conclusions from it.

B.

(1) The Opening of the German Attack.

Up to the present, we have launched our great

attacks in the form of an assault debouching

simultaneously along the whole of our attacking front

and followed by a battle; we have always prepared

previously a position from which the assault is

delivered. The Germans have adopted a different

procedure:-

1. Taking advantage of the fact that the Meuse

divides the field of battle chosen by them into two

parts which permit only of artillery support, and

render combined infantry action impossible, they

have dealt with these two divisions of the battlefield

successively. From 21st February to 5th March their

infantry attacks were directed exclusively on the

right bank and, on this bank, they seemed at the

opening of the offensive to restrict the number of

their points of attack, beginning with those which

formed salients in their lines (Bois des Caures

and Herbebois). By this means they were enabled to

open concentrated fire of special intensity, which

bombarded the objectives of the attack, and flanked

the infantry during its advance. Latterly they

adopted the same procedure on the left bank.                      

(2) 2. They constructed no approach works, although

at certain points, the distance between the lines was

between 600 and 800 metres.

3. Previous to the launching of the attack,

strong officers reconnoitring parties (50 men 2

officers) were sent out, whose object it was to

ascertain whether the artillery preparation had 

been sufficient; in cases where it was insufficient, 
the artillery had to resume fire; in 

all case the reconnoitring parties had to remain

where

B. The same consideration holds for the suppression

of the approach works; the proceeding is a dangerous

one; it can only be explained by assuming that the

object of the enemy was surprise (1) at any cost,

that he wished to bombard the advanced trenches

with the heaviest guns without the danger of firing

into his own lines, and finally that he reckoned on

the first enemy position - infantry, machine-guns, 

artillery - being put out of section before the 

assault. (2)

On the other hand it is almost certain

that the Germans constructed in all their debouching

positions, whether before Verdun or elsewhere, numerous

subterranean shel ters proof against our heavy artillery

and forming depots for reserves. Their infantry

waited there in safety for the end of the bombardment

and the opening of the attack. 

C. Reconnaissance carried out by officers

reconnoitring parties before the attack present an

interesting method of procedure in cases where the

attack is started from a distance.

D. The methodical development of the German infantry

attack conforms with the ideas of our recent

instructions (small and large units, Instructions 

dated January 16th 1916). In these instructions it was

stated that the attack should be powerful, continuous

and

__________________________________________________

(1)There are cases in which the effect of surprise

movements could not be discounted. At Verdun, the

country is closely wooded, and it is, therefore,

possible to establish concealed batteries; at other

points on the front owing to the absence of cover, it

would not be possible to conceal the emplacement of

attacking artillery.

(2) The German Staff had promised the infantrymen that they

would take possession of the captured ground at the

goose step. At certain points the German infantry is

said to have advanced with their rifles slung.

and orderly. (16th January -infantry-page 2) "Order

before rapidity".

Infiltration (advancing in driblets) is a 

good procedure during a battle whenever it is possible.

11. Plan of Defence.

Every unit commander, be his unit small or great, 

should draw up a "plan of defence", the object of which

is to overcome superior forces in the area of ground under

his command. This plan is based on knowledge of this area, 

from which are deduced:

      The determination of the probable zones of attack.

      The choice of the principal defensive positions and

              their occupation.

      The preparation of counter-attacks.

      The organisation of communications, supplies, and

               the arrangements for evacuating wounded &c.

       He will be guided by the following principles

   which are clearly laid down in the recent instructions :-

      (a) The defence is organised in depth on successive

             positions which include several lines.

      (b) Any unit chargedwith the defence or part of

             the ground never abandons it, whatever

             happens.

      (c) All lost ground is retaken by a counter-attack

           carried out by troops reserved for this purpose.

The plan of defence is established primarily

by the Army, in view of an attack by superior forces,

and taking into account the supplementary material which

would eventually be planned at its disposal by the Group

Army Commander or the Commander-in-Chief; it visualises 

the battle.

It will therefore take into account the various

possibilities of attack, and deduce from these the initial

distribution of troops on the area of ground to be defended.

This distribution will divide the zone of attack into a 

number of army corps sectors. It is of advantage 

to restrict the front of these sectors so as to have, in

each, a formation in depth.

With an army whose front is for the most part

weakly held, it is of advantage to consider the transition

from this formation to that chosen for the attack -

that is to say, to organise the relief of the army units

so as to permit the units of reinforcement to take their

positions on the front. (1)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will determine 

the distribution amongst the army corps of the forces

at his disposal - particularly of the heavy artillery.

He then defines the task to be allotted to each

army corps - the positions at which resistance will be

offered; and those which must be held at all costs.

He will finally indicate the conditions under

which he will come to the assistance of attacked army corps.

These tactical details having been setteled, the

communications, supplies, arrangements for sending wounded

etc., to the rear, must be organised and provision made for

depots of food, munitions and material.

The

________________________________________________________

(1) Whilst the means of defence are increasing the flow of

infantry and artillery reinforcements must be so regulated

that tactical unity shall not be broken; units detailed

for reinforcement must not be split before any engagement

on the pretext of meeting the most urgent calls for help.

On the contrary each of these units must have a position

on the front even at the cost of re-distribution; by this

means there can be maintained in the units the advantage

of mutual understanding among the men and among the chief

officers, and co-operation between the different arms

will be preserved.

The army commanders, each of whom will

receive a copy of this document in full, will draw up

their plans of defence on the same lines. These plans

of defence will contain in their general outlines the same

principles as those established for the army.

The Army corps commander should indicate with

special care the zones of counter-attack to be organised,

the number of troops to be charged with this action, and

the plan of action according to which the heavy artillery,

the army corps and the artillery of neighbouring divisions

are to be employed. It is self-understood that a certain 

proportion of the heavy and field artillery should be under

the command of the divisional commanders.

Having thus received instructions as their task,

the divisional Generals will in turn settle their plans of

defence, putting into practice the principles laid down by

their superior officers.

The most important task is to organise perfect

artillery support for the infantry, and therefore to

establish a plan of action for the artillery such as that

described below. They are further, charged with putting 

in a state of defence the zones of counter-attack.

This comprises :-

    (1) The construction of shelters (shell-proof shelters

          or merely deep trenches) for the troops, with

          command and observation posts adjoining.

    (2) The construction of the necessary communication

          trenches.

III. Infantry Defensive Organisation.

The following improvements are to be made henceforth

in the matter of our defence:-

A.

A. Shelters. A shelter is only of value in so far

as it provides adequate cover and admits of easy exit.

Shelters to be held against a heavy bombardment,

"mine galleries" also known as saps, propped and with a

roof of 5 metresof virgin soil.

To ensure quick exit there must be a look-out

in an armoured recess (1) immediately beside the shelter; the

look-out is provided with means for communicating with

the shelter so as to give the alarm; if these means of

communication are interrupted the look-out leaves his

position to give the alarm. 

The arrangement described in the appended

note (2) could be erected at intervals in order to give

the men time to leave the gallery if the enemy is

already in the trench.

In addition to the look-out, large periscopes

to be manipulated from the inside should be placed in a 

certain number of suitable shelters.

The capacity of the shelters varies from a squad

to half a section; there should be two exits; three

if possible; machines for clearing away the earth; the

entry should b e on a gentle slope and the descent is

effected either by a "demi-gallery" or a planked staircase.

A number of grenades for defensive purposes and

rockets as alarm signals for the lines should be

placed in the shelters.

B.

_____________________________________________________

(1) The authorities supply the armies in the field either with

armoured recesses or look-outs; the niche should be wedged

in the parapet, disguised and should be reached by an under-:ground 
passage.

(2) The construction of good shelters is a matter of practice

and of special knowledge; it is also indispensable that

commanding officers however low the effective strength of

their command should maintain their pioneer platoons at

any rate at regulation strength; the pioneers acting as

foremen and instructors in the construction of shelters.

B. Auxiliary Defences.

In front of important lines these should have as

thick parapets as possible 25 to 30 metres at least. It

is advisable to place the auxiliary defences on a counterslope 
or in a depression or in a wood.

In order to upset the accuracy of the enemy's 

fire, the barbed wire should be placed in position independently 
of the lines of the trench, leaving empty spaces

between the entanglements so as to increase the enemy's area

of fire without adding to the labour in placing the wire in

position; the entanglement which is furthest from the 
trench should first be placed in position so as to protect

our trenches from the enemy's flammen-werfer. The greatest

use should be made of the counter-slope and of depressions

and woods.

Bulkheads should be formed in the positions by

means of entanglements. Second and third lines should be

constructed in auxiliary defences and communication trenches

to facilitate the movement of reserve troops (counter-attacks,

reinforcements, etc.).

C. Flanking Defence.

The majority of the machine guns together with their

personnel should be placed in deep sap shelters; at the end

of an artillery bombardment, the soldiers mount the guns on

the emplacements which have already been prepared, if they

have not been destroyed, or simply in the trench itself. In 
the same way pits dug in the open quite clear of the line of

trench, but connected with it by underground passage, give

excellent results.

The machine-gun detachments should be able to do

all the work connected with their shelter and with their own

material.             

D.