Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/212/1 - 1915 - 1918 - Part 1

AWM38
Official History,
1914-18 War:  Records of C E W Bean,

Official Historian.
Diaries and Notebooks
Item number:  3DRL606/212/1
Title:  Notebook, 1915 - 1918
Includes references to the 17th and 52nd
Battalions, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade,
Mont St Quentin, Dernancourt and Gallipoli and
contains sketches.
AWM38-3DRL606/212/1

S
Temperley
Baldwin & NZ.  Aug 7-10 Gallipoli
NZ. Landing.
212
Dernancourt
52 Bn.
297
316-326
Mt St Quentin 17 Bn
Original    DIARY NO.212.
AWM38    3DRL 606 ITEM 212 [1]
DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN
CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914 - 1918
THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms
of gift to the Australian War Memorial.  But, apart from those terms, I wish the
following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every
reader and writer who may use them.
These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be
true.  The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what
was then in the writer's mind.  Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep;
also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so - but it does not
follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when
discovered.  Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.
These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what
their author, at the time of writing, believed.  Further, he cannot, of course, vouch
for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded.  But he
did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had
seen or otherwise taken part in the events.  The constant falsity of second-hand
evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed
upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that
those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true.  All
second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.
16 Sept., 1946.    C. E. W. BEAN.
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS
OPEN

Temperley.  Aug 7-10.
At 2 or 3 pm on afternoon of 8
they were told that a conference would take place at the HQ of NZ &
at the Apex at which Johnston, Cooper, [[V?]]
Baldwin and Godley or Braithwaite would
attend.  And they were to make an O.P. from which they could
get a good view of what they were to do.  They came and [[shorthand]]
it was about 4pm probably.  J. by [[then?]] was [[shorthand]] unable to act.
Cooper and B came by and went to talk to J and
T got hold of B's brigade major, taking on the official, waiting
for Godley.  BMajor said how on earth are we going
to do this show.  They got the draft order.  B was to
form up behind the NZ brigade and attack along the ridge
with his left on the Farm and with [[shorthand]] (they hadn't seen the country
and didn't know how on earth they could do this)  T said
there is only one thing you can do.  That is you have NZ
on the Razorback, Q, and the 971.  Our
only chance is to get 2 battalions right up behind us
by [[joining?]] and then pivot on our right hand men
and swing left and go right by the ridge.
1

The whole 5 battalion which were to do it were then at the bottom
of Rhodo Spur.  They were pretty tired already
and very short of water and they were resting.  Their march from
Anzac had been very badly conceived.  They started about 7 o'clock
in the morning and they had had 5 battalions in single
file moving about ½ mile an hour move in from the
C Ts and they had been on their feet since 7am
pushing on, standing, pushing on, standing.  The BMajor said
how are we to get our fellows up here.  T said
haul up an officer and a pack and you will have complete free
access to the Dere.  I won't allow wounded nor an officer
[[shorthand]] anything.  You walk them straight up in single
file and you begin with [[1?]] task.  He agreed.
I was getting uneasy about what J was saying to these
others.  I was getting across to see the brigadiers.  Appeared that
J was taking the road.
Diagram - see original document
2

J. said the way you have to tackle it as with our right on the Farm.
He said that you go to Ch ridge drop down over
[[shorthand]] drop down from there and then go up and attack Q
from there.  J didn't know what the ground was like there
It was almost impenetrable bush.  It had not been reconnoitred.
Nor did B suggest [[nor?]] for us to reconnoitre it.
He assumed it would be all right.  T chipped in and said no that is not
the way to do it.  He said what he had said to the BMajor and
said I am able to be sure that is the only way we shall succeed.
B said this other way is the shortest way why
shouldn't we go that way.  He was affected by the
fact that his infantry was close by on the Ch
ridge and they would have the shorter way to go.
All this time we were waiting for Godley.  While
we they were discussing my plan a wire
arrived from division.  General Godley is very sorry
he cannot attend the conference.  Detailed orders will be issued
direct to General B.  The 3 brigadiers said well that manifestly
closes the discussion.  It is no use us deciding any plan.
It is obvious it it will be disclosed to us afterwards.

Joined by the 10 Ghurkas
who were with Coxs column and
all of them attacked Q.  They
saw M's column ride
down in the battle.  There was no-one
near Q  No-one at the
Farm.  They sent a
wire.  In view of the fact that they were the only
troops anywhere near on their flank
they were absolutely alone.  T wrote out
a wire:  In view of the fact that there is no success
on the bank and that the left column is
still on the plain they didn't consider it prudent to
push an attack on Ch Bair.  The
only reply they got was to attack
at once.
They got 6 mgs up to try and cover
an advance and kept line looking over the Farm
(absolutely where they did such [[execution?]] in the
c/a)  Auck and the Ghurkas
were ordered to attack at 19.30.
There is a little dip between [[shorthand]] and Ap
where 30 to 40 men can go
abreast.  The Apex is so conveniently
placed that you can form a whole
battalion up under cover until they get there into
that dip.  They went from platoon to platoon.
It was perfectly [[costly?]].  They were led most
gallantly.  They faltered a little at first.  Then
Sammy Grant - it was his first action, went ahead and said come along lads
and waved a mauser pistol and on they went.  They lost 200 men in 20 minutes
They reached a little Turkish trench and garrisoned that.  T sat all night watching it:  We cannot do any more.
The Ghurkas xx swung [[around?]] the Farm.  They didn't quite get to the Farm but they hung on below it all day and were
[[shorthand]] at night to the Chailak Dere.
[*Auck.  Well  Otagos
Cant.  Jackey Hughes.*]
[*Otago and Canterbury were to make a combined attack
on the Turkish trenches on Rhodo spur.  But having captured
Rhodo Wellington was to take over Otago &
Cant and go on supported by Auck.
Jackey had given his men the order to go back.
Otago was let in to the fighting in Chailak. [[Shorthand]] instead of going from Ch. Bair
in probably [[shorthand]]  X
J had told me that he must begin to secure the troops down in the area of the Ch Dere.
That was by 8 o'clock.  T was with the main advance troops.  Between 8 and 9 J. Y. and [[shorthand]] had a conference.  They were*]

They went back and later on [[I?]] got orders to
block the track down from the Apex at that
point.  B went back to divisional
HQs.  B got orders that he would march on the
Farm and attack Q in that direction.
And so they never attempted to come up here
at all.  T did block that with the signal officer
the only officer left on the brigade station.
They wandered over and spread out in all this
impenetrable bush below the Farm and by
7am his most advanced troops were just
beginning to reach the Farm.
Godley and Braithwaite undoubtedly missed the attack to go
the way T had missed.  T told Godley that if he or B had been
at that conference the whole [[shorthand]] might [[shorthand]] [[shorthand]].
3
4 

NZ:  Landing.
Auck and Canterbury landed together.
Auckland was sent straight off to reinforce the Australians.  They went from
Plugge's Plateau and over on to Pope's as well as Quinn's.  By the
afternoon they were holding Pope's Quinn's Courtney's and as well as
[[shorthand]] [[shorthand]] with Australians.  One m.g. section of
Canterbury got right away to J Jolly.
Of Canterbury 2 companies supported Auckland.  They
went from Plugge's Plateau and dropped into Shrapnel Valley and
moved past Pope's to the Nek.  From there they went on
to Baby 700 and towards Battleship Hill.  2 companies went on to the
lower slopes of Walker's Ridge and got men on to No
1 post and were later driven back and that some
had held the lower slopes of Walker's Ridge by the evening.
That night the Turks got across from No 1 post that night towards
Walkers Ridge.  Capt Salmonson got the
men on to the lower slopes with about 30 men that night.
They would have come away probably [[eastwards?]].
Otago landed in the afternoon and went into
reserve on Plugge's Plateau.  They were divisional reserves.
5

Wellington landed that night and 4 Australian brigade didn't land till
next day
6

Capt Allen.  17 Bn.  Mt St Q.
A Coy was leading.  C. ws behind.
The plan ws when they
got som to the _^ first fork o / rds
N of Freckles wood tt two
coys should form up E o / Rd,
& 2 Coys west of it, the two
southerly Coys being / attacking
Coys & the two northerly ones
in suppt
Diagram - see original document
The idea ws for / whole Bn
to move S. in this formatn
till they reached Park Wood or
the Ravine, & then swing inland
7

to Mt St Q.
They had not got
20 yds before the Coy
nearest / river (A) began
to meet a tremendous lot
of Germans.  These didnt
put a big fight; they seemed
to surprised - they simply
walked thro as prisoners.  A few
fought - Each pln mopped up a
post or two - There were
also a lot of Germs. down
on / river bank amongst /
trees on / steep bank -
These were collected also by
one pln.
C. Coy came into line
with A Coy, further inland;
the other 2 Coys kept easing
8