Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 3, 11 April - 26 April 1915, Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Finalised
Accession number:
RCDIG0000581
Difficulty:
2

Page 1 / 10

Ia/1031. TRANSLATION OF A GERTAN DOCUKENT. -------- -- .. H.4. VIII Reserve Corps. Corps Headquarters, MONTHOIS. Ia. No. 7584. 11th April, 1915. TACHLE GUTS. Experience gained during the past weeks has shown that the nethod of epploying our machine guns in trench warfare is in need of improvenent. We have only succeeded in a comparatively limited nupber of cases in stopping the enemy's attacks by fire fro our machine guns. As a rule, when the mosent cane for the assault, our machine guns had already been put out of action by the fire of the enemy's artillery, or else their emplacerents were constructed in such a manner that we were not able to nake use of all the possibilities of this weapon from the point of view of flanking fire. The following points should be kept in mind as regards the employment of sechine gune :- The employment of -achine guns for firing perpendicularly to the front is outside the scope of the proper uses of these weapons. It should bo avoiced on principle. "henever possible machine guns should be used for flanking fire and placed a little to the rear in cormanding positions. Above all, wechine guns should be placed -here they can enfilade those portions of the enemy's trenches, which our artillery cannot reach or can only reach with difficulty. At points where the enemy is continually pushing forrard his works, and where an attack nay be made et any noment, it is impartant to bring cressfire to bear on his works. It ie particularly important to provide good cover for nachine guns. Zvery nachine gun should be entirely concealed from the eneny's view, or else so well mesked that it remains undiscovered. It is often necessary to strengthen very considerably the roofs of wachine gun emplacements. It is advisable during the day, in places which ere very nuch exposed to the cnemy's artillery fire, to renove machine guns fron the fire trench and place theu in shelters which are well protected against artillery fire. At the same tine that this is done, it must be possible to move the wechine gun to its firing position inwedistely. It is advantagoous froquently to change the firing position of machine guns. Above all, a machine gun which has fired during the night should not remain in the sare position during the following day. When there is a shortage of wachine gune, machine gun e- placements should be constructed se that the gun can be fired in two different directions. It is particularly i-portant for sector commenders and commanders of wachine gun oompanies not to remain satisfied with the emplacements originally selected for machine gune, but constantly to search for positions allowing of a more advantageous use of their guns. It is always possible to find new emplace- ments, aven in positions which havo been occupied by the troops for many months, (Signed) FLECK.
23 ut ted. 14 D3e Risel.s General Headquarters, Mediterrancan Expeditionary Force, 14th. April, 1914 COPy. worantm The fellewing infermation has been obtained as the result of a scouting flight over GALLIPOLI PENINSULAR with a military officer as obeerver:- BAHR There are a number of entrenchments from SEDD-EL-MIM up to BURNU, and thence N.E.to a peint on the coast due e o AniThlA. An excellent read has been mede from SEDD-EL-BAHR to KRITHIA,and ether reads,net shown on map of Gallipoli, have been constructed.A man of these roads is being sent from Tenedos,and will be forwarded when received. The following Batteries and entrenchments were seen:- One Battery, with four large emplacements waxnxzss (a) (either roefed or empty) Sq.212,19.to M7. [b) Twe four gun Batteries betveen Pl.and 0.9 Square 202 (c) All the coast strongly entrenched from 'g',Square 193 to beyend KABA TEPE. (d) Field werk under construction in Square 203.x 8. (e) A strong defensive line runs along the high greund from the middle of Square 194 to Square 204,d. Sc. 193 0.5 (f) Iwe four gun batteries Sq. 203 U.2 One four gun battery Sc. 204 R.5 One four gun battery Sq.204 R.8 Infantry redoubt Sq. 225 M.8 Camp at
AEROPLANE REPORT. April 14th 1915. -------------...-. The following flights were carried out : One spotting flight. One flight taking photographs. One flight taking Major Villiers Stuart to Gaba Tepe. Two reconnaissance flights. ...... ----- Spottirg flight. Pilot Commr. Samson. Observer Lieut. Osmond. Started at 2.40 p.m. Returned 4.50 p.m. Firing ship H.M.S. Majestio. Target 205 A 7. No hits. Turkish battleship anchored in KILIA LIMAN BAY fired at Majestic. This ship had a merchant ship alongside. This ship was of the Kaiser Barbarossa class. Observations made: One destroyer off Chanak. One battleship and two merchant ships in KILIA LIMAN BAY. One merchant ship got under weigh at 3.40 p.m., and shifted to off Fort 26. Dattery of 4 guns 205 A 7. Emplacements, 4 empty ones 202 K 3. Battery 202 S 7. 4 guns in S.W. face. 4 empty emplacements N.W. face. Big Camp, about 700 tents, 203 T. Camp, 15 tents, 202 T 5. Strongly entrenched positions covering river mouth, square 193.
- 2. il a.m. Flight with camera. Photographs developed not very good owing to age of films. Prints will be sent in tomorrow, showing position around SEDD-EL-BAHR neighbourhood. ----------.- Reconnaissance flight. Lieut. Pierse. Pilot Major Hogg. Observer Returned 1 p.m. Started 11 a.m. and " 6.30 p.m. 4.10 p.m. Result of flight : Square 169 X Y No trenches seen other than those already reported. 169 D 8 and 9 A clump of trees just north of five gun battery is a useful landmark. 1. 177 J 4 and 5 Just north of HALAR a clump of trees north of which are 4 circular marks, possibly gun pits. " 185, 188, 178, 170. Information shown on tracing. 7 Camp at 177 U 3. Camp at 186 Z 7.
- 3 - Reconnaissange Fiagt Lieut. Collet Pilot Major Villiens Stuart. Observer Started to 2.30 p.m. Returned 340 p.m. Result of flight:- (1) The gun emplacements at ACHI BABA appear to be empty. The field work at 203 X 8 reported under +(2) construction on the 11th, is now complete, and is an eight gun battery. Four emplacements face west and are cocuried. Four emplacements face north-west and are not cocupied. A strongly entrenched lane extends along the (3) high ground from 214 V to 194 N whence it runs south in the direction of MAGHRAM. -------------- Reconnaissance flight. Lieut. Davies. Pilot Observer Capt. Jenkins. Left Aerodrome twice, but owing to velocity of wind and low fuel-capacity of machine was obliged to return to ground, an out and return flight to Gallipoli being impractioable. C.R. SAMSON. (agd) Commander R.N.
The follewing information received 15/4/15 gained by seroplane reconnaissance:- Cam at 186 27. Dattery of four guns 265 47. Emplacements four cmpty ones 202 K3. Battery 202 87. four gune in S.W. face. Four empty emplacements N.w. face. Big Camp about 700 tents 203 T. Camp 15 tents 202 75. Strengly entrench pesitions covering river meuth Sc. 193.
AEECPLANS SEDD-KL-BAHR Square 205 T. Square 205 M. Square 224 08 Ceast frea fisherman'. hut to square 168 c. X EMA TETE LABA TEPE t- Sz. 202 R. Square202 F. [Square 193 c and 192 P. Square 184 S.T. I Y. ySqs.176 B and G Sc.175 P. k Sd. 168 c. i Sa. 185 U 7. redeubt St. 186 A 9 Bettery Sas. 186 and 187 Sc. 184 v. Sa. 193 Sd. 193 d and L. High greund between JAWBAZ DERE and SOCHAN DERE. k Sd. 176 I 1. I sq. 195 P and T Sc. 195 T I Hhe Stn .?... RECOTTAISANC: 1S"Aon Nething new seen Re. Canp of 32 tente Redoubt 2 guns. Entrenchments where marked on map. Pield werk. D gun emplacement ue marked on map. Pieherman'e hut to eg. 224 andxix ne ceast trneches, Sq. 224 C and I Trenches on erest and forwerd elope Sc. 224 C Gun emplacement 1 gun (in pesition) Sq. 224 g to se. 212 A. Trenches on crest and t reverse slope. a 7 gun calleecments. 3 occupied trenches as shoap Trenches on forward elope shewn on gun battr Trenches on ferward elepe. et Fertifications as shown on map. Trenches right on ereet. TRe here previously reported. 3 occupied ue and 3 deubtful. Shown in yesterday's report as having 4 gun emplacements; should be 7 9kA Should be on dhouldersc. 193 Z 1 194 The spure running dewn to SOGHAN DERR from the E. are strongly entrenched infantry trenches qupperted by gun emplacements. The mouth of small stream is defended by entrenchments on either eide and a trench screes the stresm. 944 The spure running deen to the river are entresched. (24 Trenches on erest facing ses. 74: A redeubt on each peak shown. 'h 4 gun omplecement just seuth of KRITHIA. Line of trenches running ".K, a s.w. Saa 8 gun battery facing S.E. 224
Sc. 178 P 9 Sc. 178 Kl Sa. 178 R 5 177 Y ? 177 7 6 177 i3 170 c 4. 5.9. 170 D. 8 gun battery facing sea. 't 4 gun battery with a nember of tents aleng nullah north ef it. 4 gun battery. (t Tat Aad Sule Line ef icfantry trenches fneing Su Parallel to ceast line along ridge at peint j47 a ten gun batteryew werk is apparently in hand teiag at S. 170 D 1. 505 -
15/4/17. -3 A BATTALIOR 33rd Bn.,thInf. Bde. (Lt-Col. MORSHAD) The objectives of this Battalion are the Front and Support lines.- Owing to a change in the general direction of these trenches which occurs on the front of this Battalion, it will probably be desirable for the right portion of this Battalion to attack on a bearing of 500 East of true North, while the left portion of the Battalion conforms to the direction which must be taken by the right wing of B Battalion, i.e. on a bearing of 240 East of true North. - This may involve some danger of a gap being left in the centre of the Battalion by the time the second objective is reached, but this danger, if fully foreseen and explained to all concerned, can be readily met. - The right flank of the leading wave will strike the enemy support trench to the South-east of the line C,D.E, which is to be consolidated; but this does not matter in the least. - As soon as the two lines are taken, bombing blocks must be established and garrisoned, South of our new line C,D,E in all trafficable trenches leading Southwards from the captured country. - These bombing blocks must, however, keep at a safe distance from our defensive barrages, which will be put down on ULTIMO AVENUE. - The troops must not advance beyond the line of the captured Support Trench, until all the waves of Battalion have passed through. - They will then follow the rear wave of E Battalion as far as the line of consolidation, E.F. As this Battalion will be covered by a Battalion on its front, and a barrage on its right flank, the line of consolidation D, E,F can be carefully and deliberately chosen, particularly as regards field of fire and suitable Lewis Gun positions on the section D to E. - The point of contact with B Battalion, on the north, will be at Fon ASH AVENUE, just East of the bend in that road. As regards the extension of the front line from D to C, across NO MAN'S LAND back to our old line, while this forms part of the task of "A" Battalion, there is no urgency about it, and if troops are not immediately available for the work, it can be left until the night A direct communication with our old front line, - in the which debouches from our old front line of the "Russian Sap" line at U.15.d.42.8 - must, however, be pushed on energetically, to give safe passage across NO MAN'S LAND. "A" Battalion will be responsible for the defence of the line D.E,F against counter-attack. - The total length of trench to be captured by each wave does not exeeed 550 yards. This task can be adequately dealt with by 6 platoons, in line, in each wave. - Thus one Company of the Battalion is available for carrying parties and Brigade Reserve; the remaining Companies finding their own Moppers up. The distance being short, comparatively small carrying parties should fully serve the needs of this Battalion. The total length of new trench to be dug and consolidated is about 1500 yards. This would require the continuous labour Thus 250 shovels and 100 picks should of 300 men for 48 hours. - be available for this Battalion.
-4 15/4/17. "Br BArRaLloM 35th Battalion (Lt-Col.GODDARD) Mines will be blown at Zero in the fhat salient opposite ANTON'S FARM. - These will materially shorten the length of enevy front and support trenches likely to be effectively held against the advance of this Battalion. - The objectives of the Battalion are the Front and Support Lines inclusive of the craters. - The direction of the advance will be on a bearing of 240 East of true North! - Care must be taken to keep touch with the left of "A" Battalion on the right so as to avoid any gap. - Owing to a change of direction of enemy trenches at the before mentioned salient there will probably be some overlapping at the meeting flanks of B-and 6 Bautaliens; but Ir carrte o laft Cmpaanes this does not in the least matter. The troops must not advance beyond the line of the ULSTER SUPPORT, until all the waves of FBattalion have passed through. - They will then follow the rear wave of FBattalion, as far as the line of consolidation F,G. - The junction for consolidation with "A" Battalion on the right should be made at Fon ASH AVENUE, just east of the bend in that road, and with C Battalion on the left at G about the point where the Brigade Boundary is crossed by the hedge- (see photos).- There will be ample time to choose the line F.G,carefully, as it will take some time for tools to be brought up. Particular attention must be given to securing good field of fire. This should be easy, as the line F,G, runs transversely across a spur which has a l'in 120 fall towards the North-east, and a 1 in 50 fall towards the North. B Battalion will be responsible for the defence of the line F,G, against counter-attack in the event of our forward line being driven in. The total langth of trench to be captured by each wave is about 500 yards. - This can be adequately dealt with by 6 platoons in line, in each wave. - The density of the attack of the left platoons need not be great, because the mine explosions will have thoroughly disorganized the defences of this part of the objective of this Battalion. - Thus, one company of the Battalion is available for carrying parties and Reserve; the remaining Companies finding their own Moppers up. - The furthest distance to be traversed by carrying parties from our present front line to the line F,G, is only 400 yards, so that small carrying parties can make frequent journeys. The total length of new fire and communication trenches This would require the contin- to be dug is about 1,100 yards. uous labour of 220 men for 48 hours. - Thus about 180 shovels and 80 picks should be available for this Battalion. 245 Eveafo tie tkrr lift lonpaanig, stist iitt avnform to Sr dinskøs g Tr Ziche ampang g 2 Bakahwe:

Ia/1031.
TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT.
--------

H.Q. VIII Reserve Corps.  Corps Headquarters,
MONTHOIS.
Ia. No. 7584. 11th April, 1915. 

MACHINE GUNS.
Experience gained during the past weeks has shown that the
method of employing our machine guns in trench warfare is in
need of improvement. We have only succeeded in a comparatively
limited number of cases in stopping the enemy's attacks by fire
from our machine guns. As a rule, when the moment came for the
assault, our machine guns had already been put out of action by
the fire of the enemy's artillery, or else their emplacements
were constructed in such a manner that we were not able to make
use of all the possibilities of this weapon from the point of
view of flanking fire.
The following points should be kept in mind as regards the
employment of machine guns :-
The employment of machine guns for firing perpendicularly
to the front is outside the scope of the proper uses of these
weapons. It should be avoided on principle. Whenever possible
machine guns should be used for flanking fire and placed a little
to the rear in commanding positions.
Above all, machine guns should be placed where they can
enfilade those portions of the enemy's trenches, which our
artillery cannot reach or can only reach with difficulty. At
points where the enemy is continually pushing forward his works,
and where an attack may be made at any moment, it is important
to bring crossfire to bear on his works.
It is particularly important to provide good cover for 
machine guns. 

Every machine gun should be entirely concealed from the
enemy's view, or else so well masked that it remains undiscovered.
It is often necessary to strengthen very considerably the roofs
of machine gun emplacements.
It is advisable during the day, in places which are very
much exposed to the enemy’s artillery fire, to remove machine
guns from the fire trench and place them in shelters which are
well protected against artillery fire. At the same time that
this is done, it must be possible to move the machine gun to
its firing position immediately .
It is advantageous frequently to change the firing position
of machine guns. Above all, a machine gun which has fired during
the night should not remain in the same position during the
following day.
When there is a shortage of machine guns, machine gun em-
placements should be constructed so that the gun can be fired
in two different directions.
It is particularly important for sector commanders and
commanders of machine gun companies not to remain satisfied with
the emplacements originally selected for machine guns, but
constantly to search for positions allowing of a more advantageous
use of their guns. It is always possible to find new emplacements, 
 even in positions which have been occupied by the troops
for many months. 

(Signed) FLECK.
--------- 

 

Secret
  
4th Aust. Inf. Bd. Rec 16/4/15
General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
14th. April, 1914 

C O P Y
MEMORANDUM
The following information has been obtained as the
result of a scouting flight over GALLIPOLI PENINSULAR with a
military officer as observer:-
BAHR
There are a number of entrenchments from SEDD-EL-XXX BAHR 
up to  TEKKE BURNU, and thence N.E.to a point on the coast due
west of  KRITHIA.
An excellent road has been made from SEDD-EL-BAHR to
KRITHIA, and ether roads net shown on map of Gallipoli, have been
constructed. A map of these roads is being sent from Tenedos, and
will be forwarded when received_.
The following Batteries and entrenchments were seen:-
(a)  One Battery, with four large emplacements waxnxzss
(either roofed or empty) Sq.212,L9.to M7.
[b) Two four gun Batteries between P1. and O.9 Square 202
(c) All the coast strongly entrenched from 'g', Square 193
to beyond KABA TEPE.
(d) Field work under construction in Square 203,x 8.
(e) A strong defensive line runs along the high ground from
the middle of Square 194 to Square 204,Q.
(f) Two four gun batteries Sq. 193 0.5
One four gun battery Sq. 203 U.2
One four gun battery Sq.204 R.5
Infantry redoubt Sq. 204 R.8
Camp at Sq.225 M.8 

 

AEROPLANE REPORT. April 14th 1915.
-------------
The following flights were carried out :-
One spotting flight.
One flight taking photographs.
One flight taking Major Villiers Stuart
to Gaba Tepe.
Two reconnaissance flights.
----------
Spotting flight.
Pilot Commr. Samson.
Observer Lieut. Osmond.
Started at 2.40 p.m. Returned 4.50 p.m.
Firing ship H.M.S. Majestic.
Target 205 A 7.
No hits.
Turkish battleship anchored in KILIA LIMAN
BAY fired at Majestic. This ship had a merchant ship
alongside. This ship was of the Kaiser Barbarossa class. 

Observations made: -
One destroyer off Chanak.
One battleship and two merchant ships in KILIA
LIMAN BAY. One merchant ship got under
weigh at 3.40 p.m., and shifted to off Fort
26.
x Battery of 4 guns 205 A 7.
Emplacements, 4 empty ones 202 K 3.
Battery 202 S 7. 4 guns in S.W. face.
4 empty emplacements N.W. face.
Big Camp, about 700 tents, 203 T.
Camp, 15 tents, 202 T 5.
Strongly entrenched positions covering river
mouth, square 193.

 

  - 2 - 

11 a.m. 

Flight with camera.
Photographs developed not very good owing to age
of films. Prints will be sent in tomorrow, showing position
around SEDD-EL-BAHR neighbourhood.
----------
Reconnaissance flight.
Pilot Lieut. Pierse. 
Observer Major Hogg. 
Started 11 a.m. Returned 1 p.m.
and 
 " 4.10 p.m.  " 6.30 p.m.
Result of flight :-
 X Square 169 X Y No trenches seen other than
those already reported. No report received here
X " 169 D 8 and 9 A clump of trees just
north of five gun battery is a
useful landmark.
X "  177 J 4 and 5 Just north of HALAR a
clump of trees north of which
are 4 circular marks, possibly
gun pits.
" 185, 188, 178, 170. Information shown
on tracing.
X Camp at 177 U 3.
X Camp at 186 Z 7.

 

- 3 - 
Reconnaissance flight. 

Pilot Lieut. Collet
Observer Major Villiers Stuart.
Started to 2.30 p.m. Returned 3.40 p.m.
Result of flight :-
X (1) The gun emplacements at ACHI BABA appear to
be empty.
X (2)The field work at 203 X 8 reported under
construction on the 11th, is now complete,
and is an eight gun battery. Four emplacements
face west and are occupied. Four emplacements
face north-west and are not occupied.
X (3) A strongly entrenched line extends along the
high ground from 214 V to 194 N whence it runs
south in the direction of MAGHRAM.
--------------
Reconnaissance flight.
Pilot Lieut. Davies.
Observer Capt. Jenkins.
Left Aerodrome twice, but owing to velocity
of wind and low fuel-capacity of machine was obliged to
return to ground, an out and return flight to Gallipoli
being impracticable.
(sgd) C.R. SAMSON.
Commander R.N.

 

The following information received 15/4/15 gained by
aeroplane reconnaissance:- 
————— 

Camp at 186 Z7.
Battery of four guns 265 A7.
Emplacements four empty ones 202 K3.
Battery 202 S7,  four guns in S.W. face. Four empty
emplacements N.W. face.
Big Camp about 700 tents 203 T. Camp 15 tents 202 T5.
Strongly entrench positions covering river mouth Sq. 193.

 

New 5pm 
17 4 15 
  
AEROPLANE RECONNAISSANCE  15th April
SEDD-EL-BAHR Nothing new seen TRE. 
? in sea Square 205 T. Camp of 32 tents TRE 
X Square 205 M. Redoubt 2 guns. TRE Entrenchments 
where marked on map. 
X Square 224 08 Field work. 1 gun emplacement 
 marked on map. TRE 
X Coast from fisherman's 
hut to square 168 C. Fisherman's hut to sq. 224 G andxxxx 
no coast trneches. Sq. 224 C and I 
Trenches on crest and forward slope 
Sq. 224 Q Gun emplacement 1 gun 
(in position) Sq. 224 Q to Sq. 
212 A. Trenches on crest and 
reverse slope. TRE 
X KABA TEPE 7 gun emplacements. TRE 3 occupied 
trenches as shown on map. TRE 
X KABA TEPE to Sq. 202 R. Trenches on forward slope shown on 
map. TRE 
Square 202 F. 4 gun battery shown on map. TRE 
X Square 193 G and 192 F Trenches on forward slope. TRE 
X Square 184 S.T.  X Y. Fortifications as shown on map. TRE 
X Sqs.176 B and G Sc.175 P. Trenches right on crest. TRE 
X Sq. 168 C. Where previously reported. 3 occupied 
and 3 doubtful. TRE
 X Sq. 185 U 7. redoubt Shown in yesterday's report as having 
4 gun emplacements: should be 7 TRE 
X Sq. 186 A 9 Battery Should be on Dhouldersq. 193 Z 1 TRE 
X Sq. 186 and 187 The spurs running down to SOGHAN DERE 
from the E. are strongly entrenched 
infantry trenches supported by gun 
emplacements. TRE 
X SQ. 184 W. The mouth of small stream is defended 
by entrenchments on either side and 
a trench across the stream. TRE 
X Sq. 193 The spurs running down to the river 
are entrenched. TRE 
X Sq. 193 G and L. Trenches on crest facing sea. TRE 
X High ground between JAWBAZ A redoubt on each peak shown.
DERE and SOCHAN DERE. TRE 

X Sq. 176 T 1. 4 gun emplacement just south of 
KRITHIA. TRE 
X Sq. 195 P and T Line of trenches running S.E. & S.W. 
TRE 
X Sq. 195 T 1 8 gun battery facing S.E. TRE

 

Sq. 178 F 9 8 gun battery facing sea. TRE 
Sq. 178 K1 4 gun battery with a number of tents 
along nullah north of it. TRE 
Sq. 178 R 5 4 gun battery. TRE 
" 177 Y7  '" " " tre 
" 177 Y6  '" " " tre 
" 177 Z5  '" " " tre 
" 170 C4, 5, 9. Line of infantry trenches facing S.W. TRE 
" 170 D. Parallel to coast line along ridge at 
point  347 a ten gun battery. A new 
work is apparently in hand facing 
W. at Sq. 170 D 1. TRE

 

-3- 15/4/17. 
  
"A" BATTALION 
33rd Bn., 9th Inf. Bds (Lt-Col. MORSHEAD) 

The objectives of this Battalion are the Front and Support 
lines. - Owing to a change in the general direction of these 
trenches which occurs on the front of this Battalion. It will 
probably be desirable for the right portion of this Battalion to 
attack on a bearing of 50o East of true North, while the left 
portion of this Battalion conforms to the direction which must be 
taken by the right wing of B Battalion. i.e. on a bearing of 
 24o East of true North. - This may involve some danger of a gap 
 being left in the centre of the Battalion by the time the 
 second objective is reached, but this danger, if fully foreseen 
and explained to all concerned, can be readily met. - The right 
flank of the leading wave will strike the enemy support trench 
to the south-east of the line C,D,E, which is to be consolidated; 
but this does not matter in the least. - 

As soon as the two lines are taken, bombing blocks must be 
established and garrisoned, South of our new line C,D,E in all 
trafficable trenches leading Southwards from the captured country. 
- These bombing blocks must, however, keep at a safe distance 
from our defensive barrages, which will be put down on ULTIMO 
AVENUE. - 
  
The troops must not advance beyond the line of the captured 
Support Trench, until all the waves of E Battalion have passed 
through. - They will then follow the rear wave of E Battalion 
as far as the line of  consolidation, E.F. 
  
As this Battalion will be covered by a Battalion on its 
front, and a barrage on its right flank, the line of consolidation 
D,E,F can be carefully and deliberately chosen, particularly as 
regards field of fire and suitable Lewis Gun positions on the 
section D to E. - The point of contact with B Battalion, on the 
north, will be at F on ASH AVENUE, just East of the bend in that 
road. - 
  
As regards the extension of the front line from D to C, 
 across NO MAN'S LAND back to our old line, while this forms part 
of the task of "A" Battalion, there is no urgency about it, and 
if troops are not immediately available for the work, it can be 
left until the night 
  
A direct communication with our old front line, - in the 
line of the "Russian Sap", which debouches from our old front 
line at U.15.1.4½.8 - must, however, be pushed on energetically 
to give safe passage across NO MAN'S LAND. - 
  
"A" Battalion will be responsible for the defence of the 
line D,E,F against counter-attack. 
  
The total length of trench to be captured by each wave 
does not exceed 550 yards. This task can be adequately dealt with 
by 6 platoons, in line, in each wave. -Thus one Company of the 
Battalion is available for carrying parties and Brigade Reserve; 
the remaining Companies finding their own Moppers up. The 
distance being short, comparatively small carrying parties should 
fully serve the needs of this Battalion. - 
  
The total length of new trench to be dug and consolidated 
is about 1500 yards. This would require the continuous labour 
of 300 men for 48 hours. - Thus 250 shovels and 100 picks should 
be available for this Battalion. 

 

-4- 15/4/17. 
"B" BATTALION 
35th Battalion (Lt-Col. GODDARD) 
  
Mines will be blown at Zero in the flat salient opposite 
ANTON'S FARM. - These will materially shorten the length of 
enemy front and support trenches likely to be effectively held 
against the advance of this Battalion. - 
  
The objectives of the Battalion are the Front and Support 
Lines inclusive of the craters. - The direction of the advance 
will be on a bearing of 24o East of true North.* - Care must be 
taken to keep touch with the left if "A" Battalion on the right 
so as to avoid any gap. - Owing to a change of direction of enemy 
trenches at the before mentioned salient there will probably be 
some overlapping at the meeting flanks of the centre & left 
Companies B and C Battalions; but this does not in the least matter. 
The Troops must not advance beyond the line of the ULSTER 
SUPPORT, until all the waves of F Battalion have passed through. - 
They will then follow the rear wave of F Battalion, as far as the 
line of consolidation F,G. - The junction for consolidation with 
"A" Battalion on the right should be made a F on ASH AVENUE, just 
east of the bend in that road, and with C Battalion on the left 
at G about the point where the Brigade Boundary is crossed by 
the hedge, (see photos). - There will be ample time to choose 
the line F,G carefully, as it will take some time for tools to be 
brought up. Particular attention must be given to securing a 
good field of fire. This should be easy, as the line F,G, runs 
transversely across a spur which has a 1 in 120 fall towards the 
North-east, and a 1 in 50 fall towards the North. 
B Battalion will be responsible for the defence of the 
line F,G, against counter-attack in the event of our forward 
line being driven in. 
The total length of trench to be captured by each wave is 
about 500 yards. - This can be adequately dealt with by 6 platoons 
in line, in each wave. - The density of the attack of the left 
platoons need not be great, because the mine explosions will 
have thoroughly disorganized the defences of this part of the 
objective of this Battalion. - Thus, one company of the Battalion 
is available for carrying parties and Reserve; the remaining 
Companies finding their own Moppers up. - The furthest distance 
to be traversed by carrying parties from our present front line 
to the line F,G, is only 400 yards, so that small carrying parties 
can make frequent journeys. 
The total length of new fire and communication trenches 
to be dug is about 1,100 yards. This would require the continuous 
labour of 220 men for 48 hours. - Thus about 180 shovels 
and 80 picks should be available for this Battalion. - 
  
* Except for the left Company, which will conform to the directions of the 
right company of "C" Battalion.

Last edited by:
Jacqueline KennedyJacqueline Kennedy
Last edited on:

Last updated: