Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 12, 3 April - 30 April 1916, Part 1

3/4/16

-Distribution of gifts - 

Item	Totals	H.Q Mess.	H.Q Personnel	M.G Co	13th	14th	15th	16th
Sweets  cases tins	18 65	- 15	1 25	1 25	4 -	4 -	4 -	4 -
Sauce     cases	18	1/2	1/2	1	4	4	4	4
Pickles   cases bottles	25 16	- 8	- 8	1 -	6 -	6 -	6 -	6 -
Fruit       cases bottles	15 15	- 15	1 -	1 -	3 -	3 -	3 -	3 -
Golden Syrup cases tins	19 11	- 11	1 -	3 -	4 -	4 -	4 -	4 -
Stationery    cases	2	-	-	-	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2
Xmas billies	36				9	9	9	9
		W Lee	J Dylan	GCDodd  Cpl	N.F. Evans Cpl	JL Cope Capt.	DJ Twain	WL Lindol
Sporting
Bats	20	}
Balls	40	}	all to Rev.	Capt. Cope		JL Cope 3/4/16
Footballs	20	}	for Sports	Committee
Gloves	8 pr.	}
Report on	Completion	J Monash D.G
3/4/16

3 Copies     
4/4/16

H.Q

4^th Aust. Div.
Replying to G 4/57 of April 3/16, following is brief report on 
conduct of the march of ^First Flight Fourth Division from Tel-el-Kebir to Serapeum. -

1. March Orders: - Copy of operation order No 1 was furnished prior to the commencement 
   of the move. - The orders for subsequent days differed only
   in alternating the order of march of units, & alterations of times as set out 
   hereunder. - It is desired to point out that the starting hour each day 
   was controlled by the necessity to get the Camel Train off ahead of the troops. 
   The troops could not march until the Camels were loaded & the bivouacs cleared 
   and it was found impracticable to load camels before breaking day at 
   4.55a.m. - The starting hour was intentionally made one hour later on 
   the first day, to ensure proper distribution of all loads between Camels & 
   horse teams, most of the personnel having had no previous experience of 
   loading. - 

2. First day

   March - Tel-el-Kebir to Mahoama 13 ½ miles, close to, north 
   of, and parallel to railway.

   Halts - Ten minutes in each hour, & a three hour halt near Quassassin 
   from 1200 to 1500.

   Times ^Head Left Telelkebir 0700 - ^rear reached Mahsama 1620

   Weather - High sun temperature tempered by strong ^cool breeze from North east 
   ^This was corrected on subsequent days

   March discipline - Very good, but some units had waterbottles empty before ^noon 

   Straggling 14 men fell out, of whom 2 came on by train and 4 
   were sent to Hospital (for all causes) remainder 
   joining up same day. -

   General Easy grades, good marching surface.

    

3. Second Day

   March - Mahsama to Moascar, 17 miles by route taken, which was 
   from Mahsama on a bearing of 60°degrees, passing to ^around the north 
   of the oasis in square B.5 on map Ismailia 1:100000; thence 
   direct to Moascar

   Halts - Usual hourly halts, and three hours halt in Eastern Oasis 
   (above referred to) from 1100 to 1400

   Times - ^Head Left Mahsama 0600 - Rear reached Moascar 1720.

   Weather - Dense fog until 0900 - then till 1500 high sun temperature - 
   light changeable variable winds. -

   March discipline - Excellent till about 1600. - then the camps at Moascar came 
   in sight, men began to fall out, complaining of feet and chafing.

   Straggling - 132 men fell out, of whom 9 were sent on by train, and 
   5 were sent to Hospital for all causes, remainder joined up 
   before dark

   General Good going xxxx all the way, except for 2 miles of very heavy 
   sand ^encountered between 1400 & 1500, east of place of midday halt.

4. Third Day

   March - Moascar to Serapeum (East) Camp. - 12 ½ mils, - along 
   Suez sweet water canal.

   Halts - Usual hourly halts, and 1 hour halt between 1100 & 
   1200, about 1 mile north of Serapeum West. 
   ^The halt was made short ^so as to get the troops ^quickly away from the insects infesting the Canal.

   Times - ^Head Left Moascar 0600 ^Rear reached Serapeum Camp 1420

   Weather - Hot, light warm southerly wind; but ^as the march was ^practically in a defile 
   nearly all the way, & the dust hung ^heavily in the air, -^the Conditions were 
   very trying; - high wet bulb ^temperature; flies & mosquitos very bad. - 

    

   March Discipline. Good until midday halt. - After resuming march ^at 1200 very 
   bad. As on day before, the sight of the objective (pitched camps) 
   seemed to cause many men to relax further effort to march Keep up 
   with the column.

   Straggling 460 men fell out, of whom 42 came on by train or boat, 
   and 5 were sent to Hospital from all causes; - remainder had all 
   joined up well before sunset, most of them before 1500.-

   General - Hard going, heavy on man & beast, much dust. - 

5. Remarks. - The transport, both Camel and horse, was particularly well 
   handled by the officers respectively placed in charge of same. - All W.T. 
   sheets, blankets etc were ready, unloaded ^& sorted out, in each ^units bivouac, before the troops 
   arrived. - Wheeled transport ^including travelling Kitchens marched in, in no case more than 15 minutes after the troops. Horses were fed & watered at midday each day. No accident 
   to any vehicle or harness. - No ^loss of troop baggage lost No sick horses 
   ^Only 5 camels out of 250 developed sore backs
   ^One horse overfatigued - but now well - six others slightly chafed.  
   It is considered that ^ the weather or length of the marches had very little to do with the straggling
   but that most of it was due most of the struggling was due   to bad care of feet, & 
   new ^or ill fitting boots, causing blistering; - also ^to chafing due to the ill-fit ^in many cases of recently issued ^Khaki drill trousers. - March ^also is still to be learned in the proper fitting && carrying of packs 
   All ranks ^except duty details had at least 12 hours complete rest on each of the two nights 
   of open air bivouac. - The column carried on, satisfactorily, on all three
   days, with the water carried in Waterbottles, ^together with the 7 watercarts, which ^latter  marched with the troops & not with the wheeled transport. - The number of men 
   sent to Hospital for all causes is well below the normal daily evacuations 
   for sickness. - 
   B.G.
   Corp 1^st Flight, 4^th Aust Div.

GOC                                                                           
 J Monash
 12/4/16 
4.4.16                                                    

[*Australian Imperial Force

APR 12 1916

4th Infantry Brigade*]
 

NOTES ON THE TACTICAL HANDLING OF THE LEWIS GUNS.

1. The characteristics of any weapon will usually determine its tactical 
   handling. 
2. The Lewis gun is a type of automatic rifle. It is capable of producing 
   extremely rapid fire, but is incapable of sustaining this fire for long, 
   it not being possible to use water for cooling purposes without increasing its 
   weight. 
3. Chief characteristics:-Lightness, mobility and invisibilty. 
4. The Lewis gun cannot take the place of the machine gun; it is a 
   supplement to and not a substitute for the machine gun.
5. Methods of Employment: Trench Warfare.

   1. Front Line.-The chief value of Lewis guns in a defensive line is to 
      economise infantry, not to reduce the number of machine guns. 
      Lewis guns should be used for searching and sweeping all ground 
      in front of the line of trenches which cannot be swept by the machine 
      guns from their low command in their emplacements. Lewis guns 
      firing over the parapet from prepared "firing places" can bring fire 
      to bear on depressions, covered approaches, etc., which the machine 
      guns cannot cover. Lewis gun teams should be made familiar with 
      all the "firing places" in the section of trench to which they are 
      allotted; and the ground to be swept from each. Owing to their 
      mobility, considerable liberty of action should be allowed to Lewis 
      guns, as their fire can be brought to bear on an object very rapidly. 
      During a bombardment it is just as essential to keep Lewis guns 
      and their teams under cover as machine guns and their teams, but 
      since Lewis guns have not permanent "emplacements" built for them, 
      a greater choice is possible in the selection for the spot for their 
      shelters, provided they can come into action quickly. On no account 
      should a complete gun team be all put into one shelter, they should 
      be distributed among several. There are many instances of whole 
      gun teams being killed by one shell through non-observance of this 
      precaution.

      "Firing Places" for Lewis guns should, where possible, be so 
      constructed as to be protected from frontal fire, while at the same time 
      being able to fire to either flank. 

   2. Support Trenches. The same principles hold good as in the case of 
      the front line. Owing to mobility and invisibility the Lewis guns 
      may be able to fire from positions covering the front line if this is 
      captured, which would be impossible for machine guns.
   3. Strong Points. The chief role of these is to bring sudden and intense 
      fire to bear on the enemy from an unexpected direction, if he has 
      succeeded in breaking through the front line of defence. Machine 
      guns are most suitable for this, but Lewis guns can be used from 
      places which only afford slight cover, and also for providing a mobile 
      reserve of fire power. 
   4. The attack from the Trenches. Lewis guns are very suitable for providing 
      covering fire from the front, owing to their mobility and 
      invisibility. They can be placed in forward positions under cover 
      of darkness, smoke or artillery bombardments, etc., and establish 
      themselves in any suitable cover available, such as ditches, shell 
      holes, crops, long grass, etc. From their close proximity to the 
      enemy they may be able to located his machine gun emplacements,
      etc., and be able to materially assist the advance of our own troops. 
      It is inadvisable to send forward machine guns or Lewis guns with

2

the first lines of attacking infantry, but Lewis guns, owing to their 
mobility and invisibility, can be pushed forward earlier in the fight 
than machine guns. In other words, machine guns should not move 
into a hostile trench unsupported by infantry; that is until their own 
infantry have obtained a footing therein; but once a trench is gained 
the machine guns should have timed their arrival so as to be there 
immediately; how this is to be done will depend chiefly on the 
proper use of ground and cover. 

On an enemy's trench being captured, Lewis guns are extremely 
useful in helping to cover the re-organisation of the infantry, pursue the 
enemy with fire, take part in warding off counter-attacks, and with 
the arrival of the machine guns will assist in the consolidation 
of the new lines. 

Lewis guns should be on the look out for hostile machine guns 
and concentrate their fire upon them. 

Lewis guns are also very useful in conjunction with a bomb 
attack. 

e. The attack in open warfare. In an advance in open warfare Lewis 
gunners should simulate the formations and movements of the infantry, 
and especially be careful to carry the gun either "at the trail," using 
a leather strap and handle (as for carrying a cricket bag or suit case),
or slung over one shoulder like a rifle; by this means they are
unlikely to be detected as automatic riflemen during their advance. 
It will therefore be often possible to push Lewis guns forward with 
the leading line and provide covering fire for the Infantry, and thus 
assist them to advance. Where ground is suitable it may sometimes 
be possible for the Lewis gunners to precede their own 
infantry, and opportunity to carry this out should be carefully looked 
for. 

6. Conclusions to be drawn from the above. Lewis guns will be of 
   great value for the following: - 

   (a) To supplement the fire of infantry and machine guns.
   (b) To economise infantry in trench warfare and in defensive positions.
   (c) To fire from the parapets, to command ground which cannot be 
   swept by machine gun fire. 
   (d) To sometimes provide covering fire, from the front, during an attack. 
   (e) To assist in consolidation of positions won. 
   (f) To cover the re-organization of the attacking troops. 

   (g) To provide "a mobile reserve of fire power" in the hands of battalion 
   or company commanders.

   (h) For small enterprises at night where the weight and visibility of the 
   machine gun would render the latter unsuitable.

   (i) To assist offensive or defensive bombers.

7. Lewis guns are not suitable for the following:-

   (a) Overhead fire.

   (b) Prolonged firing.

   (c)Long range fire.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

E.E.F., 4/4/16.

	1st Div	4th Bde	Total
13th Bn	65	18	83
14th	13	40 41	53 54
15th	-	33	33
	78	92	169 170

absorbed

13    119

14     61___

Total 180___

 

Parade of derelicts   5/4/16 
near Canal.

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

Serapeum,

5^th.April, 1916.

TRAINING MEMORANDUM

Brigade Grenade School

1. The construction of a Brigade School is to be commenced forthwith, 
   and training will start as soon as the necessary stores 
   are available. 
2. The intention is to train 40 per Battalion per week until further 
   notice, so that 640 men in the Brigade are trained per month.
3. The 40 men per Battalion will be drawn, 10 from each Company. 
   Each 10 men will be drawn from one section and must include a 
   non-commosioned officer.
4. Each Battalion will appoint a Grenadier Officer who will train 
   the Battalion quotas.
5. Lieutenant Murray, 13th. Battalion, will, for the present, 
   supervise the construction and work of the School, under the 
   direction of the Brigade Major.
6. The site of the School is about 400 yards North East of the 
   Brigade Lines. 
7. Commanding Officers will afford every facility to the Grenade 
   Officers to obtain the necessary working parties, tools, etc., 
   during the construction of the school.
8. While the 16th. Battalion is on the Canal Defences, the 
   Commanding Officer will make his own arrangements for grenade 
   instruction, but 40 per week must be trained in that Battalion, 
   commencing from the time the stores are available. 

JM Durrant. Major.

Brigade Major.

4th. Aust. Inf. Brigade.

5/4/16

Lecture to Officers

eligible for "Field Officer of the Day"

More of a conference than a Lecture.

Bgde Staff now preparing for war

36 officers available ∴ only once a month.

 

Importance of Duties - cleanliness, health, order & punctual administration of whole camp

Desiderata  -  Continuity of policy

                           Highest possible standards - never good enough

                           Full acquaintance with Agle policy.

                           Help each other - really a Committee 
                                                              of whom I for time being is executant

Doubtless arduous - but no child'splay.

                           24 hrs notice - rest

                                                       horse

                                                       mounted assistant

                                                       in trench with predecessor day before

                                                       assistance of Bn orderly officers

Duties : -       Operate this '& with Battalion Orderly Officers in 
                                                 in grave cases Adjutants or C.O's. 

                          Ascertain names of O. O's each day

Div                    Keep a special book, for notes, - pass to each other.

 

Duties:- Sanititation - latrines, washing places, incinerators

                Cleanliness

                Regularity

                Orderliness

                Inlying picquet - Fire, alarm, riot, help guard.

                Guards & sentries - mounting, visits, intelligence - turn them back.

                Reposts - (see para 4)

                Close trench with Bgde. H.Q.  - if anything wrong.

                Canteens - Canteen duties & hours

                                      Prices

                                      Queues

                                      Goods, qualities, supplies

                                      Roll of employees - to see list

                  Touch with & get support of predecessor

Notes on 
Duties of Brigade Field Officer 
of the Day

1. He is responsible for the general behaviour 
   of the men in camp, (regularity, order & sanitation.)
2. He mounts all guards and inlying
   piquets, and visits them once by 
   day and once by night. These 
   duties are performed mounted unless 
   otherwise ordered.
3. He will take command of the piquets in 
   case of riot, fire, or alarm.
4. He receives the reports of the commander 
   of the guard, ^ other brigade orderly officers, and
   forwards them ^by 0800 to the GOs ^Brigade Officer together 
   with his own report, in which
   he notes any irregularity or 
   unusual occurrence.
5. The duty will last for 24 hours and
   commence at reveille 7am
6. He will take immediate steps to rectify 
   any matter that is not conducive to 
   the well-being and comfort of the 
   troops.

7. He will visit the canteens and see 
   that the "List of Prices" is posted 
   up in a conspicuous place and 
   find out from the men if there