Sir John Monash, Personal Files Book 1, 5 November - 15 December 1914 - Part 3

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Finalised
Accession number:
RCDIG0000575
Difficulty:
1

Page 1 / 10

Die ueft Brolææsrat Gologé 505 1erH BKrTALIOR. A.I.. Head-Quarters, 3rd Military Dis'rict. When submitting application of C.o. 4th Battalion in this matter, I antieipated that, in terms of M.0. 524/1913. opproval would follow as a matter of routine, and therefore refruined from urging any reasons in support of the application. I desire now to do so and request the favor of a reconsideration in the light of the reasons now submitted :- (1) The 8th and 10th Battalions of Infantry and the 4th Regiment of Light Horse of the A.I.F. were permitted to carry colors, and did so; and in two cases there were official presentatione by a State Governor; ee ie desired in the present case. (ii) The 1eth Battalion has drewn a number of officers and men from the municipal distriet of St.Kilde, and the citizens of this city, led by the Mayor, keenly desire to honor this Battalion by, presentation of colors, and have already expended much effort in raising a considerable sum of money for the purpose; and in provisional arrangements for the funetion of presentation by His Excellency the State Gevernor. (iii) It is urged that the possession of a set of colors is a most potent factor in creating esprit and morale, and thet their value for Battalion efficiency cannot be overestimated.
(iv) Although, after the war, the unit will doubtless be disbanded, the colors - carrying this unit's reeord of servicee would be the sole, as well as the most effective symbol of its history, and would be preserved as such in publie trust. (v) It is only in this way that Australian war service can be symbolized and Australian war traditions preserved becosse in the nature of thinge, our only war service willude by specially raised expeditionary units, and not by unite of the Australian Military Forces. -bobowet Ite Seemem ren Comemandins Fourth Infantry Bde. Australton Impertal Foroe 17:11:14.
MILITARY COMMANDANT UNLFY BARRACKS GOODWOOD ADELAIDE. s.A. M 352 PLEASE ENDEAVOUR ARRANGE CAR AS FEQUESTED MY M 316 STOP ANTICIPATE FINANCIAL AUTHORITY IF NECESSARY. MONASH. BARRACKS MELBOURNE. 5.20 p.m. 17:11:14.
HE ARGUS MONDAY. NOVEMBER 23 1944. FIGHTING POLAND IN -NOvooOrocl JlueIPrsse gr 120 Threr. Harst LOMZAR Tresuh "Stterz Maskov SSRyoi Mershennin- lln Sbrre Prrasnysz Zusn DOStTOleTRASSnere, Plabechon Osiek OSens e esen Surssh Sr LiPgo aRoshag Karer eSZaNS. pöstroy, PBege Fehtet euuse -Shanowgetz Best StrSchet: ilkorewe Broßy af Nur Wsttoo Aete Rost eng Srande at 1 Pagstowo Novo- Regnimd. Gorgasig sje- o Drot Costyma zbce Mand Tesegte Wegrow Ruge fans Kolgve gsvere Memron WARSANSER Kakstin! De osie 660p. 2 Se. Ha Kutno Ko Babe PHnske oSIDLEC Jureh, lencru68 Powelt Miedryrzye Gora ho Vedzurkew Treshhen Rrege tukorgd o0 Stoutog) (Swerrnewtoe Gerwolia GToEE Nar) Qgerz Malsz ARadz Vo0z. zeltchow FStadet oho Penence P R. S AaANFZES Bbeer anstA Tssn ograbow Wogdnde Vechaste Russ PETRTRAU 2 ZOGZeWO Ses ftrow Zwglen RADON Averuszow dSpejo- Werges ROrOTZS fossko- LUBLIV, Sryg bwer Wedr 3 PKammrsh gZisloszy" Konsken Brec Sasden 3 Resd -BrZga oach Oworsee 3 Trebower Radonish N e Przedborz Mewsre Psehe wrreoce KELGE JNere3 larow CKrasnik Tzmelow Koniecge bovichost Opatowo chenstochow; SZGZEbrzes? Stistäke Jedrrejow Sandomierlg Janow. ApBe W) ega Plarte Spgdbor estaszow 7 r Sterehlizzl 2üg3 De (Stopica Trhd Bevchn (Notbroms Ne se Sögpaue Aut w) Leyaysk mI DkUSI BAN borg Werue V erscbr Harpon 2 .Sochnlade Phv om 7 2 Demmbuca The German attack, which developed trom Thorm, om ihe Vistula, towards Warsaw, has, accordig io ofteial messages from Petrograd, been denmliely checked. Heavy Achting is proceeding alons the Tchensto chow to Cracow tromt, where the Russians are developing a Hank attack agalnst the main German Une ow the Tronter. Russjan troops have aso ocowpied some ot Ihe passes over Ihe Carpathjan Mountalms, im rear of the Frsche fernes trese ihe Satse
Anroshet r otsie. Rr) No2S/.4 AUSTRALIAN IKEFRIAL FORCE. FOURTH LNANIRY ERIGADE. A LDS for -COMRANY OEXICERS. Gaudler rining Biondesse fublestad nag boartollet dåldmod itle Feäe) This pamphlet is issued under the Authority of the Officer Commanding the Fourth Infantry Erigade, to all officers and sergeants of the command. Its objeet is to create a uniform spirit, and to ensure a satisfactory morale. It is the duty of every offieer, not only to master and apply the maxims contained herein, but also to impress them upon his subordinates. Ir mrGlina l n It Colonel, Baf. Malor. Fourth Infantry Bde. Kor gst arg Australlan Imperial Force.
Succese in battle is the sole objeet and ultimate end of all military training. Dattle is a cevere examination in the knowledge and appliei- tion of the principles of the art of war, which have been etudied during peace. As in other branches of knowledge, carelessness of preparation, or misapplication of principles means failurs, but in this stern school, there is seldom an opportunity for any supplementary examination. 3 Mistakes must always be corrected on the spot; otherwise incorreet habits are formed, which are afterwarde difficult to eradicate; and thereby valuable training time is wasted. When faults cecur, it is often not the individual who is to blame, but the supervicion of a cuperior officer may have been lax, or his instruetions defective. Such causes of faulty behaviour should be vigilantly sought for and corrected. § All criticism must be kindly and helpful - never diccourage ing. Cencure should not be administered in the presence of cubordinates. The Commander of every unit, however small, is responsible for its training. If ineffieient, he is primarily to blame. The officer who knows his work, is firm but impartial, and cho expeete the utmost from hie men, is respeeted more and can obtan better results than the officer with defective knowledge, who is lax and who endeavours to be the "good fellow" with his men.
. It is the men in the ranks who win the battle, the officers being the leaders who take them in the right way at the right time to the right place to overcome the encey. Therefore an officer's constant thought must be the preservation of the coldiers fighting spirit and physical condition. 7 Solicitude for the comfort and well being of his men must be the first concern of every officer. He must assure himself that everything possible in the situation has been done to cecure for them rest, food and protection against surprise, canitary conditions, before looking to himself. 70 Strive always to make the best of thinge. On service nothing will ever go completely right, and that man will eucceed best who has formed the habit of doing what he can with the meane available; while, at a time of strese, his cheery spirit will animate, and be invaluable to, his unit. 7 Much greater self sacrifiee is naturally expected from offieers than from the rank and file, and therefore in the worst situation of battle and campaigning an officer should never appear to his men other than energetic and satisfied. A regiment is wer doomed when the. hear their officers complaining. Alwaye uphold the authority of Junior Officers or N.C.O'.. If an offence charged appears trivial remember that it may have become serious by repetition. Even if the case be diemissed impress upon the aceused thet the N C.O. has only done his duty in bringing the matter to noticc and that his authority well always be upheld. If such matters are treated lightly, eubordinates will overlook minor offences rather than riek being humiliated.
3. .3 An offieer who condones or overlioks a fault, one day, and punishes for the same or a lesser offence on another day is invariably hated by the men, who become unable to guage his standards, or shape their conduet sceordingly. (7 Never interfere with the performance of any duty for which a subordinate is responsible, unless his performance of it is incorrect. If you do, the responsibility becomes yours and you are cheoking not only initiative of the subordinate, but the desire to bear responsibility. . Cain the confidence of your N.C.O's as they have, through their associatione, an 'inside" knowledge of the spirit and feelings of the men in the ranks then am officer can neter obtain. The more an officer sueceeds in impressing his personality upon the men entrusted to his care, the more will they be influenced by his temperament. It is his duty therefore to appear cheerful and hopeful even under the most trying and adverse cereumstances. 1 Be natural. The assumption of mannerisme is casily detceted by men, personality is lost, and in most cases, respeet euffere. 1. One of the hardest tacke in peace is to inculoate in the coldier the necessity for the greatest care of his rifle. In peace, unfortunately, the target never hits back, and the necessity for getting a result with the first and every shot is not realised. After the first sction, however, the need for care and attention is brought home to the men, but this if often too late for many.
17 One of the cardinal principles of organization is to divide responsibility among trusted subordinates, cach responsible to you for a definite portion of the whole and working under your general cupervision. 70 Never depart from the terme of an order if the superior who gave the order is within reach for reference. If you are co compelled by circumstancce, report your cetion to your superior in the quickest possible way. 2 Miscarriage or mutillation of orders and messages transmitted by word of mouth is the rule rather than the exception. Whenever possible, therefore, orders and messages should be transmitted in writing. 5m Whenever a verbal message is sent, the messenger should be made to repeat the message; and all possible care must be tehen to see that he knows to whom the message is to be given end his loestion. 15 The evil tendency of instructional manocuvres in peace is to slow up and cheek the advance of the firing line. On active service, the watchword must always be "Prees Forward!, Press Forward! Close with the enemy." 2? Tactical prineiples can be learnt from booke, but they cannot be properly understood unless they are donstantly applied in the field under constantly varying conditions of ground and eituation.
5. 7? Knowledge can only be gained from experience. Text books are only guides and cannot be consulted when decisive action is imperative. If, during training or manoeuvres, an idea occurs of performing come duty in a manner differing from that which hes been the custom of the battalion, try it, provided (a) You are departing'from ordere, (x) No principle of tactios is violated, (c) The intention of your commander is not interfered with. If it is proved unsound, it is better to find that out during peace and,besides, experience has been gained. 26 It it celdom realised that much of a soldier' effieiency depends on pure manual dexterity, that is, hie capaciek to handle skilfully, accurately, and rapidly, the wepon ad appliances which he has to employ. Such dexterity can be acquired only by long sustained and oft repeated praetiee. 97Io cet men interested is the sure way of attaining an effestive and intelligent performenee of their dutiee. Monotonous repetition never achieves a result ocher than a mechanicalone. If, during instruetion, the men', interest is waning, change the subject at once. You can later return to the original theme, with better result. If you constantly tell men that they are ackverd and useless they will become so, because even the keenest will give up trying. On the other hand, indiseriminate or constant praise tende to make men disregard many details which are essentials in order to mmintain a standard.

3rd M.D. 14/8174. 
REGIMENTAL COLORS FOR 14TH BATTALION, A.I.F. 

Head-Quarters, 
3rd Military District. 
  
When submitting application of C.O. 14th 
Battalion in this matter, I anticipated that, in terms 
of M.O. 524/1913, approval would follow as a matter 
of routine, and therefore refrained from urging any 
reasons in support of the application. 
I desire now to do so and request the favor of 
a reconsideration in the light of the reasons now 
submitted :- 
(i)  The 8th and 10th Battalions of Infantry 
and the 4th Regiment of Light Horse of the A.I.F. 
were permitted to carry colors, and did so; and in 
two cases there were official presentations by a  
State Governor; as is desired in the present case. 
(ii)  The 14th Battalion has drawn a number of 
officers and men from the municipal district of 
St.Kilda, and the citizens of this city, led by the 
Mayor, keenly desire to honor this Battalion by 
presentation of colors, and have already expended 
much effort in raising a considerable sum of money 
for the purpose; and in provisional arrangements for 
the function of presentation by His Excellency the 
State Governor. 
(iii)  It is urged that the possession of a set 
of colors is a most potent factor in creating esprit  
and morale, and that their value for Battalion 
efficiency cannot be overestimated. 
  
14th Bn

 

-2-  
(iv)  Although, after the war, the unit will doubtless be 
disbanded, the colors - carrying this unit's record of service - 
would be the sole, as well as the most effective symbol of its 
history, and would be preserved as such in public trust. 
(v)  It is only in this way that Australian war service 
can be symbolized and Australian war traditions preserved 
because in the nature of things, our only war service will be 
by specially raised expeditionary units, and not by units of 
the Australian Military Forces. 
  
17:11:14. 
_____________________________ Colonel 
Commanding Fourth Infantry Bde. 
Australian Imperial Force

 

MILITARY COMMANDANT 
UNLEY BARRACKS 
GOODWOOD ADELAIDE.  S.A. 
  
M 352     PLEASE ENDEAVOUR ARRANGE CAR AS REQUESTED MY 
M 316 STOP XXXXX ANTICIPATE FINANCIAL AUTHORITY IF 
NECESSARY.  
MONASH.
  
BARRACKS MELBOURNE. 
5.20 p.m.  17:11:14.

 
 

THE ARGUS, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1914. 
  
FIGHTING IN POLAND 
  
The German attack, which developed from Thorn, on the Vistula, towards Warsaw, has, according to
official messages from Petrograd, been definitely checked. Heavy fighting is proceeding along the Tchenstochow 
to Cracow front, where the Russians are developing a flank attack against the main German line on the 
frontier. Russian troops have also occupied some of the passes over the Carpathian Mountains, in rear of the  
Austro-German troops in Galicia.

 

(Outside Page.)   Nov 23/14  
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.  
FOURTH INFANTRY BRIGADE.  
  
A HUNDRED HINTS  
for  
COMPANY OFFICERS.  
  
Printed and published by Critchleff Parker Mining Standard 
Melbourne. 
(Title Page)  
  
This pamphlet is issued under the Authority of the Officer 
Commanding the Fourth Infantry Brigade, to all officers and sergeants 
of the command.  
Its object is to create a uniform spirit, and to ensure a 
satisfactory morale.  
It is the duty of every officer, not only to master and apply  
the maxims contained herein, but also to impress them upon his  
subordinates.  
  
J. P. McGLINN  
Nov 23rd 1914   J. P. McGlinn 
Lt. Colonel,  
Bde. Major, Fourth Infantry Bde,  
Australian Imperial Force. 

Printers Copy
Refer Capt Jess 
Checked 
CHJ
24.11.14 

 

1.  
1  Success in battle is the sole object and ultimate end of all 
military training.  
  
2  Battle is a severe examination in the knowledge and application 
of the principles of the art of war, which have been studied 
during peace.  
As in other branches of knowledge, carelessness of  
preparation, or misapplication of principles means failure, but  
in this stern school, there is seldom an opportunity for any  
supplementary examination. 
  
3  Mistakes must always be corrected on the spot; otherwise  
incorrect habits are formed, which are afterwards difficult to  
eradicate; and thereby valuable training time is wasted.  
  
4  When faults occur, it is often not the individual who is to  
blame, but the supervision of a superior officer may have been  
lax, or his instructions defective. Such causes of faulty  
behaviour should be vigilantly sought for and corrected.  
  
5  All criticism must be kindly and helpful - never discouraging. 
Censure should not be administered in the presence of  
subordinates.  
  
6  The Commander of every unit, however small, is responsible 
for its training. If inefficient, he is primarily to blame.  
  
7  The officer who knows his work, is firm but impartial, and 
who expects the utmost from his men, is respected more and can 
obtain 
better results than the officer with defective knowledge, who is 
lax and who endeavours to be the "good fellow" with his men. 

 

2.  
8  It is the men in the ranks who win the battle, the officers 
being the leaders who take them in the right way at the right 
time to the right place to overcome the enemy. Therefore an 
officer's constant thought must be the preservation of the 
soldier's fighting spirit and physical condition. 
  
9  Solicitude for the comfort and well being of his men must 
be the first concern of every officer. He must assure himself 
that everything possible in the situation has been done to 
secure for them rest, food and protection against surprise, 
sanitary conditions, before looking to himself. 
  
10  Strive always to make the best of things. On service 
nothing will ever go completely right, and that man will 
succeed best who has formed the habit of doing what he can 
with the means available; while, at a time of stress, his 
cheery spirit will animate, and be invaluable to, his unit. 
  
11  Much greater self sacrifice is naturally expected from 
officers than from the rank and file, and therefore in the worst 
situation of battle and campaigning an officer should never appear 
to his men other than energetic and satisfied. A regiment is 
doomed when they men hear their officers complaining. 
  
12  Always uphold the authority of Junior Officers or N.C.O's. 
If an offence charged appears trivial remember that it may have 
become serious by repetition. Even if the case be dismissed 
impress upon the accused that the N C.O. has only done his duty 
in bringing the matter to notice and that his authority will 
always be upheld. If such matters are treated lightly, 
subordinates will overlook minor offences rather than risk being 
humiliated.

 

3.  
13  An officer who condones or overlooks a fault, one day, 
and punishes for the same or a lesser offence on another day 
is invariably hated by the men, who become unable to guage his 
standards, or shape their conduct accordingly. 
  
14  Never interfere with the performance of any duty for which 
a subordinate is responsible, unless his performance of it is 
incorrect. If you do, the responsibility becomes yours and you 
are checking not only initiative of the subordinate, but the 
desire to bear responsibility. 
  
15  Gain the confidence of your N.C.O's as they have, 
through their associations, an "inside" knowledge of the spirit 
and feelings of the men in the ranks that an officer can never 
obtain. 
  
16  The more an officer succeeds in impressing his personality 
upon the men entrusted to his care, the more will they be 
influenced by his temperament. It is his duty therefore to 
appear cheerful and hopeful even under the most trying and 
adverse circumstances. 
  
17  Be natural. The assumption of mannerisms is easily 
detected by men, personality is lost, and in the most cases, respect 
suffers. 
  
18  One of the hardest tasks in peace is to inculcate in 
the solider the necessity for the greatest care of his rifle. 
In peace, unfortunately, the target never hits back, and the 
necessity for getting a result with the first and every shot is 
not realised.  After the first action, however, the need for 
care and attention is brought home to the men, but this is 
often too late for many.

 

4.
19  One of the cardinal principles of organization is to divide 
responsibility among trusted subordinates, each responsible 
to you for a definite portion of the whole and working under 
your general supervision. 
  
20  Never depart from the terms of an order if the superior 
who gave the order is within reach for reference. If you are 
so compelled by circumstances, report your action to your 
superior in the quickest possible way. 
  
21  Miscarriage or mutillation of orders and messages 
transmitted by word of mouth is the rule rather than the 
exception. Whenever possible, therefore, orders and messages 
should be transmitted in writing. 
  
22  Whenever a verbal message is sent, the messenger should 
be made to repeat the message; and all possible care must be 
taken to see that he knows to whom the message is to be given 
and his location. 
  
23  The evil tendency of instructional manoeuvres in peace is 
to slow up and check the advance of the firing line. On 
active service, the watchword must always be "Press Forward!, 
Press Forward! Close with the enemy." 
  
24  Tactical principles can be learnt from books, but they 
cannot be properly understood unless they are constantly 
applied in the field under constantly varying conditions of 
ground and situation.

 

5.
25  Knowledge can only be gained from experience. Text 
books are only guides and cannot be consulted when decisive 
action is imperative.  If, during training or manoeuvres, an 
idea occurs of performing some duty in a manner differing from 
that which has been the custom of the battalion, try it, provided 
(a) You are departing not from orders, 
(b) No principle of tactics is violated, 
(c) The intention of your commander is not interfered 
with. 
If it is proved unsound, it is better to find that out 
during peace and, besides, experience has been gained. 
  
26  It is seldom realised that much of a soldier's efficiency 
depends on pure manual dexterity, that is, his capacity to 
handle skilfully, accurately, and rapidly, the weapons and 
appliances which he has to employ. 
Such dexterity can be acquired only by long sustained 
and oft repeated practice. 
  
27  To get men interested in the sure way of attaining an 
effective and intelligent performance of their duties. 
Monotonous repetition never achieves a result other than a 
mechanical one. If, during instruction, the men's interest is 
waning, change the subject at once. You can later return to 
the original theme, with better result. 
  
If you constantly tell men that they are awkward and 
useless they will become so, because even the keenest will give 
up trying. On the other hand, indiscriminate or constant 
praise tends to make men disregard many details which are 
essentials in order to maintain a standard.

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