Charles E.W. Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/54/1 July August 1916 pt16

Written, as usual, in haste, &

Not fair to Beach Thomas, who has more pluck than I have.

x It was not any discord

^whatever to them - their job made

it necessary for them to live

far back - they can't have

covered the ground  whole

front or got their messages

away in time otherwise.

C.EW.B.  

 

x   196
mail makes over the Eyewitness 

 accounts of its representative

aso of the first occasion when he

got within shell range in this battle

was when I took him to Fricourt

& we didn't stay there long.

Everyone of them is free to

come where I do if they want - &

goodness knows I'm careful &

nervous enough; but they don't,

& the consequence is I suppose

that they dont actually know

what we have been doing.

In the last three weeks

the British have recaptured

Delville Wood; & have got

into the Edge of Gillemont.

Except for those two moves

the only inch they have

advanced is where we have

practically dragged a small

portion of them on our flanks

incidentally to our advance.

The only place where there has

been movement all the time,

very heavy fighting & always movement 

197

forward, is where our Corps

has been put in - They all

spoke of this as the hardest

nut to crack - Pozieres - before

we got here. In three weeks

we have utterly cracked that nut

-it has been the fight of the 

battlefield while all the time

[diagram]

reeking like this-

while movement 

elsewhere

has been spasmodic. We found

the line like this → (hand drawn diagram )

& we have made

it like this ↓

(hand drawn diagram )

and we cant go much farther

until the English do something - We

have fought the greatest battle

in our history & one of the greatest

in theirs - but not a suspicion

of it would you get from the

English papers. 

9

198

Some fortnight ago my despatches

to England were suddenly stopped.

I asked why, & Col. Hutton Wilson

told me tt it was because he had

seen at Head quarters l statement tt I was "Official"

correspondent with the A.I.F. -

& they won't allow any except

of news from G.H.Q to be

called official.

I sd this is easily be

altered, & supposed tt I

difficulty wd all be over in

a day or two.

However still no

despatches appeared so I

wrote to Mr Fisher srgnt & saw Col.

Wilson again. He sd he hadn't

heard from I war office as to my

status yet - he wanted to know

Exactly what it was . I sd I

ws I Australian Govts Eyewitness.

He sd he wd wire to I War Office,

& Smart got Fisher to write to the

War Office - and tod

Today - by way of a bomb shell

-I received the attached letters.

I never dreamed tt I objections 

came from this source - never 

9

199

suspected it for a minute.

I have written to John Buchan

to ask him not to make any

application on my behalf (as I

had asked him to). But I

cannot get over the attitude

of this British Statesman. It

is hard engh my experience of

politicians all thro'.

One doesn't want to drag let

ones private feelings affect ones

idea of what is right or wrong in

I public interest of ones country;
 but but it acts cumulatively; and,

the attitude disclosed in

this letter does make me think

wonder whether we should not

be better in all future dealings

to be independent of these British

people; & allies rather than dependants;

we shd get more respect out of them so

We are the stronger race with the

stronger morale, at present; &

some day they will realise tt they

have to treat us with consideration

as our right & not out of courtesy -

because we shall be strong enough to make it

worth their while. They dont at present

9

200

realise how much we do for them.
My first article showed I had watched

our bombdt. from within 80yds of the

German trenches. I cant help suspecting

that this was one source of the objection.

I suppose this is one of my "facilities".

As a matter of fact any of them cd go

there any day if he wanted. But
I don't believe Phillip Gibbs joined

in this protest or whatever it was - I

dont believe he wd do so without

speaking to me about it.

I have written asking Buchan if he will write

our attack up, as I am not allowed to do so.
A heavy bombt tonight,

apparently against Thiepval. I

shd think they wd wait, if possible,

until we were going for Mouquet 

Farm.

AUG 14  1916

 

Aug 14. The boys on the coffee stall

say tt at 5 o'c. this morning Gen.

Cox's car passed going up to Bde

H.Q. The General had come along

half dressed & so had I driver.

The driver came back immed-

-iately after & said there had been

a counter attack & I Germans had

retaken some part of the trenches.

Later on we heard that they 

9
AUG 14   1916      201

had attacked the 50^th on the extreme

left & had bn thrown out again

of part of a trench wh they

entered by an immediate c.attack

Today has been showery.

Pozieres was again being

heavily bombarded - I expect the

rain has stopped this 

somewhat. Our heavy

guns have been

pretty 

active 

since

before 

lunch.

(hand drawn diagram )

This part gets shelled from direction of Courcelette.

 

This part gets shelled from behind Thiepval.

 

I doubt if the c. attack agst

the 50^th ever came off at all.

The O.C. reported tt his left coy said

it had had to retire. What I think

the O.C. Coy did say ws tt the coy on his

left had retired. (all subsequent

messages wer gave this information)

[*145th*] What happened was tt I Germans

got into the trench of British Bde on

our flank. I have not bn pushed

out. I believe an attempt will

be made to do so tonight. One ws

made last night but failed; they say,

bec. of insufficient arty preparation.

202  AUG 14/15  1916

 

[2 x Hand drawn diagrams]

 

Zero time 10 pm.

Arty barrage

1. 10.0 to 10.3.  2.10.0 to 10.5

(this makes a Double ? lines of

barrage for The first 3 [[?majors]]) 

 

AUG 14/15  1916  203

 

Aug 14 night. 13th Bde - Ross' Bn (51)

is to advance past Mouquet Farm

(but to bend its line back so as to

miss the Farm). 
[Hand drawn diagram}

Objective of 51Bn: R28c  95-66-36-

24-03-04-27d94-73 &

back to 91 inclusive.

A defensive flank will be thrown

back from R28 c 95 towards

R34 a99.

Strong Points will be estab. at R28c93

R27d73-91.

49Bn will take over line from R34B24

to R34a99 linking up with 57Bn.

Objective 13 Bn.  R27d91 excl. to

R33b 48-36 incl. Strong point

near R33 b 48.

Objective 50Bn.  R33 b 36 excl. in front

of Quarry to 33a81 incl & will

make good 1 trench from pr81 to junctn

at 33 c 69. placing stops in both trenches & abt

40 yds distant from junction.

[Bombardment has started. Cant hear any

machine guns from up there - several

German coloured flares as usual]

[*hand drawn diagram *]

9
204

AUG 14/15  1916     

13 M.G. Coy to bring in direct fire on

main commns.

 

Commns. R34a 34-35-91 &

R34 a 65-38-01 to be

made by 4 Pioneer Bn.

 

50 Bn reports at 7.55. from B Coy.

We cannot move. We have few

tools few bombs no water & I men

are badly shaken. At present

we are digging a number out. I

have too few men to take up

I frontage & after consulting the

coy commanders have decided

to remain fast. Am notifying

13th Bn.

Capt Armitage D. Coy after consulting w Capt

Fowler & Maj. Herbert agrees

tt it is impossible to advance.

[Present line 81 - Quarry - 55]

The report from latter commds

states tt they have bn very heavily

shelled all day. tt many men

have bn sent away on fatigues

& few returned. 

9
205

AUG 14/15   1916     

It looks to me as if I German

having broken I line of the 145^th

Bde next to us, last night, is

intent on counter attacking &

has attacked us been bombarding

in order to do this attack some

time tonight.

The army is using us in an

extraordinary way to make a

sort of hook around the German

position at Thiepval - & the Germans 

broke thro' such support

as I British have

given us by their

attack last night (marked

with an arrow. They

The 

[Hand drawn diagram]

[Ross. Cd of 51st - writes that the C.O. of

13th thinks it is his (Ross') genuine

(not depressed) opinion that it

would be a mistake to press

the offensive in this salient locally

further. The communications

[*They are being bombarded from due E right round to N.W*]

are awful. The boys are sticking

it well.  Water & ration carrying

are most precarious. The boys

are sticking it well but a most

congested & it will be most

difficult to deploy tonight.

9
206

AUG 14/15  1916   

51 Do not worry abt us but we

want water always. Our arty

are bombarding our front trenches

(Heavies)..

12.15. Report arrives (up to 9.30) from

50 Pou H.Q.

British report tt German

bombers are in R33 A 81

& bombing up comms  trenches to R33d28

A Gloucester officer w 20 men

had arrived at 7.30 on his way

to bomb down from 81 (.w ^his bombers

& m.gunners).

Maj. Herbert B Coy not yet joined

up w D.Coy. wh is isolated. Capt Smith in

charge of D coy has 23 men w him

1/3 of whom are Australians, balance

Oxfordshire men. D Coy had 2

Lewis guns.

1.am. News verbally from 50 Bn tt

verbal reports say tt the 50th

had gone out on the right but

met as heavy m.g. & arty fire

& had to come back.

Arty. say (on what grounds

I dont know) tt m.g. fire ws

not heavy, but gunfire was.