Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/49/1 - July 1916 - Part 6

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July 14^th I went out again. This time

with Dickinson of the 4^th Divn.

We heard abt breakfast time,

or a little later, tt our men had

attacked at daylight & had broken

thro / German front second line

on a front of 4 miles; that

/ cavalry had got thro' & tt they

had actually got to High Wood.

We found / roads near

Becourt simply seething in artillery.

Huge strings of field guns 60 pdrs

& 4.7s seemed to be on the

move - indeed / whole world seems

to be moving on. A Staff Officer

told us we cdnt get past the

Becourt corner just then as /

arty had to go on. So we left /

car & went on up / valley of

/ little stream tt runs above Fricourt

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We passed 2 men who had bn killed

at different places ^on / way by shells - lying beside /

way - one of them w a blanket thrown over his head.

It ws artillery all / way. Where

there had bn big field guns on / first

day there were big guns now

& field guns were on even

ahead of where we stopped.

The Germans were shelling / back 

of Mametz Wood but not near

any batty. It seemed to me tt

they were shelling blindly.

On July 16^th I went out with

Col. Manifold to H.Q. 13^th Corps. 

 - Gen. Congreve's Corps. We saw their

medical arrangements. These

are extraord. good - it seems to me.

Their one preoccupatn is to get /

men away - keep the place lines free

from congestion - even slight cases

go to England. I asked how abdominal

cases did. "I'm afraid I

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dont know," sd Capt Gibson of

^their RAMC staff who ws w me - "we hardly

bother ourselves w how they do,

I'm afraid - our one job is to get

them away" - but it is careful

work all / same. They divide the

wounded into those who can

walk & those who cannot

(sitting & lying). The walking wounded

come to one dressing stn & have

a cup of coffee or soup, get attended

to & then have to be picked up

by any lorry or supply waggon

& carried on. All / empty

returning waggons & lorries have 

to pass this station.

The lying wounded go by 

ambulance. These ambulances 

go pretty far up & are now

being covered by chain expanding

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metal like chain mail to

protect agst splinters.

That night I heard tt

2nd Anzac were to attack. I had not heard of this

before. They were only to go in on the left flank

of an attack by the 11^th corps. I went to

see White & he lent me his

own car to go up there the next day.

July 17. Up to 2nd Anzac or rather to 5^th Divn

to see M'Cay & Wagstaff The attack ws off.

They had had to concentrate all the 5^th Divn into a small

sector on its right near Cordonnerie. This had bn

finished at 3p.m. that morning & / bombt. ws to have

begun at 4 but it was put off. The Divn ws to

have taken a very big part in the it, I believe.

I have written something of this elsewhere.

When I got back I told

Whyte. Gwynn hadnt  bn 

able to tell me if it ws off for

Later

A remarkable

forecast by White of 

what actually 

happened.

White also said that we

rated the Germans intelligence

too low in assuming tt they

wd be deceived by such an

operation.

CEWB 16/7/16

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Good but White ws v. anxious to know

or whether it ws merely postponed

"I hate these unprepared shows, Bean,"

he sd "And that is what it is. I am quite in favour of

having a push at him up North but not just there - I think it wd

be quite a good thing to try & push where we thought we cd

go forward with a force sufficient to go forward & really do

something. But I hate these unprepared little shows. What

do we do? We may deceive the enemy for 2 days & after

tt he knows perfectly well tt it is not a big attack & tt

we are not in earnest there. We dont get anything tt does us

any good - the trenches are hard to keep & it wd

mean the breaking up of two divisions -  it wd

cost 2 divisions. No, I am all against these little

half baked attacks."

I thought so too. We had brought up a good

deal of artillery there - at least 2 big guns (prob.

12 in) amongst them. The enemy had seen our

movement. All tt we wanted cd be perfectly well done

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by simply registering w our heavy guns. We shd keep

him in suspense far longer in tt way than by

attacking. To attack means to end his suspense

almost at once & make him quite sure tt we are

not in earnest there. So long as we dont attack

but only seem to make preparations he cannot be

sure of this. What we want to do is to hold his troops

there and this will do it as well as many means.

July 18. Wrote this diary all

day. Heard we were

moving next day. 1^st Divn

is already at Warloy &

Senlis, quite close up.