Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/248/1 - 1917 - 1931 - Part 17

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066850
Difficulty:
3

Page 1 / 10

AUS 7164. 2 December 1931. Captain O.H. Woodward, N.C., P.O. Box 2194 Port Pirie, S.Aust. Doar Coptain Woodward, Some time ago you kindly supplied me with certain details concerning the tunnelling at Hill 60 before the Battle of Messines. The whole episode has been dealt with in an appendix to the forthcoming volume of the Official Histo The narrative is based on a minute studt of the records of each shift, and a comparison with other documents; but I should greatly like to have it read through by some expert cho was present, in order to ensure that it is technically correct and does not contain any error which to miners would appear absurd. I am wondering if you would be so good as to read it through for me. If so. I will, on hearing from you, post it to you, and would be grateful for any comments that may occur to you to make. The whole episode makes such a fine story that it would be a great pity if the account were spoiled through technical ignorance. Yours faithfully, C.E.w. Bean.
Box 2194. Port Pirie, 22nd Dec., 1931. Dr. C.E.W. Bean, Official Historian, Victoria Barracks, PADDINGTON, N.S.W. Dear Sir,- I am in receipt of your letter of lith inst., together with draft relating to the mines at Hill 60. I have read through the copy, and now enclose some notes which I have made for your information, together with the typewritten sheets forwarded with your letter. Yours faithfully, U Hnt
O. H. Woodward, Capt. Notes by ist AustralianTunnelling Coy., A.I.F ist Australian Tunnelling Company is credited Para. i Page i: with service from 9th Nov., 1916 to 7th June, 1917. 9th Nov., 1917 may represent the official date upon which operations at Hill 60. came under control of ist Australian Tunnell- ing Company; my own diary states under date of 3rd Nov., 1917:- "Rejoined Company with my Section at "Headquarters, 3rd Canadian Tunnelling "Company at i-30 p.m., and at 10 p.m. "that night arrived at Hill 60. for "first tour of duty. Note 2 Page i: It is the 60-metre ring, and not 60-foot ring. Last Para.Page 3: This system of intermediate galleries was known as D. Gallery. Paragraph Page 4: I am astounded to learn that Major Hill, Assistant Controller of Mines, should make a statement that strikes and other causes of restricted progress were not unknown among the ist Australian Tunnelling Company I am unaware of any incident which would justify the above statement being made. Admittedly, our progress did not compare too well with that obtained by more experienced companies. Why? Simply because work with a bayonet or push pick could not hope to achieve the results obtained by clay kicking. We were prac¬ tically unacquainted with this remarkable method of working until our arrival at Hill 60., and to be accused of strikes and restricted progress merely because of the failure of the Mines Department of the Army to attend to correct training is, I think, most unjust. We were simply informed that other companies did better work, and to my own knowledge we were never told why they were able to put up footages which we could not approach; once shown the method of clay kicking, we did work well up to the average.
2. Trench 12i Mining System was not a shallow Note 15 Page 5.: system in the same sense as the term was used when referring to Front Line Defensive Saps. At Trench 12i, the gallery was at a depth of about 60 ft. from the surface. Instead of "shaking down flakes of clay on Para. i Page 7: the ammonal", I think it would be better to indicate that the ammonal was in tin containers. No.282, Sneddon, J.B., who was killed on Note 29 Page 9: 7th April, 1917, was a Corporal. His aetig Grgastt son, Sapper W. F. Sneddon, was, I believe, on duty when his father was killed. Note 34 Page ii: Suggest the following: "The wires were found to give no deflection when tested by the galvanometer". Note 38 Page ii: E. S. Anderson was never Lieutenant-Colonel on active service, but was Major succeeding Major J. D. Henry as C.O., ist Australian Tunnelling Company. Whatever the origin of the statement that Note 40 Page 12: the gas coming out of the face burnt with a blue flame, I think it pure imagination. No miner, entering a gallery where dan- gerous gas was present, would ever use a naked light. Steel caissons were only used to penetrate Note 41 Page 12: the running sand bed, and once solid clay was reached, timber sets were used. The use of timber sets was governed by the fact that work was rendered simpler and quicker. R.B. Hinder rose to rank of Captain while Note 47 Page 13: on active service. I think it was 23rd Division which relieved Note 48 Page 13: the 47th Division, and not vice versa as stated. My diary shows that I was on duty at Hill 60. on 8th April, and states that - "Today 23rd Division telieved the 47th Division", and on iOth April - "Arrived at Hill 60 at 4 a.m. in charge of relief, heard story of raid, 2h
Note 54 Page 14: Note 55 Page i5: 3. success of which was largely due to fact that 23rd Artillery had not com¬ pleted ranging, and no effective counter barrage was possible" Lieut. Clarke was an expert listener of 3rd Canadian Tunnelling Company, and was not of ist Australian Tunnelling Company. On night of 25th April, I proceeded to Hill 60. in charge of relief party. On arrival, I learned the story of the disaster which was caused by officers preparing a charge for D. Left Gallery. A 50-1b. box of gun cotton was used as a primer, electric detonators were placed in this box, and then the detonators were tested for continuity, and evidently a super-sensitive one prematurely fired the charge. There was great ill feeling among the officers of the Company when it was learned that the disaster was ascribed to a minenwerfer, in order to hide the true cause of the disaster, as it was realised the concern which the higher command would have when an enemy minenwerfer could penetrate about 18 ft. sand cover I was in charge of the whole of the work of recovering the bodies and re¬ building the dug-out, and, after a careful inspection of the surface, and a study of the dug-out, I am convinced that the damage arose from an internal source. The roof of the dug-out was in such condition as to eliminate any theory that it had been penetrated from above. This is a chapter in the Company's history which is not to its credit, and the less said about the supposed origin of the disaster the better. I can only add that official reports were not always correct.
Frigwobe: CENTRAL 4780. e e COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, MELBOURNE, 13th October 1931 Dear Bazley, The appended statement shows the number of reinforcements taken on strength of the battalions of the 4th Division during the period mentioned in your letter of the 8th inst. The figures are taken from 3rd Echelon statistics and exclude rejoinings from hospitals. Should you require the figures of rejoining ex nospitals please let me know. Yours sincerely, ettr A.W. Bazley Esq., Victoria Barracks, Paddington. N.S.W. your action in sending me a P.S. I appreciate congratulatory note and thank you all for your kind wishes.
7031. 8 October 1931. Dear Withers, the Dr. Bean is anxious to get the figures showing reinforcements received by the 12 infantry battalions of the 4th Australian Division for the periods (a) from 12 April to 6 June 1917 (i.e., from immediately after the Battle of Bullecourt up to the eve of Messines); (b) from 7 June to 25 September 1917 (i.e., up to the eve of the Battle of Polygon Wood). We have made a rough calculation from some weekly figures furnished in the diary of the 4th Division's Adminis- trative staff, but, as the figures include men returned from schools, etc. as well as fresh reinforcements from the Base I am therefore wondering this is not altogether satisfactory. whether you could get for us more reliable figures from the Third Echelon papers in Base Records. If it were possible to show the strength of each batch and the date it went forward to the division, this would be of much assistance. we do not require the figures for the artillery, engineers, pioneers, etc., but merely for the infantry battalions. Dr. Bean does not of course want you to give too much time to this work, and if you think it is likely to prove a long job please let me know before taking any action. Yours sincerely, A.J. Withers. Esd. Defence Department, Melbourne.
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7164.
2 December 1931.
Captain O.H. Woodward, M.C.,
P.O. Box 219A,
Port Pirie, S.Aust.
 

Dear Captain Woodward,
Some time ago you kindly supplied me with certain
details concerning the tunnelling at Hill 60 before the Battle
of Messines. The whole episode has been dealt with in an
appendix to the forthcoming volume of the Official History.
The narrative is based on a minute study of the records of each
shift, and a comparison with other documents; but I should
greatly like to have it read through by some expert who was
present, in order to ensure that it is technically correct and
does not contain any error which to miners would appear absurd.


I am wondering if you would be so good as to read it
through for me. If so. I will, on hearing from you, post it to
you, and would be grateful for any comments that may occur to
you to make. The whole episode makes such a fine story that
it would be a great pity if the account were spoiled through
technical ignorance.


Yours faithfully,
C.E.W. Bean.
 

 

Box 2194.
Port Pirie,
22nd Dec., 1931.


Dr. C.E.W. Bean,
Official Historian,
Victoria Barracks,
PADDINGTON, N.S.W.


Dear Sir,-
I am in receipt of your letter of 11th
inst., together with draft relating to the mines
at Hill 60.


I have read through the copy, and now
enclose some notes which I have made for your
information, together with the typewritten sheets
forwarded with your letter.


Yours faithfully,
OH Woodward

 

Notes by O. H. Woodward, Capt.,
1st Australian Tunnelling Coy.,
A.I.F

_________________________________________________________

Para. 1 Page 1: 1st Australian Tunnelling Company is credited
with service from 9th Nov., 1916 to 7th
June, 1917.
9th Nov., 1917 may represent the official
date upon which operations at Hill 60.
came under control of 1st Australian Tunnell-

ing Company; my own diary states under date
of 3rd Nov., 1917:-
"Rejoined Company with my Section at
"Headquarters, 3rd Canadian Tunnelling
"Company at 1-30 p.m., and at 10 p.m.
"that night arrived at Hill 60. for √
"first tour of duty.

 

Note 2 Page 1: It is the 60-metre ring, and not 60-foot ring. √

 

Last Para.Page 3: This system of intermediate galleries was √
known as D. Gallery.

 

Paragraph Page 4: I am astounded to learn that Major Hill,
Assistant Controller of Mines, should make a
statement that strikes and other causes of
restricted progress were not unknown among
the 1st Australian Tunnelling Company
I am unaware of any incident which would
justify the above statement being made.
Admittedly, our progress did not compare
too well with that obtained by more
experienced companies. Why? Simply
because work with a bayonet or push pick
could not hope to achieve the results
obtained by clay kicking. We were prac-

tically unacquainted with this remarkable
method of working until our arrival at
Hill 60., and to be accused of strikes and
restricted progress merely because of the
failure of the Mines Department of the
Army to attend to correct training is, I
think, most unjust.
We were simply informed that other
companies did better work, and to my own
knowledge we were never told why they were
able to put up footages which we could not
approach; once shown the method of clay
kicking, we did work well up to the average.

 

2.

Note 15 Page 5.: Trench 121 Mining System was not a shallow
system in the same sense as the term
was used when referring to Front Line
Defensive Saps.
At Trench 121, the gallery was at a
depth of about 60 ft. from the surface. √

Para. 1 Page 7: Instead of "shaking down flakes of clay on

the ammonal", I think it would be better
to indicate that the ammonal was in tin √
containers.

Note 29 Page 9: No.282, Sneddon, J.B., who was killed on
7th April, 1917, was a Corporal. His
son, Sapper W. F. Sneddon, was, I believe,
on duty when his father was killed. √

[*! Acting Corporal*]

Note 34 Page 11: Suggest the following:
"The wires were found to give no deflection
when tested by the galvanometer". √

Note 38 Page 11:  E. S. Anderson was never Lieutenant-Colonel
on active service, but was Major
succeeding Major J. D. Henry as C.O.,
1st Australian Tunnelling Company. X

Note 40 Page 12: Whatever the origin of the statement that
the gas coming out of the face burnt with
a blue flame, I think it pure imagination. √ 
No miner, entering a gallery where dan-

gerous gas was present, would ever use a  X
naked light. 

Note 41 Page 12: Steel caissons were only used to penetrate
the running sand bed, and once solid
clay was reached, timber sets were used.
The use of timber sets was governed by
the fact that work was rendered simpler
and quicker. √

Note 47 Page 13: R.B. Hinder rose to rank of Captain while
on active service.

Note 48 Page 13: I think it was 23rd Division which relieved
the 47th Division, and not vice versa
as stated. My diary shows that I was
on duty at Hill 60. on 8th April, and
states that - "Today 23rd Division
relieved the 47th Division", and on 10th
April - "Arrived at Hill 60 at 4 a.m. in
charge of relief, heard story of raid,

 

3.

success of which was largely due to
fact that 23rd Artillery had not com-

pleted ranging, and no effective counter
barrage was possible".

Note 54 Page 14: Lieut. Clarke was an expert listener of 3rd
Canadian Tunnelling Company, and was not
of 1st Australian Tunnelling Company. √

Note 55 Page 15: On night of 25th April, I proceeded to Hill
60. in charge of relief party. On
arrival, I learned the story of the
disaster which was caused by officers
preparing a charge for D. Left Gallery.
A 50-1b. box of gun cotton was used as
a primer, electric detonators were placed
in this box, and then the detonators were
tested for continuity, and evidently a
super-sensitive one prematurely fired
the charge.
There was great ill feeling among the
officers of the Company when it was learned
that the disaster was ascribed to a
minenwerfer, in order to hide the true
cause of the disaster, as it was realised
the concern which the higher command
would have when an enemy minenwerfer
could penetrate about 18 ft. sand cover.
I was in charge of the whole of the
work of recovering the bodies and re-

building the dug-out, and, after a careful
inspection of the surface, and a study
of the dug-out, I am convinced that the
damage arose from an internal source. The
roof of the dug-out was in such condition
as to eliminate any theory that it had
been penetrated from above.
This is a chapter in the Company's
history which is not to its credit, and
the less said about the supposed origin
of the disaster the better.
I can only add that official reports
were not always correct.

———————————

 

TELEPHONE:
CENTRAL 4780.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE,


MELBOURNE, 13th October 1931
 

Dear Bazley,
The appended statement shows the number
of reinforcements taken on strength of the battalions
of the 4th Division during the period mentioned in
your letter of the 8th inst. The figures are taken
from 3rd Echelon statistics and exclude rejoinings
from hospitals. Should you require the figures
of rejoining ex hospitals please let me know.
Yours sincerely,
A.J. Withers


A.W. Bazley Esq.,
Victoria Barracks,
Paddington. N.S.W.


P.S. I appreciate your action in sending me a
congratulatory note and thank you all for your
kind wishes.
 

 

7031.
8 October 1931.
 

Dear Withers,
Dr. Bean is anxious to get the figures showing
reinforcements received by the 12 infantry battalions of the 4th
Australian Division for the periods -


(a) from 12 April to 6 June 1917 (i.e., from immediately
after the Battle of Bullecourt up to the eve of Messines);


(b) from 7 June to 25 September 1917 (i.e., up to the eve
of the Battle of Polygon Wood).


We have made a rough calculation from some weekly
figures furnished in the diary of the 4th Division's Adminis-

trative staff, but, as the figures include men returned from
schools, etc. as well as fresh reinforcements from the Base,
this is not altogether satisfactory. I am therefore wondering

whether you could get for us more reliable figures from the
Third Echelon papers in Base Records. If it were possible to
show the strength of each batch and the date it went forward to
the division, this would be of much assistance. We do not
require the figures for the artillery, engineers, pioneers, etc.,
but merely for the infantry battalions.


Dr. Bean does not of course want you to give too much
time to this work, and if you think it is likely to prove a long
job please let me know before taking any action.


Yours sincerely

 

 

A.J. Withers. Esq.
Defence Department,
Melbourne. 

 

approx. 44 row x 38 column Table of numbers by battalion by date - see original document

 

approx. 44 row x 38 column Table of numbers by battalion by date - see original document 

 

Reinforcements Taken on Strength

of Battalions of 4 Division

12 April to 30 Sept. 1917

________________
 O = Officers

OR = Other ranks
                                                                                                             Officers OR Total

(between Bullecourt & Messines) 12 April to 6 June                   66   1762   1828

                                                                                                                 Officers      OR      Total

(between Bullecourt & Messines) 12 April to 7 Junes 1917.              66           1772       1838

(between Messines & Polygon Wood) 10 June to 25 Sept 1917.     93            3679      3772

                                                                                                    Totals       159          5451      5610

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