Charles E.W. Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/54/1 July August 1916 pt16

Written, as usual, in haste, &
Not fair to Beach Thomas, who has more 
pluck than I have.
x It was not any discredit
^whatever to them - their job made
it necessary for them to live
far back - they can't have
covered the ground  whole
front or got their messages
away in time otherwise.
C.EW.B.  
 

x   196
mail makes over the Eyewitness
accounts of its representative
aso of the first occasion when he
got within shell range in this battle
was when I took him to Fricourt
& we didn't stay there long.
Every one of them is free to
come where I do if they want - &
goodness knows I'm careful &
nervous enough; but they don't,
& the consequence is I suppose
that they dont actually know
what we have been doing.
In the last three weeks
the British have recaptured
Delville Wood; & have got
into the Edge of Gillemont.
Except for those two moves
the only inch they have
advanced is where we have
practically dragged a small
portion of them on our flanks
incidentally to our advance.
The only place where there has
been movement all the time,
very heavy fighting & always movement 
 

197
forward, is where our Corps
has been put in - They all
spoke of this as the hardest
nut to crack - Pozieres - before
we got here. In three weeks
we have utterly cracked that nut
-it has been the fight of the 
battlefield while all the time
[diagram - see original document]
reeking like this-
while movement 
elsewhere
has been spasmodic. We found
the line like this → Diagram- see original document.
& we have made
it like this ↓
[diagram - see original document]
and we cant go much farther
until the English do something - We
have fought the greatest battle
in our history & one of the greatest
in theirs - but not a suspicion
of it would you get from the
English papers. 

9   198
Some fortnight ago my despatches
to England were suddenly stopped.
I asked why, & Col. Hutton Wilson
told me tt it was because he had
seen ^at the head of them the statement tt I was "Official"
correspondent with the A.I.F. -
& they won't allow any except
of news from G.H.Q to be
called official.
I sd this is easily be
altered, & supposed tt the
difficulty wd all be over in
a day or two.
However still no
despatches appeared so I
wrote to Mr Fisher Smart & saw Col.
Wilson again. He sd he hadn't
heard from the war office as to my
status yet - he wanted to know
Exactly what it was . I sd I
ws the Australian Govts Eyewitness.
He sd he wd wire to the War Office,
& Smart got Fisher to write to the
War Office - and tod
Today - by way of a bomb shell
-I received the attached letters.
I never dreamed tt the objections 
came from this source - never 

9  199
suspected it for a minute.
I have written to John Buchan
to ask him not to make any
application on my behalf (as I
had asked him to). But I
cannot get over the attitude
of this British Statesman. It
is hard engh my experience of
politicians all thro'.
One doesn't want to drag let
ones private feelings affect ones
idea of what is right or wrong in
the public interest of ones country;
 but but it acts cumulatively; and,
the attitude disclosed in
this letter does make me think
wonder whether we should not
be better in all future dealings
to be independent of these British
people; & allies rather than dependants;
we shd get more respect out of them so
We are the stronger race with the
stronger morale, at present; &
some day they will realise tt they
have to treat us with consideration
as our right & not out of courtesy -
because we shall be strong enough to make it
worth their while. They dont at present

9   200
realise how much we do for them.
My first article showed I had watched
our bombdt. from within 80yds of the
German trenches. I cant help suspecting
that this was one source of the objection.
I suppose this is one of my "facilities".
As a matter of fact any of them cd go
there any day if he wanted. But
I don't believe Phillip Gibbs joined
in this protest or whatever it was - I
dont believe he wd do so without
speaking to me about it.
I have written asking Buchan if he will write
our attack up, as I am not allowed to do so.
A heavy bombt tonight,
apparently against Thiepval. I
shd think they wd wait, if possible,
until we were going for Mouquet 
Farm.
AUG 14  1916
Aug 14. The boys on the coffee stall
say tt at 5 o'c. this morning Gen.
Cox's car passed going up to Bde
H.Q. The General had come along
half dressed & so had the driver.
The driver came back immediately 
after & said there had been
a counter attack & the Germans had
retaken some part of the trenches.
Later on we heard that they 

9  AUG 14   1916      201
had attacked the 50^th on the extreme
left & had bn thrown out again
of part of a trench wh they
entered by an immediate c.attack
Today has been showery.
Pozieres was again being
heavily bombarded - I expect the
rain has stopped this 
somewhat. Our heavy
guns have been
pretty active since
before lunch.
[diagram - see original document]
This part gets shelled from direction of Courcelette.
This part gets shelled from behind Thiepval.
I doubt if the c. attack agst
the 50^th ever came off at all.
The O.C. reported tt his left coy said
it had had to retire. What I think
the O.C. Coy did say ws tt the coy on his
left had retired. (all subsequent
messages wer gave this information)
[*145th*] What happened was tt the Germans
got into the trench of British Bde on
our flank. I have not bn pushed
out. I believe an attempt will
be made to do so tonight. One ws
made last night but failed; they say,

bec. of insufficient arty preparation.

202  AUG 14/15  1916
[diagram - see original document]
[diagram - see original document]
Zero time 10 pm.
Arty barrage
10.0 to 10.3.  2.10.0 to 10.5
(this makes a Double ? lines of
barrage for The first 3 [[?miss]]) 
  

AUG 14/15  1916  203
Aug 14 night. 13th Bde - Ross' Bn (51)
is to advance past Mouquet Farm
(but to bend its line back so as to
miss the Farm). 
[diagram - see original document]
Objective of 51Bn: R28c  95-66-36-
24-03-04-27d94-73 &
back to 91 inclusive.
A defensive flank will be thrown
back from R28 c 95 towards
R34 a99.
Strong Points will be estab. at R28c93
R27d73-91.
49Bn will take over line from R34B24
to R34a99 linking up with 57Bn.
Objective 13 Bn.  R27d91 excl. to
R33b 48-36 incl. Strong point
near R33 b 48.
Objective 50Bn.  R33 b 36 excl. in front
of Quarry to 33a81 incl & will
make good / trench from pr81 to junctn
at 33 c 69. placing stops in both ∧ trenches & abt
40 yds distant from junction.
[Bombardment has started. Cant hear any
machine guns from up there - several
German coloured flares as usual]

[diagram - see original document]
9  204
AUG 14/15  1916     
13 M.G. Coy to bring in direct fire on
main commns.
Commns. R34a 34-35-91 &
R34 a 65-38-01 to be
made by 4 Pioneer Bn.
50 Bn reports at 7.55. from B Coy.
We cannot move. We have few
tools few bombs no water & the men
are badly shaken. At present
we are digging a number out. I
have too few men to take up
the frontage & after consulting the
coy commanders have decided
to remain fast. Am notifying
13th Bn.
Capt Armitage D. Coy after consulting w Capt
Fowler & Maj. Herbert agrees
tt it is impossible to advance.
[Present line 81 - Quarry - 55]
The report from latter commds
states tt they have bn very heavily
shelled all day. tt many men
have bn sent away on fatigues
& few returned. 

9  AUG 14/15   1916   205  
It looks to me as if the German
having broken the line of the 145^th
Bde next to us, last night, is
intent on counter attacking &
has attacked us been bombarding
in order to do this attack some
time tonight.
The army is using us in an
extraordinary way to make a
sort of hook around the German
position at Thiepval - & the Germans 
broke thro' such support
as the British have
[diagram - see original document]
given us by their
attack last night (marked
with an arrow. They
The 
[Ross. Cd of 51st - writes that the C.O. of
13th thinks it is his (Ross') genuine
(not depressed) opinion that it
would be a mistake to press
the offensive in this salient locally
further. The communications
[*They are being bombarded from due E right round to N.W*]
are awful. The boys are sticking
it well.  Water & ration carrying
are most precarious. The boys
are sticking it well but a most
congested & it will be most
difficult to deploy tonight.

9  AUG 14/15  1916   206
Do not worry abt us but we
want water always. Our arty
are bombarding our front trenches
(Heavies)..
12.15. Report arrives (up to 9.30) from
50 Pou H.Q.
British report tt German
bombers are in R33 A 81
& bombing up comms  trenches to R33d28
A Gloucester officer w 20 men
had arrived at 7.30 on his way
to bomb down from 81 (.w ^his bombers
& m.gunners).
Maj. Herbert B Coy not yet joined
up w D.Coy. wh is isolated. Capt Smith in
charge of D coy has 23 men w him
1/3 of whom are Australians, balance
Oxfordshire men. D Coy had 2
Lewis guns.

1.am. News verbally from 50 Bn tt
verbal reports say tt the 50th
had gone out on the right but
met as heavy m.g. & arty fire
& had to come back.
Arty. say (on what grounds
I dont know) tt m.g. fire ws
not heavy, but gunfire was.