Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 2, 1 February - 23 February 1915, Part 9

AW
FOURTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

TACTICAL EXERCISE FEBRUARY 17/18
1915

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WHITE FORCE (13TH BATTALION):-
The White force will wear Felt Hats.
The Brown Force will wear Peaked Caps.
Umpires will wear Helmets and broad white arm bands.
15 rounds of blank ammunition per rifle will be carried
on the man.

The White Force will consist of the 13th Battalion and
will leave the Aerodrome Camp at 2 o'clock _^pm on Wednesday Feby.
17th marching through Heliopolis and east along the Suez Road.
The rear of the column must be clear of Tower No.2 by 4 o'clock,
at which hour the envelope containing the Special Idea may be
opened. 

The following Transport will be provided with horses by
the Army Service Corps Company and will march with the White
column, viz:-

Four Travelling Kitchens
Two Water Carts (filled)
One limbered G.S. Waggon carrying 2 machine guns.
Two G.S. Waggons carrying 1 blanket and 1 waterproof
sheet per man.

Three limbered G.S. Waggons carrying 400 shovels
and 200 picks (deficiencies in Battalion
tools to be drawn from 14th Battalion and
returned on completion of Exercise).
One G.S Waggon carrying supplies for breakfast
meal on Thursday Feby. 18th (to be arranged
for by A.S.C.Co.).

All ranks will carry waterbottles filled and the evening
meal for Wednesday 17th.

Hot tea, coffee or soup (if available) may be served out,
during the early evening of February 17th, provided this is
carried out under service conditions and without exposure.

Transport Vehicles are not to be taken off the road for
a greater distance than absolutely necessary so as to save
haulage over the desert sand.

UMPIRES :- 
Umpire-in-Chief                    - Col. J. Monash, V.D.
Umpires for White Force     - Lt.-Col.J.P.McGlinn, V.D.

                                                   -Lieut. J McGlinn.
Umpires for Brown Force    - Capt. C.H.Jess
                                                     - Lieut. W.J.M.Locke.

AW 
FOURTH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

TACTICAL EXERCISE FEBRUARY 17/18,    1915

INSTRUCTIONS FOR BROWN FORCE (14TH BATTALION):-
The White force will wear Felt Hats.
The Brown Force will wear Peaked Caps.
The Umpires will wear Helmets and broad White Arm
Bands.

15 rounds of blank ammunition per rifle will be carried
on the man.

The Brown Force will consist of the 14th Battalion.  A
reconnoitring patrol of 20 men under an officer (accompanied
if desired by C.O. and Adjutant) will be ready to move from
Camp at 4p.m. on Wednesday February 17th. 

The Battalion must be ready to move from Camp after mid-night
February 17-18 at an hour to be decided by the C.O.

No transport will be taken with the Battalion, but the
four Battalion Travelling Kitchens, one G.S. Waggon carrying
supplies for the breakfast meal on Thursday February 18th
(to be arranged for by the A.S.C.Co.), and two Water Carts (filled) -
all horsed by the Army Service Corps Company - will leave Camp
at 5a.m. and proceed via the SUEZ ROAD in the direction of
TOWER NO.2. 

These vehicles are not to be taken off the road.

All ranks will carry Waterbottles filled.

The envelope containing the Special Idea may be opened at
4p.m. on Wednesday February 17th.

14th Battalion will supply 13th Battalion with picks and
shovels as may be asked for;  same to be returned on conclusion
of Exercise. 

UMPIRES :- 
Umpire-in-Chief                  - Col. J. Monash, V.D.
Umpires for White Force   - Lt.-Col.J.P.McGlinn, V.D.

                                                     Lieut. J McGlinn.
Umpires for Brown Force   - Capt. C.H.Jess
                                                      Lieut. W.J.M.Locke.

18/2/15
TACTICAL EXERCISE OF 13TH AND 14TH BATTALIONS,

FOURTH AUSTRALIAN BRIGADE

NOTES FOR CRITICISM.

B R O W N.
Preliminary Reconnaissances, both daylight and
dark, were very skilfully conducted, and results
properly recorded.

The night march and advance were quietly and
methodically carried out - but were very slow - under
1 mile per hour - as might be expected.

Attack was delivered too late, and lacked the
element of surprise.

At the moment when the fight was stopped, Brown
(attack) had established decided fire superiority at
White's right flank and was threatening his right rear.
 
W H I T E .
The position was held as an Outpost Line to cover
the main body.  What was intended was that the position
should be prepared for defence by the White Advanced
Guard for occupation by its own troops, and covered by
its own outposts.

The position taken up was far too extended.
The right was very weakly held.
Insufficient co-operation and touch between
the three sections of the position.
Insufficient observation in front, and right front,
and no sufficient means of holding up an attack while the
trenches were being manned.

Considerable delay in getting personnel to work at
digging.   Distribution of tools, and allotment of working
parties could have been going on concurrently with the
later stages of the Reconnaissance by C.O. and his
Company Commanders.
No sufficient screen thrown out in the direction
of the enemy while force was halted, waiting for orders
or while reconnaissance of position was going on.
The fact that the whole of White's operations were
under close and constant observation by Brown patrols all
through the night was quite unknown to White.
The mere drill of setting working parties to their
tasks was bad; and some platoons took a long time to
organise for work.
Some trenches badly sited and not protected by
parapets against enfilade fire.
Too much noise after trenches were manned.
Too much challenging.
Tools left lying about in the way of men coming 
up in the dark to man the trenches.

NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.

DIVISIONAL TRAINING FRIDAY 19th February 1915.

REFERENCE MAP OF EGYPT 1/50,000 Mudiria Qaliubis Sheet
corrected 1914.

                             GENERAL IDEA.
A Turkish Army of 3 Army Corps is attacking the SUEZ CANAL.
Reliable information states that a large body, numbers uncertain
succeeded in forcing the line of the Canal on February 14th
1915 and crossed just North of SUEZ.
This force is advancing on CAIRO along the CAIRO-SUEZ Road.
The NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION has been sent out to
oppose and defeat this force.

SPECIAL IDEA.
Friday 19th February 1915.
From reliable sources it has been ascertained that the Turkish
force, which crossed the Canal, reached the vicinity of TOWERX
No. 5,  yesterday Thursday, 18th February at 4.p.m.
It is estimated at 1 Regiment of Mounted Troops, 1 Brigade of
Field Artillery and one Brigade of Infantry.

INSTRUCTIONS
A.  NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
AMMUNITION  
1. The following blank S.A. Ammunition will be taken:-
How Carried                Rounds per rifle.
On the man                       3.
On Pack animals              2.
Regtl S.A.A.Carts               2.

CASUALTY SCREENS. 
2. Casualty screens will be carried in the proportion of 1 per
Platoon, Infantry and 1 per Troop, Mounted Rifles & Light Horse 

B.  THE OPPOSING FORCE.
COMPOSITION
1. The enemy as estimated in the Special Idea will be represented
by a Skeleton Force with flags, representing units as follows :-
ARM                        COLOUR     RECTANGULAR    SINGLE POINT
Mounted Troops    white             1 Squadron             1 Patrol
Artillery                     Blue               1 Battery
Infantry                     Red                1.Company

DRESS AMMUNITION CASUALTY SCREENS.
2.  Marching Order with Caps as distinguishing headgear.
20 rounds blank S.A.Ammunition per man will be carried.
Casualty screens will be carried in the proportion of 1 per
Platoon, Infantry and 1 per Troop of Mounted Rifles and Light
Horse.

UMPIRE STAFF.
Rank and Name                       How Employed.
Colonel E.W.C. Chaytor              Chief Umpire

Lt-Colonel C.B.B.White               Advanced Gd & M'td R. B'de
Lt-Colonel A.W.Tufnell                Australian Inf: Brigade.
Lt-Colonel F.A.Earle                      "   L.H.Brigade     
Major D.J. Glasfurd                      Divisional Artillery
Major H.G.Reid                              Divisional Train
Major A.B.Charters                       Enemy

Captain W.S.Lawry                       2nd L.H. Regt.
Captain A.W.Nash                        3rd L.H. Regt.
Captain C. Mills                              1st L.H. Regt.
Captain N.F.Hastings                   Auckland M'td Rifles
Captain B.S.Hay                             Canterbury M'td Rifles
Captain D.W.Talbot                       Wellington M'td Rifles

-2-
Rank & Name                                    How Employed.
Captain H.S Whitehorn                  Otago M.R.Regt
Captain W.O. Brache                       16th Battn A.I.Bde.
Captain S.L.Townshend                  13th Battn A.I.Bde.
Captain A. Henry                              15th Battn A.I.Bde.
Captain J. Richardson                     14th Battn A.I.Bde.
2 Officers, Army Corps Staff.

The above officers will wear white bands 6" broad on both
arms above the elbow.

The above Assistant Umpires will meet the Chief Umpire on
bridge over Tramline in Square F.9 at 8.15.a.m. 

WPBraithwaite
Lt-Colonel,
General Staff,
New Zealand and Australian Division.

OPERATION ORDER NO. 3         Copy No. ___
by
Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, K.C.M.G., C.B.,

Commanding New Zealand & Australian Division.
Tower No. 2
19th Feb. 1915.
Reference Map of Egypt 1:50,000 Mudiria Qaliuba. Sheet
(with correction, 1914) .
INFORMATION.

 1. Reconnaissance has disclosed the enemy holding a position
extending from about pt 225 to pt 210 in Square M-8,
North of the Suez Road.  Their Mounted troops have been
driven off Ridge at Tower No.3, and have retired on pt
270 in Square N-9.
INTENTION

2. The intention is to attack the enemy in position, and
turn his Right Flank.

DISTRIBUTION

3. INSTRUCTIONS FOR ASSEMBLY .
The Division will move into positions of assembly
as follows :-
On a general north and south line a mile and a 
half East of Tower No. 2.
(a) The OTAGO M.R REGT immediately South of the Suez Road
in WADI EL HALAZONI (Square I-9) .
(b) The AUST.  INF .BDE in WADI EN NASURI, North of the 
SUEZ ROAD, (Square J-9) .

(c) The L.H. BDE and No.3 BDE A.C. West of Gebel Dhaher
(Square I-8) .
(d) ARTILLERY & ENGINEERS will halt on road 1½ miles
East of Tower No. 2 .

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT .
As soon as the above Bdes and the Otago M.R.Regt
have reported themselves in position, they will
await orders from Div. H/Qrs, on receipt of which
they will advance and make good the Ridge running
North and South through Tower No. 3 on which they
will be deployed in the following positions , and
where they will await further orders for the attack:-

(a) The AUST. INF.BDE deployed from the Suez Road, xxxxx
immediately South of Tower No. 3 inclusive to line
between L-8 & 9 inclusive.
(b) M.R. BDE will assemble and deploy on left of the
Aust. Inf. Bde from line L-8 & 9 exclusive to pt
225 in L-8 inclusive.

(c) The L.H. BDE deployed from pt 225 exclusive to pt
210 inclusive.

[* Confidential*]
OPERATIONS ON FEBRUARY 19TH. 1915

Umpire's Notes on Australian Infantry Brigade.

March discipline was generally good, with one
exception.  When Divisional Orders were received for the
advance to deployment and attack, the Brigade was kept
halted for some time while the Brigade Commander was
thinking out the situation and writing his orders.
This resulted in a gap of more than 800 yards in the
Column. It would have been better for the Brigade
Commander to have galloped forward to a suitable point
where he could write his orders, and have them ready when
the Brigade arrived. On the return to Barracks, March 
discipline seemed to me above the average.

Communication, I thought, was indifferent.
The Director commented on the fact that very few messages
were received by him from Brigade Headquarters, and in
just the same way, practically no messages were received
by the Brigade Commander from Battalion Commanders.
This I attribute partly to the fact that no use was made
of the telephone.  I saw the instruments and 5 miles
of telephone cable on the pack mules, but apparently no
attempt was made to run the wire out.

The following points struck me in the Orders
issued for Advance and Attack :-
(a) Scouts were Ordered to be 400 yards in advance
of their Battalions.  It is altogether
inadvisable to lay down /any such hard and fast 
rule. It must be left to the initiative 
of the scouts, whose distance in front must

( -2- )
(a) contd: depend on the nature of the ground; and
this may vary as the movement proceeds.

(b) A paragraph was inserted that Battalions in
the firing line were to find their own supports.
This was not necessary; it should be understood.

(c) Although the information given told the troops
from what position the enemy could be had been dislodged,
it was not stated what ground our own advanced
guard was in possession of.  Certainly this was
not stated in the Divisional Orders, but it seems
to me the Brigadier should have asked to have this
information, although he should not have delayed
the issue of his orders to get it.

(d) The leading Battalions were ordered to advance in
Mass, preceded by Scouts only, right up to the
position of deployment.  As this brought them
within 2000 yards of ground which was held by the
Enemy, I do/not think an advance in such formation
would have been in any way practicable.  We must
give the Enemy credit for directing their
artillery fire by means of observers from aircraft,
and even if they had no aircraft, the clouds of
Egyptian dust are quite sufficient assistance to
Artillery observers.

(e) A small slip was made in the dictation of orders,
from which the 13th. Battalion formed up behind
the 16th. Battalion, instead of behind the 15th.
This should have been detected at once by the
Brigade staff, but it was only noticed at the
moment when the advance from the position of
deployment was beginning.

( -3- )

(f) The premature advance by the 15th. Battalion,
which was also taken up by the 14th. Battalion,
was thoroughly thrashed out by the Director at
the Conference.

I thought the distribution of troops over the ground
was an injudicious one.  I quite recognise that from the point
the orders were issued, the Brigadier could not study the ground
thoroughly, and it is not easy to understand it from the reference
map. This explains why he divided the ground equally, but the
matter ought to have been rectified by officers on the spot as
the Attack proceeded.  What happened was that the troops on
the right, close to the road, were under fire on ground as flat
as a billiard table, and so crowded that eventually in places
they were three or four deep, while on the ridges slightly to
North, where there was excellent undulating ground, the lines
were not dense enough to have any hope of a successful assault.
It did not seem to be understood that the order to cover any
particular piece of ground, means to cover it with fire rather than
with men. The ground adjoining the road was a flat terrain
[*that*] over which we attacked at Colenso, and I do not think that it was
worth while attempting an advance over such ground at all.

On the left of the 14th. and right of the 15th. Battalions,
I thought the firing line pushed on with insufficient support:
in other words, the advance of the firing line was too fast,
and the advance of the supports was too slow. This was due to
the want of initiative on the part of the C.O., who should watch
from the rear and send forward what is required.

The isolated assault by a po_^rtion of the 15th. Battalion
could not succeed;  this was commented upon by the Director at
the Conference.

I never saw any ranges taken with mekometers.

( -4- )

13th. Battalion :- Did not seem to know their objective,
and therefore lost direction and became subject to
oblique fire.
14th. Battalion :- A machine-gun was put in a very exposed
position on an intermediate ridge between Tower No. 3
and Pt. 225.  The Umpire with the Battalion informed me
that many better covered positions could have been found
on the same ridge.

There was too much exposure to fire by semaphore
signallers, and officers and N.C.O's., who constantly
stood up in the firing line. 
There was also an absence of covering fire when
advancing by alternate rushes.
15th. Battalion :- There were far too many stragglers in
the advance to the position of deployment.
16th. Battalion :- Halted in the open about 10 minutes,
although there was good cover further to the front.

A W Tufnell Lt Colonel.
General Staff,
East Lancashire Division, T.F.

FEB 20 1915