Charles E W Bean, Diaries, AWM38 3DRL 606/186/1 - 1917 - 1918 - Part 1

Conflict:
First World War, 1914–18
Subject:
  • Documents and letters
Status:
Awaiting approval
Accession number:
RCDIG1066802
Difficulty:
5

Page 1 / 10

AWM3S Official History, 1974-18 War: Records of CE W Bean, Official Historian. Diaries and Notebooks Hem number: 3DR1606/78617 Title: Notebook, 1917 -7978 includes references to the 29th, 35th, 36th and 49th Battalions. AWMISS-SDRLCOGHSS
2 33 3 2 3 55 8.E 33 52223 32336 3
See & Duncan Saye Bn Bn a Brred 3 o 6
whether sd stay where they were. They had decided to stay when 2t Harper, a young offo who came from Scotland abt 2 yrs ago. to Austialia, pushedin on them asked what as happening. We have decided to we shall stay in this line as the right is not coming up, they Sdl. you may - but the 29th Bn
won't sal Harper (who had only just come back from aladet Bn at Cambridge & be took the line on with him to its final objective. There he day in found out how many L.Gs they had & to they had only one dram of amink ian he formed a sort of small redoubt - sent back for ammn thro the BBde - & Maj. Treeman found him in possete up there when he reconnoctred,i I recommended him. He as recommede
by Pyrser T or a V.C. & fot a M.C. < I doubt if Purser cd or wd put whole story into his recommendation.
56 Bn S5 By 49 Bn 8 ADF 19. Villers 137 C fne The attack we madein 2 waves A D 75yds between two: There were formed on rear stope of rid g from B. 18 centt to E. J.S. Gat Capt Willimbrock D Gaham Capt. Atknson, gedi (R.) (R) & verry k 6 tarner knips fatoch Blwvett el H Devine dofes 3 AHenderson K. W Nayles R. A mostey. Decr L Dean wd. S t Barton inband Early dee had for sometims bu. Each Coys organises as 3 slatoons eny below strength (now 2 phs) epris8
67 the arty we to cooperate as far as possible - but there were very few arly shots - the first to ad be known of atteck ad be o men appearing over Bridge. There we no barrage. The 52 Bn Were sending on every available man. Col. Denton had to fix zero howr by when he wa read [First intenation to be had t cattack ws 4pm. C.O. Samfellibrand aft 130 who as hem &move to all possible speed as the posem was critical! he wa have to assault I ridge if he didn't get there first. He went straight up & saw the O.C.S of Coys & they stanted at once from the trench live in front of Lavicville (rt on Amxens Rd, left on Dernanct Mab Lavieville Rd. Officers had tren well in hand&
the time for moree ws gu as 21 CO to Coy Commdrs. Te Ht lrs. of Eghn were in same Guarry as 12 Bde Hgus. By 315 Co knew his bn ws in posite - in touch on lep t 65Bn & on it w Col. S2n. withan whose t gis were further down 1 gally to Sev. The adack order intructed C.O. 49 Bn to estab. Hgi with 52 Bn t in quarry to Sr. of Ftrees. on order being reed at kpm., Co. got his boy cominds at trees & gave them instens as to live of advance (left on millinet. Dernaust Ro, et thro DBScential & D19 central objoe. Buire Dernanat rly time. At this time the
8 Bn knew to line had fallin back but not where it was After giving final instru C.O. move to gos from 7 trees to yuarry & arranged Zero hour as 5.15 (sending a runner to Coy Commors & 12Bde Boble the troops actually on rtD49 w wh. the were in touch ws the Coy of 51Bn wh ws in posite behind the hill. The lines went formd at 5.15 till they met fire on getting over Icrest. Fom there they went in a succession of rushes. During these mosto oficers, who ad lead rushes, were killed or wa

AWM38

Official History,

1914-18 War: Records of C E W Bean,

Official Historian.

Diaries and Notebooks

Item number: 3DRL606/186/1

Title: Notebook, 1917 - 1918

Includes references to the 29th, 35th, 36th and

49th Battalions.
AWM38-3DRL606/186/1

 

Original        DIARY NO. 186

AWM38         3DRL 606  ITEM 186 [1]

DIARIES AND NOTES OF C. E. W. BEAN

CONCERNING THE WAR OF 1914-1918

THE use of these diaries and notes is subject to conditions laid down in the terms

of gift to the Australian War Memorial. But, apart from these terms, I wish the

following circumstances and considerations to be brought to the notice of every

reader and writer who may use them.

These writings represent only what at the moment of making them I believed to be true. The diaries were jotted down almost daily with the object of recording what was then in the writer's mind. Often he wrote them when very tired and half asleep; also, not infrequently, what he believed to be true was not so - but it does not follow that he always discovered this, or remembered to correct the mistakes when discovered. Indeed, he could not always remember that he had written them.

These records should, therefore, be used with great caution, as relating only what

their author, at the time of writing, believed. Further, he cannot, of course, vouch

for the accuracy of statements made to him by others and here recorded. But he

did try to ensure such accuracy by consulting, as far as possible, those who had

seen or otherwise taken part in the events. The constant falsity of second-hand

evidence (on which a large proportion of war stories are founded) was impressed upon him by the second or third day of the Gallipoli campaign, notwithstanding that those who passed on such stories usually themselves believed them to be true. All second-hand evidence herein should be read with this in mind.

16 Sept., 1946.                                              C.E. W. BEAN
AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMMORIAL

ACCESS STATUS
OPEN

 

1

186

See Duncan 33 Bn.

& Sayers 35 Bn.

 

85                           2

29 Bn

Polygon Wood

Houghton, the Corps Court Martial Officer

who ws in 29 Bn at Polygon w a rear

company tells me that when the Bn

ws advancing & its right ws held up

(31 Bn) at the Objve the two front

line Coy Commdrs & a junior offr or two

held a hurried conference as to

Polygon

29 Bn

 3

3
whether they ^29 shd go on or stay where

they were. They had decided to stay

when 2/Lt Harper, a young offr who

came from Scotland abt 2 yrs ago

to Australia, pushed in on them &

asked what ws happening. "We have

decided tt we shall stay in this line

as the right is not coming up," they

sd.

"You may — but the 29th Bn

 

won't," sd Harper (who had only just

come back from a Cadet Bn at Cambridge)

& he took the line on with him to

its final objective. There he dug in –

found out how many L.Gs they had

& tt they had only one drum of ammn.

Then he formed the a sort of small

redoubt  – sent back for ammn thro

the 15 Bde  – & Maj Freeman found him

in positn up then when he reconnoitred 

& recommended him. He ws recommended

 

85

^by Purser for a V.C. & got a M.C.

I doubt if Purser cd or wd put

/ whole story into his recommendation.

 

6

36 Bn 35 Bn

49 Bn

Ap 5 1918

Villers Bretonneux

The attack ws made in

2 waves

C D A B

75 yds between two. These

were formed on rear slope

of ridge from D18 centl to E 7c8.3

C                           D                          A                            B

Lt Graham, Capt Willenbrock, Capt Atkinson, Capt Gledhill

                                 (k.)                            (k)

Lt Verry k.         Lt Turner k.         Lt Blewett         Lt Carlisle

night of attack   night of attack

Lt Devine           Lt Henderson    Lt Naylor         Lt Argue

d o/w                   k. night of attack         k.          MC. early wd.

Lt Mosley.           Lt Dean wd.        Lt Barton        stayed on

                              inland Early                                  duty?

Each Coy ^had for for sometime bn. ws organised as 3 platoons

being below strength (now 2 plus)

Ap21/18

 

85                           

 7

The arty ws to cooperate as far

as possible – but there were

very few arty shots – the first

tt wd be known o / attack

wd be / men appearing over

/ ridge. There ws no barrage.

The 52 Bn were sending on every

available man. Col. Denton

had to fix zero hour by when

he ws read [First intimation

tt he had to c. attack ws 4p.m.

C.O. saw Gellibrand abt 1.30 who

as him to move w all possible speed

as the positn was critical &

he wd have to assault / ridge

if he didnt get there first. He

went straight up & saw the 

O.C.s of Coys & they started at

once from the trench line

in front of Lavieville (rt on

Amiens Rd, left on Dernanct- 

Wil Lavieville Rd. Officers

had / men well in hand &

 

 85                     
 8

the time for move ws gn

as 2.15 by C.O. to Coy Commdrs. 
The H Qrs of 49 Bn were in

same quarry as 12 Bde Hqrs.

By 3.15 C.O. knew his bn ws in

positn – in touch on left

w 45 Bn & on rt w Col.

Witham 52Bn whose HQers were

further down / gully to S.W.

The attack order instructed

C.O. 49 Bn to estab. HQrs

with 52 Bn so in quarry to

S.W. of 7 trees.

On / order being recd

at 4p.m., CO. got his Coy 

Commds at 7 trees & gave 

them instrns as to line of

advance (left on Millenct –

Dernanct Rd, rt thro

D183 central & D 19 central –

objve. Buire Dernanct

rly line. At this time the

 

  85                           9

Bn knew tt / line had fallen

back but not where it was.

After giving final instrns C.O.

moved HQrs from 7 trees to 

quarry & arranged zero 

hour as 5.15 (sending a 

runner to Coy Commdrs & 

12 Bde.)

Probly the troops actually

on rt of s8 49 w wh they

were in touch ws the Coy

of 51 Bn wh ws in positn

behind the hill.

The lines went forwd at

5.15 till they met fire on

getting over / crest. From

there they went in a

succession of rushes.

During these most of /

officers, who wd lead /

rushes, were killed or wd.

 

                                                                

 

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