Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 6, 3 August - 7 August 1915, Part 10

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Part of Quest:
Sir John Monash (General, b.1865 - d.1931)
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG0000592
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

fo wate Water Bllley Emply 16th B2. 40 gals 15 3p hit 14th Bh. 120 gals 13 15gals 41 Dethaitant ase seyale Tp f wite Present bef ae Cfall ut $4 1908 c
Regres tnt vay an position refoding wate. thi trpl has drants to past 24hou lan a sor fallows and all ond Watet are empty pronty te supply avnitite ent or memre &e t o Ct E bre 168 VASISSTNI MITITSA EOSCL DIAGIEN
Tine. Eth Angust. 2230.2240 2200 2200-2230 2210-2330 2330 618/25 0400,718125. (during this tine rate of Pece will be o..s round per battery every Live ninutes). 2th Ausust. 0400-0430 KLEEALAMANLAREERALLALBLYLELON Appendix A. Axtillar Linstable Lexnicnt of Slth and merning of 2th Ansuetl 27 Larset. Pattery. Remarks. TABLE TOP Left flank section 4th (How) Battery. (BIC TABLE TOP) Sr Nowitzer. Right Section, ap. Battery, 69th Bde, R.F.A. RHODODENDRON Left flank section 4th (Row) Battery. SPUR S Kewitzer. Right Section &s. Battery 69th Bde Selty Cuns at 80Ky and AcBattery, 69th Thereafter this Camp at SIL1 Bde. Battery renains in observation of guns at 6142 in case they fire. 4th (Row) Battery NEK Right Section, B. Battery, 69th Bde. NEK and Phillips Battery. Reg. ANLAC TREECH CHESSBOARD. DLAGRAN IIL. Aj, A4, A7. Caddy's Battery Trenches contained between All, All, and C6(a), Cis, Ciz, CIL, CIO, suanit of BAB: 700, C2, and 32 (all Browne's Battery) inclusive). 4th (How) Battery Al, As. A8, A9, A12, Bl. Right Section, PD. Battery, 69th Bde. MEK only. Trenches in front of QUTMIIS and Battery, P.2.F.A. NEK and Tm As for 2330-0400 As for 2330-0400. Rate of fire wil bo increased to more nornal rate for proliminary bom- BOTO
A0. Tine. Jarsst. oune at 8142 and CAP beyond. O430 $.433 Oob Intensivo rate of fire. 4th August, 1917. 26 Pattery. Remarks. Ac Battery, 69th Brigade. - Phillip's Battery. Not to shoot Caddy's Battery. North Browne'’s Battery. of 4th (Row) Battery. CHESSBOARD. (sed) W.G. Braithwaite Lt-Col. General Staff, N.2. & A. Dvisici
2 Ravratine of operations of 1 Con From 2135] Night) 6/7h August 1915. 1945 2th Auguat 1915 The Head of the Battalion left in own Bivonak Kines in Reserve Gully at 2220 and head of column passed Statting Point. at 2225 and it was found that throughout the march along the Beach Road that in order to keep touch that an uneven pace amounting a times to a steady double was necessary. tat the point where the 13th 4 battations moved off to the outpost position as per operation order, I found Adifficult to get into touch with guides wha were to indicate the new direction of the advanced. Te eventually got into touch. with Major overtous his guiding party about 0230 14730 in a gully which was at the time lempecary Bde Headquartes. At this point BCoy was detailed as Advance Gward with Battalion HR in rear of leading platon of B Cay Mr 2 o After advancing about 200 yds actoss an open clearing, fire was opened on us from a gully running parallel to our front, this was assaulted with the bayone and taken and advance continued. at this poin a Turkish telephone were was picked up and demolished. We then advanced across some open ground and enemy opened fire on our fron and both flanks which necessitated the deployment of the whole of the advance guard, and D Coy was sent forward to support B Coly. The assault was pushed on and ridges deared of enemi, and advance continued. A Coy was then sent forward on the right to protect the advance. At about 0300 again got into personal touch with Major Overton and Party, I closely questioned him
with regards to owry continued advang and asked him to indicate approscimately the position of the 200 metre contour of the Abdil Rahman Bair. Major overton closely questioned the Tarkish guide and Interpriter and then indicated to myself and my officers the direction of our objectve and which the guide said was a quarter of an hour away. We here korganized battalion continuing B Coy as addance Guard with D+A Coy supporting, we then passed message back to Brigade asking for 16h Battry to keep close touch and back us up as we were meeting with stubborn of on going to t returning fromt and our messenger, sam that he t6 Battalion were keeping close touch. our line of advance now took us over nough braken stoney ridges densily covered with low prickly undergrowth in which the Turks had staken cover and were distinately dispiting very yard of our advance, control has hard to maintain, officers and NCOs had to take exciptional personal risks in collecting commands a keeping them in hand so as to get the assault vigorously puished on and to keep enemy on the retreat fust at dayligh. we had driven the enemy from Hill Near 92V4 on which positton they had put up their most determined defensive. B this time on account of the continued rapid advance over County sutable to enemy and presenting natural obstactes to ourselves had told considerably on the troops, of my command and they were much fatiqued. Having observed, troops on ridge to my right front I twice sent messengers to gett into touch and find of they were our troops, they returned on each occasion with prisoners, I eventurally succeeded in getting into touch with flags and learned that the troopyd
an our fron were 13th 114t Brd I then swept across Valley and cleaned, up (18 Turks and 11 Turtish officer who were hidden in bushes and firing on us. By this time 16th Battnhad come (up on our right and with one company 15th Battn assaulted ridge to night of 13 414. this thus completing the line throughout with a Battalih of 13. English Division of on the seft and in touch with 129 troops on the right of6 Ondian Brigade 4 Having reassembled my command I found that I had a frontage of about 10oyds to put in t state of defense with Dere Support & Communication trenches and then dug. resene Trenches which was done in very quick time and an excellent performance considerid the axhansted condition of the toops. 3 C.Os and advitants then rectived an urgent call to Brigade HR to furnish reports and receive instruction as to, future actions Then the Cosand adjutants of the Brigade at the command of the Brigadier proceedide to General Cox A Quarers and were then informed by our Brigadies General that we were to consolidate our position and that we would not undertake any further offensive movement that day and we then remained in our position with no further happening of importance until insiructed to report at HA at 1945 on 7 august for orders. our casualties during this pound. of the operation were officers wounded approse 30 other Rank Killia Wounded 75 Blaretot
JANNNNNN Dy s astemated bit fe utath Capturd 40 Prisonus Killl wo and wounded 1100. The main body of the eneny on ourd fron retraled into the Abodel Rahman Pair. August 72 1915 2145 7 HCannan S Col. Lays C.0. 15tn 4. Infy Bde 4A
46 Readmarters, Pornentet. In such circumstances names of Battalions should be Ao forwarded to Army Corps Headquarters by Divisions at once, estimated losses being sent here as soon as known Brigadiers should detail a Staff Officer for this duty B. to patrol the line and ascertain estimated heavy casualties, notifying D.H.d. who vill transmit to Army Corps Headquarters. In all cases the information will be sent to G.H.d. by Army Corps Headquarters. Attention is directed to the definition of heavy casualties. 171 Lieut-Colonel A.A & QoM.G. Aowallanand Nor Eoal and Aray Corpe. 6. 8.15 4tth. Aushalian Infauhy Brigate Towwarded Msnilur Daag Auzaelove vz & a Danaion 6/8/13
C.FaMIO rom MM CONCMI No. of Message Office Stamp. or sent out received he AAA post Ne tred to the face Meaded -Penc

 

8

Water failure  
Reserve Gully 6/8/15

16th Bn. 40 gals.       Water Bottles Empty.

15th Bn.   Nil                     "          "             "

14th Bn. 120 gals             "          "             "

13th Bn  185  gals            "          "             "

All Battalions are sending

Tins now for water

Present stock nil.

CW Pulling

Lieut

[*1908*]

for Bde Q.M.

J N Edmonds

Major

Bde Field Officer

3

P.T.O

 

          

Regret to report very serious

position regarding water.

This Brigade has drawn for

past 24 hours less than

400 gallons, and all our

water bottles are empty. Apparently
no supply available 

 


NEW. ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.   Appendix A.

Artillery Timetable for night of 6/7th and morning of 7th

August. 1915.

[*27*]

Time. Target. Battery. Remarks.

6th August.
2139-2150
         2200

 

 

 

 

TABLE TOP
(BIG TABLE TOP)

 

 

 


Left flank section
4th (How) Battery.
6" howitzer
Right Section, "B"

Battery, 69th Bde,

R.F.A.

  

2150 2210

2200-2230

 

 

 

 

RHODODENDRON
SPUR

 

 

 

 

Left flank section

4th (How) Battery.

6" Howitzer.

Right Section "B"

Battery 69th Bde,

R.F.A

  
 

Guns at 80K3 and

Camp at 81L1

 

 

"A" Battery, 69th

Bde

 

 

Therefore this

Battery remains in

observation of guns

at 81A2 in case they

fire.

2210-2330

 

 

NEK

 

 

4th (How) Battery

Right Section, "B"

Battery, 69th Bde

  

2330   6/8/15      

0400, 7/8/15.

(during this

time rate of

fire will be

one round per

battery every

five minutes).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NEK and
CHESSBOARD

 

 

 

 





 

 

 




Trenches in front
of QUINN'S

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Phillip's Battery.

 

 

 

Caddy's Battery )

                )

and         )

                 )

Browne's Battery)

 

4th (How) Battery

 

 

Right Section, "B"

Battery, 69th Bde

 

2nd Battery, N.Z.F.A.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ref. ANZAC TRENCH

DIAGRAM III.

A3, A4, A7.


Trenches contained

between A12, A11,

C6(a), C13, C12, C11,

C10, summit of BABY

700, C2, and B2 (all

inclusive).
 

A1, A5, A8, A9, A12,

B1

 

NEK only.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7th August.
0400-0430

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NEK and
CHESSBOARD

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

As for 2330-0400

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

As for 2330-0400.
Rate of fire will be
increased to more 
normal rate for
preliminary
bombardment

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

[*26*]

Time. Target. Battery. Remarks.
 

Guns at 81A2 and

CAMP beyond.

 

 "A" Battery, 69th
Brigade.
 		  

0430-00433

Intensive

rate of fire
 

 CHESSBOARD


 

Phillip's Battery.

Caddy's Battery.

Browne's Battery.

4th (How) Battery.

 Not to shoot
North
of
CHESSBOARD

4th August, 1915.

(Sgd) W.G. Braithwaite Lt-Col.

General Staff,

N.Z. & A. Division
 

 



 [*23*]  

Narrative of operations of 15th B'n

From 2135 Night 6/7th August 1915.

To 1945 7th August 1915.

The head of the Battalion left it's own

Bivouac Lines in Reserve Gully at 2220

and head of column passed Starting Point

at 2225 and it was found that 

throughout the march along the Beach Road

that in order to keep touch that an uneven

pace amounting a times to a steady double

was necessary.

At the point where the 13th  & 14th 

battalions moved off to the outpost position

as per operation order, I found it difficult

to get into touch with guides who were to

indicate the new direction of the advance.

We eventually got into touch

with Major Overton & his guiding party about

1430 0230, in a gully which was at the time

Temporary  B'de Headquarters.

At this point B Coy was detailed

as Advance Guard with Battalion HQ

in rear of leading platoon of B Coy

JM

18

2

[*22*]

After advancing about 200 yds across

an open clearing, fire was opened on us

from a gully running parallel to our

front, this was assaulted with the bayonet

and taken and advance continued.

At this point a Turkish

telephone wire was picked up and

demolished.

We then advanced across

some open ground and enemy opened

fire on our front and both flanks

which necessitated the deployment of

the whole of the advance guard, and

D Coy was sent forward to support

B Coy.

The assault was pushed on

and ridges cleared of enemy, and

advanced continued.

A Coy was then sent forward

on the right to protect the advance.

At about 0300 I again got

into personal touch with Major Overton

and Party, I closely questioned him

20

 

[*21*]

with regards to own continued

advance and asked him to indicate 

approximately the position of the 200

metre contour of the Abdel Rahman Bair.

Major Overton closely questioned

the Turkish guide and Interpreter and then

indicated to myself and my officers

the direction of our objective and

which the guide said was a quarter

of an hour away.

We here reorganized battalion

continuing B Coy as Advance Guard

with D & A Coy supporting, we then

passed message back to Brigade

asking for 16th Battn to keep close

touch and back us up as we

were meeting with stubborn opposition,

and our messenger ^on going to & returning from Bde HQ 

saw that the 16th Battalion were keeping close touch.

Our line of advance now

took us over rough broken stoney

ridges densely covered with low prickly

undergrowth in which the Turks

had taken cover and were obstinately

22

[*20*]

disputing every yard of our advance;

control has hard to maintain, officers

and NCO'S had to take exceptional

personal risks in collecting commands

& keeping them in hand so as to get

the assault vigorously pushed on and

to keep enemy on the retreat.

Just at daylight we had driven the

enemy from Hill near 92U4 on which

position they had put up their most

determined defensive.

By this time on account of the

continued rapid advance over country

suitable to enemy and presenting

natural obstacles to ourselves had

told considerably on the troops of

my command and they were much

fatigued.

Having observed troops on ridge

to my right front I twice sent messengers

to get into touch and find if they were our

troops, they returned on each occasion with

prisoners, I eventually succeeded in getting

into touch with flags and learned that the troops

34

 

[*19*]

on our front were 13th & 14th Bns 

I then swept across valley and

cleaned up 18 Turks and 1 Turkish 

officer who were hidden in bushes

and firing on us.

By this time 16th Battn had

come up on our right and with

one company 15th Battn assaulted

ridge to right and with of 13th & 14th Bn's

thus completing the line throughout

with a Battalion of 13th English Division 

of on the left ^ of the 13th Battn and in touch with

29th   Division Indian Brigade troops on the right of   16th Bn

Having reassembled my

command I found that I had

a frontage of about 100yds to

put in a state of defence with

Fire Support & Communication

trenches and then dug Reserve

Trenches which was done in very

quick time and an excellent performance

considering the Exhausted Condition

of the troops.

26

[*18*]

CO's and adjutants the received

an urgent call to Brigade H.Q.

to furnish reports and receive

instruction as to future action.

Then the C'Os and Adjutants of

the Brigade at the command of the

Brigadier proceeded to General Cox's

H.Quarters and were then informed

by our Brigadier General that we were

to consolidate our position and that

we would not undertake any further

offensive movement that day and

we then remained in our position

with on further happening of importance

until instructed to report at HQ

at 1945 on 7th August for orders.

Our casualties during this period

of the operation were

7 officers wounded

approx 30 other Ranks Killed

       "      75     "            "      Wounded

28

 

It is estimated that the 15th Battn

captured 40 prisoners Killed 100 and

wounded 100. The main body of the enemy

on our front retreated into the Abdel Rahman Bair.

August 7th 1915

2145

[*17*]

Ja H Cannan

Lt Col

C.O. 15th Bn

4th Infy B'de

36

 

[*46*]

Headquarters

..............................................

Forwarded

A. In such circumstances names of Battalions should be

forwarded to Army Corps Headquarters by Divisions at

once, estimated losses being sent here as soon as known

B. Brigadiers should detail a Staff Officer for this duty

to patrol the line and ascertain estimated "heavy"

casualties, notifying D.H.Q. who will transmit to Army

Corps Headquarters.

C. In all cases the information will be sent to G.H.Q. by

Army Corps Headquarters.

Attention is directed to definition of 

heavy casualties.

Lieut-Colonel

A.A & Q.M.G.

Australianand New Zealand Army Corps

[*4th Australian Infantry Brigade*]

[*Forwarded*]

[[?]]

D a a G

NZ & A Division

Anzac Cove 

6/8/15

 

 

Army Form C. 2123

C. Form (Original)

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

No. of Message

recd 0845

Recd.

from Q.A..............

By. [[F Flane?]].................

Prefix [[BM?]]...........

Code............

Words.........

Sent, or sent out

At.........................m.

By.........................

Returned Aug ?

at....................M

Office Stamp

10

BQ 7/8/15

Service Instructions

Handed in at the

Office At ..............M

Received here at 8.40 M.

TO  4 th A I BDE

Sender's Number 
T2

Day of Month

7th 

In reply to Number

_

A A A

After securing Ridge 9x2 (in

black) in square T U I

found Wiltshire Batt accupying outpost

position on this ridge square

U aaa I therefore prolonged 

the outposts line from right

of Wilts to high ground

in vicinity of BAIR in

ABDEL RAHMAN BAIR aaa I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                        

                                                                                                         

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