Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 6, 3 August - 7 August 1915, Part 3

Status:
Open for review
Accession number:
RCDIG0000592

Page 1 / 10

Tesued at 8 a.m.3/4 Copy No. T.. War Diary 2 Record O/C. Signals ist A.L.H.Bde. 3rd A.L.H. Bde N.Z.L.R.Bde. N.Z. Inf Bde 4th Aust. Inf. Bde. - 13th Division 29th Indian Inf Bde 10- —Obindian ZABde11. 12 C.R.A. T. .R. A.D.M.S. 0/C Divisional Trein A.D.C. (for G.O.C.) Admin. Staff de. Cnral Sta d.. exzParpe -- No 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Appendix B. EZIALAD AWD ASTRALLAW DIVISION syonr 25 r in accordance with - DIVISIONAL ORDER No Il, dated sth. August, 1915. Iüroralow. No information regarding future plans or movements of Troops contained in Order No il dated 5th August, or in these instructions, is to be republished in Orders which reach lower than Brigade Staffs, except in so far as is necessary for the efficient carrying out of operations ordered. uB The Right Covering Force is to seize certain points now in (a) Ooh Blu possession of the eneny which if in his hands would seriously rOAC:. interfere with the initial advance of our Assaulting Colunne. Right Covering The operations of the Right Covering Force should start Force. with the attack on lo 3 Post (60 B 4): the assault being tined for 9.30 p.m., i.e., when the shelling by the Destroyer ceases and the searchlight is switched off. The Troops detailed for the attack on BAUCHOP HILL (92 A 7 and 8) have in the first instance the tesk of protecting the initial advance of the Assaultine Coluans up the CEAILAK DIRN and towarde "ALDT: POIFT (92 R 7). The sttack on BAUCFOP HILL should begin simultaneously with the assault on Old No 3 Post and should aim at driv - ingthe enny Dorth of the AGHYL DîRE so as to prevent him frou molesting the Left Asssulting Column from the Northonn spurs of the BAUCHOP HILL Ridge. TABLI TOP (80 C 9) should be attacked by two Coluans mov- ing viz the SAZLI BIIT DERE and CHAILAK DERE, the former being tined so as to rgach the level of OLn Ko 3 POS NOT Soo tha.30 p.n. (the tise fixed for the assault on that Post: the latter Coluen issuing from Ko 3 Post as soon as the BAUCHOr HILL Force (vide b) has cleared the way cufficiently to acmit of ite doing so. At 9.40 p.m. the cearchlight will be switched on to TABLE TOr and the hill will be beavily shelled by the Destroyer and by our Howitzers till s p.. at which time shelling 100 will cesse and the light will be switched off - the latter being the signal for the asssult. Action by (b) The objective of the Left Covering Force is the DANAK JELIK BAIR frow tho 'De cf DAMAK JELIK to the Knoll Left Covering (92 0. 9) with the cbject of protecting the left flank of Forcc. the Right Assaulting Colunn fro interference from the North and Nortr Mast: and directly assisting the operations of our troops further North who will bo using the Beach as close to us as the mouth of the AS"AK DERE (91). This necessitates:- An advance frou the CHAILXX DERE past "ALDEP POI"T This shoul- closely follow the advence egsinst DALCLOP'S HILL. The Assault of the DANAX JZLIK BAIR. The occupation of the Northern spurs of the hill as far Zast as Knoll 92 0. 9. Care will be taken not to open fire on our troops lend- ing to the North West. The first objoctive is the line CHUETY BAIR - Heas of KUR DERE. ACTIOW BY RIGET This necessitates : A.SAUL JFoury. (a) An advance up the SAZLI NUIT DERE and CEAILAK Dr2T and the clearing of RLODO–—DRON GPPE. (General (b) Strongly picketting the Rirht of the Line of Johneton). Advance towards 3A? "LBSFIP FILL (80 o. 2). (c) Seizing and holding RFODODTTRCT RIDGR (60 J 3; K 1). The cccond objective is es indiceted in para 2 (e) This necessitates on advance of Operation Order He 11. South Cest aleng tbe Riece ageinst BiTTLESHIP HILL and don
124 the Southern elopes of SARI BAIR. The G.O.C. wishes the Mountain Artillery attached te this Column to be provided -ith an ample escort, to be utilized DIP as a battery, and to advance via the CHAILAK DERU IU E- DIATCLY in rear of the troops of the Right assaulting Col¬ unn using this route. Action by Left The objective is tho line Head of KUR DERE (81 A 4) Ihraulting Coluan KOJA CHTTII TEP3. (General Cex). This necessitates e An advance up the AGHYL DERE. 15 The pickotting of the line of advance so as to guart against interference from the North from the point KNOLL 92.0.(9, where the right of the Left Govering Force rests. c) The seizure and consolidation of the line indicated as the objective: joining up on the right with the left of General Johnston's Coluen (pere 3). Brigadigr-General Cox will NOf operate South of the line Square l2 till KoJA CHEEN rxie in his possession. The G.O.0. vishes the Hountain Artillery attached to this Colunn to be provided with an ample escort and to follow inncdiately in rear of the Column. It is left to the discretion of the G.O.C. 13th Division Reser. to attach a proportion of Divisional Engineers to the Left Covering Force (para 2 b). The G.OC. N.Z. Nounted Rifles Brigade will detail guides Guides. as under : Right Assaulting Column, Lieut. Taylor, N.Z.M.R. 4 1 Tpr. Left Assaulting Column, Major Overton, N.Z.M.R. & 1 Tpr. Right Reserve Column, - 2 Troopers N.Z..R. Left Reserve Coluan, 2 Troopers, N.Z.M.R. Left Covering Force, Lieut Wilson and 1 Trooper. It nust be impressed on all ranks that speed and silence Precautions. are factors which will do nuch to ensure success. Speed will enable us to forestall the enemy's Reserves : silence will prevent bim frou finding out our strength and dispos- ition. (b) By night the bayonet enly will be used by Troops attack- ing the enemy. Magasines will NOT be charged by Troops of the Assaulting Colunns; they will only be charged by Troops left as Pickets and Garrisons of Posts. e) The danger of striking lighte or smoking while it is dark is to be impressed on all, and is to be strictly for¬ bioden. Svery effort is to be made to re-form Troops into their Rerforming original Companies, Platoons and Sections. Powerful aseis¬ Troops. tance will be available by daylight from the guns of h. M. Ships and from those in position at Anzac. Under cover of this bombardment, Unite will be re-organized, and all preparatione made for e.further edvance. As soon as the main objectivee ere ohtained, Troops will Entrenching. dig in. Trenches will be traversed, and comnunication trenches made. heavy hostile Artillery force is to be expected ehen it becomes light. 10. Telephone Wires, Troops are to be warned not to break or damage any of our own Telephone wires. Hostile wires met with by lead- ing Troope are to be et once cut, and the ends knotted up separately, so that they may be recognised as hostile by troops coming after - otherwise they micht be repaired under the impression that they were our own wires. 11. ali ad The supreme importance of striet punctuality and Mex Discipling.accurate timing of initial movements cannot be over¬ rated. The various attacks are timed so as to afford wutual support and protection. Equally important is the closing up of Units while on the march. Any straggling either along the onenunication trench or along the gullies must inevitably ceuse troops in rear to be delayed, and therefore not immediately available when ranted.
12. oe 3 3. Column Commanders and Commandere of Reserve Brigades will detail Staff Officers to march, one at the head of the Column or Brigade, the other at the rear, till they are clear of all communication trenches or ros's Divisional Staff Officers and within our lines. Military Police willbe stationed et important points within our lines to check timings and prevent less of direetion. No Officer, D. C. 0. or man is to fall out to assist to the rear a wounded men; to do this is a serious Stretcher parties will follow all Military Offence. Columns and will attend to the wounded. Stretcher parties are not to block or interfere with the forward movement of Troops - they are not to maake use of any Communicetion Trench or Sap till all move- ment of fighting troops through it has ceased for the night. Nrg Grasttuartaer Lieut-Colonel, Seneral Staff. New Zealand and Australian Davision.
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTMALIAN DIVISION. . SSns wete N2iDDideNo MARCH TABLE. alSat yl PASS S.P. S. P. ROUTE REMARKS UNIT HOUR R.GNT 455A0LT CA Aruises HosPsto.?ep- Comnente. Trnd t3 NZ. Juf: Jrappr Varllag a 8 SoAn. M2. Engmen Pat de dd follnorc fhs Happg Bushe Gellg 26 Tr Battang (ha ich tr 10.15pm. Vallag ti SAtTSII DERE SSvensntg rttoraed for Com Trneh 7 J92 L. B6IT DER Slappg Velleg SA2L. B6.T DESe CA C 9.4oN feunding at oteer Sc5 Iimer NosPotos ora Belich Roat 16 Trr3 Tort Riserne Gullg LEET COERINO als g.o pm Pfons tond) Föne Jtrad anes NoNo3 Lerr Asiout? Fra Srrach Hoad to o pooå Port 10. 10 Hoa. Ig Juf Bae VPost ethende T. AGHSL DE AS do e 945- ka add dinnner 1 88 3 A beust Juf bte cto fillrwor e 46M10M. Patz. USDr. 31 Ie Brehieng Theaa aunnes HG bea Srach Raad ti ho3 ane Heut dh- DE G /2 20 u 9 H.trp ot AGttie Dene Aghit Denelel Sheadime tr 3 Port vin beact kom f tro 3 Tat aude a- h 1 JOa upTCHHINN DERT eee 11 1Pandsde Trajo Ginsstt SRugestz - AD..
Issued to Operstisags Night 6/ August. A. Aust GretGde NX ZEALAND AND AUSTRALLAN DIVISION Divisional Headquartef: ANZAC COVE, 5th August 1915. G.0.C. 13th Division. ist Australian Division 29th Indian Infantry Brigade O.C. Indian "ountain Artillery Bde. All Brigades, N.Z. M A. Divieion. aimStaff. C.R.A., C.R.E., A.D.4 with reference to Order No. Il dated 5th August and the Instructions and Appendices issued therewith, the following amendments and additions are issued :- apunn 30 11 The assault on PLATEAU 400 (68 c.) will take Prra 1 [5). place at 2.30 p.m. The Left Covering Force on gaining the DEKAK Para 3 (b1. JELIK BAIR will get in touch with the Ferce effecting a landing North of the ASTAX DERE (Squere 91). The Nountain Battery ettached to the Right Para 3 (c). Assaulting Column will not use the Communication Trench it will move to the vicinity of No. 3 Post vis the Beach, It will keep clear (vide Ammended March Table attached). of treope moving along the Beach road. The Assaulting Coluen moving vie the SAZLI BEIT DERE will commence ite forward movement at 10.45 p.m. (insteed of at 10. 30 p.m.) The Officers Commanding Nos. 3 end e Sections Para 3 (fl. of Defence will engagerthe enemy by fire and bomb attack 8 p.m. and througheut the en the sight éth/7th August s night. The Bearer Division of the Indian Field Para 4 (al. Ambulance will be disposed of under the orders of the c.o.C. 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. nuuniuud I At 9. 30 p.m. the fire of eur Hewitzere will Para 2 (al. be turned on to BIG TABLE TOP : the searchlight, however will not be directed en te it till 9.40 p.m., when the fire of the Naval Guns will be turned on te it in addition to that of the Howitzere. The c.O.C. directe that "ountain Paras, 3(c) and 4(c). Batteries with their escort normally march not less than half a mile in rear of the Colunns to which they are ettached The portion of this para. restricting Brig- Para 4 (c). General Cox's movements South of the line Square pu is cancelled. In order te indicate to the Navy and to our Artillery the positionsof our Troope on the morning of the 7th August, The flares will flares will be lit at dawn along our line. consist of Naval green lighte, one of which will be burned at 3.45 a.m.,and another at 3.55 c.m. by each Battalion in the front along the position occupied by its most advanced Troops. Care is to be taken to place the flare where it will be shaded fro the view of the enemy. If the CFUNUK BAIR Ridge has been reached, the flares will be burned a short distance down our side of the slope. Brigadiers will indent on Captain Parry Okeden, Officer in charge of Ammunition Supply, for flares to be used during the forthcoming operatione.
35 (2) From 8 p.m. on the 6th August till 4 a.m. on the 7th August the Beach road from Reserve Gully northward is reserved Sommunisstion entirely for the forward movement of troops and ansmels. The Covered Way leading to Ho. 2 Post will be roserved for rearward movement after 11.30 p.m. on the night 6th//th August and on the 7th August. Brigadiers and Officers Commanding Units will indent on Böche. the Ammunition Supply Officer for chatever boabs they require. Interpreters have been detailed to each Brigade and have Interpreters been ordered to report to their respective Brigade Head- cuarters at 9 s.m. 6th August. In order to control movemente along roads and covered ways Soni lof curingthe operations now commencing, staff Officers and Movements. Military Police have been posted at various points within our lines to regulate traffie. Intercommuni- Instructiens regarding intercornunication with Ships and cation, Ships air craft, Part 1, and Land Communications,Part 2, have and Air Graft,been distributed to-day to all Brigadiere. l rackorening elime. Ceneral Staff. NL. £A.Division. ...
1A AnSEIALLAN AD ED ZLALAUD ANYCOTPS.G To are about to mako our sooond advanco on our way to Constunti¬ noplo, and I want to let alleranks know of whut great importance the movo wo aro to mare will be. Tho whole world has now hoard of the action of the Australians end Mew Zoulandors whon wo landed hero at tho ond of April. Tho highost poasiblo opinion has boen formed of our doings by all Military oritios, and wo therofore havo to cot up to an extraordinarily high standard to livo up to rur reputation. I want you all to romombor that the fighting wo shall probubl¬ havo in this dvenoo will bo vory much of the samo nature as it was tho day wo landod - cortainly it will be so for a portion of tho troep. 7ee Wo shell have to face and tacklo a vory dirficult bit of oountry which tho onomy havo to come oxtont ontronched, as thoy did for our s rival. Then hovovor wo ignorod all tronchos - rushing at all wo saw, olasing tho Tr out of thon, Looping thow woll on tho run. This wo hevo got to Co again. Epmombor that undor no oirounstancos can wo possibly turn buck. Having startad our attach it heas got to bo soon through, and that it will bo scon through with grost suocoss I havo no o will advance on a broul front as wo did on landing. doubt. Somo will find thay hevo tronohos in Tront of thon; othors will not. But all must koop on and on continuously until vo havo occupied tho onomy position. Onco wo havo got into the, I fool suro thet Australians and Now Zoalandors will novor allow thorsolvos to bo drigon out. It will procably cono to : good doal of fighting sotually in tho trenchos, and in thom wo woll knoy that ary ono of us is oqual to at loast ton Durls, so that wo will and must drivo thom along the tronchos boforo us and nover givo thom broathing spoce for a monert. Wo shall havo tho advantags of starting whilo it is still cocl, but aftor hard olimbing I know how hot it gots and wator will bo a groot. diffioulty. I ornostly thorofore ask all mon, ao i did tho doy wo landod, to bo nost caroful of their wator bottlos and not to stert drinling till lato in the day. Tho comploto defoat of tho Turks now vill havo an onor ous offect and will bring us a vory largo stop noaror Constant nowlo. an' indeod it may I hope provont thom making any othor dofinito stur! for a considerablo tino - also, by prossing thon hard and continuiag to rces thom or tho next fow days, wo should hopo to capture guns aud nazin uns as woll es prisonors und oorys. "o have to romombor that when wo aro chezing them thraugh their tronches, as I hopo o shall b doing, thoy aro surs to tr ar! bomb us as much ad thoy can. Wo howovor havo two or throa bowba to cvory ono of thoirs, and it only remains for us to proso boy oacily vo can bo thom with tho bomb, as wo know wo now can do with tho hayonet and the flo. Two nato throo days hord fighting may, wo hopo, cloar tho Turks from theso hills round us, and I know that cveryono will do his best to mako succoss a cortainty. Whon wo landod, tho plaoo of honor was givon to tho Austral¬ Division in loading our attoch. On this ocospion too thet Divis: ill start tho attaok and will havo its full Jhare of fighting, honor of socomplishing tho tack which wo sot boforo us on the 2" April - viz., tho attccline of Hill 971, will noy foll to tho Zoaland and Austr relien Livision. Thoy will hero a hard and timo of it, but I woll mow thet nothi Swill top the, and will provo to the worldt thot thore are no Turks wo cn gto taling a position onco thay Levo mado up their hinds to do so Romombor, mon, the order of tho day muet bo “shovo on a shoving on" until wo re in completo poppossion of the hoights whon wo hope wo phall eve the Thrbs at our nercy. hementer, too, thet thers will be now Divisions of berd Nitche or'e Arny oporating in conjunction with un, who will be wotching! carofully, and whoso succoss vill be entiroly d. opondent upon ourt Sieg
to ablo to show thom tho way first - and this I know you will do. Romombor too to do all you can to consorvo and koop your amn¬ unition during tho boginning of your advanco, i.o., whilo on tho flat It will thon bo dark, so tho majority and whon in tho lowor hills. of any ammunition that might bo firod would probably bo wastod, whilo you may hopo to got at tho onomy with tho bayonot and oithor capturo or kill him at onco or got him whilo on tho run. Lator on, whon wo got to tho top of tho hill, all tho ammunition wo can possibly carry will be wantod, as wo may bo suro that tho onomy will not givo up his strong position without a strugglo, and when wo havo takon it ho will vory likoly countor attack to drivo us out. Evory offort will bo mado to bring up armunition and wator as quickly as possiblo, but you all know as woll as I do thoro will bo difficultios in gotting thoso up quickly onough, so koop all tho ammunition you can for shooting purposos whon it is light onough to soe and dostroy tho Turks in front of you and koop your wator bottlos full as long as you possibly can. Wo know that wo havo ostablishod a moral suporiority ovor tho Turks, and havo boon ablo not only to koop thoir snipors complotoly undor, but in many cusos wo havo gono far to stop thoir bombing. Though thoy aro torrifiod of tho Australian and Now Zoaland soldiers in tho opon, yot thoro is no doubt that thoy will always fight woll whon bohind tronchos. On this occasion, howovor, I trust wo may bo able to got a good many of thom in tho opon, when by constantly prossing thom lot us hopo thoy will again do as our men said thoy did whon they landod on tho 25th April - run fastor than they had ovor soon mon run boforo. Thore is just ono moro point I want you all to romombor, which is that whon wo havo takon tho onemy's position and drivon him off it, our work is by no moans ondod, so mon must not think that thoy will thon bo ablo to get off and como down to tho boach for a swim. is thon that our hardest work, and possibly tho groatest dotormination, will be roquirod, as wo not only havo got to turn tho onomy off his prosont position, but having onco chiftod him from his front tronchos, wo have to koop running him out of thom as far as wo possibly can, oapturing wo hopo ovorything ho possossos, and giving him no rest until ho is complotoly dofoatod hore. zudusord 4.9 915
2 Neadquartere. ............................ Forrarded. In such circumstances names of Battalions should be forwarded to Army Corps Headquarters by Divisions at once, estimated losses being sent here as soon as known Erigadiers should detail a Staff Officer for this duty to patrol the line and ascertain estimated 'heavy" casualties, notifying D.H.C. wno will transmit to Army Corps Headquarters., In all cases the information will be sent to G.H.Q. by Army Corps Headquarters. Attention is directed to the definition of heavy casualties. Lieut-Colonel A.A & Q.M.G. a Australienand Hee Zealand Army Corpa. 6-715 4t " Siskalam frlantag Alriges Nonarede Worriilerke Ga a6 Augee lore 202 5d Dridos

29
Issued at 8 a.m. 5/8/15

To. Copy No. To. No
War Diary   1 C.R.E. 13
Record   2 A.D.M.S. 14
O/C, Signals 3 O/C Divisional Train 15
1st A.L.H.Bde.   4 A.D.C.  (for G.O.C.) 16
3rd A.L.H.Bde.  5 Admin. Staff   17
N.Z.M.R.Bde.  6 do.  18
N.Z.Inf Bde 7 General Staff  19
4th Aust. Inf. Bde. 8 do.  20
13th Division 9 A & N.Z. Army Corps 21
29th Indian Inf Bde 10    
O/C Indian M.A.Bde 11    
C.R.A.  12    
 

Appendix B.
25
SECRET
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO COMMANDERS.
in accordance with -
DIVISIONAL ORDER No 11, dated 4 5th. August, 1915.
1.
INFORMATION.     No information regarding future plans or movements of
Troops contained in Order No 11 dated 5th August, or in
these instructions, is to be republished in Orders which
reach lower than Brigade Staffs, except in so far as is
necessary for the efficient carrying out of operations
ordered.
2. 
ACTION BY
COVERING
FORCE.
Right Covering
Force.     (a) The Right Covering Force is to seize certain points now in
possession of the enemy which if in his hands would seriously
interfere with the initial advance of our Assaulting
Columns.
The operations of the Right Covering Force should start
with the attack on No 3 Post (80 B 4) : the assault being
timed for 9.30 p.m., i.e., when the shelling by the
Destroyer ceases and the searchlight is switched off. 
The Troops detailed for the attack on BAUCHOP HILL (92 X 7
and 8) have in the first instance the task of protecting
the initial advance of the Assaulting Columns up the
CEAILAK DERE and towards "ALDT" POINT (92 R 7).
The attack on BAUCHOP HILL should begin simultaneously
with the assault on Old No 3 Post and should aim at driving
the enemy North of the AGHYL DYRE so as to prevent him
from molesting the Left Assaulting Column from the Northern
spurs of the BAUCHOP HILL Ridge.
TABLE TOP (80 C 9) should be attacked by two Columns moving
via the SAZLI BEIT DERE and CHAILAK DERE, the former
being timed so as to reach the level of OLD No 3 POST NOT 
SOONER than 9.30 p.m. (the time fixed for the assault on
that Post: the latter Column issuing from No 3 Post as
soon as the BAUCHOP HILL Force (vide b) has cleared the
way sufficiently to admit of its doing so.
At 9.40 p.m. the searchlight will be switched on to TABLE
TOP and the hill will be heavily shelled by the Destroyer
[*10 pm*]  and by our Howitzers till 9.50 p. m. at which time shelling
will cease and the light will be switched off - the latter
being the signal for the assault.
Action by
Left Covering 
Force.     (b) The objective of the Left Covering Force is  the DAYAK
JELIK BAIR  from the "D" of DAYAK JELIK to the Knoll
(92 0. 9) with the object of protecting the left flank of
the Right Assaulting Column from interference from the
North and North East: and directly assisting the operations
of our troops further North who will be using the Beach as
close to us as the mouth of the ASMAH DERE (91).
This necessitates :-
An advance from the CHAILAK DERE past WALDER POINT - 
This should closely follow the advance against BAUCHOP'S
HILL.
The Assault of the DAYAK JELIK BAIR.
The occupation of the Northern spurs of the hill as far
East as Knoll 92 0. 9.
Care will be taken not to open fire on our troops landing
to the North West.
3.
ACTION BY RIGHT
ASSAULTING COLUMN.
(General
Johnston).     The first objective is the line CHUNUK BAIR - Head of
KUR DERE.
This necessitates:
(a)  An advance up the SAZLI BEIT DERE and CHAILAK
DERE and the clearing of RHODODENDRON SPUR.
(b)  Strongly picketting the Right of the Line of
Advance towards BATTLESHIP HILL (80 0. 2).
(c) Seizing and holding RHODODENDRON RIDGE (80 J 3;
K 1). The second objective is as indicated in para 2 (c)
of Operation Order No 11.  This necessitates an advance
South West along the Ridge against BATTLESHIP HILL and down 

 

24
2.
the Southern slopes of SARI BAIR.
The G.O.C. wishes the Mountain Artillery attached to this
Column to be provided with an ample escort, to be utilised
as a battery, and to advance via the CHAILAK DERE IMMEDIATELY
in rear of the troops of the Right assaulting Column
using this route.
4.
Action by Left
Assaulting Column
(General Cox).     The objective is the line Head of KUR DERE (81 A 4)
- KOJA CHEMEH TEPE.
This necessitates:
(a) An advance up the AGHYL DERE.
(b) The picketting of the line of advance so as to guard
against interference from the North from the point KNOLL
92.0. (9, where the right of the Left Covering Force rests.
(c)   The seizure and consolidation of the line indicated
as the objective: joining up on the right with the left of
General Johnston's Column (para 3).
Brigadier-General Cox will NOT operate South of the line
Square 92/80 till KOJA CHEMEH TEPE is in his possession.
The G.O.C. wishes the Mountain Artillery attached to this
Column to be provided with an ample escort and to follow
immediately in rear of the Column.
5.
Reserve.     It is left to the discretion of the G.O.C. 13th Division
to attach a proportion of Divisional Engineers to the
Left Covering Force (para 2 b). 
6.
Guides.     The G.O.C. N.Z.Mounted Rifles Brigade will detail guides
as under  :
Right Assaulting Column,  Lieut. Taylor, N.Z.M.R. & 1 Tpr.
Left Assaulting Column,  Major Overton, N.Z.M.R. & 1 Tpr.
Right Reserve Column,  -  2 Troopers N.Z.M.R.
Left Reserve Column,  -  2 Troopers, N.Z.M.R.
Left Covering Force, Lieut Wilson and 1 Trooper.
7.
Precautions.    (a) It must be impressed on all ranks that speed and silence
are factors which will do much to ensure success.  Speed
will enable us to forestall the enemy's Reserves : silence
will prevent him from finding out our strength and disposition.
(b) By night the bayonet only will be used by Troops attacking
the enemy.  Magazines will NOT be charged by Troops of
the Assaulting Columns:  they will only be charged by
Troops left as Pickets and Garrisons of Posts.
(c) The danger of striking lights or smoking while it is dark
is to be impressed on all, and is to be strictly forbidden.
8.
Re-forming
Troops.     Every effort is to be made to re-form Troops into their
original Companies, Platoons and Sections. Powerful assistance
will be available by daylight from the guns of
H.M. Ships and from those in position at Anzac. Under cover
of this bombardment, Units will be re-organized, and all
preparations made for a .further advance.
9.
Entrenching.     As soon as the main objectives are obtained, Troops will
dig in.  Trenches will be traversed, and communication
trenches made.  Heavy hostile Artillery force is to be
expected when it becomes light.
10.                       
Telephone Wires.     Troops are to be warned not to break or damage any of
our own Telephone wires.  Hostile wires met with by leading
Troops are to be at once cut, and the ends knotted up
separately, so that they may be recognised as hostile by
troops coming after - otherwise they might be repaired
under the impression that they were our own wires.
11.
Punctuality and
March Discipline.     The supreme importance of strict punctuality and
accurate timing of initial movements cannot be overrated.
The various attacks are timed so as to afford
mutual support and protection.  Equally important is the
closing up of Units while on the march.  Any straggling
either along the communication trench or along the
gullies must inevitably cause troops in rear to be
delayed, and therefore not immediately available when
wanted. 

 

23
3.
Column Commanders and Commanders of Reserve Brigades
will detail Staff Officers to march, one at the head
of the Column or Brigade, the other at the rear, till
they are clear of all communication trenches or roads
within our lines.    Divisional Staff Officers and
Military Police will be stationed at important points
within our lines to check timings and prevent loss of
direction.
12.
Wounded.     No Officer, N. C. O. or man is to fall out to assist
to the rear a wounded man;  to do this is a serious
Military Offence. Stretcher parties will follow all
Columns and will attend to the wounded.
Stretcher parties are not to block or interfere with
the forward movement of Troops  -  they are not to make
use of any Communication Trench or Sap till all movement
of fighting troops through it has ceased for the
night.
W G Braithwaite Major,
Per Lieut-Colonel,
General Staff.
New Zealand and Australian Division. 

 

 22

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
MARCH TABLE. Issued with NZ & A Div Order No 11
d/ 5 August 1915.

UNIT

PASS S. P.
HOUR

S. P.

ROUTE

REMARKS

RIGHT ASSAULT
CHAILAK DERE Col
N.Z. Infy                  }
N.Z. Engineers     }
26 M Battery (bn 1
sec)


a  8.50 pm.
b  10.15 pm.
Happy Valley

Mule Gully
Communications Trench to No 3
Post
do   do  follows C fro Happy
Valley to SAZLI BEIT DERE
Arrives No. 3 Post  9.30pm.
SAZLI BEIT DERE Col c  9.40pm. Happy Valley Comm’ Trench to SAZLI BEIT DERE 15 minutes allocated for
forming up clear of Sap. 
LEFT COVERING FORCE (d)  9.0pm Reserve Gully
(lower end)
via Beach Road to No3 Post Leaves No 3 Post 9.45pm

LEFT ASSAULT

29 Inf Bde            }
4 Aust Inf Bde     }
21 M Battery

e  9.45pm

f  11.10pm
do

do
via Beach Road to N of No 3
Post & thence to AGHYL DERE
follows c
Head arrives N of No 3
Post 10.20pm
Head arrives N of 3
Post 11.45p.m.
Reserve
AGHYL DERE Col
CHAILAK DERE Col
5 August 1915.
g  11.20pm
h  12.00m
do
do
via Beach Road to No. 3 and
on  to AGHIL DERE
via Beach Road to No 3 Post and
up the CHAILAK DERE
NV Pruiste Major
General Staff
th Div
Head arrives AGHYL
DERE 12.20am
Head arrives No 3 Post
10 am
 

4 Aust Inf Bde
36
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
Divisional Headquarters,
ANZAC COVE, 5th August 1915.
Issued to :
G.O.C.  13th Division.
1st Australian Division
29th Indian Infantry Brigade
O.C. Indian Mountain Artillery Bde.
All Brigades, N.Z. & A. Division.
C.R.A., C.R.E., A.D.M.S., Admin. Staff.
With reference to Order No. 11 dated 5th August and the
Instructions and Appendices issued therewith, the following
amendments and additions are issued :-
1.     ORDER NO. 11
Para 1 (b).  The assault on PLATEAU 400 (68 C. ) will take
place at 5.30 p.m.
Para 3 (b).  The Left Covering Force on gaining the DEMAK
JELIK BAIR will get in touch with the Force effecting a
landing North of the ASMAK DERE (Square 91).
Para 3 (c).  The Mountain Battery attached to the Right
Assaulting Column will not use the Communication Trench -
it will move to the vicinity of No. 3 Post via the Beach,
(vide Ammended March Table attached).  It will keep clear
of troops moving along the Beach road.
The Assaulting Column moving via the SAZLI
BEIT DERE will commence its forward movement at 10.45 p.m.
(instead of at 10.30 p.m.).
Para 3 (f).  The Officers Commanding Nos. 3 and 4 Sections
of Defence will engage the enemy by fire and bomb attack
on the night 6th/7th August at 8 p.m. and throughout the
night.
Para 4 (a).  The Bearer Division of the Indian Field
Ambulance will be disposed of under the orders of the G.O.C.
29th Indian Infantry Brigade.
2. INSTRUCTIONS
Para 2 (a).  At 9.30 p.m. the fire of our Howitzers will
be turned on to BIG TABLE TOP : the searchlight, however,
will not be directed on to it till 9.40 p.m., when the fire
of the Naval Guns will be turned on to it in addition to
that of the Howitzers.
Paras. 3(c) and 4(c).  The G.O.C. directs that Mountain
Batteries with their escort normally march not less than
half a mile in rear of the Columns to which they are attached.
Para 4 (c).  The portion of this para. restricting Brig-General 
Cox's movements South of the line Square 92/80 is
cancelled.
3.
Operations
Night 6/7
August.
In order to indicate to the Navy and to our Artillery the
positionsof our Troops on the morning of the 7th August,
flares will be lit at dawn along our line.  The flares will
consist of Naval green lights, one of which will be burned
at 3.45 a.m., and another at 3.55 a.m. by each Battalion in
the front xxxxxxxx line along the position occupied by its most
advanced Troops.  Care is to be taken to place the flare
where it will be shaded from the view of the enemy.
If the CHUNUK  BAIR Ridge has been reached, the flares will
be burned a short distance down our side of the slope.
Brigadiers will indent on Captain Parry Okeden, Officer
in charge of Ammunition Supply, for flares to be used
during the forthcoming operations. 

 

35
(2)
4.
Communication     From 8 p.m. on the 6th August till 4 a.m. on the 7th August
the Beach road from Reserve Gully northward is reserved
entirely for the forward movement of troops and animals.
The Covered Way leading to No. 2 Post will be reserved
for rearward movement after 11.30 p.m. on the night 6th/7th
August and on the 7th August.
5.
Bombs.    Brigadiers and Officers Commanding Units indent on
the Ammunition Supply Officer for whatever bombs they
require.
6.
Interpreters    Interpreters have been detailed to each Brigade and have
been ordered to report to their respective Brigade Headquarters
at 9 a.m. 6th August.
7.
Control of
Movements.     In order to control movements along roads and covered ways
during the operations now commencing, Staff Officers and
Military Police have been posted at various points within
our lines to regulate traffic.
8.
Intercommunication.
Ships and Air Craft.     Instructions regarding intercommunication with Ships and
air craft, Part 1, and Land Communications, Part 2, have
been distributed to-day to all Brigadiers.
WG Braithwaite Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,
N.Z. & A. Division.
 

 

41
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND  ARMY CORPS.
We are about to make our second advance on our way to Constantinople,
and I want to let all ranks know of what great importance the
move we are to make will be.
The whole world has now heard of the action of the Australians
and New Zealanders when we landed here at the end of April.  The
highest possible opinion has been formed of our doings by all Military
critics, and we therefore have to act up to an extraordinarily high
standard to live up to our reputation.
I want you all to remember that the fighting we shall probably
have in this dvance will be very much of the same nature as it was
the day we landed - certainly it will be so for a portion of the troops
We shall have to face and tackle a very difficult bit of country which
the enemy have to some extent entrenched, as they did for our arrival.
Then however we ignored all trenches - rushing at all we saw,
chasing the Turks out of them, and keeping them well on the run.  This
we have got to do again.  Remember that under no circumstances can we
possibly turn back.  Having started our attack it has got to be seen
through, and that it will be seen through with great success I have no
doubt.  We will advance on a broad front as we did on landing.  Some
will find they have trenches in front of them; others will not.  But
all must keep on and on continuously until we have occupied the enemy's
position.  Once we have got into that, I feel sure that Australians
and New Zealanders will never allow themselves to be driven out.  It
will probably come to a good deal of fighting actually in the trenches,
and in them we well know that any one of us is equal to at least ten
Turks, so that we will and must drive them along the trenches before us
and never give them breathing space for a moment.
We shall have the advantage of starting while it is still cool,
but after hard climbing I know how hot it gets and water will be a great
difficulty.  I earnestly therefore ask all men, as I did the day we
landed, to be most careful of their water bottles and not to start
drinking till late in the day.
The complete defeat of the Turks now will have an enormous
effect and will bring us a very large step nearer Constantinople, and
indeed it may I hope prevent them making any other definite stand for a
considerable time - also, by pressing them hard and continuing to press
them for the next few days, we should hope to capture guns and maxim
guns as well as prisoners and camps.
We have to remember that when we are chasing them through their
trenches, as I hope we shall be doing, they are sure to try and bomb us
as much as they can.  We however have two or three bombs to every one
of theirs, and it only remains for us to prove how easily we can beat
them with the bomb, as we know we now can do with they bayonet and the
rifle.
Two xxto three days hard fighting may, we hope, clear the Turks
from these hills round us, and I know that everyone will do his best
to make success a certainty.
When we landed, the place of honor was given to the Australi
Division in loading our attack.  On this occasion too that Divisi
will start the attack and will have its full share of fighting, 
honor of accomplishing the task which we got before us on the 25
April - viz., the attacking of Hill 971, will now fall to the
Zealand and Australian Division.  They will have a hard and d
time of it, but I well know that nothing will stop them, and
will prove to the world that there are no Turks who can stop 
taking a position once they have made up their minds to do so
Remember, men, the order of the day must be "shove on a
shoving on" until we are in complete possession of the heights
when we hope we shall have the Turks at our mercy.
Remember, too, that there will be now Divisions of Lord Kitchener's
Army operating in conjunction with us, who will be watching us
carefully, and whose success will be entirely dependent upon our being

 

40
able to show them the way first - and this I know you will do.
Remember too to do all you can to conserve and keep your ammunition
during the beginning of your advance, i.e., while on the flat
and when in the lower hills.  It will then be dark, so the majority
of any ammunition that might be fired would probably be wasted, while
you may hope to get at the enemy with the bayonet and either capture or
kill him at once or get him while on the run.  Later on, when we get
to the top of the hill, all the ammunition we can possibly carry will
be wanted, as we may be sure that the enemy will not give up his
strong position without a struggle, and when we have taken it he will
very likely counter attack to drive us out.
Every effort will be made to bring up ammunition and water as
quickly as possible, but you all know as well as I do there will be
difficulties in getting these up quickly enough, so keep all the
ammunition you can for shooting purposes when it is light enough to see
and destroy the Turks in front of you and keep your water bottles
full as long as you possibly can.
We know that we have established a moral superiority over the
Turks, and have been able not only to keep their snipers completely
under, but in many cases we have gone far to stop their bombing.
Though they are terrified of the Australian and New Zealand soldiers in
the open, yet there is no doubt that they will always fight well when
behind trenches.  On this occasion, however, I trust we may be able
to get a good many of them in the open, when by constantly pressing
them let us hope they will again do as our men said they did when they
landed on the 25th April - run faster than they had ever seen men
run before.
There is just one more point I want you all to remember, which
is that when we have taken the enemy's position and driven him off it,
our work is by no means ended, so men must not think that they will
then be able to get off and come down to the beach for a swim.  It
is then that our hardest work, and possibly the greatest determination,
will be required, as we not only have got to turn the enemy off his
present position, but having once shifted him from his front trenches,
we have to keep running him out of them as far as we possibly can,
capturing we hope everything he possesses, and giving him no rest until
he is completely defeated here.
W. R. Birdwood
4(~5)/8/15. 

 

46
Headquarters,
Forwarded.
A.  In such circumstances names of Battalions should be
forwarded to Army Corps Headquarters by Divisions at
once, estimated losses being sent here as soon as known
B.  Brigadiers should detail a Staff Officer for this duty
to patrol the line and ascertain estimated "heavy"
casualties, notifying D.H.Q. who will transmit to Army
Corps Headquarters.
C.  In all cases the information will be sent to G.H.Q. by
Army Corps Headquarters.
D.  Attention is directed to the definition of
heavy casualties.
Lieut-Colonel
A.A & Q.M.G.
6-8-15.   Australianand New Zealand Army Corps.
4th Australian Infantry Brigade
Forwarded
NWBB Thoms
D.a.a.G
N.Z & A Divisions
Anzac Cove                                                             
6/8/15

 

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