Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 6, 10 June - 12 July 1915, Part 8

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Part of Quest:
Sir John Monash (General, b.1865 - d.1931)
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG0000590
Difficulty:

Page 1 / 10

Keaaquariers, Fourth Australian Inf. Bde. Reserve Cully June asnd. 1815. New Zealand & Australian Mvision, ORGANTLATION OF BOHS OFTENSIVE. with reference to N.2.0. 18s of 20/6/15, alrecting report on a series ofs questions set out, on above subject, 1 beg to sumit the felleting renares It would, in ay opinion, be as undesireble to lay dow in this watter, any rigid or stereotyped procedure, as it has been found undesirable to do in other forms of offensive or defensive Dction. The influences upon this question of the surrounding conditions of time, place, nature of ground or ailitary situation, sise and soope of the operation, and nunerous other facters, ore just is retent as in the case of the enploysent of fire action, and blanchier other forms of offence and defence. The wain consideration is to train a good number of expart boab-tnrovers and to lay down s a suggested and cuitebtentative orcanisation for their enployment and for a systes of supply to then neasure of the requisite bonbs, but to leave to exch consender & of latitude in their expleyment. the fundsnental question upon which the whole subject turns is the number of bonbethrewers required for any eiven frentage, in the absence of practical experience, and without a definite know- -ledge of the conditions, 1t is inrossible to lay cown any reliable rule, but having regard to the range (within linits of reasonable accuracy) of an expert bonbethrewer - and alloving for the losses in an assault, a useful basis would be to allow each bombatnrower a frontage of, say, 9 parus, this being the frentage which he should be able to comsand readily, from any position, wnether lying or running, or from a trench with a range in depth of from 15 to 80, yards,MthIEnarparty. such a besis would previde 14 or 13 expert beab-throwers 1f each thrower be served by two for each 100 yards frontage. trained boab-carriers, this will require a personnel of three trained men per & yaras frontage, or ary 40 pon per 100 yards of frontage- being the number now in rctual training per bettalion of this Brigade, on this basis, a battalion will have sufficient trained personnel to cover a frent of 100 yards. 1f the battalion has to attack (as is probable poooblo) on a breader frent than this, the apacins of the boat-throw- -ing parties vill have to be correspondingly enlarged. Jonmat DOF an attack across the open - as in an assault upon the 5. enenys trenches - the Hirst line would consist of a thin line of acoutsn’ to discover the lecation of the trenches and the dansity The scouts would be fellowed by the ca dispositions. the ong, bombing parties distributed at the outset at the selected intervals along the frent, but alert to concentrate upon the points where the onenys trenches are most densely held. For following up the attack - after the enerys front trenches have been gained i the best procedure would ebviously be to work along the enenys connunication trenches and so into his accond and later his tmird line. The number of such conmunication trenches and their spacing would determine the number of boabing parties that could be eaployed, as ebviously only one party could work along any siven treach at one and the sane time.
The Mornal ereanisation of a bonbing perty suggested 2 One expert bombethrewer, two Dombeearriers, three non with bayenets, all in charge of a N.C.C., but the particular order forwation in which they would neve andwerk should be left to be decided in accordance with the nature of the ground and of the task. The boab-thrower (with rifle slung) can carry 15 boabs in special haverasek made for the purrose, each tonbeearmer (with rifle alung) can earry so banbs in two such hovervacks. This would sive 78 bonbs with the party. As soon as the Hirst boabetarover had delivered hie two haverascks of bonbs to the threwer, he would return to a battalien depot for a further surply. This bettalion denot nust be pushed forward as close as pobsible to the frent, as the acties proceeds. The boaps sould be praked in cases of my 100, rried by two nex, othervise lightly burdened. As to the trpe of boab, 1 is of epinion that for general 0 Robile offensive suchge is contenplated in F.E.G.1ss, the creinary Kind crenade (jan tixNwith fuse, 1s. upon the whole, the rest ad- 14 is handy, easily thrown with accurncy, -vantageous to expley. and nore certain in its offects than the Martin-hale type. of the Letbiniere bomb, I have ne practieal experience, but it seens heavier and clunsier than the hand grenade. The best nothod of ienition of the hand erenade is by 10. means of a tinder lighter. failing this, by means of a lighted eis of course lights are objectionable at nicht, and in -arette. by striking natches in successian. case there would be ne time to isnit wile I consider that there should be a Brigade 11. instructer in bonb throsing, I de not think that any eireunstrnees would arise in such close country as we have here requiring al beabing detachments to be brissded under one officer. assault by bonb-throwing is. in by opinien, ealculated 13. to be vary successful ever a comaritively linited frentage, as a concentrated loeal offort, but only if the flanks of the assault are pretected from onfilade rifle and nachine gun fire. I as not senguim of its success if enployed sipultanceusly ever a broad frent, because there would be little emportunity for covering fire, and no chance of protecting the flanks of the advancing lines of throwers. Colonel Conmanding Fourth Auatralian Inf. Bde.
m mi Arny Forn C. 213. C. Form. (Original). MESSACES AND SICNALS. No. of Message Recd M 50 p ro Sent, or sent out Onpogamg e 22) Collected 88 84 t Distance Paid out 2361 Service instruct Returned Handed in at the Office al 134 Receved nee at 15 5/. th 70 Aust Enfade r AA4 Sestro is will hell ol no o2t am in at prently when front excied me e celled Inem er bnto rear vienche ad Bestr is wyld increase rarge 1 2 please arrovg Lack ✓ from TALKER ridll pear trench had n ser X El trenss to mach Ar dect 4 44 FROM PLACE FTIME All Porterage, Redirection aed on Cclivery are to be bor term, and the particulars of suc Charges for Delivery paid our are to be set ie lace of the adoDemew me Thl We sould vea iiast routed
1 nfet A OR AM WNE SRISADE CADE aerkuun mecei Fonc E3SUWIS
w3 NN28 C RCO MATEAY Ou Lr C D e HIDGE Rec? 24/6/15
Sappe who Lent 6/15 N 5. Allen H 12 Signal op birdy Capt, Lawtrell from Alexandrra stores brought n Spie fpee Wits C 2 N
38 Killed J Fromeg 54 Houhed 5 dpoatiti et
per Lient Socke 25/6/15 tifted to citch, rible and naited f 21 to take recat dn chest.
D D Forn Army Form C. 2121. MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. No. of Message PCL Code m/ Word] CharSe This message in on a/c of. Oe ACMENASMMEHAE Sent. Datcf am slend service From WOTRALAI ERIAL FORCE C 18 ro 3x4 Sept CRH 4 Just Juf B04 A SMeTT SYAMon Lws to M AAA 24S96 25 soeothedy ooiacon fele in te sourter sone ver cav sworder of prvert the transfer of tro ha the swpe sone e cb ae bice Taat sebo Divescon puste out a foree the excivat of four coneped n the doutie the BCACLON TREACHESand shadcRo didge fas dy Dir autar asstt ove u eoighgeatren st pus o L00ar Diws foa Fendeeas segeyuna wher otion of dus Dir ling myge te t mih hicle and bobattach want esd seie and eeguge the tuning with comb sight and machinge fire as apputunity befi the officer commandeng From Place Time The chove may be forwarded as now carrected CMTTFrd IH MMIM SIS SAL s For Army Form C. 2121. 10. Of MCAARE MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. PCR Code m/ Words] CharS Recd. at This message in on alc of: OAce ASAANHSENIEEHAME 44 Date- soric From CAA PIOD T0 2 Lorest to te OY AMont Si AAA noa Sichns ind our particular of Ater Tor to the funches ficing i 4115 RA visd devisincd ate tley mie ast the whole operated as oppotunt, of fer raying particular attentios of the Frendy opposte i 8115 R Fo0 and of PoDETprice & the bivonage in rec MORTHR RiOgE and the operation will comence from the right at a time to be note fied by the au Di fte N2&A Dir Nh wle punit on to there canied achon rr (Bong Bn 310 Mucg 1 DoN14S S 110 Place 14 The above may be forwarded as now corrected. 11Ar 1 e a Comn
A Fulyingn euet Oc 6thon Treturn Onote JrcAr Ptt SRIADE MATOR, ST INE, ARENE AAA AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORTE. 28JUN1915 Bde HO. 4 I roted w cot &tope Edg. 19t orr A1t 28. 6.15 1225 26 SAKI

Headquarters,
Fourth Australian Inf. Bde.
Reserve Gully,
June 22nd, 1915.
New Zealand & Australian Division,
ORGANIZATION OF BOMB OFFENSIVE.
With reference to N.Z.G. 193 of 20/6/15, directing a
report on a series of 8 questions set out, on above subject, I beg
 to submit the following remarks:
1.  It would, in my opinion, be as undesirable to lay down
in this matter, any rigid or stereotyped procedure, as it has been 
found undesirable to do in other forms of offensive or defensive 
action. The influences upon this question of the surrounding 
conditions of time, place, nature of ground or military situation, 
size and scope of the operation and numerous other factors, are 
just as potent as in the case of the employment of fire action, arme
blanche or other forms of offence and defence.

2.  The main consideration is to train a good number of expert 
bomb-throwers and to lay down a suggested and quite tentative 
organization for their employment and for a system of supply to them 
of the requisite bombs, but to leave to each commander a great measure 
of latitude in their employment.

3.  The fundamental question upon which the whole subject
turns is the number of bomb-throwers required for any given frontage.
In the absence of practical experience, and without a definite knowledge
of the conditions, it is impossible to lay down any reliable rule,
but having regard to the range (within limits of reasonable accuracy)
of an expert bomb-thrower - and allowing for the losses ^during in an assault,
a useful basis would be to allow each bomb-thrower a frontage of, say,
8 yards, this being the frontage which he should be able to command
readily, from any position, whether lying or running, or from a trench
with a range in depth of from 15 to 20 yards. xxxxxxxxx

4.  Such a basis would provide 12 or 13 expert bomb-throwers
for each 100 yards frontage. If each thrower be served by two
trained bomb-carriers, this will require a personnel of three trained
men per 8 yards frontage, or say 40 men per 100 yards of frontage -
being the number now in actual training per battalion of this Brigade.
On this basis, a battalion will have sufficient trained personnel to
cover a front of 100 yards. If the battalion has to attack (as is
possible∧probable) on a broader front than this, the spacing of the bomb -
throwing parties will have to be correspondingly enlarged.

5.  For an attack across the open - as in an assault upon the
enemy's ^ Foremost trenches - the first line would consist of a thin line of
scouts to discover the location of the trenches and the density of
the enemy's dispositions.  The scouts would be followed by the
bombing parties distributed at the outset at the selected intervals
along the front, but alert to concentrate upon the points where the
enemy's trenches are most densely held.

6.  For following up the attack - after the enemy's front
trenches have been gained x  the best procedure would obviously be
to work along the enemy's communication trenches and so into his
second and later his third line. The number of such communication
trenches and their spacing would determine the number of bombing
parties that could be employed, as obviously only one party could
work along any given trench at one and the same time.
 

 

7.  The normal organization of a bombing party suggested
is: -
One expert bomb-thrower, two bomb-carriers, three men
with bayonets, all in charge of a N.C.O., but the particular order or
formation in which they would move should be left to be
 decided in accordance with the nature of the ground and of the task.
 

8.  The bomb-thrower (with rifle slung) can carry 15 bombs
in special haversack made for the purpose, each bomb-carrier (with
 rifle slung) can carry 30 bombs in two such haversacks. This would
 give 75 bombs with the party. As soon as the first bomb-thrower
 had delivered his two haversacks of bombs to the thrower, he would
 return to a battalion depot for a further supply. This battalion
 depot must be pushed forward as close as possible to the front, as the
 action proceeds. The bombs could be packed in cases of say 100,
 carried by two men, otherwise lightly burdened.
 

9.  As to the type of bomb, I am of opinion that for general
mobile offensive such as is contemplated in N.Z.G.193, the ordinary 
hand grenade (jam tin)∧type with fuse, is, upon the whole, the most advantageous to employ. It is handy, easily thrown with accuracy,
 and more certain in its effects than the Martin-Hale type. Of the 
Letbiniere bomb, I have no practical experience, but it seems heavier
 and clumsier than the hand grenade.
 

10.  The best method of ignition of the hand grenade is by
means of a tinder lighter. Failing this, by means of a lighted cigarette.
Of course lights are objectionable at night, and in any
case there would be no time to ignite by striking matches in succession.
 

11.  While I consider that there should be a Brigade
instructor in bomb throwing, I do not think that any circumstances
would arise in such close country as we have here requiring all
bombing detachments to be brigaded under one officer.
 

12.  Assault by bomb-throwing is, in my opinion, calculated 
to be very successful over a comparatively limited frontage, as a 
concentrated local effort, but only if the flanks of the assault are
protected from enfilade rifle and machine gun fire. I am not sanguine
of its success if employed simultaneously over a broad front, because
there would be little opportunity for covering fire, and no chance of
 protecting the flanks of the advancing lines of throwers.
 

Colonel 
Commanding Fourth Australian Inf. Bde.

 

Army Form C.2123.
C. Form. (Original).
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS. 
No. of Message ... 
Recd. from QHA     

By                ES        
Prefix SM 
Code 3.50p
Words 80
Delivery
Means
Distance
Charges for Delivery
Collected
Paid out
Sent, or sent out
At ... M.
By ...
Returned ...
at ... M.

Office stamp
BQ 12
12
23.6.15  
Service Instructions.
Handed in at the   N.Z. Office at    15M. 50  Received here at 15.56 PM

TO          4th  Aust  Inf  Bde
*Sender's Number. NZD 216  
Day of Month. 23rd
In reply to Number.
AAA
                                       

Destroyers will shell old no 3  post
at 2 am 24 June apparently
when front trenches are shelled
enemy crowd into rear trenches
AAA  Destroyers will increase range
to get these but please arrange
machine gun fire from WALKERS
ridge to enfilade rear trench
AAA Officers in no 1  post
can point out exact trench to
machine guns addressed no 4
Section repeated no 3 Section of
4th  Aust  Inf  Bde

 

FROM         NZA Divn

PLACE
TIME            1350 
 

PTO
JM
23/6/15

All Porterage, Redirection, or other charges collected on delivery are to be brought to accouat by me ans of Stamps affixed to the face of the
form, and the particulars of  such charges and of amounts paid out are to be set forth in writing above, in the spaces headed "Delivery" and
"Charges for Delivery".
* This line should be deleted if not required.

 

 

OC Inlying Piquet 

(15th Bn)
To note return please
JP McGlinn Lieut, Colonel,
BRIGADE MAJOR, 4TH INF BRIGADE
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE
23 JUN 1915

4 Bde
Noted
Ja H Cannan Lt
C / G 15 Bn

 

Recd
24/6/15

 

 

 

25/6/15

Sapper W. J. Allen
3rd L.H. Signal Troop
(under Capt, Gartrell)
Who brought stores from Alexandria

Lieut. Wilson (Sapxxi office)
2-F.Co
N.Z.S

 

 

38 Killed
2 Prisoners
54 Wounded} [[net?]] 
5 Invalided 

99

 

 

For Lieut Locke
25/6/15


 

 

28
"A" Form                                
Army Form C 2121.
MESSAGES AND SIGNALS.
No. of Message.
Prefix ... Code ... m.
Words
Charge
Office of Origin & Service Instructions.
Sent
At ... m.
To
By
This message in on a/c of    

Recd      Service .   
(Signature of "Franking Officer")                                              

Recd. at  1145   m.     15

Date         11.45 am 

From        BRIGADE MAJOR 4TH INF BRIGADE
                   AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.
                   28 JUN 1915

 

TO   } No 3  &  4 Sect
         } CRA  4  Aust  Inf  Bde

 

Sender's  Number. 
NZG 246   
Day of Month. 
25
In reply to Number.
A A A    

                                   

SECRET  The 8th Army Corps attack today in
the Southern Zone at 11am.  In order to prevent
the transfer of Troops from the ANZAC Zone
the following action is being taken aaa
Australian's Division pushes out a force the
equivalent of four companies in the direction
of the ECHELON TRENCHES and SNIPERS
RIDGE aaa  Aust Div Artillery assists this
move and engages rear slopes of LONELY
PINE and JOHNSTONS JOLLY aaa Other 
positions of 1 Aust Div line engage the enemy
with rifle and bomb attack aaa.
(2) The NZ & A Divisions will engage the enemy
with bombs & rifle and machine gun fire
as opportunity offers. The officer commanding
From
Place
Time
The above may be forwarded as now corrected
Censor
(Z)
Signature of Addressor of person authorized to telegraph in his name.


Date 14

TO    2

                               

No 4  Sections  will pay  particular attention
to  the  trenches facing WALKERS TOP.
NZ & A Divisional Artillery will assist the
whole operation as opportunite offers
paying particular attention to the 
trenches opposite WALKERS TOP and
POPES HILL & the bivouacs in each of
MORTAR RIDGE  area
The operations will commence from the 
right at a time to be notified by the
1 Aust Div to the NZ & A Div  who will
pass it onto those concerned.

Acknge
(Done Bm 310 JP McG 1155 28-6-15)

From NZ & A Div
Place
Time 1105  PT0

J P McGlinn
 Signature of person authorized to telegraph in his name.

 

 

OC Inlying Picquet
(16th Bn)
To note return
J P Mc Glinn
BRIGADE MAJOR 4TH INF. BRIGADE.
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.
28 JUN 1915

1158

HQ. 4th Inf. Bde
Noted
H Pope W.Col
Cdg 16th Bn AIF.

28.6.15
1225

 

 

 

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Andrew DobbinAndrew Dobbin
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